subject:"RE\: Is Consciousness Computable\?"

On 7/1/2014 9:47 PM, LizR wrote:

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

What would a non-reductionist ontology look like?

The explanatory chain you gave earlier would look like one if I could make
sense of it.

Some kind of Holism. Plotinus talks about "The One", but what good is that.
If you
stop taking this stuff so seriously (searching for THE TRUTH) and think of
these
theories as different models for an unknowable reality, then you see that a
model
with ONE part isn't very useful. You immediately then have to start
explaining why
it "seems" to have parts in spite of being The One.

Any chance of you explaining what you meant without all the waffle? I'm actually
interested to know. Please could you start with that diagram which goes from arithmetic
to arithmetic and explain how it makes sense, or is reductionist, or SOMETHING. I am
starting to get a tronnies feel as I keep asking for clarification and none appears...
Anyway I hve to go now kids to feed etc hope to hear somethijng sensible next time!

Each step "->" is whole field of science and you want me to explain it? It's not a worked
out, unified causal theory. It's just a way of seeing that there isn't necessarily some
ur-stuff that explains everything else.

Brent

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?


On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, 
saying
that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense,

It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".


Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was obvious I was using causal 
in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation.


You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or "biology -> evolution -> 
mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?


Brent

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?


On 7/1/2014 9:40 PM, LizR wrote:

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 7/1/2014 6:52 PM, LizR wrote:



Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible 
to
statistical mechanics?


Erasing a bit means putting it in a known state, which is a decrease in 
entropy.


I don't get why a "known state" is important here. I certainly don't see why it's a 
decrease in entropy. (I assume you mean known to someone?)


If you just left it in some unknown state you wouldn't be erasing it. Entropy decreases 
because before the bit was in one of two possible states; after it's in only one.


http://www.nature.com/news/the-unavoidable-cost-of-computation-revealed-1.10186

Brent

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:

> What would a non-reductionist ontology look like?
>

The explanatory chain you gave earlier would look like one if I could make
sense of it.

> Some kind of Holism. Plotinus talks about "The One", but what good is
> that. If you stop taking this stuff so seriously (searching for THE TRUTH)
> and think of these theories as different models for an unknowable reality,
> then you see that a model with ONE part isn't very useful. You immediately
> then have to start explaining why it "seems" to have parts in spite of
> being The One.
>

Any chance of you explaining what you meant without all the waffle? I'm
actually interested to know. Please could you start with that diagram which
goes from arithmetic to arithmetic and explain how it makes sense, or is
reductionist, or SOMETHING. I am starting to get a tronnies feel as I keep
asking for clarification and none appears... Anyway I hve to go now kids to
feed etc hope to hear somethijng sensible next time!

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:

> OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.
> Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make
> sense,
>
>  It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".
>

Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was obvious I was
using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please
continue the explanation.

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 7/1/2014 6:52 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit
>> reducible to statistical mechanics?
>>
>>  Erasing a bit means putting it in a known state, which is a decrease in
> entropy.
>
> I don't get why a "known state" is important here. I certainly don't see
why it's a decrease in entropy. (I assume you mean known to someone?)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?


On 7/1/2014 6:52 PM, LizR wrote:

On 2 July 2014 05:33, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 7/1/2014 1:01 AM, LizR wrote:

On 1 July 2014 17:59, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote:

ISTM...

In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / 
energy.
Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those 
things, like
entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, 
or
Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive
mass-energy/space-time) involved.

There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, 
which
would indicate that the real picture is something like "it from bit" or 
what
might be called "primitive informationism". Evidence for PI come from 
the
entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer
limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I 
already
covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information 
requires some
irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know 
about
... perish the thought).

That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental 
level.
It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics.

Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to
statistical mechanics?


I'd appreciate an answer to this question, if you have one. I can't see the connection 
and am genuinely interested, I wasn't being rhetorical.


Erasing a bit means putting it in a known state, which is a decrease in entropy. Since 
overall entropy cannot decrease this must be transferred to the environment. If the 
environment is at temperature T the work required to do this is ST, or for one bit 
kTln(2).  This is a very small number because Boltzmann's constant k is very small.  So 
real computers use many orders of magnitude more energy per bit.  Feynman noted that it 
can be avoided by using reversible computing.




PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a
necessary consequence of comp, which would give the "ontological chain"
arithmetic -> consciousness -> information -> matter (I think ... this 
is all
"ISTM" of course).

OK, except I think the chain is:

arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic


That doesn't make sense to me. I mean everything except the last term is 
OK, but
you're apparently claiming that arithmetic is fundamental AND an invention 
of the
human mind. Which at first glance looks suspiciously like fence sitting and 
having
and eating your cake...

Unless you have a theory of circular ontology, of course, in which case 
please fill
in a few more details.

Why?  The details are no different than in the linear case.  In the details 
you look
at each "->" separately.  What's different about the circular case is that 
you don't
suppose that one of the levels is "fundamental" or "primitive".


OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that 
A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense,


It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".

it's a bit of a chicken and egg situation (though luckily evolution can answer that 
one). Some more information would be appreciated.


But I generally consider ontolgy to be derivative.  You gather data, create 
a model,
test it.  If it passes every test, makes good predictions, fits with other 
theories,
then you think it's a pretty good model and may be telling you what the 
world is
like.  THEN you look at and ask what are the essential parts of it, what 
does it
require to exist.  But that's more of a philosophical than a scientific 
enterprise,
because, as in QM, there maybe radically different ways to ascribe an 
ontology to
the same mathematical system.  Even Bruno's very abstract theory is 
ambiguous about
whether the ur-stuff is arithmetic or threads of computation.  You can 
probably show
they are empirically equivalent - just like Hilbert space and Feynman paths 
give the
same answers but are ontologically quite different.


OK. How you get to it is, of course, via empiricism (how else?). But so far most 
physicists (that I've come across) have considered that a reductionist ontology is most 
likely to be correct.


What would a non-reductionist ontology look like?  Some kind of Holism. Plotinus talks 
about "The One", but what good is that. If you stop taking this stuff so seriously 
(searching for THE TRUTH) and think of these theories as different models for an 
unknowable reality, then you see that a model with ONE part isn't very useful. You 
immediately then have to start

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On 2 July 2014 05:33, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 7/1/2014 1:01 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 1 July 2014 17:59, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>   ISTM...
>>
>>  In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter /
>> energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those
>> things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental
>> particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the
>> primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved.
>>
>> There are problems with this view if information has primitive status,
>> which would indicate that the real picture is something like "it from bit"
>> or what might be called "primitive informationism". Evidence for PI come
>> from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the
>> Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and
>> (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of
>> information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some
>> other things I don't know about ... perish the thought).
>>
>>  That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental
>> level.  It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical
>> mechanics.
>>
>>   Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit
> reducible to statistical mechanics?
>
> I'd appreciate an answer to this question, if you have one. I can't see
the connection and am genuinely interested, I wasn't being rhetorical.

>PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be
>> a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the "ontological chain"
>> arithmetic -> consciousness -> information -> matter (I think ... this is
>> all "ISTM" of course).
>>
>>  OK, except I think the chain is:
>>
>> arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic
>>
>
>  That doesn't make sense to me. I mean everything except the last term is
> OK, but you're apparently claiming that arithmetic is fundamental AND an
> invention of the human mind. Which at first glance looks suspiciously like
> fence sitting and having and eating your cake...
>
>  Unless you have a theory of circular ontology, of course, in which case
> please fill in a few more details.
>
>  Why?  The details are no different than in the linear case.  In the
> details you look at each "->" separately.  What's different about the
> circular case is that you don't suppose that one of the levels is
> "fundamental" or "primitive".
>

OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively,
saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, it's a
bit of a chicken and egg situation (though luckily evolution can answer
that one). Some more information would be appreciated.


> But I generally consider ontolgy to be derivative.  You gather data,
> create a model, test it.  If it passes every test, makes good predictions,
> fits with other theories, then you think it's a pretty good model and may
> be telling you what the world is like.  THEN you look at and ask what are
> the essential parts of it, what does it require to exist.  But that's more
> of a philosophical than a scientific enterprise, because, as in QM, there
> maybe radically different ways to ascribe an ontology to the same
> mathematical system.  Even Bruno's very abstract theory is ambiguous about
> whether the ur-stuff is arithmetic or threads of computation.  You can
> probably show they are empirically equivalent - just like Hilbert space and
> Feynman paths give the same answers but are ontologically quite different.
>

OK. How you get to it is, of course, via empiricism (how else?). But so far
most physicists (that I've come across) have considered that a reductionist
ontology is most likely to be correct. Of course the majority doesn't rule
in physics, and it's fine that you prefer a circular ontology, I'd just
like to know how it's actually supposed to work, (preferably sans waffle,
if you can manage it).

   and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model
> of the world.
>

 We aren't in a position to do more than build models of the world. If you
think it's a possible model then that's *all* you can ever claim for it,
well, unless some evidence comes along that disproves it, when you can't
even do that.


>   I think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the
> world; but without supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with
> certainty the world must be that way.
>

 Of course, we can't know for certain what the world is like.

>   As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles
> were something like a "point in a weight diagram" - or something - which
> sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I
> have to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from
> the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this...

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?


On 7/1/2014 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities.  
"Particles" are nothing more than "what satisfies particle equations".  Bruno complains 
about Aristotle and "primitive matter", but I don't know any physicists who go around 
saying,"I've discovered primitive matter."


That's is exactly why I have no complains on physicists. Most are neutral on this. Some 
are christians.


I "complain" only about physicalist. And I don't complain, I just show them 
epistemologically inconsistent if they assumes comp together with physicalism.


I certainly complain when they eliminate person and consciousness.






or "Let's work on finding primitive matter."  They just want a theory that is a little 
more comprehensive, a little more accurate, a little more predictive than the one they 
have now.  And they couldn't care less what stuff is needed in their theory - only that 
it works.



That is your right, but that is not an argument to defend this or that theory when the 
goal is the search of the truth.


I'm all for searching for what is true.  I'm suspicious of searches for THE 
truth.

Brent
Is that the truth?
No, but it's a lot simpler.
  --- Walt Kelly in "Pogo"

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 01 Jul 2014, at 07:59, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote:

ISTM...

In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter /  
energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of  
those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of  
fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever  
else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved.


There are problems with this view if information has primitive  
status, which would indicate that the real picture is something  
like "it from bit" or what might be called "primitive  
informationism". Evidence for PI come  from the entropy  
of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer  
limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and  
(unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit  
of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And  
maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought).


That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a  
fundamental level.  It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to  
statistical mechanics.




PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might  
be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the  
"ontological chain" arithmetic -> consciousness -> information ->  
matter (I think ... this is all "ISTM" of course).


OK, except I think the chain is:

arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic



Arithmetic, even one diophantine equation can supports loop of that  
kind.


There is a "paradoxal" combinator which provides solution to such loop  
Yx = x(Yx). Y provides semantical fixed point, and you can get the  
second recursion theorem too.


Like in general relativity Gödel show the existence of circular time  
loop.


Any way the "->" are not temporal, but logical, or epistemological.





and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible  
model of the world.  I think of it as a way to describe and predict  
and think about the world; but without supposing that it's possible  
to prove or to know with certainty the world must be that way.


The criteria remains the same. That's why I insist that comp + some  
definition of knowledge can be tested.









As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his  
particles were something like a "point in a weight diagram" - or  
something - which sounds to me at least like some form of  
information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding  
of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever  
it's called is, well, about like this...


In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic  
entities.  "Particles" are nothing more than "what satisfies  
particle equations".  Bruno complains about Aristotle and "primitive  
matter", but I don't know any physicists who go around saying,"I've  
discovered primitive matter."


That's is exactly why I have no complains on physicists. Most are  
neutral on this. Some are christians.


I "complain" only about physicalist. And I don't complain, I just show  
them epistemologically inconsistent if they assumes comp together with  
physicalism.


I certainly complain when they eliminate person and consciousness.






or "Let's work on finding primitive matter."  They just want a  
theory that is a little more comprehensive, a little more accurate,  
a little more predictive than the one they have now.  And they  
couldn't care less what stuff is needed in their theory - only that  
it works.



That is your right, but that is not an argument to defend this or that  
theory when the goal is the search of the truth.


Bruno







Brent





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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 01 Jul 2014, at 06:35, LizR wrote:


ISTM...

In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter /  
energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of  
those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of  
fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else  
may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved.


There are problems with this view if information has primitive  
status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like  
"it from bit" or what might be called "primitive informationism".  
Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole  
information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the  
holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the  
requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some  
irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't  
know about ... perish the thought).



Shannon's notion of information, and Kolmogorov-Chaitin-Solovay  
notions of information are purely mathematical (and usually definable  
in arithmetic, but non computable). But quantum information, despite a  
rather precise mathematical formulation,  will be considered as much  
physical as the quantum reality can be, and might be more primitive in  
some attempt to unify the physical laws.







PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might  
be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the  
"ontological chain" arithmetic -> consciousness -> information ->  
matter (I think ... this is all "ISTM" of course).


The question is to interpret that correctly. usually I just prefer to  
ignore the word "information" as it is a tricky word, having many  
sense, from the 3p Shannon notion to the 1p human content-full beliefs  
"informed" with the news, called in french "information", like in "TV  
information".


I would see a lot of intermediate 3p information coming logically  
"before" consciousness. The UD, and thus the sigma_1 sentences can be  
said to handle a lot of information in the 3p sense, but  
consciousness, or just the 1p "creates" the information when it  
differentiates, like looking at an alternate possibilities of the type  
W v M, in self-multiplication (on all relevant sigma_1 sentences).


Roughly, the difference between classical and quantum information is  
that the classical information is entirely determined above your  
substitution level, and the quantum information is entirely determined  
by the infinities of computations below your substitution level. QM  
becomes an empirical evidences that there is a very stable first  
person plural reality, of the type we have to justify by the person  
points of view modalities.







As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles  
were something like a "point in a weight diagram" - or something -  
which sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic  
entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds and  
flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is,  
well, about like this...






Beautiful mathematics, and I tend to believe in this and E8, and the  
Monster group, Moonshine, ...


Normally the arithmetical quantization should justify those groups.

The advantage of comp is that it unifies not just all what we see, but  
also all a large part of what we don't see.


(By the Solovay G/G* difference and its intensional variants).

Bruno











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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On 7/1/2014 1:01 AM, LizR wrote:

On 1 July 2014 17:59, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote:

ISTM...

In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy.
Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things,
like
entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or
Planck
cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive
mass-energy/space-time)
involved.

There are problems with this view if information has primitive status,
which would
indicate that the real picture is something like "it from bit" or what
might be
called "primitive informationism". Evidence for PI come from the entropy of
black
holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the
Beckenstein
bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the
requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible
amount of
energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the
thought).

That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental
level. It's
a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics.

Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to statistical
mechanics?

PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a
necessary
consequence of comp, which would give the "ontological chain" arithmetic ->
consciousness -> information -> matter (I think ... this is all "ISTM" of
course).

OK, except I think the chain is:

arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic

That doesn't make sense to me. I mean everything except the last term is OK, but you're
apparently claiming that arithmetic is fundamental AND an invention of the human mind.
Which at first glance looks suspiciously like fence sitting and having and eating your
cake...

Unless you have a theory of circular ontology, of course, in which case please fill in a
few more details.

Why? The details are no different than in the linear case. In the details you look at
each "->" separately. What's different about the circular case is that you don't suppose
that one of the levels is "fundamental" or "primitive". But I generally consider ontolgy
to be derivative. You gather data, create a model, test it. If it passes every test,
makes good predictions, fits with other theories, then you think it's a pretty good model
and may be telling you what the world is like. THEN you look at and ask what are the
essential parts of it, what does it require to exist. But that's more of a philosophical
than a scientific enterprise, because, as in QM, there maybe radically different ways to
ascribe an ontology to the same mathematical system. Even Bruno's very abstract theory is
ambiguous about whether the ur-stuff is arithmetic or threads of computation. You can
probably show they are empirically equivalent - just like Hilbert space and Feynman paths
give the same answers but are ontologically quite different.

and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model of
the world.

We aren't in a position to do more than build models of the world. If you think it's a
possible model then that's /all/ you can ever claim for it, well, unless some evidence
comes along that disproves it, when you can't even do that.

I think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the world;
but
without supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with certainty the
world
must be that way.

Of course, we can't know for certain what the world is like.

As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were
something
like a "point in a weight diagram" - or something - which sounds to me at
least
like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my
understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or
whatever
it's called is, well, about like this...
In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities.
"Particles" are nothing more than "what satisfies particle equations". Bruno

complains about Aristotle and "primitive matter", but I don't know any
physicists
who go around saying,"I've discovered primitive matter." or "Let's work on
finding
primitive matter."

