Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Bruno, 2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be Hi Günther, Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a state where you know you are immortal, because your immortality is a past event. I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this before, Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly). I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very logically, identifying total amnesia with death. It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your procedural memory, because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary knowers. Well I agree that in total amnesia thought experiment... well the amnesia is not total... the subject still knows his former language and other knowledge... except all knowledges/memories about *who* he was is lost. And in this sense IF in one minute I lose these memories about my current ME, then my current ME is dead for all practical purpose. And IF mwi and/or comp is true then there must exists a moment which is a successor of current ME without the current ME memories being lost... so I should end up in this state and not in the state where my identity was erased because like I can't be where I'm dead... I can't be where I'm not. The 'I' which is referred is the one with memories, the one without cannot meaningfully say he is a successor of me now, except if he sees like in real world total amnesia case that his body was mine and causally connected to mine. But in comp sense this is not meaningful... If my mind can be copied and transferred in a metal body, this metal body is not causally connected to my biological body... but that mind is a continuation of current me. So in this sense, if you say that it is possible that all successor moment to a moment could lead to a total amnesia, then QI is false... or tautologically true because it means you are everyone (ie: no one). But for all practical purpose current ME would be dead. I'll continue to read the rest of the mail. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Günther, Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a state where you know you are immortal, because your immortality is a past event. I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this before, Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly). I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very logically, identifying total amnesia with death. It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your procedural memory, because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary knowers. I agree with you that you can't have a universal machine stopping relatively to all others from it's POV; but I don't see why we can't think of it having total amnesia. So, for the time being, let us take surviving as meaning to keep (at least large parts) of one's memory. All right. Comp leads also to that form of immortality, at least for awhile (if I can say). The problem of death is intrinsically difficult, because you will survive with amnesia or not according of the level of substitution, which we cannot know, but only bet on (or perhaps even choose in some circumstances?). Total amnesia seems to lead to the remembering of you being the universal person, plausibly Plotinus Soul-Universe, or the arithmetical S4Grz (the third hypostase). Total amnesia is complete fusing. We remember we are all the same person. We can lost that memory only by differentiating oneself again. facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100% correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then comp is false! Could you elaborate? I don't see why LG should be bad news for comp? You mean because LG proposes a fundamental spacetime quantization? I don't see how it would falsify comp? It is obviously an open problem. But taking literally the UDA, and making abstraction of some still possible (logically) conspiration of the numbers, it seems clear that comp predict that an electron, for going from A to B, with respect to you, will be supported by a continuum of computational histories. I have no clue how to select a finite or countable infinity of subcomputations. But if that is the case, the UDA shows that such a conclusion (like LG) has to be derived from arithmetic. Otherwise, it would be treachery. And why the finitely describable Big Bang? It seems you have a problem when there are some finite limits (outside of the effective computation of mind). Is this because you need the continuum in the AUDA to get Quantum logic or something like that? Not at all. That would be treachery too. If the continuum was not possibly emerging from AUDA, I would take this as an evidence that comp is false. The reason comes really from computer science and the (enumerable) redundancy of the computational states, and the non enumerable redundancy of the 1-pov infinite stories. Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death), our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even without amnesia Why do you believe that latter? Consider someone who dies, relatively to you. Well, La Palisse was found of tautology: after he died, someone said 5 minutes avant sa mort, Monsieur de La Paice vivait encore. Fives minutes before he died, Sir de La Palice was still alive. Now, from the point of view of the dying person, the UD generates 2^aleph_zero histories going through that state where he is is still alive, and which are below its computational relevant substitution level. Even with just QM, you can see stories which will repair anything wrong with whatever needed to generate a short consistent computation. At his substitution level he is finite, and finite machine can always be fixed, and that is all the soul need to survive an instant. But this is true for all instants, by exactly the repetition of the argument. Perhaps some Gods can be mortal, but no souls, as supported by finite entities. That would be like my mechanics: no, you car is definitely broken. It is a lie, or a simplification, what it means is it would be more expensive to fix it than to buy a new one. In the ud, the first person has unbound-able resources. I think, and Quentin disagrees, that, would I be dying, I would feel myself surviving more probably in the amnesic stories, probably because I tend to believe (those days) that, if comp is true, my substitution level could probably be rather high. So I would survive in those normal world with a lesser brain. But if Quentin is right and all my memory are necessary for being me, I will survive in those consistent dreams where my brain has been repaired by friendly white
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Günther, 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of computations going trough their corresponding states. Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is already a continuum of stories/computations. I'm fine up to here. The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By No, they need not - see below. I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need correspond to a continuation of an OM. I am not saying this, but only that to compute my next 1-OM, I have to take into account the infinity of computations going through all 3- OM corresponding to this 1-OMs. You agree that some continuations can actually be a non- continuation, don't you? Yes. For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are continuations of your state which code your termination. I am a universal machine. No state of myself codes my termination. But I can be supported by a stopping computation. At the same time I am supported by an infinity of non stopping computations. I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations need correspond to OMs. All computational continuations are needed for the measure corresponding to the 1-indeterminacy. Even more so the more my substitution level is low. The indeterminacy itself bears on those where I continue, and indeed this corresponds to some subset of all computations, but that subset has still the cardinality of the continuum (by simple counting). This is a rough reasoning, only the interview of the machine can provide the math for treating the equivalence class aspect of the computations. I argue informally. For instance, in step 1 we say yes doctor, but we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving with some cogwheels - no doctor ;-) Indeed :) So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_ (2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds). But it is just plainly consistent that the annihilation *could* be not successful, and given that all consistent computations (computation in which *I* remain consistent are defined intrinsically in the arithmetical relation, I don't see how such consistent computations can be eliminated. It is a sort of practical problem with comp: you have no way to guaranty a self-annihilation (unless you can change the laws of arithmetic of course). How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? No. I am conscious, only in the computation which supports me. Of course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a state where you know you are immortal, because your immortality is a past event. (then I would agree - QI; but I don't share that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA) I have no idea which criteria you could use to be certain that all your continuations will stop. If this could be true, your histories (going through you actual state) would be enumerable, and in a sense you would be already dead. Such computations are of negligible measure. This is a part of comp which leads to verifiable physical facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100% correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then comp is false! Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death), our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even without amnesia (or Mitra's backtracking), but I believe the amnesic continuation to be more normal than the other, but this of course is hard to compute and in fine depend of what you will mean by you, something comp makes only you capable of defining or identifying yourself with). I don't like this idea, and I really wish someone find an error, but I can't. In arithmetic there are even histories where each time your brain dysfunction some alien white rabbits give you a new suitable brain, update it with suitable subroutines, and let you continue your universal computation. Even your current computer is immortal, from its own pov (rather poor today). All universal machine have 2^aleph_zero continuations resilient in arithmetic, and you can feel yourself alive in all those who doesn't stop. In the long run amnesia makes its office (but this I just hope!). You can program a universal machine to stop, relatively to another universal machine.
