> On 6 Sep 2020, at 19:53, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > Do you have a paper explaining this?
No. It is a recent finding. But it is almost trivial, the difficulties are in the "descriptive set theory". I have thought wrongly that allowing the full measure on the sigma_1(a) would make it trivial, but I was wrong. My intuition was based on the fact that the determinacy axioms is incompatible with the axioms of choice, but that is mitigated by the consistency of the axiom of choice and a restricted form of determinacy, called “projective determinacy” in set theory. It happens that mechanism seems to require only that restricted form of “determinacy”. My paper: Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. Get close to those issues, but to explain descriptive set theory require some amount of both topology and mathematical logic. Bruno > > Brent > > On 9/6/2020 7:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> I think you are helping yourself to probabilities by implicitly assuming a >>> measure. >> >> It is not obvious, but there is a measure for the first person views, plural >> ([]p & <>t) and singular ([]p & p, []p & <>t & p). >> I have realised more or less recently that the measure is inherited from a >> measure on the sigma_1 set + arbitrary oracles, that is the union of all >> sigma_1(a) for a being a real (or complex number). This requires a bit of >> Descriptive Set theory. >> >> So, there is a measure, even a Lebesgue Measure. There is an integral, >> normally Feynman’s one, if both Mechanism, and Quantum Mechanics are correct. >> >> It took me some time to admit that the invariance of the first person for >> the Universal-Dovetailer-steps “delays” enforces the presence of all >> oracular computations. It is a continuum, with a complicated structure >> determined by the modes of self-reference (which are 8, although there are >> more like 4 + 4 * infinity). >> >> Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5F5521FF.5080005%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5F5521FF.5080005%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2FBB1D00-A089-4D89-9B14-5C1708504D11%40ulb.ac.be.