Well, I think Bruno thinks it's more an unconscious assumption for most physicists,
rather than something explicitly stated. For example your statement about your mother
implicitly assumes her mind is "nothing but" what her brain does. That's a primitive
materialist assumption

But it's not an assumption. There's lots of evidence for it and practically none against
it. I don't think Bruno contests that. He just supposes that this mind/body relation can
be explained from a level he

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On 1 July 2014 17:59, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>   ISTM...
>
>  In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter /
> energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those
> things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental
> particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the
> primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved.
>
> There are problems with this view if information has primitive status,
> which would indicate that the real picture is something like "it from bit"
> or what might be called "primitive informationism". Evidence for PI come
> from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the
> Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and
> (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of
> information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some
> other things I don't know about ... perish the thought).
>
> That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental
> level.  It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical
> mechanics.
>
> Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to
statistical mechanics?

> PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a
> necessary consequence of comp, which would give the "ontological chain"
> arithmetic -> consciousness -> information -> matter (I think ... this is
> all "ISTM" of course).
>
> OK, except I think the chain is:
>
> arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic
>

That doesn't make sense to me. I mean everything except the last term is
OK, but you're apparently claiming that arithmetic is fundamental AND an
invention of the human mind. Which at first glance looks suspiciously like
fence sitting and having and eating your cake...

Unless you have a theory of circular ontology, of course, in which case
please fill in a few more details.

>
> and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model of
> the world.
>

We aren't in a position to do more than build models of the world. If you
think it's a possible model then that's *all* you can ever claim for it,
well, unless some evidence comes along that disproves it, when you can't
even do that.


>   I think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the
> world; but without supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with
> certainty the world must be that way.
>

Of course, we can't know for certain what the world is like.

> As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were
> something like a "point in a weight diagram" - or something - which sounds
> to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have
> to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8
> group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this...
>
> In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic
> entities.  "Particles" are nothing more than "what satisfies particle
> equations".  Bruno complains about Aristotle and "primitive matter", but I
> don't know any physicists who go around saying,"I've discovered primitive
> matter."  or "Let's work on finding primitive matter."
>

Well, I think Bruno thinks it's more an unconscious assumption for most
physicists, rather than something explicitly stated. For example your
statement about your mother implicitly assumes her mind is "nothing but"
what her brain does. That's a primitive materialist assumption (and one
that may be right, of course) but my point is that no one stops to make it
explicit, because nowadays it's deeply ingrained in the thought processes
of anyone who isn't strongly religious, and "goes without saying".


> They just want a theory that is a little more comprehensive, a little more
> accurate, a little more predictive than the one they have now.  And they
> couldn't care less what stuff is needed in their theory - only that it
> works.
>

So why the century-long kerfuffle about the correct interpretation of
quantum mechanics? :-)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-30 Thread meekerdb

On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote:

ISTM...

In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information
is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of
these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or
whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved.

There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would
indicate that the real picture is something like "it from bit" or what might be called
"primitive informationism". Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the
black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the
holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing
a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other
things I don't know about ... perish the thought).

That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental level. It's a
thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics.

PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary
consequence of comp, which would give the "ontological chain" arithmetic ->
consciousness -> information -> matter (I think ... this is all "ISTM" of course).

OK, except I think the chain is:

arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic

and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model of the world. I
think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the world; but without
supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with certainty the world must be that way.

As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were something like
a "point in a weight diagram" - or something - which sounds to me at least like some
form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds
and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like
this...

In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities. "Particles"
are nothing more than "what satisfies particle equations". Bruno complains about
Aristotle and "primitive matter", but I don't know any physicists who go around
saying,"I've discovered primitive matter." or "Let's work on finding primitive matter."
They just want a theory that is a little more comprehensive, a little more accurate, a
little more predictive than the one they have now. And they couldn't care less what stuff
is needed in their theory - only that it works.

Brent

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-30 Thread LizR

ISTM...

In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy.
Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things,
like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles,
or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive
mass-energy/space-time) involved.

There are problems with this view if information has primitive status,
which would indicate that the real picture is something like "it from bit"
or what might be called "primitive informationism". Evidence for PI come
from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the
Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and
(unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of
information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some
other things I don't know about ... perish the thought).

PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a
necessary consequence of comp, which would give the "ontological chain"
arithmetic -> consciousness -> information -> matter (I think ... this is
all "ISTM" of course).

As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were
something like a "point in a weight diagram" - or something - which sounds
to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have
to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8
group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this...

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 29 Jun 2014, at 21:20, LizR wrote:

On 29 June 2014 20:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law
of the qubits ("quantum logic") from the laws of the bits (the laws
of Boole, + Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the
road qubits to bits. But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of
that road, which separates quanta and qualia (normally, although
quanta must be a first person plural).

It sounds to me as though you are saying that information is real
if arithmetic is real...?

What do you mean by "real" here?

The question is not so much about what is real, but about what is
primitively real.

With computationalism, and the TOE chosen, 0, s(0), ... and + and *
are primitively real, as we assume the RA axioms. Information is
derived from it, both the classical one, and the quantum one.

But a physicist like Landauer(*) would say that "information" is
real because it is an essentially physical things:

(*)
http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~biophy09/Biophysik-Vorlesung_2009-2010_DATA/QUELLEN/LIT/A/B/3/Landauer_1996_physical_nature_information.pdf

(If so, deriving the entropy of a black hole would be support for
comp :-)

I don't see why. It would be consistent with Landauer's notion of
physical information, ISTM.

Maybe I jumped the gun here, or something.

I should have written: "It would be consistent with Landauer's notion
of *primitive* physical information, ISTM."

Deriving the entropy of a black hole seems to me - upon reflection -
to show that information is physically real,

That's not clear to me. deriving the number of items in my fridge
might makes those items real, but not necessarily the number itself
real. I mean that a physicalist can argue in that sense.

so it makes it as real as the physical world.

Not for a primitive materialist, who will say that the information are
only in your mind.

According to comp the physical world is not primitively real, so
information would be not primitively real either.

No. Although you get shannon information quasi directly with the self-
duplication, and get some trace of the quantum information in the
first person plural. OK.

However, it WOULD be physically real,

The quantum one, yes.

which is a step away from "just something convenient for humans to
use" (like temperature, as mentioned elsewhere).

I agree.

This seems to accord with fundamental particles appearing to be
little bundles of information, which I think is roughly A Garrett
Lisi's view, amongst others (JA Wheeler?)

JA Wheeler, sure. Garret Lisi? If you can give a quote. I don't see
him even addressing the question of the nature of "his particles". He
proposed a very cute and quasi-convincing theory (except it does not
work), very mathematical. But he does not address the "reality"
question. May be I am wrong on this, but then I would be happy with a
reference.

The fact that only "erasing information" needs energy is fascinating,
and still a bit weird in the comp perspective. It might be a very
fundamental fact, and the shadow of it in arithmetic might be the
symmetry of the logic of observable on the atomic (sigma_1)
proposition, and the antisymmetry just above. But I don't want get too
much technical.

Bruno

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-29 Thread LizR

On 29 June 2014 20:04, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law of the
> qubits ("quantum logic") from the laws of the bits (the laws of Boole, +
> Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the road qubits to bits.
> But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of that road, which separates
> quanta and qualia (normally, although quanta must be a first person plural).
>
>
>> It sounds to me as though you are saying that information is real if
> arithmetic is real...?
>
> What do you mean by "real" here?
>
> The question is not so much about what is real, but about what is
> primitively real.
>
> With computationalism, and the TOE chosen, 0, s(0), ... and + and * are
> primitively real, as we assume the RA axioms.  Information is derived from
> it, both the classical one, and the quantum one.
>
> But a physicist like Landauer(*) would say that "information" is real
> because it is an essentially physical things:
>
>
> (*)
> http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~biophy09/Biophysik-Vorlesung_2009-2010_DATA/QUELLEN/LIT/A/B/3/Landauer_1996_physical_nature_information.pdf
>
>
> (If so, deriving the entropy of a black hole would be support for comp :-)
>
>
> I don't see why. It would be consistent with Landauer's notion of physical
> information, ISTM.
>

Maybe I jumped the gun here, or something. Deriving the entropy of a black
hole seems to me - upon reflection - to show that information is physically
real, so it makes it as real as the physical world. According to comp the
physical world is not primitively real, so information would be not
primitively real either. However, it WOULD be physically real, which is a
step away from "just something convenient for humans to use" (like
temperature, as mentioned elsewhere).

This seems to accord with fundamental particles appearing to be little
bundles of information, which I think is roughly A Garrett Lisi's view,
amongst others (JA Wheeler?)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-29 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 26 Jun 2014, at 03:55, LizR wrote:

On 26 June 2014 03:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 May 2014, at 00:17, LizR wrote:

On 28 May 2014 19:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote:

On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb wrote:
I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and
therefore consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical
instantiation is dispensable.

Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's
necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental)
thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to
us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the
Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this
is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information
paradox too?)

I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the
"reification of information" it on, though.
As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos -
neither maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like
"complexity". Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott
Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818

As usual I don't have time to read that paper, at least not
immediately. However I see that defining complexity appear to
require coarse graining. If so, I would take this to mean that
there isn't anything fundamental being defined - or at least that
we're in a grey area where nothing is known to be fundamental. On
the other hand, entropy used to require coarse graining but as I
mentioned above has now been defined for black holes, so assuming
BHs really exist (and the things we think are BHs aren't some other
type of massive object of an undefined nature) that would at least
suggest that fundamental physics involves entropy, and hence
information.

Is there any complexity measure that doesn;t involve CG and hence
isn't just (imho) "in the eye of the beholder" ?

Computer science provides a lot of definition for complexity, below
the computable, like SPACE or TIME needed, related to tractability
issues and above the computable, like the degree of unsolvability
shown to exists by using machine + oracles (for example).

Those notion are typically not in the eye of the beholder, as they
are the same for all universal numbers. Computer scientist says that
they are machine-independent notion. They remain invariant for the
change of the base of the phi_i.

With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law
of the qubits ("quantum logic") from the laws of the bits (the laws
of Boole, + Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the
road qubits to bits. But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of
that road, which separates quanta and qualia (normally, although
quanta must be a first person plural).

It sounds to me as though you are saying that information is real if
arithmetic is real...?

What do you mean by "real" here?

The question is not so much about what is real, but about what is
primitively real.

With computationalism, and the TOE chosen, 0, s(0), ... and + and *
are primitively real, as we assume the RA axioms. Information is
derived from it, both the classical one, and the quantum one.

But a physicist like Landauer(*) would say that "information" is real
because it is an essentially physical things:

(*)
http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~biophy09/Biophysik-Vorlesung_2009-2010_DATA/QUELLEN/LIT/A/B/3/Landauer_1996_physical_nature_information.pdf

(If so, deriving the entropy of a black hole would be support for
comp :-)

I don't see why. It would be consistent with Landauer's notion of
physical information, ISTM.

Bruno

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-25 Thread LizR

On 26 June 2014 03:49, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 29 May 2014, at 00:17, LizR wrote:
>
> On 28 May 2014 19:46, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>> I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore
>>> consciousness) can exist without physics.  That physical instantiation is
>>> dispensable.
>>>
>>
>>  Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary
>> to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than
>> something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the
>> entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic
>> principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black
>> hole information paradox too?)
>>
>> I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the "reification
>> of information" it on, though.
>>
>> As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither
>> maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like "complexity".
>> Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll
>> and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818
>>
>
> As usual I don't have time to read that paper, at least not immediately.
> However I see that defining complexity appear to require coarse graining.
> If so, I would take this to mean that there isn't anything fundamental
> being defined - or at least that we're in a grey area where nothing is
> known to be fundamental. On the other hand, entropy used to require coarse
> graining but as I mentioned above has now been defined for black holes, so
> assuming BHs really exist (and the things we think are BHs aren't some
> other type of massive object of an undefined nature) that would at least
> suggest that fundamental physics involves entropy, and hence information.
>
> Is there any complexity measure that doesn;t involve CG and hence isn't
> just (imho) "in the eye of the beholder" ?
>
>
> Computer science provides a lot of definition for complexity, below the
> computable, like SPACE or TIME needed, related to tractability issues and
> above the computable, like the degree of unsolvability shown to exists by
> using machine + oracles (for example).
>
> Those notion are typically not in the eye of the beholder, as they are the
> same for all universal numbers. Computer scientist says that they are
> machine-independent notion. They remain invariant for the change of the
> base of the phi_i.
>
> With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law of the
> qubits ("quantum logic") from the laws of the bits (the laws of Boole, +
> Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the road qubits to bits.
> But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of that road, which separates
> quanta and qualia (normally, although quanta must be a first person plural).
>
> It sounds to me as though you are saying that information is real if
arithmetic is real...?

(If so, deriving the entropy of a black hole would be support for comp :-)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-25 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 29 May 2014, at 00:17, LizR wrote:


On 28 May 2014 19:46, meekerdb  wrote:
On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote:

On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb  wrote:
I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and  
therefore consciousness) can exist without physics.  That physical  
instantiation is dispensable.


Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's  
necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental)  
thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to  
us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the  
Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this  
is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information  
paradox too?)


I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the  
"reification of information" it on, though.
As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos -  
neither maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like  
"complexity".  Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott  
Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818


As usual I don't have time to read that paper, at least not  
immediately. However I see that defining complexity appear to  
require coarse graining. If so, I would take this to mean that there  
isn't anything fundamental being defined - or at least that we're in  
a grey area where nothing is known to be fundamental. On the other  
hand, entropy used to require coarse graining but as I mentioned  
above has now been defined for black holes, so assuming BHs really  
exist (and the things we think are BHs aren't some other type of  
massive object of an undefined nature) that would at least suggest  
that fundamental physics involves entropy, and hence information.


Is there any complexity measure that doesn;t involve CG and hence  
isn't just (imho) "in the eye of the beholder" ?


Computer science provides a lot of definition for complexity, below  
the computable, like SPACE or TIME needed, related to tractability  
issues and above the computable, like the degree of unsolvability  
shown to exists by using machine + oracles (for example).


Those notion are typically not in the eye of the beholder, as they are  
the same for all universal numbers. Computer scientist says that they  
are machine-independent notion. They remain invariant for the change  
of the base of the phi_i.


With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law of  
the qubits ("quantum logic") from the laws of the bits (the laws of  
Boole, + Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the road  
qubits to bits. But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of that  
road, which separates quanta and qualia (normally, although quanta  
must be a first person plural).


Bruno









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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-25 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 28 May 2014, at 04:36, LizR wrote:


On 28 May 2014 14:12,  wrote:
On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to  
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to  
show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...


I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't  
gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did  
try to drop it. I shall probably try again.


Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to  
follow the arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very  
much. I know Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything,  
which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an  
awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from  
computation ...



Just to make this more precise, the starting idea is not really that  
consciousness arises from a computation, but more that consciousness  
is invariant for the change of universal machines below its local  
machine substitution level.






but I guess some relatively simple idea can sometimes lead to a huge  
theory ...


Yes.




maybe when (or if) I get to grips with the MGA and the logic  
involved in deriving some features of physics from comp, I might  
have something more sensible to say on the matter,


Do you understand that the reversal occurs at step seven, if you  
accept the protocol?


In step seven, we have already the basic shape of the physical laws:  
they have to be a statistic (a mean of quantifying uncertainty) on all  
computations going through "your state" (defined indexically with  
Gödel's/Kleene's method, cf Dx =: 'xx' => DD =: 'DD').


Of course, a physicalist can still save the identity mind-brain link  
by making the physical universe "small" (= without concrete UD running  
in it forever).


But already at this stage, the move seems to be motivated only by  
avoiding looking at a possible (and testable) explanation of the  
origin of the physical laws, and such a move does not solve neither  
the problem of consciousness, nor the problem of matter. So step 8,  
despite its intrinsic interest, is used in the UDA only for the  
nitpicking mind who believe such move can make sense "rationally";  
Step 8 shows that it endows the primitive matter with magical  
properties, whose role in both matter and consciousness has to be made  
magical on purpose. It makes primitive matter isomorphic to a god-of- 
the-gap, and here it is made to avoid a problem whose testable  
solution would solve the mind-body problem, or refute comp (assuming  
we are not dreaming or in an emulation).