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a state where you know you are immortal, because your immortality is a past event. I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this before, Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly). I agree with you that you can't have a universal machine stopping relatively to all others from it's POV; but I don't see why we can't think of it having total amnesia. So, for the time being, let us take surviving as meaning to keep (at least large parts) of one's memory. facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100% correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then comp is false! Could you elaborate? I don't see why LG should be bad news for comp? You mean because LG proposes a fundamental spacetime quantization? I don't see how it would falsify comp? And why the finitely describable Big Bang? It seems you have a problem when there are some finite limits (outside of the effective computation of mind). Is this because you need the continuum in the AUDA to get Quantum logic or something like that? Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death), our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even without amnesia Why do you believe that latter? In arithmetic there are even histories where each time your brain dysfunction some alien white rabbits give you a new suitable brain, update it with suitable subroutines, and let you continue your What continuations are possible in arithmetic? I would like to warn against the approach of taking conceivability/ humand mind logical possibility as a criterion (as you seem to suggest with saying that the transporter failed is a consistent extension). The criterion for continuation must be arithmetic possibility, and here, I don't see any formal or even informal way to get to worlds in the anthropocentric sense. opportunity to go through the UDA (seventh step) again with Kim. I suggest you polish your argument against comp-immortality until then, perhaps. Will do :-) But I think beforehand we should clear up any mutual misunderstandings; you have obviously been thinking about these things for a long time, and you have made connections/inferences which may not be as obvious as you think. BTW: thanks for your modal logic post (the Dt explanation), here again the above mentioned issue crops up: while the modal logic may be elemental, your interpretation of them is certainly not. Often it is the interpretation that does all the work (consider for instance Einstein's SR: the mathematics was there before, he just suggested a new interpretation by adding postulates (Principle of Relativity for electrodynamics, c as constant speed of light)). These interpretation issues are often played down, but they are in fact essential. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Gunther wrote: ...assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? brings up in my mind: thinking in comp (at least: in numbers) translates 'conscious' into 'computed' ?? (That would imply an elevation from the binary embryonic contraption as our computer into more sophisticated systems, if I dare say: 'analogue'?) - - -proposal for vocabulary - - - John M On Wed, Mar 11, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno, 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of computations going trough their corresponding states. Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is already a continuum of stories/computations. I'm fine up to here. The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By No, they need not - see below. I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need correspond to a continuation of an OM. You agree that some continuations can actually be a non-continuation, don't you? For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are continuations of your state which code your termination. I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations need correspond to OMs. For instance, in step 1 we say yes doctor, but we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving with some cogwheels - no doctor ;-) So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_ (2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds). How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? (then I would agree - QI; but I don't share that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA) Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 11 Mar 2009, at 02:25, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi Bruno, The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent). Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build to much scenario from you say here). Ok: if you make OM's correspond to numbers, then QI holds if for all OM's (encoded by some n) there are some (at least one) f(n) so that it is a continuation. Only 3-OM correspond to (relative) number. I prefer to call them states or worlds. 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of computations going trough their corresponding states. Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is already a continuum of stories/computations. If the aliens destroy all the reconstitution machines (and the person beaming over does not find the beaming to have failed), this would mean that there exists a number n (=OM) for which there is no f(n) which encodes a continuation. The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By step 8, they have to shut down elementary arithmetic. If they can do that from inside elementary arithmetic, it means elementary arithmetic is inconsistent. Robinson arithmetic would be inconsistent. So there can't both be a continuation OM (f(n) for n) _and_ aliens destroying _all_ the machines in the multiverse - which would say there is _no_ such f(n), for some given n (the teleportation n). Maybe the confusion arises because we are talking on 2 levels: the platonic view (numbers) and the inside view (OMs). What is determined in the one (platonic relations) decides what is possible in the OMs. The 3-OM are determined in the little arithmetical Platonia. The 1-OM of the humans lives in the first person plenitude, which escapes provably (assuming the humans to be machine) the humans mathematics. But the 1-OM of a simpler (than us) Lobian machine, like Peano Arithmetic is still tractable by a much richer Lobian machine like Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory. I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to empirical QM, we have good objective (sharable) reason we share most of those histories. Best regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Bruno, 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of computations going trough their corresponding states. Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is already a continuum of stories/computations. I'm fine up to here. The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By No, they need not - see below. I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need correspond to a continuation of an OM. You agree that some continuations can actually be a non-continuation, don't you? For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are continuations of your state which code your termination. I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations need correspond to OMs. For instance, in step 1 we say yes doctor, but we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving with some cogwheels - no doctor ;-) So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_ (2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds). How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? (then I would agree - QI; but I don't share that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA) Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Bruno, The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent). Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build to much scenario from you say here). Ok: if you make OM's correspond to numbers, then QI holds if for all OM's (encoded by some n) there are some (at least one) f(n) so that it is a continuation. If the aliens destroy all the reconstitution machines (and the person beaming over does not find the beaming to have failed), this would mean that there exists a number n (=OM) for which there is no f(n) which encodes a continuation. So there can't both be a continuation OM (f(n) for n) _and_ aliens destroying _all_ the machines in the multiverse - which would say there is _no_ such f(n), for some given n (the teleportation n). Maybe the confusion arises because we are talking on 2 levels: the platonic view (numbers) and the inside view (OMs). What is determined in the one (platonic relations) decides what is possible in the OMs. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno, - again the bartender... * Initial remark: I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency - which I find not assured in DIFFERENT universes. As I said axioms (2+2=4) are in my opinion *thought - conditions* to make one's theory workable and so they are conditioned by the circumstances. * What I try to add is the *'mind-body' problem*. While I have no definition for *mind,* we 'all' think to know what it means: *a non-material mentality* which encompasses the tool's (brain(function)) *genetic built differences* - i.e. enhanced or reduced ease of connectivity-building in select topical domains - plus the *sum of previous experience* helping one's personal interpretation (and maybe more) including one's faith in a soul as well, while the* 'body'* is the formulation of a* **figment* in the 'physical world' upon phenomena that are (mis/poorly) understood when received and *both *are parts of the *complexity of us*. I cannot figure a 'separation' of substantial parts of a complexity without destruction of the complexity in its entirety, so a transport can be only the entire complexity - or none. Aristotle had it easy with his simple cognitive level of the 'physical world' so there was an easy possibility of thinking separately about the physical body and the rest of it not fitting into such. In brief: *I se no 'mind-body' problem*, only when we try the ancient (I may say: obsolete) ways of separating the *'physical world figment'* from the total (complexity). * ((you promised an explanatory post to my askings - I am in a hurry to write down these remarks, because MAYBE after your explanations these would not make senseG)) John M On Sun, Mar 8, 2009 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote: The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent). Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build to much scenario from you say here). Of course we are in complex matter. It is good to recall that UDA is essentially a question. It is an rgument of the kind; did you see that taking comp seriously the mind-body problem is two times more complex that in the usual Aristotelian version of it. We have not only to find a theory of mind/consciousness/psyche:soul/first-person; but we have to extract the physical laws (laws of the observable), if there exists any, from that theory of mind. But now it happens that the theory of mind already exists, if we continue to take the comp hyp seriously. Indeed, it is computer science, alias intensional and extensional number theory (or combinators ...). here there are the bombs (creative bomb) of Post Turing ... discover of the mathemaical concept of universal machine, and of Gödel' Bernay Hilbert Löb's discovery of the formal probability predicate, expressible in arithmetic, and some of its key and stable properties, leter capture completely (at some level) by Solovay. Roughly speaking Universal Machine + induction axioms gives Löbian Machine, and this is the treshold she remains Lobian in all its correct extension. It is the ultimate modest machine. The discovery if the universal machine is a discovery is one of the very rare absolute notion. It makes computable an absolute notion. Now, is the universal machine really universal? That is the content, in the digital realm, of Church Thesis. Gödel discovery is that there is no corresponding notion of provability. If you are interested in just arithmetical truth, truth concerning relations between natural numbers, you cannot have a theory or a machine enumerating all the true propositions. You will have with chance a succession of theories: like Robinson Arithmetic, Peano Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF+there is an inaccessible cardinal, whatever ... Each of them will prove vaster and vaster portion of arithmetical truth, but none will get the complete picture; like us, obviously today at least. If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be other successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's state, a continuum of successor states exists. This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is not at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)? After all, there are halting computations. By step seven. A machine halt only relatively to a universal machine which executes it. The whole problem for *us* is that we cannot not know which univerrsal machine we are, nor really which universal machine supports us. The UD generates your state S again, and again, and again an
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote: The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent). Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build to much scenario from you say here). Of course we are in complex matter. It is good to recall that UDA is essentially a question. It is an rgument of the kind; did you see that taking comp seriously the mind-body problem is two times more complex that in the usual Aristotelian version of it. We have not only to find a theory of mind/consciousness/psyche:soul/first-person; but we have to extract the physical laws (laws of the observable), if there exists any, from that theory of mind. But now it happens that the theory of mind already exists, if we continue to take the comp hyp seriously. Indeed, it is computer science, alias intensional and extensional number theory (or combinators ...). here there are the bombs (creative bomb) of Post Turing ... discover of the mathemaical concept of universal machine, and of Gödel' Bernay Hilbert Löb's discovery of the formal probability predicate, expressible in arithmetic, and some of its key and stable properties, leter capture completely (at some level) by Solovay. Roughly speaking Universal Machine + induction axioms gives Löbian Machine, and this is the treshold she remains Lobian in all its correct extension. It is the ultimate modest machine. The discovery if the universal machine is a discovery is one of the very rare absolute notion. It makes computable an absolute notion. Now, is the universal machine really universal? That is the content, in the digital realm, of Church Thesis. Gödel discovery is that there is no corresponding notion of provability. If you are interested in just arithmetical truth, truth concerning relations between natural numbers, you cannot have a theory or a machine enumerating all the true propositions. You will have with chance a succession of theories: like Robinson Arithmetic, Peano Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF+there is an inaccessible cardinal, whatever ... Each of them will prove vaster and vaster portion of arithmetical truth, but none will get the complete picture; like us, obviously today at least. If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be other successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's state, a continuum of successor states exists. This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is not at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)? After all, there are halting computations. By step seven. A machine halt only relatively to a universal machine which executes it. The whole problem for *us* is that we cannot not know which univerrsal machine we are, nor really which universal machine supports us. The UD generates your state S again, and again, and again an infinity of time (UD-step time) in many similar and less similar computational histories. The first person expectations have to be defined (by UDA(1-6) on *all* computational histories. If only due to those stupid histories dovetailing on the reals while generating your state S, makes the cardinal of the set of all (infinite) computational histories going through that state S a continuum. That the UDA informal view. In AUDA, the first person view is given by the conjunction of provability with truth. We lose kripke accessibility, but we get a richer topology, close to histories with continuous angles in between; but it is heavily technical. Each hypostases has its own mathematics. Surely more later, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:09, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi Bruno,
With COMP it is not so clear.
explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt;
the
Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith.