Bruno







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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-09 Thread ghibbsa



On Sunday, June 8, 2014 9:13:28 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Jun 2014, at 00:08, ghi...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:49:30 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> "My" theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the 
> amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) "yes 
> doctor" (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for 
> giving sense to "artificial brain" and "doctor".
> By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis 
> much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not 
> prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we 
> know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong 
> hypothesis, with consequence as "radical" as reminding us that Plato was 
> Aristotle teacher, and that his "theory" was not Aristotelian (at least in 
> the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued 
> to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends).
>
> So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp theory 
> (which is arguably a very old idea).
>
> Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even take 
> offense that we can imagine not following comp.
>
>
> Because they might not. This is a  problem, because the other thing you do 
> is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. So 
> you are dominating people. 
>
>
> Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a 
> flaw if you think there is one).
>
> I show comp -> something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, 
> I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is 
> admittedly counter-intuitive. 
>
>
>
>
> Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in 
> extre dimensional reality? 
>
>
> First, I don't express myself in that way.  
>
> For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its 
> logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that 
> matter goes on in extradimensional reality.
>
> With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine if 
> its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or has a 
> very large cardinal.
>
> Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary arithmetic 
> (like Robinson arithmetic). 
>
> I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and 
> the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology.
>
>
>
> Do theybelieve in MWI 
>
>
> This is ambiguous.
>
> In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of "super-atheism", as a 
> (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become 
> skeptical) on both a creator and a creation.
>
> So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory.
>
> What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the 
> set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in 
> the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That 
> is not mine, that is standard material.
>
> You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the 
> beginning.  
>
>
> Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.
>
>
>  You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. 
> Russell Standish read it...he understood. 
>
> So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. 
>
>
> I obviously shouldn't have said this, so am sorry for doing so. 
>
>
> It is not the first time you "explode".
>

It's not even the first time you read the falsification description that 
you had demanded. Are you connected enough to reality to actually see how 
disrespectful and insulting this is? You are one set of traits for when its 
about coddling people through your steps and selling your theory. But you 
sat there and let me sweat trying to repeat myself endlessly. I think you 
think, a lot different than you've managed to sell to people. Don't bother 
denying and pretending you did read...do it for non-judgemental rapture of 
the others. I know you didn't, because I know you never changed your line 
one bit...never acknowledged the position, never explained why it wrong, or 
right. Never even tried...even superficiously to walk me or anyone through 
your claims, and my theory in parallel, demonstrating the connectors. 

There's a bit more, or less, to you than the 
angelic self-depracting front. Something of the Night 

>
>
>
>
> But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not 
> responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him 
> to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn'

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-09 Thread ghibbsa



On Sunday, June 8, 2014 4:41:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> Oops. I meant to say more but hit a wrong key and somehow sent that above 
> one-liner. And there's no way to edit your posts...oh well, to continue...
>  
>
> On 8 June 2014 10:08, > wrote:
>
> But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not 
> responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him 
> to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would 
> demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no 
> case to answer'. Silence from PGC.
>
>
> I'm afraid I missed this. I don't have time to read everything and 
> especially tend to skip those incredibly long posts with stuff interpolated 
> (is that the word?) into the text and nested 15 levels deep. And I am quite 
> interested in this argument, too! That is, I believe I can see both sides, 
> so I am interested in evidence for either. As I jokingly say, on days with 
> an R in them I feel Bruno has the answer to life, the universe and 
> everything, on the other days I feel the force of the materialist 
> objections (amongst others) and feel that they "refute it THUS!"
>
>  
> PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the 
> guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he 
> ever described anything he believes in, in plain English?
>
>
> I'm sure I've seen some plain English posts from PGC, and some that seem 
> to me to make good points. But I can't quote chapter and verse on that. But 
> flowery language abounds here, methinks, so I try to parse it and either it 
> looks like a camel to me, my lord, or a cloud.
>

He speaks from behind a veneer. Average to writers block.  

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-09 Thread ghibbsa



On Sunday, June 8, 2014 4:41:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> Oops. I meant to say more but hit a wrong key and somehow sent that above 
> one-liner. And there's no way to edit your posts...oh well, to continue...
>  
>
>> On 8 June 2014 10:08, > wrote:
>>
>>> But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not 
>>> responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him 
>>> to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would 
>>> demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no 
>>> case to answer'. Silence from PGC.
>>>
>>
>> I'm afraid I missed this. I don't have time to read everything and 
> especially tend to skip those incredibly long posts with stuff interpolated 
> (is that the word?) into the text and nested 15 levels deep. And I am quite 
> interested in this argument, too! That is, I believe I can see both sides, 
> so I am interested in evidence for either. As I jokingly say, on days with 
> an R in them I feel Bruno has the answer to life, the universe and 
> everything, on the other days I feel the force of the materialist 
> objections (amongst others) and feel that they "refute it THUS!"
>
>>  
>>> PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the 
>>> guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he 
>>> ever described anything he believes in, in plain English?
>>>
>>
> I'm sure I've seen some plain English posts from PGC, and some that seem 
> to me to make good points. But I can't quote chapter and verse on that. But 
> flowery language abounds here, methinks, so I try to parse it and either it 
> looks like a camel to me, my lord, or a cloud.
>
>>  
>>> Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at 
>>> explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their 
>>> dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this 
>>> despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast 
>>> majority of science, historically and now would agree with?
>>>
>>
> You should see me on the Tronnies thread, or trying to explain why time 
> symmetry in physics may be important for understanding quantum theory. 
> YANA.You are not alone. 
>
>>  
>>> And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments 
>>> about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic 
>>> accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life 
>>> for us, consciousness not being generated by our brains...direct links to 
>>> MWI. That latest argument, I simply rejected by pointing out that not 
>>> everyone does accept MWI, who accept QM.
>>>
>>
> No, indeed not. Although sometimes the reasons aren't very convincing (Jim 
> Al Khalili just really likes Bohm's take, or so he told me). But anyway 
> consensus views get short  thrift on this forum
>

You touch on something plausibly near the root and heart of the 
'worldsense'  ever more predominant at the frontiers of knowledge. 

That *is* a consensus, and short shrift is what the dissenters get much 
more I should say. That's the consensus that matters sweet fruit. I 
perceive te consensus as profoundly rigid...as like a foreign country 
with its own language, translation services fully serviced 24 hours Arthur 
dents disused filing cabinet cellar stairs missing. Self 
contained/referencing, explanation good, nice body boat race can't 
understand a bloody word, one avoids translation so dull. 
an

It isn't necessarily a virtue dismissing long standing time tested 
scientific knowledgedismissing method as 'philosophical overlay' is 
deeply flawed.  The component of consensus due short shrift is the hear 
today gone tomorrow notions what it's all about. But I was talking about 
something that has been there since the beginning. I don't think it'll be 
falsification gone tomorrow of what's laid across this stall. 

What else? Oh yesI still fancy you nuts all the same...intellectually 
speaking of course.fleeting memoryI was in Sydney in 1976 just a 
little kid, some babysitter showed up like I'd never met before, stuck 
'Barbarella' on the telly for me and disappeared upstairs with some 
chick. A deal I could buy for a dollar. Aussie's are just so fabulous. 

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Jun 2014, at 23:42, LizR wrote:


On 9 June 2014 09:16, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 08 Jun 2014, at 05:41, LizR wrote:

Yes comp strikes me as highly controversial, which is why have been  
trying to get to grips with it, to decide where I stand. But I have  
got stuck at the MGA and (I think) some Kripkean logic.


If you get step 3 I am already glad. Step 7 needs the understanding  
of the notion of universal number when written in some (Turing  
universal) base.


I recall the number u is universal (in the base phi_i), if  
phi_u()= phi_x(y). Such u is sigma_1 complete, and becomes  
Löbian when he proves p -> []p for all p sigma_1.


What you miss, and many miss, is the mathematical, actually  
arithmetical definition of "beweisbar", the "[]p" hypostase which is  
the one which explains the presence of all its "rivals", the "[]p &  
p", notably.


The creative bomb is Gödel's theorem, and the discovery of the  
universal machine (hated and loved by different mathematicians, and  
which does bring some amount of mess in Platonia.


Well I believe I understand Godel's theorem - in its word-based  
form, at least. Understanding it arithmetically (i.e. properly) is  
more of a challenge.


OK.






I can't get even an infinity of computations to grok some of that  
stuff.


Nobodies does.

Thank you for those kind words. (Also I feel "nobodies" is an  
interesting word and should be a crossword solution, because it  
contains quite a few other words ... no/bo/dies ... I will add it to  
my collection.)


I will ask copyrights for my typo errors! I will get rich!






More precisely. No sigma_1 complete and pi_1 incomplete (machines)  
entities does.
Pi_1 complete set (which are still arithmetical, but no more  
computable) can solve much more, but are still incomplete with  
respect to the arithmetical truth.


But come on! All you need is a good diary, patience, and well, you  
might have good manuals with you like the Mendelson, Boolos,  
Smorynski, and you might need to see by your own eyes the  
equivalence between a bunch of universal numbers/languages/machines/ 
systems.


I haven't given up! But things keep happening ... distractions ...  
work, housework, children, husband ...


Take it easy.




I ask myself if the confusion between p->q and q->p should not be  
punished by laws, as propaganda.


Probably, if stated a little more wordily. I encounter that often  
enough.


I think the confusion of p->q and q->p might be an example of  
something which can have an advantage in Darwinian selection, yet a  
disadvantage in the long run. That's why evolution eventually  
"invented" the brain.






Legalized drugs, make propaganda, and lies in advertising,  
punishable perhaps ...


Yeah! (Swinging sixties here I come!)


 Well hippies were against war. Here I suggest a war against those  
who lies systematically and I want they to pay for all the stress, the  
pain and the death they are responsible for.  But the sixties were not  
bad :)


Bruno




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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-08 Thread LizR

On 9 June 2014 09:16, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 08 Jun 2014, at 05:41, LizR wrote:
>


> Yes comp strikes me as highly controversial, which is why have been trying
>> to get to grips with it, to decide where I stand. But I have got stuck at
>> the MGA and (I think) some Kripkean logic.
>>
>
> If you get step 3 I am already glad. Step 7 needs the understanding of the
> notion of universal number when written in some (Turing universal) base.
>
> I recall the number u is universal (in the base phi_i), if phi_u()=
> phi_x(y). Such u is sigma_1 complete, and becomes Löbian when he proves p
> -> []p for all p sigma_1.
>
> What you miss, and many miss, is the mathematical, actually arithmetical
> definition of "beweisbar", the "[]p" hypostase which is the one which
> explains the presence of all its "rivals", the "[]p & p", notably.
>
> The creative bomb is Gödel's theorem, and the discovery of the universal
> machine (hated and loved by different mathematicians, and which does bring
> some amount of mess in Platonia.
>

Well I believe I understand Godel's theorem - in its word-based form, at
least. Understanding it arithmetically (i.e. properly) is more of a
challenge.

> I can't get even an infinity of computations to grok some of that stuff.
>
> Nobodies does.
>

Thank you for those kind words. (Also I feel "nobodies" is an interesting
word and should be a crossword solution, because it contains quite a few
other words ... no/bo/dies ... I will add it to my collection.)

>
> More precisely. No sigma_1 complete and pi_1 incomplete (machines)
> entities does.
> Pi_1 complete set (which are still arithmetical, but no more computable)
> can solve much more, but are still incomplete with respect to the
> arithmetical truth.
>
> But come on! All you need is a good diary, patience, and well, you might
> have good manuals with you like the Mendelson, Boolos, Smorynski, and you
> might need to see by your own eyes the equivalence between a bunch of
> universal numbers/languages/machines/systems.
>

I haven't given up! But things keep happening ... distractions ... work,
housework, children, husband ...

I ask myself if the confusion between p->q and q->p should not be punished
> by laws, as propaganda.
>

Probably, if stated a little more wordily. I encounter that often enough.

>
> Legalized drugs, make propaganda, and lies in advertising, punishable
> perhaps ...
>
> Yeah! (Swinging sixties here I come!)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Jun 2014, at 05:41, LizR wrote:

Oops. I meant to say more but hit a wrong key and somehow sent that  
above one-liner. And there's no way to edit your posts...oh well, to  
continue...


On 8 June 2014 10:08,  wrote:
But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not  
responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even  
invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't  
responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped  
responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence  
from PGC.


I'm afraid I missed this. I don't have time to read everything and  
especially tend to skip those incredibly long posts with stuff  
interpolated (is that the word?) into the text and nested 15 levels  
deep. And I am quite interested in this argument, too!



Nice.



That is, I believe I can see both sides, so I am interested in  
evidence for either.


Exactly like me.

And later things aggravate: exactly like all löbian number "in some  
consciousness state".




As I jokingly say, on days with an R in them I feel Bruno has the  
answer to life, the universe and everything, on the other days I  
feel the force of the materialist objections (amongst others) and  
feel that they "refute it THUS!"


"THUS!". Yes. You see the problem.







PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is  
it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in  
here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain  
English?


I'm sure I've seen some plain English posts from PGC, and some that  
seem to me to make good points. But I can't quote chapter and verse  
on that. But flowery language abounds here, methinks, so I try to  
parse it and either it looks like a camel to me, my lord, or a cloud.


Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at  
explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value  
their dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand  
all of this despite it being me to be mentioning a take on  
falsification that the vast majority of science, historically and  
now would agree with?


You should see me on the Tronnies thread, or trying to explain why  
time symmetry in physics may be important for understanding quantum  
theory. YANA.You are not alone.


And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive  
arguments about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by  
some sort of logic accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to  
involve things like eternal life for us, consciousness not being  
generated by our brains...direct links to MWI. That latest argument,  
I simply rejected by pointing out that not everyone does accept MWI,  
who accept QM.


No, indeed not. Although sometimes the reasons aren't very  
convincing (Jim Al Khalili just really likes Bohm's take, or so he  
told me). But anyway consensus views get short thrift on this forum.


These are really really controversial claims, and there's no way  
it's reasonable to think that if someone accepts comp as some high  
level proposal, that if they were forced to choose between that and  
all of the above, they can be relied on to stick with comp.


And if they can't be relied on...if there's a reasonable prospect  
scientists will rather reject comp than accept infinities of dreams,  
and eternal life, and consciousness outside the body...if there's a  
reasonable chance they'll rather reject comp than accept that, then  
the thing to do WITH INTEGRITY is acknowledge that, and not be going  
around saying they accept something.


Yes comp strikes me as highly contraversial, which is why have been  
trying to get to grips with it, to decide where I stand. But I have  
got stuck at the MGA and (I think) some Kripkean logic.


If you get step 3 I am already glad. Step 7 needs the understanding of  
the notion of universal number when written in some (Turing universal)  
base.


I recall the number u is universal (in the base phi_i), if  
phi_u()= phi_x(y). Such u is sigma_1 complete, and becomes Löbian  
when he proves p -> []p for all p sigma_1.


What you miss, and many miss, is the mathematical, actually  
arithmetical definition of "beweisbar", the "[]p" hypostase which is  
the one which explains the presence of all its "rivals", the "[]p &  
p", notably.


The creative bomb is Gödel's theorem, and the discovery of the  
universal machine (hated and loved by different mathematicians, and  
which does bring some amount of mess in Platonia.




I can't get even an infinity of computations to grok some of that  
stuff.


Nobodies does.

More precisely. No sigma_1 complete and pi_1 incomplete (machines)  
entities does.
Pi_1 complete set (which are still arithmetical, but no more  
computable) can solve much more, but are still incomplete with respect  
to the arithmetical truth.


But come on! All you need is a good diary, patience, and well, you  
might have good manuals with

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Jun 2014, at 00:08, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:49:30 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
"My" theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en  
the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and  
2) "yes doctor" (and the amount of turing universality in the  
neighborhood for giving sense to "artificial brain" and "doctor".
By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the  
hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature.  
This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with  
respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically*  
extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as "radical" as  
reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his "theory"  
was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle  
followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a  
platonist, like some scholars defends).


So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp  
theory (which is arguably a very old idea).


Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can  
even take offense that we can imagine not following comp.



Because they might not. This is a  problem, because the other thing  
you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you  
r theory. So you are dominating people.


Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to  
show a flaw if you think there is one).


I show comp -> something. Of course, after 1500 years of  
Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the  
reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive.





Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on  
in extre dimensional reality?


First, I don't express myself in that way.

For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning  
its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which  
think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality.


With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal  
machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural  
numbers) or has a very large cardinal.


Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary  
arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic).


I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter,  
and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology.




Do theybelieve in MWI

This is ambiguous.

In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of "super-atheism",  
as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or  
become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation.


So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory.

What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure  
determine the set of all emulations, indeed with an important  
redundancy. They exist in the sense that you can prove their  
existence in elementary arithmetic. That is not mine, that is  
standard material.


You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since  
the beginning.


Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.

 You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification.  
Russell Standish read it...he understood.


So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months.

I obviously shouldn't have said this, so am sorry for doing so.


It is not the first time you "explode".





But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not  
responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even  
invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't  
responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped  
responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence  
from PGC.


PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is  
it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in  
here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain  
English?


Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at  
explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value  
their dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand  
all of this despite it being me to be mentioning a take on  
falsification that the vast majority of science, historically and  
now would agree with?


But you have not succeeded that comp + "the arithmetical theaetetus"  
is not experimentally testable in that very sense.
Unless you introduce "wordplay"-difficulties just to prevent the  
admittedly naive but precise interview of the löbian number to take on.


I really would not like being patronizing but let me give you an  
advise: never complains when people says "I don't understand you".  
Just reply by making the point

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-07 Thread LizR

Oops. I meant to say more but hit a wrong key and somehow sent that above
one-liner. And there's no way to edit your posts...oh well, to continue...


> On 8 June 2014 10:08,  wrote:
>
>> But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not
>> responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him
>> to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would
>> demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no
>> case to answer'. Silence from PGC.
>>
>
> I'm afraid I missed this. I don't have time to read everything and
especially tend to skip those incredibly long posts with stuff interpolated
(is that the word?) into the text and nested 15 levels deep. And I am quite
interested in this argument, too! That is, I believe I can see both sides,
so I am interested in evidence for either. As I jokingly say, on days with
an R in them I feel Bruno has the answer to life, the universe and
everything, on the other days I feel the force of the materialist
objections (amongst others) and feel that they "refute it THUS!"

>
>> PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the
>> guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he
>> ever described anything he believes in, in plain English?
>>
>
I'm sure I've seen some plain English posts from PGC, and some that seem to
me to make good points. But I can't quote chapter and verse on that. But
flowery language abounds here, methinks, so I try to parse it and either it
looks like a camel to me, my lord, or a cloud.

>
>> Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at
>> explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their
>> dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this
>> despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast
>> majority of science, historically and now would agree with?
>>
>
You should see me on the Tronnies thread, or trying to explain why time
symmetry in physics may be important for understanding quantum theory.
YANA.You are not alone.

>
>> And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments
>> about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic
>> accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life
>> for us, consciousness not being generated by our brains...direct links to
>> MWI. That latest argument, I simply rejected by pointing out that not
>> everyone does accept MWI, who accept QM.
>>
>
No, indeed not. Although sometimes the reasons aren't very convincing (Jim
Al Khalili just really likes Bohm's take, or so he told me). But anyway
consensus views get short thrift on this forum.

>
>> These are really really controversial claims, and there's no way it's
>> reasonable to think that if someone accepts comp as some high level
>> proposal, that if they were forced to choose between that and all of the
>> above, they can be relied on to stick with comp.
>>
>> And if they can't be relied on...if there's a reasonable prospect
>> scientists will rather reject comp than accept infinities of dreams, and
>> eternal life, and consciousness outside the body...if there's a reasonable
>> chance they'll rather reject comp than accept that, then the thing to do
>> WITH INTEGRITY is acknowledge that, and not be going around saying they
>> accept something.
>>
>> Yes comp strikes me as highly contraversial, which is why have been
trying to get to grips with it, to decide where I stand. But I have got
stuck at the MGA and (I think) some Kripkean logic. I can't get even an
infinity of computations to grok some of that stuff.

>
>> I'm dropping this now. I'm technically saying sorry for calling someone a
>> liar, but for everything else I think the integrity issues are somewhere
>> else. And it really doesn't matter if you all want to gang up and not see
>> any of these issues. Collective blindspots are hardly anything new in the
>> world.
>>
>> I think "gang up" is probably the last thing the members of this forum
will do!

("Die, my dear Doctor? Why, that's the last thing I shall do!")

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-07 Thread LizR

On 8 June 2014 10:08,  wrote:

> On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:49:30 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> "My" theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the
>> amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) "yes
>> doctor" (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for
>> giving sense to "artificial brain" and "doctor".
>> By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis
>> much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not
>> prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we
>> know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong
>> hypothesis, with consequence as "radical" as reminding us that Plato was
>> Aristotle teacher, and that his "theory" was not Aristotelian (at least in
>> the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued
>> to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends).
>>
>> So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp
>> theory (which is arguably a very old idea).
>>
>> Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even
>> take offense that we can imagine not following comp.
>>
>>
>> Because they might not. This is a  problem, because the other thing you
>> do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory.
>> So you are dominating people.
>>
>>
>> Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a
>> flaw if you think there is one).
>>
>> I show comp -> something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism,
>> I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is
>> admittedly counter-intuitive.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in
>> extre dimensional reality?
>>
>>
>> First, I don't express myself in that way.
>>
>> For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its
>> logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that
>> matter goes on in extradimensional reality.
>>
>> With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine
>> if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or
>> has a very large cardinal.
>>
>> Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary
>> arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic).
>>
>> I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and
>> the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology.
>>
>>
>>
>> Do theybelieve in MWI
>>
>>
>> This is ambiguous.
>>
>> In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of "super-atheism", as a
>> (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become
>> skeptical) on both a creator and a creation.
>>
>> So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory.
>>
>> What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the
>> set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in
>> the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That
>> is not mine, that is standard material.
>>
>> You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the
>> beginning.
>>
>>
>> Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.
>>
>>
>>  You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification.
>> Russell Standish read it...he understood.
>>
>> So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months.
>>
>
> I obviously shouldn't have said this, so am sorry for doing so.
>

That's OK. We all get a bit carried away at times.

>
> But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not
> responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him
> to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would
> demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no
> case to answer'. Silence from PGC.
>



>
> PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the
> guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he
> ever described anything he believes in, in plain English?
>
> Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at
> explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their
> dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this
> despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast
> majority of science, historically and now would agree with?
>
> And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments
> about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic
> accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life
> for us, consciousness not being generated

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-07 Thread ghibbsa



On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:49:30 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> "My" theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the 
> amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) "yes 
> doctor" (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for 
> giving sense to "artificial brain" and "doctor".
> By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis 
> much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not 
> prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we 
> know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong 
> hypothesis, with consequence as "radical" as reminding us that Plato was 
> Aristotle teacher, and that his "theory" was not Aristotelian (at least in 
> the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued 
> to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends).
>
> So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp theory 
> (which is arguably a very old idea).
>
> Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even take 
> offense that we can imagine not following comp.
>
>
> Because they might not. This is a  problem, because the other thing you do 
> is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. So 
> you are dominating people. 
>
>
> Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a 
> flaw if you think there is one).
>
> I show comp -> something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, 
> I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is 
> admittedly counter-intuitive. 
>
>
>
>
> Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in 
> extre dimensional reality? 
>
>
> First, I don't express myself in that way.  
>
> For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its 
> logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that 
> matter goes on in extradimensional reality.
>
> With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine if 
> its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or has a 
> very large cardinal.
>
> Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary arithmetic 
> (like Robinson arithmetic). 
>
> I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and 
> the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology.
>
>
>
> Do theybelieve in MWI 
>
>
> This is ambiguous.
>
> In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of "super-atheism", as a 
> (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become 
> skeptical) on both a creator and a creation.
>
> So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory.
>
> What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the 
> set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in 
> the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That 
> is not mine, that is standard material.
>
> You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the 
> beginning.  
>
>
> Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.
>
>
>  You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. 
> Russell Standish read it...he understood. 
>
> So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. 
>

I obviously shouldn't have said this, so am sorry for doing so. 

But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not 
responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him 
to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would 
demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no 
case to answer'. Silence from PGC. 

PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the guy's 
flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he ever 
described anything he believes in, in plain English? 

Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at explaining 
what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their dizzy comp 
experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this despite it 
being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast majority of 
science, historically and now would agree with? 

And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments 
about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic 
accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life 
for us, consciousness not being generated by our brains...direct links to 
MWI. That latest argument, I simply rejected by pointing out that not 
everyone does accept MWI, who accept QM. 

These a

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Jun 2014, at 15:02, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:





On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Kim Jones   
wrote:




On 5 Jun 2014, at 8:13 am, LizR  wrote:


On 5 June 2014 07:49,  wrote:

You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since  
the beginning.


Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.

 You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of  
falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood.


So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months.

I don't believe Bruno is a liar.

Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles,  
and see where you differ?


I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems  
you claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it  
does.


As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than  
string theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club,  
though. I've claimed that comp isn't a theory but a logical  
argument, but apparently I was wrong about that. As a theory it  
needs to be testable, which means it can be falsified... So a  
definition of falsification would seem like a good place to start,  
certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one.


So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you  
agree with it?





I strongly doubt that Bruno will respond to this. I wouldn't if I  
were him; not because there is nothing to respond to but because the  
manner of the communication appears to have reached the nadir at  
least from Al. Al, take your meds or whatever you need to destress  
and maybe seriously consider doing the following:


Instead of blathering on a-treat, summarise in no more than four or  
five concise bullet points your notion of falsifiability. Could you  
do that, mate? I for one would welcome this. It has been an enormous  
thread and I think in such cases a revisitation of the main points  
in as simple a format as humanly possible makes sense and would help  
many, including yours truly. Perhaps the plot has been lost. Nobody  
would seriously doubt the seriousness and the passion of your  
approach - that leaps off the screen. You are however, given to  
raving on in a rhapsodic manner about stuff. I simply want to see  
how simply and clearly you can put it all down. Perhaps Bruno might  
welcome that too.


Following that, if you both don't see eye to eye then that will be  
apparent and the nature of the disagreement will be clearly  
revealed. There is no law which requires people to see eye to eye  
about things. Your differences of opinion about falsifiability are  
indeed very interesting and instructive. Stop living in a world of  
"I am right; you are wrong" - that merely reveals your deep  
emotional need for others to agree with you on what you consider  
core issues. Perhaps Bruno means what he says: he doesn't get you.  
If you do what I ask, you can give him his last chance. If he fails  
it in your eyes - well, maybe just get over it, man. Move on. Just  
move on.


Well, my impatient reaction might have something to do with it. If  
so, apologies. It's simply hard for me to see a notion of  
falsification eroding the notions made precise for Church Thesis,  
Turing Universality, incompleteness, QM and QL, Löb, the link to  
Plotinus, by extension UDA etc; just as it's hard to see space time  
curvature supplanted by p-time or the statement that two peoples'  
watches will stay the same traveling at different speed.


There is a lot of great work and a lot of logic to fit any taste as  
precedence for standards of falsification.


Why the QL question is avoided, I cannot understand. Why/how Ghibbsa  
perceives falsification without referencing the appropriate math  
under attack is also beyond me.


You'd have to show where these gentlemen who's work is referenced  
here, went wrong regarding falsification, or where Bruno, who has  
been nothing but a gentleman in this thread, catering to every  
attack with care/respect as a sincere scientific question, did the  
same.


My patience ran out a while ago, like when somebody says something  
serious, but then starts bantering and moving to meta-and seemingly  
unrelated psychological levels and attacks, which is why the thread  
may have turned sour; but I can always flip a switch and give it  
another shot, as I can always be wrong, quite simply.


I can understand Kim's "why would he answer at all?" After this much  
time spent replying to Ghibbsa's posts and dealing with all the  
claims and personal attacks without reference, at some point a  
person will just leave the room; which is not to imply that this is  
such a point, nor that Bruno is such a person. But at some point  
this is understandable. PGC


Good analysis. I should not reply to insults, simply. It is slef- 
deafeating. But ghibbsa was usually polite. That burst astonsihed me.  
That is often (but not always) a symptom of lack of trust in yo

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Jun 2014, at 11:49, Kim Jones wrote:





On 5 Jun 2014, at 8:13 am, LizR  wrote:


On 5 June 2014 07:49,  wrote:

You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since  
the beginning.


Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.

 You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of  
falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood.


So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months.

I don't believe Bruno is a liar.

Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles,  
and see where you differ?


I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems  
you claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it  
does.


As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than  
string theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club,  
though. I've claimed that comp isn't a theory but a logical  
argument, but apparently I was wrong about that. As a theory it  
needs to be testable, which means it can be falsified... So a  
definition of falsification would seem like a good place to start,  
certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one.


So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you  
agree with it?



I strongly doubt that Bruno will respond to this. I wouldn't if I  
were him; not because there is nothing to respond to but because the  
manner of the communication appears to have reached the nadir at  
least from Al. Al, take your meds or whatever you need to destress  
and maybe seriously consider doing the following:


Instead of blathering on a-treat, summarise in no more than four or  
five concise bullet points your notion of falsifiability. Could you  
do that, mate? I for one would welcome this. It has been an enormous  
thread and I think in such cases a revisitation of the main points  
in as simple a format as humanly possible makes sense and would help  
many, including yours truly. Perhaps the plot has been lost. Nobody  
would seriously doubt the seriousness and the passion of your  
approach - that leaps off the screen. You are however, given to  
raving on in a rhapsodic manner about stuff. I simply want to see  
how simply and clearly you can put it all down. Perhaps Bruno might  
welcome that too.


Sure.




Following that, if you both don't see eye to eye then that will be  
apparent and the nature of the disagreement will be clearly  
revealed. There is no law which requires people to see eye to eye  
about things. Your differences of opinion about falsifiability are  
indeed very interesting and instructive. Stop living in a world of  
"I am right; you are wrong" - that merely reveals your deep  
emotional need for others to agree with you on what you consider  
core issues. Perhaps Bruno means what he says: he doesn't get you.  
If you do what I ask, you can give him his last chance. If he fails  
it in your eyes - well, maybe just get over it, man. Move on. Just  
move on.


Yes, I asked him to explain again its falsification notion, and why he  
thinks comp+the classical theory of knowledge is not testable, given  
that it provides the logic of uncertainty, and that it can be compared  
to quantum logic.


For me it is already a "miracle" that the two material logics (Z1*,  
X1*) and even the soul logic (S4Grz1) get an arithmetical quantization  
when the logic is restricted to the sigma_1  sentences.


But you are right, when people insult, answering is very difficult and  
probably unnecessary.


Bruno



Kim






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-05 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Kim Jones  wrote:

>
>
>
> On 5 Jun 2014, at 8:13 am, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 5 June 2014 07:49,  wrote:
>
>>
>> You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the
>> beginning.
>>
>>>
>>> Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.
>>>
>>
>>  You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification.
>> Russell Standish read it...he understood.
>>
>> So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months.
>>
>> I don't believe Bruno is a liar.
>
> Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles, and see
> where you differ?
>
> I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems you
> claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it does.
>
> As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than string
> theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club, though. I've claimed
> that comp isn't a theory but a logical argument, but apparently I was wrong
> about that. As a theory it needs to be testable, which means it can be
> falsified... So a definition of falsification would seem like a good place
> to start, certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one.
>
> So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you agree with
> it?
>
>  I strongly doubt that Bruno will respond to this. I wouldn't if I were
> him; not because there is nothing to respond to but because the manner of
> the communication appears to have reached the nadir at least from Al. Al,
> take your meds or whatever you need to destress and maybe seriously
> consider doing the following:
>
> Instead of blathering on a-treat, summarise in no more than four or five
> concise bullet points your notion of falsifiability. Could you do that,
> mate? I for one would welcome this. It has been an enormous thread and I
> think in such cases a revisitation of the main points in as simple a format
> as humanly possible makes sense and would help many, including yours truly.
> Perhaps the plot has been lost. Nobody would seriously doubt the
> seriousness and the passion of your approach - that leaps off the screen.
> You are however, given to raving on in a rhapsodic manner about stuff. I
> simply want to see how simply and clearly you can put it all down. Perhaps
> Bruno might welcome that too.
>
> Following that, if you both don't see eye to eye then that will be
> apparent and the nature of the disagreement will be clearly revealed. There
> is no law which requires people to see eye to eye about things. Your
> differences of opinion about falsifiability are indeed very interesting and
> instructive. Stop living in a world of "I am right; you are wrong" - that
> merely reveals your deep emotional need for others to agree with you on
> what you consider core issues. Perhaps Bruno means what he says: he doesn't
> get you. If you do what I ask, you can give him his last chance. If he
> fails it in your eyes - well, maybe just get over it, man. Move on. Just
> move on.
>

Well, my impatient reaction might have something to do with it. If so,
apologies. It's simply hard for me to see a notion of falsification eroding
the notions made precise for Church Thesis, Turing Universality,
incompleteness, QM and QL, Löb, the link to Plotinus, by extension UDA etc;
just as it's hard to see space time curvature supplanted by p-time or the
statement that two peoples' watches will stay the same traveling at
different speed.

There is a lot of great work and a lot of logic to fit any taste as
precedence for standards of falsification.

Why the QL question is avoided, I cannot understand. Why/how Ghibbsa
perceives falsification without referencing the appropriate math under
attack is also beyond me.

You'd have to show where these gentlemen who's work is referenced here,
went wrong regarding falsification, or where Bruno, who has been nothing
but a gentleman in this thread, catering to every attack with care/respect
as a sincere scientific question, did the same.

My patience ran out a while ago, like when somebody says something serious,
but then starts bantering and moving to meta-and seemingly unrelated
psychological levels and attacks, which is why the thread may have turned
sour; but I can always flip a switch and give it another shot, as I can
always be wrong, quite simply.