Please bear in mind that I have not yet studied the AUDA in detail.
How
does Dt suppress cul-de-sac?
By Kripke semantics. A Kripke frame is given by a set of worlds,
together with an accessibility relation between those worlds.
For a mathematical logician a kripke frame is just a set with a binary
relation. By definition a world is just an element of that set, and
the accessibility relation is just that binary relation.
Those Kripke frames are used to provide a mathematical tools to reason
on formal modal logical systems. They provide models of modal theory,
that is mathematical structure which satisfy, in a mathematical sense,
the theorems of the modal logical system.
The idea is that a modal theorem in a modal system should be a formula
true in a ll the worlds of some frame. the hope, indeed realized for
many theories including G (but not G*), is that there is a binary
relation on a type of frame which characterized all and only all the
theorem of the modal system.
We do logic here, meaning we dispose of a set of propositional
variables p, q, r, ...
A frame become a model when you assign on each world a function from
{p, q, r, ...} to {0, 1} (a valuation). If v() = 1 in world alpha, we
say that p is true at world alpha. You make each world obeying
classical logic (for exemple if p is true in alpha, and if q is true
in alpha, you make (p q) true in alpha, etc.
The key of Kripke semantics is that Bp iis true alpha if and only if p
is true in all worlds beta which are accessible (cf the binary
relation of the frame) from alpha.
Now, what does mean to say that Dp is true in alpha? We have no
choice, given that Dp is really an abbreviation of ~B~p, which means
that it is false (in alpha) that B~p, which means that it is false (by
Kripke key point) that ~p is true in all worlds accessible from alpha,
which means (using false - false is a tautology) there is a world,
with p true, accessible from alpha.
So if Dp, or even just Dt is true in alpha, then there is necessarily
a world beta, with p true, or even just t, accessible from alpha.
alpha cannot be a culd-de-sac.
You can note that in cul-de-sac, Dt is false, so Bf is true. Bf is
true because trivially if a world beta is accessible from alpha then f
(false) is true in beta. This is trivially true because the
proposition beta is accessible from alpha is never met, so the
condition is always false, and the propositions have the shape f - f
(a tautology).
To sum up: the Kripke semantics of Bf is I am dead or I am in a cul-
de-sac world.
The Kripke semantics of Dt is I am alive or I am in world able to
access some other world.
World, or moment, or whatever. It is said that Artemov would have
interpret jokingly Dt as I am in country which provides visa.
Günther, I will be frank, this is just elementary modal logic, and
even advanced modal logic is considered easy compared to the
provability logic. Solovay theorem made one precise modal logic, G, an
incredible tools for simplifying the provability logic field. The
modal logic G is to provability logic, what tensor calculus is to
general relativity theory. G is just one modal logic among an ocean of
possible modal logics.
Somehow modal logic is the abstract theory of the multimultiverses.
It is just a wonderful result that the formula of Löb, B(Bp-p)-Bp,
the only axiom of G, (really), formalizes completely the whole field
(at the propositional level). It gives, with the intensional variants,
the whole propositional theology of the honest or correct, or sound,
universal machine. (Universal machine believing some effective
induction principle, they are automatically Löbian).
It is an ideal case, of course, in our lives we are far from lobian.
But it is what we need, by UDA, to get the correct, assuming comp, big
picture, including physics, first and third and first plural physics.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno, My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to numbers in the first place But that would violate the comp assumption. No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number. - that is why the aliens could destroy the machine (it follows from 3-det that something _had_ to happen to prevent successor states which wouldn't correspond to numbers). But machines are secondary. The physical machines are pattern emerging in the mind of persons themselves emerging from the relation between numbers. I don't see how aliens could manage a machine not to have successors. The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent). If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be other successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's state, a continuum of successor states exists. This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is not at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)? After all, there are halting computations. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Bruno, With COMP it is not so clear. explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt; the Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith. Please bear in mind that I have not yet studied the AUDA in detail. How does Dt suppress cul-de-sac? Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Günther, On 05 Mar 2009, at 00:50, Günther Greindl wrote: Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4. I am not sure I understand. If the continuation uses non existent numbers, the continuation does not exist, or it is an inconsistent continuation, that is a cul-de-sac world. I can prove that 0 = 1, if there is a natural number between 3 and 4. A god cannot make disappear a natural number, nor introduce a natural number where there is none. It seems to me. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
HI Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4. I am not sure I understand. If the continuation uses non existent numbers, the continuation does not exist, or it is an inconsistent continuation, that is a cul-de-sac world. I can prove that 0 = 1, if there is a natural number between 3 and 4. A god cannot make disappear a natural number, nor introduce a natural number where there is none. It seems to me. We are just talking a little past each other. To recap: I initially meant that it would be possible, in a teleportation experiment, that aliens prevent any copies from being instantiated. You then said that that would be equivalent to making disappear a number, which is not possible. My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to numbers in the first place - that is why the aliens could destroy the machine (it follows from 3-det that something _had_ to happen to prevent successor states which wouldn't correspond to numbers). So, of course nobody can introduce new numbers - but if there were successor states which would require new numbers, that would mean that QI is false - there a cul de sacs (modus tollens). Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Le 05-mars-09, à 11:10, Günther Greindl a écrit : HI Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4. I am not sure I understand. If the continuation uses non existent numbers, the continuation does not exist, or it is an inconsistent continuation, that is a cul-de-sac world. I can prove that 0 = 1, if there is a natural number between 3 and 4. A god cannot make disappear a natural number, nor introduce a natural number where there is none. It seems to me. We are just talking a little past each other. To recap: I initially meant that it would be possible, in a teleportation experiment, that aliens prevent any copies from being instantiated. You then said that that would be equivalent to making disappear a number, which is not possible. My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to numbers in the first place But that would violate the comp assumption. - that is why the aliens could destroy the machine (it follows from 3-det that something _had_ to happen to prevent successor states which wouldn't correspond to numbers). But machines are secondary. The physical machines are pattern emerging in the mind of persons themselves emerging from the relation between numbers. I don't see how aliens could manage a machine not to have successors. So, of course nobody can introduce new numbers - but if there were successor states which would require new numbers, that would mean that QI is false - there a cul de sacs (modus tollens). If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be other successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's state, a continuum of successor states exists. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Le 05-mars-09, à 11:15, Günther Greindl a écrit : Hi Stathis, It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to the emergent class of me, being conscious. Then I would be dead. It seems possible, but in that case the QTI would be wrong. Also, it isn't clear that the MWI says that everything that can happen, does happen, even though that is how it is sometimes characterised. Indeed, that is what Jonathan (I guess) and I (definitely) have been arguing. We agree. The MWI does forbid world in which 1 = 0. Many things remains impossible in the MWI. In fact, I am quite sure that MWI in it's current form implies that not everything (a priori physically plausible) happens - interference of histories is (I think) showing us that. Sure. But note that a lot of things happens, including the white rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare. With COMP it is not so clear. Something subtle happens with comp. The scientist cannot prevent the apparition of cul-de-sac everywhere, but this is the reason that he has to abandon science for theology once he decide to compute probabilities. he will does that by defining the probability by an explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt; the Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith. But this makes a strong restriction of what is possible, and harder to eliminate the white rabbits. Cf, with comp we have to derive QM. We just cannot assume it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Sure. But note that a lot of things happens, including the white rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare. Could it be that some things which seem physically possible, like the matter in my keyboard spontaneously rearranging itself into a miniature fire-breathing dragon, are actually impossible under MWI, i.e. don't occur in any branch of the multiverse? If we take seriously *classical* quantum mechanics into account, or even *special relativistic quantum mechanics* into account, I don't see how we could prevent such happening (your keyboard becoming a dragon) in the multiverse. It just follows from the math. Of course the probability that your keyboard become a firing dragon in your branch is much little than winning the big lottery every nanosecond during 100^100 millennia. The main reason is that in such theories position and momentum are described by continuous variables, and the quantum splitting or observers differentiation operate on the continuum. They are even a continuum of variant among your possible dragons, but this remains relatively rare. Of course we have good reason to dismiss both classical quantum mechanics and special relativistic mechanics as the real theory, given that they forget the unavoidable problem of quantization of gravitation, and thus of space-time. If we take into account gravitation, we have a choice of theories on which physicists are still debating a lot. I would say that with the superstring sort of theories, the multiverse generates still a continuum of differentiation of stories, and that keyboard-dragon transformation will still happen in many branches (but will still be very rare, for the same reason as above). If we take the Loop-Gravity kind of theories, then gravitation (which curves space-time) is properly quantized, and we get eventually a discrete space-time. In that case, if we add the assumption that the physical universe is sufficiently little, it may be that the keyboard-dragon transformation does not occur, in the resulting finite or enumerable multiverse. Now, *this* would be a problem for comp, because comp implies indeed that everything consistent happens somewhere indeed (unless Günther is right and that some comp super-selection rule applies, but I don't see where such super-selection could come from). Of course keyboard-dragon types of transformations are utterly NOT verifiable, even in the ironical first person way of quantum or comp suicide. If you decide to kill yourself until your keyboard transforms itself into a firing dragon, a simple evaluation of the probabilities will show that you have 99,... % of chance of surviving only with a brain making you believing that such a transformation has occurred, when it has not. It is the general practical weakness of comp or quantum suicide: if you ask for something *near-impossible, suicide will send you in dreamland (1 person view), and probably in a asylum (3 person view). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:13, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/4 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: Imagine the sequence: Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to have a big distance, the concern is causal disconnection in spacetime). Now, in the meantime, the reconstitution chamber has been overtaken by aliens (coming from the other side of the galaxy) who have advanced technology and can control the multiverse - they decide the tweak the multiverse that the reconstitution happens in _no_ multiverse at all (by destroying all chambers). This would suggest that the no cul de sac conjecture implies that annihilation in the above sequence fails. But surely this can not depend on the decision of the aliens, who were nowhere near the causal lightcone of the annihilation event. This would imply one of three things (in my view in decreasing degree of plausibility): .) no cul-de-sac is false; no QI, even in RSSA scenarios. .) annihilation always fails. That is, if a copying machine exists, there will always be a version of you which feels that copying has not succeeded and nothing happened (even if you said you wanted to be annihilated after the duplication). .) COMP obeys global super-selection rules, akin to pre-determinism; that is, in scenarios where aliens destroy the chambers, annihilation fails, else not. Analogously for other scenarios. The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens. Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided through a throw of a fair coin. This makes the decision unbiased by fake protocols based on a bad understanding of what the comp probabilities are. Yes, deciding which copy will take on which role by a coin toss would probably eliminate dynasties of torturers. This is an interesting point, since the fact that the coin toss is introduced does not actually do anything ta change the probability that you will end up being tortured, its effect being mainly psychological. Absolutely so. That is why, fundamentally, the B people illustrate a higher moral ethic. By allowing overlap, and delayed self-annihalation, they force the teleporter user to have a better idea of what he is going to do, even if they know they cannot have a complete knowledge or any certainties of what will happen. The A people, who disallow overlaps between copies and original, are more like: let us use the comp theory without trying to think about what we are really doing. It is a bit the difference between those who say yes to the doctor after many explanations, and those who say yes to the doctor, but doesn't want to know what the doctor will precisely do. Of course I respect the two attitudes. I disrespect only the C people, who doesn't care about any person they feel different. The A people are ignorant, but does not ignore their ignorance. The C people are ignorant and ignore their ignorance. The B people, note, are ignorant, but try to be less ignorant. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On Wed, 2009-03-04 at 12:25 +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens. Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! We are a collection of particles, though the exact arrangement and constitution of such is constantly changing. Yet, under most circumstances, from moment to moment our instantaneous state follows a trajectory such that this state continues to be a member of the larger class that is me, being conscious. It is again the situation of many microstates mapping to one higher level, emergent macrostate according to some membership function, the exact nature of which depends on your specific theory of identity. The no cul-de-sac conjecture, more precisely, states that as the wavefunction of our present collection of particles unitarily evolves there will always be at least one decoherent branch of it that continues to satisfy the macrostate membership function that is me, being conscious, delays and copies notwithstanding. It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to the emergent class of me, being conscious. Then I would be dead. There are many questions/assumptions in the above line of reasoning. What is the macrostate membership function that defines a set of particles as me? As the set becomes entangled with its environment, how and when does one decoherent branch then decohere into one or more new branches (that are still me)? Presumably, our digital level of substitution is much higher than the exact quantum state of this collection of particles. What microstate changes don't make a difference, which do? Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Stathis, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Imagine the sequence: Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens. Assuming COMP you are probably right, but with standard MWI I'm with Jonathan - it suffices that the aliens would make sure that no decoherent branch contains a successor macrostate; considering that the reconstitution machine and the incoming beam are (localized) macrostates, this seems plausible. Maybe we would have to modify the scenario a bit (not 100 000 lightyears distance, which would open up possibilites for very different histories) but the minimal distance to ensure that annihilation has finished before reconstitution would begin (without tampering). Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along three classes: A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to self-infliction. In case of accidental or exceptional self- multiplication, consent is asked at any time. B: a stable minority (in the long run). Accept teleportation but do allow overlap of individuals. Some will fight for the right of self- infliction including the consent made before the duplication, but with precise protocol. You know the problem of the masochist: I say no, continue, I say no no, stop! C: the bandits. They violates protocols and don't ask for consents. They should normally be wanted, I mean researched by all the polices of the universe, or already be in jail or in asylum. I think B might work, since it is more or less like the present situation, where our decisions are based on a rough risk-benefit analysis, i.e. we decide on a course of action if as a result gain*Pr(gain) = loss*Pr(loss). So we decide to smoke, for example, if we judge the pleasure of smoking (or the suffering caused by trying to give it up) to outweigh the suffering that may result from smoking-related illnesses. However, there are also differences if the copies are allowed to overlap. If I make a decision that has an adverse effect on my future self I may regret the decision, but it's not possible to ask my past self to reverse it. On the other hand, if I agree for one of my copies to torture the other it is always possible for the victim to ask the torturer to release him. Also, it is possible for the torturer to come to believe that he is never at risk himself after repeated duplications: I've done this many times and it's always the *other* guy who suffers, not me, so there is no reason for me not to repeat the process. This would be so even if the agreement was for 100 copies to be made and 99 of them enslaved: the one who does the enslaving may come to believe that he is never at risk, and continue creating copies 100 at a time. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along three classes: A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to self-infliction. In case of accidental or exceptional self- multiplication, consent is asked at any time. B: a stable minority (in the long run). Accept teleportation but do allow overlap of individuals. Some will fight for the right of self- infliction including the consent made before the duplication, but with precise protocol. You know the problem of the masochist: I say no, continue, I say no no, stop! C: the bandits. They violates protocols and don't ask for consents. They should normally be wanted, I mean researched by all the polices of the universe, or already be in jail or in asylum. I think B might work, since it is more or less like the present situation, where our decisions are based on a rough risk-benefit analysis, i.e. we decide on a course of action if as a result gain*Pr(gain) = loss*Pr(loss). So we decide to smoke, for example, if we judge the pleasure of smoking (or the suffering caused by trying to give it up) to outweigh the suffering that may result from smoking-related illnesses. However, there are also differences if the copies are allowed to overlap. If I make a decision that has an adverse effect on my future self I may regret the decision, but it's not possible to ask my past self to reverse it. On the other hand, if I agree for one of my copies to torture the other it is always possible for the victim to ask the torturer to release him. Also, it is possible for the torturer to come to believe that he is never at risk himself after repeated duplications: I've done this many times and it's always the *other* guy who suffers, not me, so there is no reason for me not to repeat the process. This would be so even if the agreement was for 100 copies to be made and 99 of them enslaved: the one who does the enslaving may come to believe that he is never at risk, and continue creating copies 100 at a time. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Stathis This was mentioned in the TNG technical manual. I do not recall, right, now, which post TOS episodes mentioned it. Ronald On Mar 2, 8:42 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/3/2 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com: Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term). The question is what level of resolution is needed in order to copy the memories, personality etc. You may not need quantum resolution, since in that case it is hard to see how you could avoid drastic mental state changes while just sitting still. Also, in which TNG episode does it mention quantum resolution for the transporter? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 03 Mar 2009, at 13:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along three classes: A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to self-infliction. In case of accidental or exceptional self- multiplication, consent is asked at any time. B: a stable minority (in the long run). Accept teleportation but do allow overlap of individuals. Some will fight for the right of self- infliction including the consent made before the duplication, but with precise protocol. You know the problem of the masochist: I say no, continue, I say no no, stop! C: the bandits. They violates protocols and don't ask for consents. They should normally be wanted, I mean researched by all the polices of the universe, or already be in jail or in asylum. I think B might work, since it is more or less like the present situation, where our decisions are based on a rough risk-benefit analysis, i.e. we decide on a course of action if as a result gain*Pr(gain) = loss*Pr(loss). So we decide to smoke, for example, if we judge the pleasure of smoking (or the suffering caused by trying to give it up) to outweigh the suffering that may result from smoking-related illnesses. However, there are also differences if the copies are allowed to overlap. If I make a decision that has an adverse effect on my future self I may regret the decision, but it's not possible to ask my past self to reverse it. On the other hand, if I agree for one of my copies to torture the other it is always possible for the victim to ask the torturer to release him. Also, it is possible for the torturer to come to believe that he is never at risk himself after repeated duplications: I've done this many times and it's always the *other* guy who suffers, not me, so there is no reason for me not to repeat the process. This would be so even if the agreement was for 100 copies to be made and 99 of them enslaved: the one who does the enslaving may come to believe that he is never at risk, and continue creating copies 100 at a time. You can then imagine the surprise of the copy or copies: - I did this often and thought there are no risk, but here I am enslaved, and I will suffer and die. That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided through a throw of a fair coin. This makes the decision unbiased by fake protocols based on a bad understanding of what the comp probabilities are. Iterating the procedure, with the throwing of the coin, could make you believe you are incredibly lucky, but the computationalist should know better: this is just the usual comp-suicide self-selection (assuming of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an obvious proposition). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi, better: this is just the usual comp-suicide self-selection (assuming of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an obvious proposition). I have been thinking along these lines lately, in a somewhat different context: the teleportation with annihilation experiment together with the no cul de sac conjecture and RSSA (that is, a case not covered by Jack's paper). Imagine the sequence: Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to have a big distance, the concern is causal disconnection in spacetime). Now, in the meantime, the reconstitution chamber has been overtaken by aliens (coming from the other side of the galaxy) who have advanced technology and can control the multiverse - they decide the tweak the multiverse that the reconstitution happens in _no_ multiverse at all (by destroying all chambers). This would suggest that the no cul de sac conjecture implies that annihilation in the above sequence fails. But surely this can not depend on the decision of the aliens, who were nowhere near the causal lightcone of the annihilation event. This would imply one of three things (in my view in decreasing degree of plausibility): .) no cul-de-sac is false; no QI, even in RSSA scenarios. .) annihilation always fails. That is, if a copying machine exists, there will always be a version of you which feels that copying has not succeeded and nothing happened (even if you said you wanted to be annihilated after the duplication). .) COMP obeys global super-selection rules, akin to pre-determinism; that is, in scenarios where aliens destroy the chambers, annihilation fails, else not. Analogously for other scenarios. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term). Ronald On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar experience. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/3/2 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com: Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term). The question is what level of resolution is needed in order to copy the memories, personality etc. You may not need quantum resolution, since in that case it is hard to see how you could avoid drastic mental state changes while just sitting still. Also, in which TNG episode does it mention quantum resolution for the transporter? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
To have strict continuity you would certainly need the state, but not at the quantum level, see Tegmark's paper. But you could probably do without most of the state information if you were willing to accept a gap - as in anesthesia. Brent ronaldheld wrote: Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term). Ronald On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar experience. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is don't do to the other what the other does not want you to do on him/her (except to save your soul). But could someone makes the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers. Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to reconstitute an army of Bruno to extinguish a nuclear energy source which is on fire? Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, I would not agree in advance to do anything that would hurt my copy before the copy was made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how short the time since differentiation. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 01 Mar 2009, at 09:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is don't do to the other what the other does not want you to do on him/her (except to save your soul). But could someone makes the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers. Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to reconstitute an army of Bruno to extinguish a nuclear energy source which is on fire? Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, I would not agree in advance to do anything that would hurt my copy before the copy was made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how short the time since differentiation. All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in your interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can you be coherent, take the full piece of botter dead is not big deal of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishness. Do you prefer to live in a country 1 where self-torture is allowed but only when the decision is made before the duplication (and yes you could be the victim indeed), or in a country 2 where self-torture is allowed after the duplication. It seems to me that your midazolam- argument (I re-quote below(*)) should in fine relativize the very notion of selfishness. I think it is preferable to live in the first country: yes I could be the victim, but I can remember my consent. In the second type of country, I could even more so be the tortured one ... eventually; and without my consent. OK? I guess you did see this, because of your terrible assumption: Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, The real question is: let us suppose you are not selfish ... can you sympathize with those who will propose some right of self-torture? Note that in The prestige, the self-inflicting decision is taken before, by Angier. Borden had less choice, and it is as he got the full secret that nobody really can both remember and stay alive. (Here I am inconsistent or really near inconsistency, as the prestige). With comp, selfishness is not a problem. It is selfishness + ignorance: this mix can generate suffering. Bruno (*) Stathis wrote (2009/2/27): This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter. If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be consistent I should also think that death is no big deal. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Stathis, Bruno, It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is don't do to the other what the other does not want you to do on him/her (except to save your soul). You have already answered your question in the first two sentences with the last two sentences. But could someone makes the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers. In law it is usual that with personal rights, consent can be withdrawn anytime. Why should it be different with duplicates? So, if a duplicate withdraws consent, every prior consent is nullified. Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to reconstitute an army of Bruno to extinguish a nuclear energy source which is on fire? Bruno_[n] can decide for himself if he goes on the mission or not. It they decide not to (some or all of them), you have to cope with an army of Brunos though. Maybe they could translate your book into english? ;-)) made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how short the time since differentiation. That would lead to terrible consequences. You would have slaves! How long would your willingness to hurt them last, after differentiation? Assuming duplication technologies, these guys can stick around for very long, so maybe after a 1000 years they are more similar to 'me in a 1000 years' than to you. Why should you have the right to hurt people like me? In case of availability of duplication technology, there can be only one rule, without exemption: every duplicate has the same rights as the original (it is as the original in any sense that matters), immediately. You have no more rights over your duplicates as I have over mine; duplicates are not things to be owned, but persons. (There is only one right where one should have priority over one's own code: the decision to make duplicates in the first place.) Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in your interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can you be coherent, take the full piece of botter dead is not big deal of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishness. Do you prefer to live in a country 1 where self-torture is allowed but only when the decision is made before the duplication (and yes you could be the victim indeed), or in a country 2 where self-torture is allowed after the duplication. It seems to me that your midazolam- argument (I re-quote below(*)) should in fine relativize the very notion of selfishness. I think it is preferable to live in the first country: yes I could be the victim, but I can remember my consent. In the second type of country, I could even more so be the tortured one ... eventually; and without my consent. OK? Living in the first country is equivalent to allowing a contract where you agree to a gain today at the cost of suffering tomorrow, like selling your soul to the devil. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 28 Feb 2009, at 03:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_ person. So, what counts is change, not objective time. What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather than a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that is the true tragedy. The problem with this explanation is that fear of death is only partly, if at all, attenuated by rational considerations. I could probably make my hour old backup do anything I want by holding a gun to his head. Darwinian evolution did not prepare us to duplication and the like. This happens all the time. Our cortex contradicts some instincts wired in the limbic system and in the cerebral stem. In discussions about duplication with amnesia, it is important to distinguish the quasi academical or conceptual question do we survive?, and the practical question Are we happy surviving in this or that way. I would say no in practice to a doctor who proposes me an artificial brain and warning me on a possible amnesia, yet, if I have no choice, I believe that comp forces me to say that I will survive (yet unhappily wounded). Of course we are then lead to the idea that we always survive no matter what. In practice we want keep what we like, be it books, programs, friends, memories, sure. Stathis, you post which I quote below was very good: This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter. If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be consistent I should also think that death is no big deal. It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is don't do to the other what the other does not want you to do on him/her (except to save your soul). But could someone makes the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers. Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to reconstitute an army of Bruno to extinguish a nuclear energy source which is on fire? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal memories. By loosing memory I would be wounded, not dead. By loosing your memory, the resulting 'I' is no more the previous 'I' and in this settings it makes no sense to talk about 'I', the subject is not the same. If I with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment. No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed with you, but I have lost any certainties here. What is you ? By what you say, I'm as you as you are... But I can assure you, I'm not you, and if tomorrow you wake up without your memories but mine instead you'll be me not you anymore (and If you have my memories you'll be rightly believe so). You know it was you because you did wake up as you... How could I know that? Because now you remember it and you are fully self aware and know who you are. you didn't know inside the dream... This is Maury's conception of dream. I doubt it a lot, and consider it refuted by the work of Laberge and Dement (and Hearne) on lucid dreaming. Well... I had once what is call a lucid dream... but I knew I was somehow conscious only when I was able to recollect it (when I woke up)... I don't know if I could ascribe meaning to say I was really conscious during the dream. note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming, OK, here I disagree rather strongly. What could prove that wrong ? I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream. Personal identity is indeed related to recollection of some memory, even in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting. Well I don't differentiate forgetting everything and dying... result is the same. Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I think not. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? You will be dead. Gosh! And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead? Best regards, Bruno Well a backup of one minute ago is nearer to your you now... And in a sense I could say you survive 'at least a very actual near you did'. My current 'I' is the past of an infinity of futur 'I' where all these 'I' having as past my current 'I' have all the right to say they were me... But one of these 'I' which was differentiated of the others 'I' cannot claim that the others 'I's are valid continuation... They are not. What I care to continue is 'I', meaning my knowledge, my memories, my name, what I've done, who I did know... If it dissappears then it's plain death. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? you people take it for granted that a (supernatural???) authority has nothing else to do except making replicas of members of the Everything List. And you observe, how good - or bad - its work is. Some teleological view of pantheism Ha Ha). Otherwise where would the replicas come from and where would they go? (Probably the notion comes from the backup mode of your computer and the file backup updated every Sunday). John M On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 12:43 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Gosh! And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead? This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter. If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be consistent I should also think that death is no big deal. But isnt' there a range here. I would certainly feel less anxious about dying if there were a backup of me made an hour ago than if it were made months or years ago or if there were no backup at all. On the other hand, an hour of memory loss from taking midazolam may be less worrisome simply because we, as a culture, have a lot of experience with loss of consciousness and memory from anesthesia, etc. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno, List, in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting. Let us say that we have a measure of continuation (of psychological) identity from 1 to 0, where 1=full continuation and 0=death, and we apply this measure from one OM to the next. Then forgetting would be everything between 0 and 1. O, extreme forgetting, is death. Oliver Sacks's book The Man who mistook his wife for a hat comes to mind, where he also describes a patient, Jimmie, who has severe retrograde amnesia which started when he was around 60 or so and which erased his memories up to 40 years prior. An especially chilling episode occurs in the book when Sacks mentions that, on the first interview with the patient, he gives him a mirror (which Sacks regrets) and the patient gets a panic attack, because he sees a 65 year old when he expects to be 19. Fortunately, he forgets a few moments later. He lives in an eternal now being reset every few minutes, because (through alcohol abuse) he can't develop new memories (and in his severe case many past ones where erased). This person has lived up to 65, but, through losing his memories, from 65 onwards one could say that he died with 19 (relative to his 65+ states). I think I is a logical construction (we will come back on this). Memories have a big values, but I don't put it in my identity, nor Hmm, I do think that memories constitutes your identity (in the wide sense, also muscle memory as Brent mentioned). If not that, what then? Drescher (in Good and Real, 2006, MIT Press) for instance likens qualia to gensyms in LISP http://www.cs.utah.edu/dept/old/texinfo/emacs19/cl_6.html: QUOTE: Creating Symbols These functions create unique symbols, typically for use as temporary variables. Function: gensym optional x This function creates a new, uninterned symbol (using make-symbol) with a unique name. ENDQUOTE I am not so sure about qualia, but I think the I symbol fits this description nicely: a unique symbol for use as temporary variable, around which memories (filters on histories) gather. This I variable is not really essential, what is essential is the memories (relating one to the world). Indeed, Susan Blackmore (english naturalist philosopher/psychologist) describes having eliminating any feeling of I through meditation. To be more precise, I think she has simply eliminated the I symbol but it is still present subsymbolically as an anchor for memories (see also papers by Aaron Sloman and John Pollock describing persons as virtual machines). Plotinus Universal Soul (less mystically: the first person view) could never die (as in: there will always be an experience in Platonia, somewhere, somewhen (better: nowhere, nowhen); but your _personal identity_ here on Earth in this Universe etc. ceases to exist without your memories. Less and less memories - means more and more histories pass through you (assuming COMP), until, when you have lost all memories (including the memory of your brain organization which leads you to be able to process visual stimuli, same holds for other senses) which equals death all histories pass through that state, and as Russell nicely points out in his book (he uses bitstrings) all histories are as good as no histories - all differences get lost, there is no person left to appreciate (that is then indeed the true view from nowhen and nowhere - nothing). To put up the above paragraph another way: you need memories to _be_ _someone_. To be someone is to be someone relatively to possible histories, which gets mediated by memories. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Stathis, List, if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there As Bruno said in a previous post, what we should care about in personal survival is not concrete memories (although memories are essential to anchor a person in reality) but rather something else (values, insights etc) In your example, living for an hour will not necessarily accrete much experience or new insights which you would like to share with your future self or others. So, indeed, death does not matter (apart from ethical considerations which are not at issue now, but only personal identity) for the one hour duplicate, and you can also take the amnesia-inducing medication. On the other hand, if you had an insight in exactly that hour: let's say, you've been working on a scientific problem for ten years, and in that hour you (the duplicate) saw something which sparked something in your brain that led you to a solution (and you know it was due to the extreme situation, and the other you will not have this insight), then you should worry very much. If you are annihilated, something important is lost (for yourself, for others). The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_ person. So, what counts is change, not objective time. What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather than a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that is the true tragedy. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
John Mikes wrote: Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? Ask Bruno, he's the one who brought it up. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
John Mikes wrote: Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? It is only a thought experiment to make clear what we care about regarding personal identity. And if computationalism is true, this thought experiment will be practically quite relevant in the near(?) future (as in mind uploading etc) (see Bostrom and Sandberg; Whole Brain emulation roadmap http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/Reports/2008-3.pdf) And as regards COMP, the duplications occur all the time. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 08:34:48PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Gosh! And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead? This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter. If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be consistent I should also think that death is no big deal. If Multiverse (or COMP), and no cul-de-sacs is true, then the backups are actually irrelevant. There will always be next OM to experience. If no cul-de-sacs is false, however, then true death is possible, and I'm not convinced that the presence of backups will help much. Either way, there is little to be concerned about :) Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_ person. So, what counts is change, not objective time. What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather than a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that is the true tragedy. The problem with this explanation is that fear of death is only partly, if at all, attenuated by rational considerations. I could probably make my hour old backup do anything I want by holding a gun to his head. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_ person. So, what counts is change, not objective time. What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather than a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that is the true tragedy. The problem with this explanation is that fear of death is only partly, if at all, attenuated by rational considerations. Well mine is pretty attenuated - but whether it was strictly rational considerations or just getting older I couldn't say. I could probably make my hour old backup do anything I want by holding a gun to his head. But would you shoot him? ;-) Brent Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me they were, the worse it would be. --- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2. Supposedly it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1? Why wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories? B3 in the example given only has memories of B1. If B3 did have memories of S1 then there would indeed be fusion of S and B. But I am thinking in terms of observer moments (or observer minutes in this case): S1, S2, S3, B1, B2, B3 as essentially self-contained, not necessarily causally connected, and forming a stream of consciousness only by virtue of their information content. If they were different, then of course the streams of consciousness would be difference. The only change that would leave the two streams of consciousness intact is if either S2 or B2 were missing. Incidentally, the observer minutes would have to have the right sort of information content even if they were causally connected, or they wouldn't form a stream of consciousness. If I receive a brain injury which causes complete amnesia for my pat, there is a break in my stream of consciousness despite the fact that there is a clear causal connection and physical continuity between my pre- and post-injury self. Physical continuity and causal connectivity are only useful for subjective continuity because they generate observer moments with the right sort of information content. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. Because of continuity of the body. If we knew the person's body was destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a different person who just happened to be similar - and the person would agree with us. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if not conscious memories. So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution; but that too is a form of memory. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can compare the memories? To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I'm doubtful. I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of how it makes sensible story of the world. You call it a useful fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? Dead. Brent Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi, 2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. From my current point of view... Well I would be dead... the me/I which is writing this. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. If I with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). You know it was you because you did wake up as you... you didn't know inside the dream... note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming, I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream. Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I think not. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? You will be dead. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-) Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory. In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. Because of continuity of the body. If we knew the person's body was destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a different person who just happened to be similar - and the person would agree with us. I am not sure. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if not conscious memories. So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution; but that too is a form of memory. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can compare the memories? That would be a reason to doubt I was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I'm doubtful. I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of how it makes sensible story of the world. You call it a useful fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction. I think I is a logical construction (we will come back on this). Memories have a big values, but I don't put it in my identity, nor would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this could be personal stuff. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? Dead. I ask what I just asked to Quentin: what if the backup has been done last year or a minute ago, or a second ago? Did I died this night, given that I don't remember the dreams I made? We are in the subtle à-la The prestige water ... Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group,