I can understand Kim's "why would he answer at all?" After this much time
spent replying to Ghibbsa's posts and dealing with all the claims and
personal attacks without reference, at some point a person will just leave
the room; which is not to imply that this is such a point, nor that Bruno
is such a person. But at some point this is understandable. PGC

>
> Kim
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-05 Thread Kim Jones

> On 5 Jun 2014, at 8:13 am, LizR  wrote:
> 
>> On 5 June 2014 07:49,  wrote:
>> 
>> You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the 
>> beginning.  
>>> 
>>> Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.
>> 
>>  You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell 
>> Standish read it...he understood.
>> 
>> So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months.
> I don't believe Bruno is a liar.
> 
> Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles, and see 
> where you differ?
> 
> I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems you claim 
> comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it does.
> 
> As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than string theory! 
> Not sure that puts it into the refutable club, though. I've claimed that comp 
> isn't a theory but a logical argument, but apparently I was wrong about that. 
> As a theory it needs to be testable, which means it can be falsified... So a 
> definition of falsification would seem like a good place to start, certainly. 
> And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one.
> 
> So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you agree with it?
> 
I strongly doubt that Bruno will respond to this. I wouldn't if I were him; not 
because there is nothing to respond to but because the manner of the 
communication appears to have reached the nadir at least from Al. Al, take your 
meds or whatever you need to destress and maybe seriously consider doing the 
following:

Instead of blathering on a-treat, summarise in no more than four or five 
concise bullet points your notion of falsifiability. Could you do that, mate? I 
for one would welcome this. It has been an enormous thread and I think in such 
cases a revisitation of the main points in as simple a format as humanly 
possible makes sense and would help many, including yours truly. Perhaps the 
plot has been lost. Nobody would seriously doubt the seriousness and the 
passion of your approach - that leaps off the screen. You are however, given to 
raving on in a rhapsodic manner about stuff. I simply want to see how simply 
and clearly you can put it all down. Perhaps Bruno might welcome that too. 

Following that, if you both don't see eye to eye then that will be apparent and 
the nature of the disagreement will be clearly revealed. There is no law which 
requires people to see eye to eye about things. Your differences of opinion 
about falsifiability are indeed very interesting and instructive. Stop living 
in a world of "I am right; you are wrong" - that merely reveals your deep 
emotional need for others to agree with you on what you consider core issues. 
Perhaps Bruno means what he says: he doesn't get you. If you do what I ask, you 
can give him his last chance. If he fails it in your eyes - well, maybe just 
get over it, man. Move on. Just move on.

Kim

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-04 Thread LizR

On 5 June 2014 07:49,  wrote:

>
> You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the
> beginning.
>
>>
>> Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.
>>
>
>  You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification.
> Russell Standish read it...he understood.
>
> So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months.
>
> I don't believe Bruno is a liar.

Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles, and see
where you differ?

I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems you
claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it does.

As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than string
theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club, though. I've claimed
that comp isn't a theory but a logical argument, but apparently I was wrong
about that. As a theory it needs to be testable, which means it can be
falsified... So a definition of falsification would seem like a good place
to start, certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one.

So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you agree with
it?

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-04 Thread ghibbsa



On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> "My" theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the 
>> amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) "yes 
>> doctor" (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for 
>> giving sense to "artificial brain" and "doctor".
>> By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis 
>> much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not 
>> prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we 
>> know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong 
>> hypothesis, with consequence as "radical" as reminding us that Plato was 
>> Aristotle teacher, and that his "theory" was not Aristotelian (at least in 
>> the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued 
>> to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends).
>>
>> So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp 
>> theory (which is arguably a very old idea).
>>
>> Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even 
>> take offense that we can imagine not following comp.
>>
>>
>> Because they might not. This is a  problem, because the other thing you 
>> do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. 
>> So you are dominating people. 
>>
>>
>> Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a 
>> flaw if you think there is one).
>>
>> I show comp -> something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, 
>> I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is 
>> admittedly counter-intuitive. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in 
>> extre dimensional reality? 
>>
>>
>> First, I don't express myself in that way.  
>>
>> For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its 
>> logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that 
>> matter goes on in extradimensional reality.
>>
>> With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine 
>> if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or 
>> has a very large cardinal.
>>
>> Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary 
>> arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic). 
>>
>> I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and 
>> the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology.
>>
>>
>>
>> Do theybelieve in MWI 
>>
>>
>> This is ambiguous.
>>
>> In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of "super-atheism", as a 
>> (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become 
>> skeptical) on both a creator and a creation.
>>
>> So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory.
>>
>> What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the 
>> set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in 
>> the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That 
>> is not mine, that is standard material.
>>
>> You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the 
> beginning.  
>
>
> Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.
>

 You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. 
Russell Standish read it...he understood. 

So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. 



>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> the infinite multiverse of dreams? 
>>
>>
>> If you agree that the natural numbers obeys to the axioms (with s(x) 
>> intended for the successor of x, that is x+1):
>>
>> 0 ≠ s(x)
>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
>> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
>> x+0 = x
>> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>> x*0=0
>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>>
>> Then you get the "multiverse of dreams" by comp. 
>>
>> Keep in mind the most fundamental theorem of computer science (with 
>> Church Thesis): Universal machines exist. And that theorem is provable in 
>> Robinson arithmetic (in a weak sense), and in Peano Arithmetic (with a 
>> stringer sense).
>>
>>
>>
>> What are the other consequences of the theory. Run me through them.
>>
>>
>> If it helps you to doubt a little bit of physicalism and Aristotelianism, 
>> I am happy enough.
>>
>> The consequence is more a state of mind, an awe in front of something 
>> bigger that we thought (the internal view of arithmetic on itself).  An awe 
>> in front of our ignorance, but also the discovery that such ignorance is 
>> structured, productive, inexhaustible.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> So here I would say that PGC was just saying the normal thing. Most 
>> rationalists believe in comp, and what follows has been peer reviewed 
>> enough. (Then humans are humans, and the notoriety of some people makes 
>> ideas having to wait they died before people talk and think, and speci

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-04 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
"My" theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en  
the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and  
2) "yes doctor" (and the amount of turing universality in the  
neighborhood for giving sense to "artificial brain" and "doctor".
By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the  
hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature.  
This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with  
respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically*  
extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as "radical" as  
reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his "theory"  
was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle  
followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a  
platonist, like some scholars defends).


So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp  
theory (which is arguably a very old idea).


Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can  
even take offense that we can imagine not following comp.



Because they might not. This is a  problem, because the other thing  
you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you  
r theory. So you are dominating people.


Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to  
show a flaw if you think there is one).


I show comp -> something. Of course, after 1500 years of  
Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the  
reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive.





Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on  
in extre dimensional reality?


First, I don't express myself in that way.

For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning  
its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which  
think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality.


With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal  
machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural  
numbers) or has a very large cardinal.


Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary  
arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic).


I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter,  
and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology.




Do theybelieve in MWI

This is ambiguous.

In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of "super-atheism",  
as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or  
become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation.


So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory.

What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure  
determine the set of all emulations, indeed with an important  
redundancy. They exist in the sense that you can prove their  
existence in elementary arithmetic. That is not mine, that is  
standard material.


You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since  
the beginning.


Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it.








the infinite multiverse of dreams?

If you agree that the natural numbers obeys to the axioms (with s(x)  
intended for the successor of x, that is x+1):


0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Then you get the "multiverse of dreams" by comp.

Keep in mind the most fundamental theorem of computer science (with  
Church Thesis): Universal machines exist. And that theorem is  
provable in Robinson arithmetic (in a weak sense), and in Peano  
Arithmetic (with a stringer sense).




What are the other consequences of the theory. Run me through them.

If it helps you to doubt a little bit of physicalism and  
Aristotelianism, I am happy enough.


The consequence is more a state of mind, an awe in front of  
something bigger that we thought (the internal view of arithmetic on  
itself).  An awe in front of our ignorance, but also the discovery  
that such ignorance is structured, productive, inexhaustible.










So here I would say that PGC was just saying the normal thing. Most  
rationalists believe in comp, and what follows has been peer  
reviewed enough. (Then humans are humans, and the notoriety of some  
people makes ideas having to wait they died before people talk and  
think, and special interests and all that, so I admit the results  
are still rather ignored, though some people seems to be inspired by  
them also, hard to say).


No that's not right. There are huge chains of unrefuted logic out  
there. People don't sign up to those chains, they sign up to what  
they accept. Scientists might reject comp if they hear what you've  
got to say. A large number would not find that you sought to  
dominate their options in comp very scientific.


The problem here Bruno, is you act like they have responsibility to  
automatell

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-03 Thread ghibbsa



On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 03 Jun 2014, at 05:14, ghi...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 3:23:25 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the 
> key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating 
> that for me, the salient point about the article was that the 
> distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they 
> closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 
> 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth 
>
>
> Nice.
>
>
> Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy  or .nice like "yeah mother fucker 
> I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread!" 
>
> Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it. 
>
> What about the issue itself though?
>
> It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the 
> case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. 
> When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp 
>
>
> Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you 
> will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist "Jacques 
> Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He 
> wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp)  book on this. But even among 
> the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. 
>
> Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which 
> cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the 
> right level. 
>
>
> Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is 
> can replace < organA >with   +  field B>+..+... 
>
> One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that 
> differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of 
> computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I experience 
> consciousness in my head, why not my liver? 
>
>
> >  
> Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the 
> premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a 
> designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact 
> that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the 
> solution of the diophantine equations.>
>
>
>
> So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because 
> there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at 
> some point involving god and something else? 
>
> This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus 
> composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of them 
> would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that. 
>
> Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't 
> mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at 
> no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in 
> terms of comp at all. 
>
> What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds, 
> has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way 
> now from they believe in comp. 
>
> I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And 
> the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels 
> someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a 
> zebra? 
>
> Or do I miss the point? 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, 
>
> What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a 
> problem (except J.P. Delahaye)?
>
>
>  
> Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things? 
> Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me? 
>
> What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is 
> that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless 
> they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this: 
>
> Scientist believes comp= --> Bruno's criteria is assuming-com --> brunos's 
> UDA follows --> Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows 
>
>   
>   
> --> MWI follows 
>
>   
>   
> --> Infinite dreams follows 
>
> * So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI? 
>
>
> Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually,

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-03 Thread meekerdb

On 6/2/2014 7:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 05:46:32PM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:

On Monday, June 2, 2014 5:06:07 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:

Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be
violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a
dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no
longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude
that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a
statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable.

Yo Russell, I was just wondering...what do you include when you reference
Anthropic Principle. Like above. I mean...I can see that if we're talking
about AP as the explanation for our universe and us here within it, then
just for that, there the inference of large number of other universes. Is
this roughly as far as things go, or are there further inferences directly
from these first two?

FWIW, by the AP, I simply mean the principle that observed reality is
consistent with our existence in that reality.

We can conceive of realities (virtual or otherwise) in which the AP is
violated eg Deutsch's chess reality example from FoR, or some of the
dreaming argument examples Bruno gives. I'm not sure whether the AP
has ever really been violated in a dream (Bruno has studied dreams
more than me, so perhaps he could comment, moreso even from his Salvia
experiences), and VR technology is still too primitive to do the
experiment (and may, in any case, be unethical to perform).

The link between the AP and many universes has to do with the strong
AP, which states that the universe has to be compatible conscious
life, and the rather unlikely probability of that happening by
chance. You either have to accept a divine creator, that the laws of
physics are just so (for inexplicable reasons),

But that only works if the creator is constrained to create using a physics consistent
with conscious life. As Ikeda and Jefferys point out a supernatural creator could create
conscious life in a universe physically incompatible with conscious life (that's what
*super*natural means). So then observing that your universe is physically compatible with
your existence cannot count as evidence for a supernatural creator.

Brent

or many
universes. People of an atheistic bent will tend to prefer many
universes, I suppose, and theistic people will plug for the
creator. Some people have attacked the idea that the AP is unlikely by
chance - Victor Stenger wrote a book on that topic, for instance. I'm
not exactly convinced, but at least he tried.

But in any case, there are many other arguments in favour of many
universes, which I outline in my book.

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-03 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 05:46:32PM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 2, 2014 5:06:07 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: 
> >
> > > 
> > > Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be 
> > > violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a 
> > > dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no 
> > > longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude 
> > > that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a 
> > > statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. 
> >
> 
> 
> Yo Russell, I was just wondering...what do you include when you reference 
> Anthropic Principle. Like above. I mean...I can see that if we're talking 
> about AP as the explanation for our universe and us here within it, then 
> just for that, there the inference of large number of other universes. Is 
> this roughly as far as things go, or are there further inferences directly 
> from these first two? 
> 

FWIW, by the AP, I simply mean the principle that observed reality is
consistent with our existence in that reality.

We can conceive of realities (virtual or otherwise) in which the AP is
violated eg Deutsch's chess reality example from FoR, or some of the
dreaming argument examples Bruno gives. I'm not sure whether the AP
has ever really been violated in a dream (Bruno has studied dreams
more than me, so perhaps he could comment, moreso even from his Salvia
experiences), and VR technology is still too primitive to do the
experiment (and may, in any case, be unethical to perform).

The link between the AP and many universes has to do with the strong
AP, which states that the universe has to be compatible conscious
life, and the rather unlikely probability of that happening by
chance. You either have to accept a divine creator, that the laws of
physics are just so (for inexplicable reasons), or many
universes. People of an atheistic bent will tend to prefer many
universes, I suppose, and theistic people will plug for the
creator. Some people have attacked the idea that the AP is unlikely by
chance - Victor Stenger wrote a book on that topic, for instance. I'm
not exactly convinced, but at least he tried.

But in any case, there are many other arguments in favour of many
universes, which I outline in my book.

-- 

Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-03 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 03 Jun 2014, at 05:14, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 3:23:25 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy  
wrote:





There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually  
pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments.  
Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article  
was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been  
identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno  
says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the  
machine, and so on and so forth


Nice.

Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy  or .nice like "yeah mother  
fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia  
thread!"


Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it.

What about the issue itself though?
It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be  
the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my  
position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp


Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough  
you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer  
scientist "Jacques Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot  
believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti- 
comp)  book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen  
as an exceptional view.


Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ  
which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right  
functions at the right level.


Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like  
'comp is can replace < organA >with   +  
+..+...


One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution  
that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense  
amount of computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I  
experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver?



>
Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together  
with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the  
existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily  
refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with  
their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations.>



So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something,  
because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they  
must think at some point involving god and something else?


This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus  
composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of  
them would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with  
that.


Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we  
don't mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that  
word, and at no point or level do we have any reason to think they  
think they think in terms of comp at all.


What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their  
minds, has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This  
is a long way now from they believe in comp.


I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a  
donkey. And the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey  
exactly parallels someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the  
first person is riding a zebra?


Or do I miss the point?






and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on  
comp,
What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention  
a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)?



Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding  
things? Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me?


What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and  
directly, is that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people  
believe, unless they've said they believe it. Are you assuming  
things like this:


Scientist believes comp= --> Bruno's criteria is assuming-com -->  
brunos's UDA follows --> Stuff about consciousness outside the head  
follows


--> 
 MWI follows


--> 
 Infinite dreams follows


* So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI?


Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did,  
actually, but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three  
and acknowledged that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1- 
views (like John Clark). In brussels, they have invoked a  
philosopher who judged the thesis not receivable (w

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-03 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 03 Jun 2014, at 04:23, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy  
wrote:





There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually  
pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments.  
Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article  
was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been  
identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno  
says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the  
machine, and so on and so forth


Nice.

Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy  or .nice like "yeah mother  
fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia  
thread!"


Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it.


?
Nice like "yummy", I would say. Or I misunderstand you even when we  
agree?





What about the issue itself though?
It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be  
the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my  
position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp


Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough  
you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer  
scientist "Jacques Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot  
believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti- 
comp)  book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen  
as an exceptional view.


Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ  
which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right  
functions at the right level.


Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like  
'comp is can replace < organA >with   +  
+..+...


In practice? Perhaps. But the reasoning is theoretical. It has to be,  
to be genuinely testable.
The only major scientific discovery that you need is the discovery of  
the universal (Turing) machine, and some idea how it works.







One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution  
that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense  
amount of computation takes place,


?  (that is ambiguous).




never becomes conscious.


If there are universal computation, we cannot exclude that some  
consciousness can be associated to it, but is it playing a role in our  
consciousness? Well, if yes, it means that we have to lower the  
substitution level, and ask to the doctor to copy also the liver and  
the heart, at the right level (which exist by the comp assumption).  
Keep in mind that the reasoning does not put any bound on the level.  
You might need to copy the moon too, if not the entire physical  
universe. This does not change the reversal consequence of  
computationalism. This follows from the step 7 in the UD Argument. If  
your mind state is a computational state (and thus belongs to  
infinitely many computations), the UD will go through that states  
infinitely often.





Why do I experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver?


That is cultural. The early greeks thought consciousness is  
experienced in the liver-stomach-belly. Some yoga technic makes it  
feels like that. I don't think I experience consciousness where I  
might feel to experience it (even John Clark seems to agree on this).


Actually, you will find many reports of different type in which people  
describes a feeling that their consciousness is attached to object out  
of the body, or even to nothing. The idea that "we are in our body" is  
also a mental construct.










>
Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together  
with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the  
existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily  
refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with  
their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations.>



So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something,  
because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they  
must think at some point involving god and something else?


Not at all. I am saying that they believe in comp, when they argue  
that biological organism are machines. They use that assumption to  
prove the existence of god, because they believe also (wrongly) that a  
machine needs a designer.






This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus  
composed of comp-objects.


The expression "composed on comp-object" does not make sense to me.



You say they believe comp, when most of them would probably totally  
reject that god is anything to do with that.


When I succeed to connect on the net, I can give you many videos on  
youtube where creationist shows something biological looking like a  
sophisticated machine, and doing the argument I sum

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-03 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 02 Jun 2014, at 17:58, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:

so I offered a test event tailored to a specific and probably fairly  
central to most others, charge relating to my positioning with Bruno  
in not responding to all or most counter arguments and objections or  
criticisms of something I have actually or effectively done.


I constructed a basic test event, obviously it had to be tied to a  
very specific argument, involving a specific charge or suspicion, in  
a situation featuring possible two of us. It isn't a problem to  
construct a falsifiable prediction that is in keeping with the  
criteria of step one of the definition.


So he chooses one of the Bruno counter points  I did not answer, and  
goes for the knock down hardest one he thinks I'll find. And I will  
say why that point did not make a case to answer. And why I have dug  
my heels and stopped showing him the courtesy of answering anyway.  
This is because I don't he has even now read my definition  
seriously, because his own objections are clearly illegitimate or  
misconceived, and his own offers of events of testing or whatever  
clearly do not meet the critieria of definition.


In fact his positions have not changed at all. I cannot reconcile  
this with a serious reading. And there's actually no point in  
continuing unless and until Bruno does make the decision to read my  
definition, which he requested and I supplied for. And absorb it,  
and be able to distinguish where any position he has does or does  
meet a criteria.


He doesn't have to agree with any of it. But he had to know where  
the argument is, if he's serious.


Because one way that his theory NOW ACTUALLY IS, falsifiable is in  
terms of the status he claimed for it, of falsifiability. The reason  
that isn't actually falsifiability is because every theory at a  
falsifiable status has spent a long time in a pre-falsifiable stage.  
And may well still be that phase, because to falsifiable the process  
itself has to not only start but finish, and there are a lot of  
constraints what a delay has to meet in criteria to be legitimate.  
Most delays quickly correspond to falsification events, but of the  
status only. Which never falsifies the theory and can never. Because  
IT'S DECOUPLED and never knows much what the fuck the theory is !! 
Anyway, here was example,.


"So for example, Bruno has argued that I failed address an he has  
said saw what he regards as a successful test., He then infers from  
my silence that I have effectively rejected it, and he concludes I  
must therefore be in contradiction with myself because I said I  
didn't have the skills to be doing things like that. "


So everything connects and is logical in what he says and his  
conclusion. But once again he's still on the inside of his theory,  
and still being driven along by the influence of the same  
misconception that the dichotomy which seems to regard the  
interaction between the falsification structure as an end to  
process  - and in this setting the interaction is via me obviously,  
in that the action I took in not responding amounts to a rejection  
of some element in his theory. Which on its own its perfectly  
correct. not responding is a response.


But the same problematic misconception remains in his thinking here,  
which best illustrated here, amounts to believing decoupling between  
anything to do with the process of falsification, and anything to do  
with anything in his theory theory is a dichotomy of correct  
interaction with the interior of his theory, in this case that if I  
am going to effectively reject something by not addressing it, I am  
immediately contradicting myh own position thatI do not have skills  
to be making judgement calls about elements of his theory. So it's  
clearly perfectly sound reasoning he's got in play there.


But falsification doesn't care what is reasoned correct or not,  
within a theory. It doesn't care and will never care. Because it can  
never care about one particular theory, when it is process that runs  
across the entirety of science through the entirety of the history  
of science. How can anything like that have any dependence on a  
particular logical reasoning that on its own terms demands a reason  
why it can't be heard?


It's all good though, because the logical that is correct can be  
clearly stated as the consequence of the definition and my response  
to Bruno, which proxies for the interaction of the falsification  
structure to the theory. Bruno is right in act that silence is not  
an adequate response to the issues that he raising. Because the part  
of the falsification, if it is to deaf to all theories is also to  
deliver explicit and simple criteria to that theory. This is only  
connection possible. It is one way to the interface, the outer  
surface of the theory, from the structure to the theory. That must  
be a very simple request for, initially a condition that meets the  
criteria of the fir

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-03 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 5:14 AM,  wrote:

>
>
> It looks like I was counter-bitching something he threw at me. It's a
> problem being custard pied. I notice you don't step in...so you seem
> to tacitly support this behaviour toward me.
>
>
>
All tempest in a tea pot. Who cares that I don't find your arguments
convincing at this point, concerning the issue of falsification/prediction
you raised?

This cycle of apologizing, attacking on personal level, playing everybody's
shrink, and then talking in friendly "mate" register and constantly
switching the way somebody flicks through radio stations; it gets tedious
and even when/if I do see you raising some interesting question, which you
often do, I'd have to deal with a mountain of personal attacks, psychology
etc. to converse with you in polite manner on said question.

I'd have rather spent my few minutes of free time today following the chess
championship in Norway or reading up on what Russell could have meant with
cardinality of virtual and baseline environments, but won't trouble him or
anybody else in the forum to spoon feed, because it might be off topic and
everybody is busy enough.

Also, I appreciate deeply whenever anyone puts a thoughtful post out there
that enriches the content of the list, yours included, especially when they
are concise and polite with readers' time. But do I mention it every time?
No, because as musicians we get sensitive to when one of us overplays, as
this tends to diminish the value of the entire group's/band's effort, no
matter how hard everybody else works, contributes, and tries. Just trying
not to clog/overplay with limited success.

I have no axe to grind with you on a personal level, but I will disagree
when I do and refuse to entertain posts that have authoritative,
interrogative quality, as I see it as a waste of people's precious time.
Sorry. PGC

>
>> ...
>>
>>  --
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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?



On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 3:23:25 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the 
>> key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating 
>> that for me, the salient point about the article was that the 
>> distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they 
>> closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 
>> 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth 
>>
>>
>> Nice.
>>
>
> Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy  or .nice like "yeah mother fucker 
> I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread!" 
>
> Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it. 
>
> What about the issue itself though?
>
>> It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the 
>> case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. 
>> When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp 
>>
>>
>> Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you 
>> will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist "Jacques 
>> Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He 
>> wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp)  book on this. But even among 
>> the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. 
>>
>> Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ 
>> which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at 
>> the right level. 
>>
>
> Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is 
> can replace < organA >with   +  field B>+..+... 
>
> One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that 
> differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of 
> computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I experience 
> consciousness in my head, why not my liver? 
>
>
> >  
>> Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with 
>> the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a 
>> designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact 
>> that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the 
>> solution of the diophantine equations.>
>>
>
>
> So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because 
> there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at 
> some point involving god and something else? 
>
> This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus 
> composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of them 
> would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that. 
>
> Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't 
> mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at 
> no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in 
> terms of comp at all. 
>
> What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds, 
> has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way 
> now from they believe in comp. 
>
> I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And 
> the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels 
> someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a 
> zebra? 
>
> Or do I miss the point? 
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on 
>> comp, 
>>
>> What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a 
>> problem (except J.P. Delahaye)?
>>
>
>  
> Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things? 
> Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me? 
>
> What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is 
> that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless 
> they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this: 
>
> Scientist believes comp= --> Bruno's criteria is assuming-com --> brunos's 
> UDA follows --> Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows 
>
>   
>   
> --> MWI follows 
>
>   
>   
> --> Infinite dreams follows 
>
> * So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI? 
>
>
>> Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually, 
>> but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three and acknowle

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the 
> key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating 
> that for me, the salient point about the article was that the 
> distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they 
> closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 
> 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth 
>
>
> Nice.
>

Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy  or .nice like "yeah mother fucker I'm 
with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread!" 

Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it. 

What about the issue itself though?

> It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the 
> case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. 
> When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp 
>
>
> Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you 
> will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist "Jacques 
> Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He 
> wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp)  book on this. But even among 
> the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. 
>
> Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which 
> cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the 
> right level. 
>

Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is 
can replace < organA >with   + +..+... 

One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that 
differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of 
computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I experience 
consciousness in my head, why not my liver? 

>  
> Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the 
> premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a 
> designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact 
> that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the 
> solution of the diophantine equations.>
>

So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because 
there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at 
some point involving god and something else? 

This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus 
composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of them 
would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that. 

Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't 
mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at 
no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in 
terms of comp at all. 

What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds, 
has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way 
now from they believe in comp. 

I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And 
the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels 
someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a 
zebra? 

Or do I miss the point? 

>
>
>
> and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, 
>
> What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a 
> problem (except J.P. Delahaye)?
>

Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things? 
Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me? 

What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is 
that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless 
they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this: 

Scientist believes comp= --> Bruno's criteria is assuming-com --> brunos's 
UDA follows --> Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows 

--> MWI follows 

--> Infinite dreams follows 

* So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI? 

> Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually, 
> but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three and acknowledged 
> that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1-views (like John Clark). 
> In brussels, they have invoked a philosopher who judged the thesis not 
> receivable (which means not even a private defense: they have never heard 
> me, even in priva

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?



On Monday, June 2, 2014 5:06:07 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: 
>
> > On Sun, Jun 01, 2014 at 09:19:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote: 
> >> 
> >>> On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: 
>  On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: 
> > 
> > Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non- 
> > virtual 
> > reality environments have measure one in the space of environments 
> > hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, 
> > whereas 
> > virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. 
>  
>  But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the 
>  cardinality of the continuum? 
>  
> >>> 
> >>> Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be 
> >>> countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of 
> >>> programs. 
> >>> 
> >>> With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of "real" environments 
> >>> experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would 
> >>> include all the CantGoTu environments. 
> >>> 
> >>> We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most   
> >>> likely 
> >>> not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite 
> >>> observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument). 
> >>> 
> >>> I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality - 
> >>> Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being 
> >>> logically incompatible with our existence as an observer. 
> >>> 
> >>> The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon 
> >>> that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that 
> >>> falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can   
> >>> you 
> >>> possibly distinguish those two situations? 
> >> 
> >> We can't. 
> >> 
> >> But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at 
> >> least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming 
> >> or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical, 
> >> that is built on the top of the sum on all computations). 
> >> 
> >> So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe 
> >> more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp 
> >> physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the 
> >> emulation is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are 
> >> dreaming or emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed) 
> >> environment/video-game. 
> >> 
> >> By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at 
> >> the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels. 
> >> 
> >> Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits, 
> >> but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian 
> >> consistent deception. 
> >> 
> >> Bruno 
> >> 
> >> 
> > 
> > I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not 
> > in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between 
> > the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones. 
>
> Hmmm I see what you mean, and in "that sense" we are at the base   
> level. 
>
> yet, we can still belong to an emulation build on the top of that base   
> level, so that it inherits of the measure on all computations. 
>
> If that was not possible, we would not been able to survive with an   
> artificial brain. If we can, we can survive with the right relative   
> measure in virtual environment, like the emulation of Washington and   
> Moscow in step six. 
>
> But this is also what makes it possible for us to discover that we are   
> in virtual environment, or that we are dreaming. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > Therefore if 
> > we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess 
> > world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must 
> > be falsified. 
>
> Not necessarily. I might have given you a pill, and then put you in a   
> very well done emulation, without you noticing any difference (before   
> comparing the comp physics and the physics of your environment). 
>
>
>
> > 
> > Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that   
> > we are 
> > in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in 
> > doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our 
> > phenomenological physics. 
> > 
> > Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be 
> > violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a 
> > dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no 
> > longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude 
> > that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a 
> > statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. 
>


Yo Russell, I was just wondering...what do you include when you reference 
Anthro

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-02 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Jun 01, 2014 at 09:19:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:


Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non- 
virtual

reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum,
whereas
virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0.


But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the
cardinality of the continuum?



Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be
countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of
programs.

With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of "real" environments
experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would
include all the CantGoTu environments.

We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most  
likely

not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite
observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument).

I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality -
Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being
logically incompatible with our existence as an observer.

The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon
that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that
falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can  
you

possibly distinguish those two situations?


We can't.

But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at
least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming
or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical,
that is built on the top of the sum on all computations).

So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe
more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp
physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the
emulation is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are
dreaming or emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed)
environment/video-game.

By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at
the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels.

Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits,
but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian
consistent deception.

Bruno




I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not
in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between
the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones.


Hmmm I see what you mean, and in "that sense" we are at the base  
level.


yet, we can still belong to an emulation build on the top of that base  
level, so that it inherits of the measure on all computations.


If that was not possible, we would not been able to survive with an  
artificial brain. If we can, we can survive with the right relative  
measure in virtual environment, like the emulation of Washington and  
Moscow in step six.


But this is also what makes it possible for us to discover that we are  
in virtual environment, or that we are dreaming.









Therefore if
we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess
world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must
be falsified.


Not necessarily. I might have given you a pill, and then put you in a  
very well done emulation, without you noticing any difference (before  
comparing the comp physics and the physics of your environment).






Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that  
we are

in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in
doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our
phenomenological physics.

Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be
violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a
dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no
longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude
that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a
statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable.


I am not sure we can make something falsifiable into something non  
falsifiable by an act of faith, ... except indeed by invoking a dream,  
or a Daemon, but this is of course is a very weak "refutation". I  
would say that it is better to bet we are not in a second order dream/ 
emulation by default. If the comp-QL differ from the empiric-QL, it  
will be time to hesitate between the truth of comp, or of the the  
classical theory of knowledge, or if we are in a simulation (that  
might depends on the way the comp-QL is violated).


The fact in dispute with ghibbsa is that I am giving a precise way to  
test comp (with nuance due to the vague character of "test" applied to  
"reality") when translated

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

so I offered a test event tailored to a specific and probably fairly 
central to most others, charge relating to my positioning with Bruno in not 
responding to all or most counter arguments and objections or criticisms of 
something I have actually or effectively done. 

I constructed a basic test event, obviously it had to be tied to a very 
specific argument, involving a specific charge or suspicion, in a situation 
featuring possible two of us. It isn't a problem to construct a falsifiable 
prediction that is in keeping with the criteria of step one of the 
definition. 

So he chooses one of the Bruno counter points  I did not answer, and goes 
for the knock down hardest one he thinks I'll find. And I will say why that 
point did not make a case to answer. And why I have dug my heels and 
stopped showing him the courtesy of answering anyway. This is because I 
don't he has even now read my definition seriously, because his own 
objections are clearly illegitimate or misconceived, and his own offers of 
events of testing or whatever clearly do not meet the critieria of 
definition.

In fact his positions have not changed at all. I cannot reconcile this with 
a serious reading. And there's actually no point in continuing unless and 
until Bruno does make the decision to read my definition, which he 
requested and I supplied for. And absorb it, and be able to distinguish 
where any position he has does or does meet a criteria. 

He doesn't have to agree with any of it. But he had to know where the 
argument is, if he's serious. 

Because one way that his theory NOW ACTUALLY IS, falsifiable is in terms of 
the status he claimed for it, of falsifiability. The reason that isn't 
actually falsifiability is because every theory at a falsifiable status has 
spent a long time in a pre-falsifiable stage. And may well still be that 
phase, because to falsifiable the process itself has to not only start but 
finish, and there are a lot of constraints what a delay has to meet in 
criteria to be legitimate. Most delays quickly correspond to falsification 
events, but of the status only. Which never falsifies the theory and can 
never. Because IT'S DECOUPLED and never knows much what the fuck the theory 
is !!Anyway, here was example,. 

"So for example, Bruno has argued that I failed address an he has said saw 
what he regards as a successful test., He then infers from my silence that 
I have effectively rejected it, and he concludes I must therefore be in 
contradiction with myself because I said I didn't have the skills to be 
doing things like that. " 

So everything connects and is logical in what he says and his conclusion. 
But once again he's still on the inside of his theory, and still being 
driven along by the influence of the same misconception that the 
dichotomy which seems to regard the interaction between the falsification 
structure as an end to process  - and in this setting the interaction is 
via me obviously, in that the action I took in not responding amounts to a 
rejection of some element in his theory. Which on its own its perfectly 
correct. not responding is a response. 

But the same problematic misconception remains in his thinking here, which 
best illustrated here, amounts to believing decoupling between anything to 
do with the process of falsification, and anything to do with anything in 
his theory theory is a dichotomy of correct interaction with the interior 
of his theory, in this case that if I am going to effectively reject 
something by not addressing it, I am immediately contradicting myh own 
position thatI do not have skills to be making judgement calls about 
elements of his theory. So it's clearly perfectly sound reasoning he's got 
in play there. 

But falsification doesn't care what is reasoned correct or not, within a 
theory. It doesn't care and will never care. Because it can never care 
about one particular theory, when it is process that runs across the 
entirety of science through the entirety of the history of science. How can 
anything like that have any dependence on a particular logical reasoning 
that on its own terms demands a reason why it can't be heard? 