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-) Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory. In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead. I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing. If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. Yet I am still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison. Have a good day, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-) Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory. In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead. I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing. If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. It was only *complete amnesia* that was equated with death. Yet I am still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison. Consciousness, or self-awareness? Brent Have a good day, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. Because of continuity of the body. If we knew the person's body was destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a different person who just happened to be similar - and the person would agree with us. I am not sure. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if not conscious memories. So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution; but that too is a form of memory. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can compare the memories? That would be a reason to doubt I was me. When you were dreaming you might have dreamed you were somebody else. Once when I took some medication, which didn't seem to have any psychotropic effects when I was awake, I found that my dreams seemed to be someone else's dreams. That is they had people in them which my dream self seemed to know and they knew me, but which in waking life I either had never met or didn't recall. Additionally the circumstances and events, while being realistic, were completely foreign to me - I drove a different car, wore different clothes, lived in a different place,... To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I'm doubtful. I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of how it makes sensible story of the world. You call it a useful fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction. I think I is a logical construction (we will come back on this). Memories have a big values, but I don't put it in my identity, nor would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this could be personal stuff. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived,
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com meeke...@dslextreme.com: It is the potential fusion that bothers me. It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our closest continuations might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me. But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the brain. I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable, and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively. In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all distinct. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 25 Feb 2009, at 03:39, russell standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first persons. And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in nature a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is the normal candidate. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ It is the potential fusion that bothers me. It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our closest continuations might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me. But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the brain. Brent Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer the Occam catastrophe. The sense of ego would be enough to explain why you don't merge with Stathis. Not being a Salvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does the ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the ego? It depends of course of what you mean by the ego. Ego Death is a well discussed topic in Entheogen Forums, especially on Salvia, but also DMT. If by ego you mean the terrestrial self I would say yes. I think we do similar experiences in the deep sleep (= the non REM sleep), but like with Salvia, it seems we have to forget the main point to come back on Earth. Even the part which we don't forget is ineffable, probably of the type G* minus G, or more accurately Z* minus Z, or even more accurately: X1* minus X1 (cf your Nothing book page 129) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
russell standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time. So an closest continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my unconscious period. I don't think so. The only way you notice the periods of unconsciousness is by virtue of the discontinuity between two observer moments that you recall (as evidenced by a clock or some other irreversible process). The moments of unconsciousness are not observer moments. A fair objection (maybe). But still it seems that I could easily share an OM with someone else and then end up in an observerer superposition. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but yet is not you (and you are dead) This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of identity is only an illusion. I don't think so. Unless you assume comp, but then to say the copy is not you has no meaning at all. This last is not really problematic, it is just equivalent with the negation of comp. It is brought by non-comp-people who, on the contrary insist a notion of continuity which is broken by digital substitution. For a computationalist, the continuity is given by the comp history, and is not broken by teleportation and the like, not even self- differentiation through self-duplication. As I see it, to say that the copy has all your important mental qualities but still isn't you because it lacks your soul - the significant thing about the soul here being that it is something over and above mental qualities - is equivalent to saying you assume comp, but the copy still isn't you. Actually, I have no objection to this way of speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real continuity. I think we agree. Just note that when I don't write assuming comp I consider also the case when comp is false. Perhaps I shouldn't. The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you). And, the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up to the unspeakable you = ONE). I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable. Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much more precise. I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively. The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. I still don't understand your point. Assume that the copy is arbitrarily close to the original me in every mental quality: is there still some sense in which it might not really be me? If you can come up with an answer, then it could equally well be applied to walking across the room, which none of us do worrying that we won't survive the experience. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar experience. Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first persons. And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in nature a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is the normal candidate. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar experience. Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first persons. And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in nature a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is the normal candidate. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ It is the potential fusion that bothers me. It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our closest continuations might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me. But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the brain. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first persons. And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in nature a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is the normal candidate. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ It is the potential fusion that bothers me. It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our closest continuations might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me. But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the brain. Brent Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer the Occam catastrophe. The sense of ego would be enough to explain why you don't merge with Stathis. Not being a Silvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does the ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the ego? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 6:39 PM, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first persons. And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in nature a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is the normal candidate. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ It is the potential fusion that bothers me. It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our closest continuations might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me. But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the brain. Brent Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer the Occam catastrophe. I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time. So an closest continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my unconscious period. Brent The sense of ego would be enough to explain why you don't merge with Stathis. Not being a Silvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does the ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the ego? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time. So an closest continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my unconscious period. I don't think so. The only way you notice the periods of unconsciousness is by virtue of the discontinuity between two observer moments that you recall (as evidenced by a clock or some other irreversible process). The moments of unconsciousness are not observer moments. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 23 Feb 2009, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but yet is not you (and you are dead) This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of identity is only an illusion. I don't think so. Unless you assume comp, but then to say the copy is not you has no meaning at all. This last is not really problematic, it is just equivalent with the negation of comp. It is brought by non-comp-people who, on the contrary insist a notion of continuity which is broken by digital substitution. For a computationalist, the continuity is given by the comp history, and is not broken by teleportation and the like, not even self- differentiation through self-duplication. Actually, I have no objection to this way of speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real continuity. I think we agree. Just note that when I don't write assuming comp I consider also the case when comp is false. Perhaps I shouldn't. The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you). And, the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up to the unspeakable you = ONE). I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable. Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much more precise. I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively. The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Regards, Quentin I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