It's all good though, because the logical that is correct can be clearly 
stated as the consequence of the definition and my response to Bruno, which 
proxies for the interaction of the falsification structure to the theory. 
Bruno is right in act that silence is not an adequate response to the 
issues that he raising. Because the part of the falsification, if it is to 
deaf to all theories is also to deliver explicit and simple criteria to 
that theory. This is only connection possible. It is one way to the 
interface, the outer surface of the theory, from the structure to the 
theory. That must be a very simple request for, initially a condition that 
meets the criteria of the first step of falsification. Now I have 
asked Bruno for this a few times, and I have explained each time why this 
is all I ever

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-02 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy  
wrote:





There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually  
pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments.  
Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article  
was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been  
identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno  
says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the  
machine, and so on and so forth.


Nice.




It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be  
the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my  
position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp


Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough  
you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist  
"Jacques Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in  
STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp)  book on  
this. But even among the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional  
view.


Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ  
which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right  
functions at the right level.


Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with  
the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence  
of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by  
the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their  
execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations.





and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on  
comp,


What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having mention  
a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)?


Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did,  
actually, but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three  
and acknowledged that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1- 
views (like John Clark). In brussels, they have invoked a philosopher  
who judged the thesis not receivable (which means not even a private  
defense: they have never heard me, even in private) from his personal  
conviction (and later invoke the "free-exam" principle for that, like  
if the free-exam is the right for professor to give bad note to  
student without questioning them).


So here I would say that PGC was just saying the normal thing. Most  
rationalists believe in comp, and what follows has been peer reviewed  
enough. (Then humans are humans, and the notoriety of some people  
makes ideas having to wait they died before people talk and think, and  
special interests and all that, so I admit the results are still  
rather ignored, though some people seems to be inspired by them also,  
hard to say).


The so-called radicality of what I say is in the mind of those who  
thought that science has solved all problem, and that it has notably  
decided between Plato and Aristotle (almost the genuine difference  
believer/non-believer),  and that comp explains the mind and its  
relation with matter.


I show that this is not true, and that if we can accept that comp and  
computer science does indeed explain a large part of the mind,  
including knowledge and perhaps consciousness, it can only succeed on  
this if it explains the observable by a complex sum on all  
computations seen from the possible machine's points of view.  (and  
that can be handled mathematically if we accept some definitions).






you are the one's being less than honest, intellectually. Not me.


I disagree, because you insinuate that there is a problem without  
showing one, besides the fact that you may dislike comp, bet it is  
false, etc.


At least Richard has the honesty to recognize his use of a god of the  
gap.


And please don't take my word for comp and its consequences, just try  
to understand. It is not easy, due to our quasi-instinctual  
aristotelianism, but it is neither that much difficult (probably  
easier for those who remember their dreams, and dig on the spiritual  
side).


Sometimes, I think you got the main point, but have a critics at some  
metalevel. That might be right, but up to now, you did not succeed in  
making it clear for me, nor others, I think. You acknowledge that, so  
good luck for being more understandable.


Bruno






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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-01 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 02:19:49AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:50 AM, Russell Standish 
> wrote:
> 
> >
> >
> > I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not
> > in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between
> > the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones.
> 
> 
> What kind of set theory are you referring to here, when you specify "all
> environments and virtual ones"? PGC
> 

The usual one. The axiom of choice is not relevant here.


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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-01 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:50 AM, Russell Standish 
wrote:

>
>
> I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not
> in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between
> the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones.


What kind of set theory are you referring to here, when you specify "all
environments and virtual ones"? PGC


> Therefore if
> we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess
> world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must
> be falsified.
>
> Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that we are
> in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in
> doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our
> phenomenological physics.
>
> Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be
> violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a
> dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no
> longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude
> that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a
> statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable.
>
> --
>
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
>  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
>  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
>
> 
>
> --
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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-01 Thread Russell Standish

On Sun, Jun 01, 2014 at 09:19:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> >On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> >>On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>>
> >>>Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
> >>>reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
> >>>hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum,
> >>>whereas
> >>>virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0.
> >>
> >>But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the
> >>cardinality of the continuum?
> >>
> >
> >Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be
> >countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of
> >programs.
> >
> >With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of "real" environments
> >experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would
> >include all the CantGoTu environments.
> >
> >We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most likely
> >not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite
> >observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument).
> >
> >I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality -
> >Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being
> >logically incompatible with our existence as an observer.
> >
> >The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon
> >that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that
> >falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can you
> >possibly distinguish those two situations?
> 
> We can't.
> 
> But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at
> least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming
> or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical,
> that is built on the top of the sum on all computations).
> 
> So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe
> more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp
> physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the
> emulation is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are
> dreaming or emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed)
> environment/video-game.
> 
> By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at
> the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels.
> 
> Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits,
> but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian
> consistent deception.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 

I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not
in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between
the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones. Therefore if
we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess
world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must
be falsified.

Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that we are
in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in
doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our
phenomenological physics.

Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be
violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a
dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no
longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude
that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a
statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:


Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum,  
whereas

virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0.


But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the  
cardinality of the continuum?




Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be
countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of  
programs.


With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of "real" environments
experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would
include all the CantGoTu environments.

We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most likely
not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite
observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument).

I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality -
Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being
logically incompatible with our existence as an observer.

The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon
that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that
falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can you
possibly distinguish those two situations?


We can't.

But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at  
least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming  
or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical,  
that is built on the top of the sum on all computations).


So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe  
more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp  
physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the emulation  
is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are dreaming or  
emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed) environment/video-game.


By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at  
the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels.


Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits,  
but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian  
consistent deception.


Bruno





Cheers

--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
(http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-01 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Sun, Jun 1, 2014 at 6:22 PM,  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 2:53 AM, Russell Standish 
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> > On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:
>> >
>> > >As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
>> > >segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
>> > >to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
>> >
>> >
>> > Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
>> > without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
>> > frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
>> > vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
>> > premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
>> > universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
>> > the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
>> > second-order reality)
>> >
>>
>> This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
>> possibility of falsification of COMP.
>>
>>
>> Is this not, as you have stated before on this list if I remember
>> correctly, a standard consequence of Turing Machines (I'm referring to
>> dreaming, second-order reality)?ma
>>
>
> It doesn't matter that it is a standard consequence of somethingnot in
> the narrow issue of falsifiability.
>

In what context? I have not seen you clarify.


>> I'm still not convinced by the "falsification attacks" of late; they seem
>> to me just reductionism in disguise of pursuit of clarity. We are doubting
>> now falsification as laid out by our advances in computability in the last
>> century? I don't see the alternatives many posts of late here apparently
>> are assuming, while most seem to ignore the elephant follow-up "do you take
>> Quantum Logic then to be empirical; how do you manage then?"  As if this
>> standard were leveraged against other TOEs seriously on all levels (which
>> ones satisfy such things completely btw?), and therefore comp should abide
>> concerning personal ultimate answers, falsification, prediction, and all
>> this stuff that appeals to my insecurity and bad sci-fi writing.
>>
>> Smells like prohibition/authoritative argument. Like the academic
>> prancing around of labels, qualification histories, the Salvia post
>> appearing designed to get people to "lower their defenses", so they can be
>> attacked for speaking not literally/correctly, apologies for not biting
>> btw; and the related posturing of meta-arguments and psychology across
>> different threads lately, ending in insults and useless "I know what you're
>> thinking via label"- stuff. This I consider unscientific and ties in with
>> the theological discussion in the other thread: posing as if these things
>> were decided, set, and going on personal crusade for fancy projections
>> instead of sticking to the relevant points in discussion. That's what
>> distinguishes crusading from sciethance and makes it problematic. PGC
>>
>
> Well, first of all, it's meaningless to leave my addy out when you are
> clearly speaking about me.
>
It's also important to be clear that you are continuing your argument by
> other means
>

Nope. Still asking the same question. Not even defending comp or Bruno's
work at this point and merely asking: where is yours? Where do you stand
concerning falsification? I am genuinely curious and willing to listen if
you have found a flaw with Bruno's work. I'm ready to listen if you have
even something vaguely interesting to say about falsification.

Apologies, but a claim to a problem with falsification, without reference
to clear assumptions and precise target within the constraints of the work
in question, even with your great skill in rhetoric, does not convince me.
I don't believe comp is true either, as you seem to assume.


>  in what you are saying, and that when an individual attempts to discredit
> another individual on bad-motivation grounds,
>
 and addresses other individuals which he has interacted with for longer,
> that is a serious escalation and extremely personal.
>

Sure, carrot soup is harder to bite than chicken soup. Most posts with you
lately are, to detriment of clarity, "extremely personal", when there is
disagreement (what is "science proper" about this?).

I already stated you contradict the opening statement of FoR in which DD
shoots down falsification/prediction fetish from his end, after which you
switched to linguistic "pal register", and laughed it off, after unloading
all manner of psychological personal arguments (which still surprises me,
because all I did was disagree with the absolute status you attached to
your "falsification argument", given that you never presented it fully or
even sketch it out; this in line with your "salvia thread humility
statement to Richard" today btw) or some projection of comp you are
enterta

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-01 Thread ghibbsa



On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 2:53 AM, Russell Standish  > wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:
> >
> > >As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
> > >segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
> > >to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
> >
> >
> > Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
> > without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
> > frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
> > vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
> > premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
> > universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
> > the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
> > second-order reality)
> >
>
> This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
> possibility of falsification of COMP.
>
>
> Is this not, as you have stated before on this list if I remember 
> correctly, a standard consequence of Turing Machines (I'm referring to 
> dreaming, second-order reality)?ma
>

It doesn't matter that it is a standard consequence of somethingnot in 
the narrow issue of falsifiability. 

>
> I'm still not convinced by the "falsification attacks" of late; they seem 
> to me just reductionism in disguise of pursuit of clarity. We are doubting 
> now falsification as laid out by our advances in computability in the last 
> century? I don't see the alternatives many posts of late here apparently 
> are assuming, while most seem to ignore the elephant follow-up "do you take 
> Quantum Logic then to be empirical; how do you manage then?"  As if this 
> standard were leveraged against other TOEs seriously on all levels (which 
> ones satisfy such things completely btw?), and therefore comp should abide 
> concerning personal ultimate answers, falsification, prediction, and all 
> this stuff that appeals to my insecurity and bad sci-fi writing. 
>
> Smells like prohibition/authoritative argument. Like the academic prancing 
> around of labels, qualification histories, the Salvia post appearing 
> designed to get people to "lower their defenses", so they can be attacked 
> for speaking not literally/correctly, apologies for not biting btw; and the 
> related posturing of meta-arguments and psychology across different threads 
> lately, ending in insults and useless "I know what you're thinking via 
> label"- stuff. This I consider unscientific and ties in with the 
> theological discussion in the other thread: posing as if these things were 
> decided, set, and going on personal crusade for fancy projections instead 
> of sticking to the relevant points in discussion. That's what distinguishes 
> crusading from sciethance and makes it problematic. PGC
>

Well, first of all, it's meaningless to leave my addy out when you are 
clearly speaking about me. It's also important to be clear that you are 
continuing your argument by other means in what you are saying, and that 
when an individual attempts to discredit another individual on 
bad-motivation grounds, and addresses other individuals which he has 
interacted with for longer, that is a serious escalation and extremely 
personal. 

There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the 
key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating 
that for me, the salient point about the article was that the 
distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they 
closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 
3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth. 

It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the 
case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. 
When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp and clearly 
infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, you are the 
one's being less than honest, intellectually. Not me. 


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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-06-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 31 May 2014, at 22:40, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:


As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...


Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
second-order reality)

This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove  
the

possibility of falsification of COMP.

I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a
much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point.

But it is also a relatively "trivial" (conceptually simple) point,
embedded already in the "Dream argument" and that "lucidity" is a
relative notion, even a graded one, like in "Inception" (a less nice
movie by the author of "the prestige" (in my opinion and taste)).



But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different  
sort of

physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?

If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and
the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with
an environment disobeying the physical laws.

Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game,
(second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order
"dream", the one emerging from *all* computations going through your
state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can "observe" in the
virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you
can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream
of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey
physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in
them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical
reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey
S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*).

If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the
consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the
one in Alice in Wonderland!

So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we
are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the
classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not
sure makes sense).

But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the
LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or
in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown "real
theory". So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of
comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related
to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the
universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others.

The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some
information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we
belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström.

Bruno



I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being
in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality.

David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is
basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all
possible virtual realities. Consider the discussion between pages 127
and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not
possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a
CantGoTu environment.

Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum,  
whereas

virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0.


But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the  
cardinality of the continuum?


Assuming comp, yes. At least in some sense. We can defend that idea.

But it is hard to say if that is confirmed by the observation of the  
physical reality, in the sense that we have not yet marry gravitation  
and the quantum, and so have not yet a coherent empiric theory of  
space-time.


I think.

Bruno






Brent


But we can never
know that we're in one.

DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one
can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of
chess. This is because the "rules of physics" of such an environment
are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But
provided the r

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-31 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
> >reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
> >hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas
> >virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0.
> 
> But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of 
> the continuum?
> 

Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be
countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of programs.

With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of "real" environments
experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would
include all the CantGoTu environments.

We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most likely
not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite
observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument).

I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality -
Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being
logically incompatible with our existence as an observer.

The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon
that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that
falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can you
possibly distinguish those two situations?

Cheers

-- 

Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-31 Thread meekerdb


On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:


As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...


Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
second-order reality)


This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
possibility of falsification of COMP.

I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a
much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point.

But it is also a relatively "trivial" (conceptually simple) point,
embedded already in the "Dream argument" and that "lucidity" is a
relative notion, even a graded one, like in "Inception" (a less nice
movie by the author of "the prestige" (in my opinion and taste)).




But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of
physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?

If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and
the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with
an environment disobeying the physical laws.

Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game,
(second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order
"dream", the one emerging from *all* computations going through your
state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can "observe" in the
virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you
can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream
of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey
physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in
them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical
reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey
S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*).

If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the
consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the
one in Alice in Wonderland!

So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we
are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the
classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not
sure makes sense).

But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the
LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or
in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown "real
theory". So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of
comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related
to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the
universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others.

The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some
information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we
belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström.

Bruno



I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being
in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality.

David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is
basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all
possible virtual realities. Consider the discussion between pages 127
and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not
possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a
CantGoTu environment.

Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas
virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0.


But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of 
the continuum?

Brent


But we can never
know that we're in one.

DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one
can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of
chess. This is because the "rules of physics" of such an environment
are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But
provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an
observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether
you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above.

The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that
allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else _has_ to
be geography.

The only way we can prove we'

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-31 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 31 May 2014, at 13:21, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 10:07:00AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 31 May 2014, at 08:45, Russell Standish wrote:

I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being
in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality.

David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment.


It is unclear if this contains only total functions or partial one.


Neither. A CantGoTu environment by construction is not the result of
any program.


I reread DD on this, but it is unclear. But a part of this is made non  
relevant by the FPI. As the DU dovetails on the oracles (the real)  
too. We can come back on this. On the partial functions, we have the  
closure for the diagonalization. The way the CantgTu are defined, it  
is unclear what complexity it can have in the arithmetical hierarchy.  
I can stretch in different way to get different correct sense, but it  
is unclear which one is meant.






...





Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum,  
whereas

virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But we can never
know that we're in one.


What is a non-virtual reality environments in the UD*?
UD* is not a set, so cardinality notion does not apply. But with the
rule Y = II, we can associate a set of computations which has the
cardinality of the continuum to UD*, but this can make the virtual
reality environments into a continuum (and I think it should, to get
rid of the white rabbits).



I think the way virtual reality is defined in FoR, there can only ever
be a countable number of them. It is the environment that is
simulated, not the observer.


In his glossary, he propose a more general definition, but in some  
paragraph it looks it is like you say.


He is not at ease with logic/computability theory.





By contrast with the UD, it is the observer that is "simulated",
leading to a continuum of environments by FPI.


The UD emulates all the 3p observers, in all environment (computable  
or not a priori). This leads to a continuum of environment by FPI  
(being enough naive, and open for equivalence classes of computations  
and states, notably structured by the use of the Theaetetus definitions.














DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that  
one

can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of
chess. This is because the "rules of physics" of such an environment
are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But
provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an
observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether
you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above.


But DD ignores the FPI.



Sure - but I'm not sure of the relevance...


An environment is defined by the probability on the computations, or  
the sigma_1 sentences, as believe, ([]p), known ([]p & p), observe  
([]p & <>p), felt ([]p & <>p & p).


Physics is given by the laws governing our consistent extensions,  
which is describable in terms of elementary machine's beliefs (like  
the belief in Robinson arithmetic and the induction axioms).










The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that
allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else  
_has_ to

be geography.