- Original Message - From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] Quentin Anciaux wrote: If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Regards, Quentin I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? Brent Hi Brent and Quentin, Could it be that it is the continuous possibility of recall from memory itself and not just the occasional recall acts that are important to continuity of P.I.? Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Stephen Paul King wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] Quentin Anciaux wrote: If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Regards, Quentin I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? Brent Hi Brent and Quentin, Could it be that it is the continuous possibility of recall from memory itself and not just the occasional recall acts that are important to continuity of P.I.? Stephen Sure. But what provides that possibility - the causal (physical) continuity of the brain and body. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar experience. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 20 Feb 2009, at 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Review of a book that may be of interest to the list. Brent Meeker Original Message Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15326 : View Other NDPR Reviews http://ndpr.nd.edu/ David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction/, Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826. *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College* Thank-you for alerting us to this book. I'll pick out just one passage from the review for comment: Though Shoemaker argues that the last three views suffer from serious problems that prevent them from being plausible accounts of our identity over time, he offers a different sort of argument against the Soul Criterion: There are good practical reasons to insist on a tight connection between the nature of personal identity and our practical concerns, and thus reject any theory of personal identity -- like the Soul Criterion -- that denies this connection. (33) Even if souls exist, we lack any kind of epistemic access to them; rather, we reidentify individuals in terms of their bodies and/or their psychologies. Thus, souls are irrelevant to the practical issues under consideration, and this irrelevance is taken to justify the rejection of the Soul Criterion. Predominantly on this list we use the psychological criterion of personal identity, originated by Locke and developed using various SF thought experiments by Derek Parfit. See also Dennet and Hofstadter's Mind'I for further references. This criterion is assumed true if you are to agree to teleportation or replacement of your brain with a functionally equivalent electronic analogue, and is contrasted with non-reductionist theories involving the existence of a soul. This constrast is misleading. Parfit believes in Token and tokens identity. He overlooked the subjective indeterminacy and the reversal consequence. That is why he finds natural to call his teleportation preserving identity a reductionist thesis like if it were reducing the notions of souls and consciousness to organized piece of matter. But the idea of betting we can survive digital substitution is really reductionist in the other way round. This view, (at least that is was the UDA is supposed to explain) leads to a reduction of matter to soul/ consciousness and eventually to machine-nameable and machine- unnameable relations. Concerning soul the comp idea is even antireductionist; it prevents any theory (third person communicable) to give a name to it, without eliminating it. If I have a soul, it might not be transferred in the copying process even though the copy acts the same as the original. I can understand this if the copy is a philosophical zombie for lack of a soul, but it seems that according to Shoemaker's usage the soul is not identical with the mind or consciousness. From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but yet is not you (and you are dead) The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you). And, the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up to the unspeakable you = ONE). I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable. Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much more precise. This leaves open the possibility that my copy might both behave *and* think the same way I do but still not be the same person. But if that is so, then as Shoemaker says, that would make the soul irrelevant. The word soul is charged with history. I use it usually in the sense of the knowing first person, and assuming the comp hyp, or weaker hypothesis with similar self-copying quality, you cannot dispense from the existence of such a soul. In arithmetic this will be related to the fact that the theaetetical idea of defining knowledge of P by justification of P when P is true lead to a modality which acts like pure justification but reasons like a knower. It is the same arithmetical part of truth, but it is seen differently, necessarily so by incompleteness(*). Eventually this is important because it justifies a purely scientific (third person communicable) notion of soul, and matter will be generated by that soul. Note that such a theory of soul is verifiable. I appreciate Parfit, but he remains stuck by its Aristotelian Theology (like so many, of course), and that is why, I guess, he calls comp (or weaker a-like) a reductionist view, where I would pretend such a view is more like a vaccine against many (if not all) reductionist conception
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but yet is not you (and you are dead) This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of identity is only an illusion. Actually, I have no objection to this way of speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real continuity. The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you). And, the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up to the unspeakable you = ONE). I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable. Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much more precise. I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi Stathis, Bruno, List, the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up to the unspeakable you = ONE). I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable. Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much more precise. I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively. You must take into account Bruno's Plotinian interpretation: the One, the Intellect, and the Universal Soul. In this sense, you can become more you in that you penetrate false knowledge Maya and realize your true nature (the Dao, if you like, roughly the ONE in Plotinus). @Bruno: What I have come to wonder: you take the Löbian Machine to be the model of a person - say, a human. But what if the Löbian Machine is actually (and only) the ultimate person - the universal soul, in Plotinus' terminology. This would account for the infinite (continuum!) histories (lived through the lives of all beings in the multiverse), the universal soul forgetting itself in a cosmic play, sort of - but also for COMP immortality - immortal would be the _universal soul_, but not necessarily concrete persons (as we conceive them, which requires at least some continuity of memory etc) Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Review of a book that may be of interest to the list. Brent Meeker Original Message Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15326 : View Other NDPR Reviews http://ndpr.nd.edu/ David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction/, Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826. *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College* Thank-you for alerting us to this book. I'll pick out just one passage from the review for comment: Though Shoemaker argues that the last three views suffer from serious problems that prevent them from being plausible accounts of our identity over time, he offers a different sort of argument against the Soul Criterion: There are good practical reasons to insist on a tight connection between the nature of personal identity and our practical concerns, and thus reject any theory of personal identity -- like the Soul Criterion -- that denies this connection. (33) Even if souls exist, we lack any kind of epistemic access to them; rather, we reidentify individuals in terms of their bodies and/or their psychologies. Thus, souls are irrelevant to the practical issues under consideration, and this irrelevance is taken to justify the rejection of the Soul Criterion. Predominantly on this list we use the psychological criterion of personal identity, originated by Locke and developed using various SF thought experiments by Derek Parfit. This criterion is assumed true if you are to agree to teleportation or replacement of your brain with a functionally equivalent electronic analogue, and is contrasted with non-reductionist theories involving the existence of a soul. If I have a soul, it might not be transferred in the copying process even though the copy acts the same as the original. I can understand this if the copy is a philosophical zombie for lack of a soul, but it seems that according to Shoemaker's usage the soul is not identical with the mind or consciousness. This leaves open the possibility that my copy might both behave *and* think the same way I do but still not be the same person. But if that is so, then as Shoemaker says, that would make the soul irrelevant. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
[Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Review of a book that may be of interest to the list. Brent Meeker Original Message Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15326 : View Other NDPR Reviews http://ndpr.nd.edu/ David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction/, Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826. *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College* Although there are many excellent texts dealing with the metaphysics of personal identity, Shoemaker's /Personal Identity and Ethics/ is the first book I know to tackle in such an extended way the question of the relationship between personal identity and our practical concerns. It is a very welcome addition to the philosophical literature. While even experts on the subject of personal identity will undoubtedly learn something new from this rich discussion, I expect the book's primary use will be in undergraduate (and perhaps graduate) classes, and its exceptionally clear presentation of some very thorny issues makes it an excellent choice for this purpose. Shoemaker has divided his discussion of the relationship between personal identity and our practical concerns into two broad parts. The first half of the book focuses on our self-regarding practical concerns. Which theories of personal identity make it rational for us to anticipate an afterlife? More generally, when is it rational for someone to anticipate, or have self-regarding concern about, a future experience? The second half of the book focuses on other-regarding practical concerns. What light can theories of personal identity shed on ethical issues at the beginning of life, such as abortion, genetic intervention, and the creation of life through cloning? What light can they shed on ethical issues at the end of life, such as the legitimacy of advance directives? What can they tell us about the proper treatment (or cure) in cases of multiple personalities? What role should theories of personal identity play in our assessment of moral responsibility? What is the relationship between personal identity and ethical theory, and in particular, do certain theories of personal identity make certain ethical theories more plausible? Shoemaker's first chapter focuses on the question of whether an individual can survive the death of her body, and he frames his discussion around John Perry's /Dialogues Concerning Personal Identity and Immortality/. (Those adopting Shoemaker's book for classroom use would likely want to assign these /Dialogues /along with it.) He also introduces four different theories of personal identity -- the Soul Criterion, the Body Criterion, the Memory Criterion, and the Brain-Based Memory Criterion -- each of which is ultimately dismissed as inadequate. Though Shoemaker argues that the last three views suffer from serious problems that prevent them from being plausible accounts of our identity over time, he offers a different sort of argument against the Soul Criterion: There are good practical reasons to insist on a tight connection between the nature of personal identity and our practical concerns, and thus reject any theory of personal identity -- like the Soul Criterion -- that denies this connection. (33) Even if souls exist, we lack any kind of epistemic access to them; rather, we reidentify individuals in terms of their bodies and/or their psychologies. Thus, souls are irrelevant to the practical issues under consideration, and this irrelevance is taken to justify the rejection of the Soul Criterion. Whether we're right to insist on such a tight connection between the nature of personal identity and our practical concerns is a question that recurs throughout the book, but which Shoemaker addresses in the concluding chapter. I'll return to this issue below. In the second chapter, which deals primarily with the problem of when we can rationally have self-regarding concern about a future experience, Shoemaker discusses what he takes to be the two most sophisticated theories of personal identity on offer (112): the Psychological Criterion and the Biological Criterion, often called /Animalism/. Like the book as a whole, this chapter is admirably clear as it rehearses the standard considerations for and against each of the two views. Having argued that proponents of these criteria end up in a kind of stand-off -- each view faces a set of problems that are overall roughly equal in seriousness -- Shoemaker uses the third chapter to introduce two alternative approaches: the Narrative Identity Criterion and the Identity Doesn't Matter view (IDM). Unlike the previous theories considered, the Narrative Identity Criterion proposed by Marya Schechtman aims to explain what makes an individual who she is rather than to offer a theory of her numerical identity over time. On this view, an experience or action can be properly