The only way we can prove we're actually in a simulation is if the
Anthropic Principle were to suddenly fail.


You need to take into account the comp RSSA, based on the FPI. All
computations emulating an observer, even if contradicting the
physical laws, have to be taken into account, and that is why
physics is a sum on all computation (going through your states),


OK - but how does the following follow?


so
you can (in principle) find out if you are in a simulation (assuming
comp all along).



It is like in the lucid dream. You believe that the physical laws  
prevent you to fly by will, then you observe yourself flying at will,  
and conclude that you are dreaming (i.e. you are in a second order  
simulation, sustained by the physical reality).



But now, imagine I want fake you more subtly, by making an emulation  
of the known physics. Well in that sense we will have the []p & p  
together and you are not failed. Indeed, from the 3-1 view, you are in  
all computations, and no more in that second order than in the first  
order (relatively to the UD*).


Now, I have to fail you at some level in that simulation, because I  
can't emulate all the computations done in UD* to get all the decimal  
correct in the FPI on the whole Sigma_1 truth, so, in principle, if  
you have all the time, and if I don't make change to the system  
(except adding the needed memories for your exploration, you (from my  
1-view of your 3p being in the computer) will at some point get the  
decimal wrong from t

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-31 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 2:53 AM, Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:
> >
> > >As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
> > >segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
> > >to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
> >
> >
> > Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
> > without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
> > frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
> > vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
> > premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
> > universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
> > the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
> > second-order reality)
> >
>
> This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
> possibility of falsification of COMP.
>

Is this not, as you have stated before on this list if I remember
correctly, a standard consequence of Turing Machines (I'm referring to
dreaming, second-order reality)?

I'm still not convinced by the "falsification attacks" of late; they seem
to me just reductionism in disguise of pursuit of clarity. We are doubting
now falsification as laid out by our advances in computability in the last
century? I don't see the alternatives many posts of late here apparently
are assuming, while most seem to ignore the elephant follow-up "do you take
Quantum Logic then to be empirical; how do you manage then?"  As if this
standard were leveraged against other TOEs seriously on all levels (which
ones satisfy such things completely btw?), and therefore comp should abide
concerning personal ultimate answers, falsification, prediction, and all
this stuff that appeals to my insecurity and bad sci-fi writing.

Smells like prohibition/authoritative argument. Like the academic prancing
around of labels, qualification histories, the Salvia post appearing
designed to get people to "lower their defenses", so they can be attacked
for speaking not literally/correctly, apologies for not biting btw; and the
related posturing of meta-arguments and psychology across different threads
lately, ending in insults and useless "I know what you're thinking via
label"- stuff. This I consider unscientific and ties in with the
theological discussion in the other thread: posing as if these things were
decided, set, and going on personal crusade for fancy projections instead
of sticking to the relevant points in discussion. That's what distinguishes
crusading from science and makes it problematic. PGC

>
> But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of
> physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?
>
> Cheers
>
> --
>
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
>  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
>  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
>
> 
>
> --
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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-31 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 10:07:00AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 31 May 2014, at 08:45, Russell Standish wrote:
> >I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being
> >in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality.
> >
> >David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment.
> 
> It is unclear if this contains only total functions or partial one.

Neither. A CantGoTu environment by construction is not the result of
any program.

...

> 
> >
> >Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
> >reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
> >hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas
> >virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But we can never
> >know that we're in one.
> 
> What is a non-virtual reality environments in the UD*?
> UD* is not a set, so cardinality notion does not apply. But with the
> rule Y = II, we can associate a set of computations which has the
> cardinality of the continuum to UD*, but this can make the virtual
> reality environments into a continuum (and I think it should, to get
> rid of the white rabbits).
> 

I think the way virtual reality is defined in FoR, there can only ever
be a countable number of them. It is the environment that is
simulated, not the observer.

By contrast with the UD, it is the observer that is "simulated",
leading to a continuum of environments by FPI.

> 
> 
> >
> >DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one
> >can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of
> >chess. This is because the "rules of physics" of such an environment
> >are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But
> >provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an
> >observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether
> >you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above.
> 
> But DD ignores the FPI.
> 

Sure - but I'm not sure of the relevance...

> 
> 
> >
> >The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that
> >allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else _has_ to
> >be geography.
> >
> >The only way we can prove we're actually in a simulation is if the
> >Anthropic Principle were to suddenly fail.
> 
> You need to take into account the comp RSSA, based on the FPI. All
> computations emulating an observer, even if contradicting the
> physical laws, have to be taken into account, and that is why
> physics is a sum on all computation (going through your states), 

OK - but how does the following follow?

> so
> you can (in principle) find out if you are in a simulation (assuming
> comp all along).
> 

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-31 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 31 May 2014, at 08:45, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:


As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...



Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
second-order reality)



This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
possibility of falsification of COMP.


I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a
much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point.

But it is also a relatively "trivial" (conceptually simple) point,
embedded already in the "Dream argument" and that "lucidity" is a
relative notion, even a graded one, like in "Inception" (a less nice
movie by the author of "the prestige" (in my opinion and taste)).





But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort  
of

physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?


If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and
the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with
an environment disobeying the physical laws.

Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game,
(second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order
"dream", the one emerging from *all* computations going through your
state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can "observe" in the
virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you
can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream
of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey
physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in
them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical
reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey
S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*).

If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the
consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the
one in Alice in Wonderland!

So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we
are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the
classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not
sure makes sense).

But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the
LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or
in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown "real
theory". So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of
comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related
to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the
universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others.

The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some
information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we
belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström.

Bruno




I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being
in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality.

David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment.


It is unclear if this contains only total functions or partial one.




It is
basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all
possible virtual realities.


With that ambiguity.




Consider the discussion between pages 127
and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not
possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a
CantGoTu environment.


If the CantGoTu contains all partial function, then UDA proves in a  
finite amount of time that we are in there.
If the cant'Goto contains only total function, then we can't be there  
with comp.
We can be in a special programs, but that is indeed impossible to  
prove, even with an infinite amount of time.






Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas
virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But we can never
know that we're in one.


What is a non-virtual reality environments in the UD*?
UD* is not a set, so cardinality notion does not apply. But with the  
rule Y = II, we can associate a set of computations which has the  
cardinality of the continuum to UD*, but this can make the virtual  
reality environments into a continuum (and I think it should,

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-30 Thread Russell Standish

On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> >On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:
> >>
> >>>As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
> >>>segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
> >>>to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
> >>
> >>
> >>Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
> >>without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
> >>frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
> >>vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
> >>premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
> >>universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
> >>the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
> >>second-order reality)
> >>
> >
> >This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
> >possibility of falsification of COMP.
> 
> I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a
> much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point.
> 
> But it is also a relatively "trivial" (conceptually simple) point,
> embedded already in the "Dream argument" and that "lucidity" is a
> relative notion, even a graded one, like in "Inception" (a less nice
> movie by the author of "the prestige" (in my opinion and taste)).
> 
> 
> 
> >
> >But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of
> >physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?
> 
> If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and
> the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with
> an environment disobeying the physical laws.
> 
> Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game,
> (second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order
> "dream", the one emerging from *all* computations going through your
> state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can "observe" in the
> virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you
> can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream
> of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey
> physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in
> them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical
> reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey
> S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*).
> 
> If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the
> consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the
> one in Alice in Wonderland!
> 
> So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we
> are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the
> classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not
> sure makes sense).
> 
> But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the
> LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or
> in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown "real
> theory". So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of
> comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related
> to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the
> universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others.
> 
> The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some
> information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we
> belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 

I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being
in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality.

David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is
basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all
possible virtual realities. Consider the discussion between pages 127
and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not
possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a
CantGoTu environment.

Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas
virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But we can never
know that we're in one.

DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one
can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of
chess. This is because the "rules of physics" of such an environment
are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But
provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an
observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether
you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above.

The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that
allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else _has_ t

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-30 Thread Alberto G. Corona

No.

2014-05-18 18:47 GMT+02:00, Telmo Menezes :
> On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 9:12 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 16 May 2014, at 16:52, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 8:05 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 15 May 2014, at 14:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 8:31 PM, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 On 14 May 2014, at 09:36, Telmo Menezes wrote:




 On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:

>
> On 12 May 2014, at 16:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR  wrote:

>  I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max
> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his
> conclusions
> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises
> somehow in
> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then
> consciousness will be computable by definition.
>

 Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that
 even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
 computer
 could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter,
 and not
 just a simulation, to generate the consciousness.

 If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics
 with
>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing
>>> something
>>> obvious?
>>>
>>
>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so
>> trivial to disprove:
>>
>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
>> matter,
>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness."
>>
>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp)
>> 2. brain generates consciousness but
>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then
>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp)
>>
>> so comp = ~comp
>>
>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot.
>>
>>
>> I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not
>> afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology
>> for
>> participating to the discussion with a shift.
>>
>> What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with
>> comp (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes
>> consciousness to a computer implemented in a primitive physical
>> reality.
>> Physics might be computable, in the sense that we can predict the
>> physical
>> behavior, but IF primitive matter is necessary for consciousness,
>> then,
>> although a virtual emulation would do (with different matter), an
>> abstract
>> or arithmetical computation would not do, by the lack of the
>> primitive
>> matter.
>> I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is
>> the role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence,
>> which
>> seems here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or
>> Maudlin's argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use
>> here
>> becomes magical: almost like saying that a computation is conscious
>> if
>> there is primitive matter and if God is willing to make it so. We can
>> always reify some "mystery" to block an application of a theory to
>> reality.
>>
>
> Ok, I tried to think about this for a while. It appears that it also
> connects with the issue "can there be computation without a
> substrate?".
>
> Please see what you think of my thoughts, sorry if they are a bit
> rough
> and confusing:
>
> In a purely mathematical sense, it seems to me that computation is
> simply a mapping from one value to another.
>
>
>
> Well, it is a special sort of mapping. There are 2^aleph_0 mapping in
> general, but only aleph_0 computational mapping. So it is a bit more
> than a
> mapping.
>
>
>
>
>
> Any computer program p can be represented as a value under some
> syntax.
>
>
> Any program + some data,
>

 Why "+ some data"? Any additional data can be made part of the program,
 no?


 Sure. But it helps to think in both ways.

>>>
>>> Yes, especially if one actually has to write computer

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-30 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:


As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...



Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
second-order reality)



This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
possibility of falsification of COMP.


I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a much  
longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point.


But it is also a relatively "trivial" (conceptually simple) point,  
embedded already in the "Dream argument" and that "lucidity" is a  
relative notion, even a graded one, like in "Inception" (a less nice  
movie by the author of "the prestige" (in my opinion and taste)).






But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of
physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?


If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and the  
level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with an  
environment disobeying the physical laws.


Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game, (second  
order dream) or in the physical reality (first order "dream", the one  
emerging from *all* computations going through your state. Well, if  
the laws of physics that you can "observe" in the virtual environment  
differs from the one you extract from comp, you can know that you  
belong to a second order simulation (like a dream of video game), or  
you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey physics, but you keep  
existing (with the normal probability) in them, because they inherit  
the normality of first order physical reality which comes from *all*  
worlds/computations (which obey S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*).


If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the  
consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the  
one in Alice in Wonderland!


So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we are  
in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the  
classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not sure  
makes sense).


But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the LARC  
has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or in an  
emulation of the standard theory in some unknown "real theory". So it  
is not a so big weakening of the falsification of comp, as it is  
implicit in all experimental science. It is related to the fact that  
with respect to the normal computations, the universal beings emerging  
from that can still lie to each others.


The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some information  
on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we belong to a  
virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-29 Thread Russell Standish

On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:
> 
> >As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
> >segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
> >to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
> 
> 
> Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
> without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
> frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
> vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
> premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
> universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
> the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
> second-order reality)
> 

This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
possibility of falsification of COMP.

But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of
physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-28 Thread LizR

On 28 May 2014 19:46, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore
>> consciousness) can exist without physics.  That physical instantiation is
>> dispensable.
>>
>
>  Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary
> to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than
> something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the
> entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic
> principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black
> hole information paradox too?)
>
> I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the "reification
> of information" it on, though.
>
> As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither
> maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like "complexity".
> Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll
> and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818
>

As usual I don't have time to read that paper, at least not immediately.
However I see that defining complexity appear to require coarse graining.
If so, I would take this to mean that there isn't anything fundamental
being defined - or at least that we're in a grey area where nothing is
known to be fundamental. On the other hand, entropy used to require coarse
graining but as I mentioned above has now been defined for black holes, so
assuming BHs really exist (and the things we think are BHs aren't some
other type of massive object of an undefined nature) that would at least
suggest that fundamental physics involves entropy, and hence information.

Is there any complexity measure that doesn;t involve CG and hence isn't
just (imho) "in the eye of the beholder" ?

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-28 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:

As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to  
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to  
show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...



Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without  
making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a  
refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid.  
Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically:  
compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine,  
and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I,  
or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality)






On 28 May 2014 14:12,  wrote:
On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to  
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to  
show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...


I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't  
gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did  
try to drop it. I shall probably try again.


Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to  
follow the arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very  
much. I know Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything,  
which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an  
awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from  
computation ... but I guess some relatively simple idea can  
sometimes lead to a huge theory ... maybe when (or if) I get to  
grips with the MGA and the logic involved in deriving some features  
of physics from comp, I might have something more sensible to say on  
the matter,



It is always a relief to see that some people can stay rational on the  
fundamental matter.


It is not always easy to distinguish genuine non understanding from  
the nitpicking some philosophers seemed to be trained for.


Then ghibbsa seems to believe that computationalism is false, so he  
wants it not even refutable, as it gives sense that it might be true.  
I don't know.


John Clark is clearer in his "refutation" of step three, where  
everyone can see that no matter he get his conclusion, at some point  
he has to confuse the first person discourse with the third person  
discourse (when seeing this, Clark usually said "don't come back on 1p  
and 3p again (mixed with some vulgar word).


I can understand the comp "shock" for people unaware of Everett, but  
in this list people are aware of Everett, or of QM without collapse.  
Without the Everett embedding of the subject in the physical reality  
is prolonged into a embedding of the subject in the arithmetical  
reality.



Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 28 May 2014, at 02:59, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 1:13:38 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:

On Monday, May 26, 2014 8:19:01 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 May 2014, at 19:02, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:46:47 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: LizR 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm
> Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
>
> On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List  
<everyt...@googlegroups.com

> > wrote:
>  So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in
> the scientific sense.

Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is
wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its
logic of the observable) and its actual testing?

Because you don't have one.

But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional  
physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis.

So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean  
logic, like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism.

And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people  
using the quantum facts to argue against mechanism.

The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable,  
and infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more  
complex.

If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in  
the field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of  
the possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the  
structure of the computations going through our states  
(computational states), and so that logic is determined by the  
mental ability of the universal machine. Mathematically, we can  
limit ourselves to machine having simple (true) beliefs, like 0+x =  
x, etc.

Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work?

Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the  
physics of the machines.

Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics  
that I do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics  
collapse into boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have  
been refuted, or show trivial, and QM would have been refuted  
altogether, at least as a physical laws. The real physics would be  
boolean, and QM would only describe a subpart of it.

Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts  
or retrodicts that the observable
have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like  
logic. It predicts or retrodicts also a part of the "hamiltonian"  
under a symmetry conditions.

It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it,  
but that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to  
solve to progress.  You just need to understand the technics. It is  
had, and I have done the best I could. A student and friend of mine,  
the late Eric Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems.

And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics,  
which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process.  My  
interest is in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul.

If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have one.  
But does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory.

They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck  (or  
bad luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is  
exactly the quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that.
And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the  
origin of the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that  
where UDA and machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we  
find quantum logic.

If, as it is probable, such comp QL differ crucially from quantum  
QL, well, we have to test to evaluate if it is fatal or not for comp.

Oh, but I forget to mention one more things. The comp QL has more  
axioms, and if it is not defeated by empiry, it does provide new  
theorems and new physical predictions, like the comp knower S4Grz is  
not just the classical knower S4, the comp QL (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*)  
have axioms inherited from the Löb formula, from which we get  
information not available. In their first order arithmetical  
extensions, there is an infinities of such information.

Hi Bruno - you can definitely rest easy about the 'rumours'.I've  
no access to such things and don't seek them out. So far as I'm  
concerned a 'list' - even a public one like this - is sacrosanct and  
private. Like fight club geezer...th

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-28 Thread meekerdb

On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote:

On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/27/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote:

On 28 May 2014 14:12, mailto:ghib...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue
into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show
that
either his premises or his argument is wrong...

I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't
gone down
that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop it.
I shall
probably try again.

Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the
arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know
Bruno has
said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to
falsification...
which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the idea that
consciousness
arises from computation

I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore
consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is
dispensable.

Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that
information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has
relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the
Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe
QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?)

I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the "reification of
information" it on, though.

As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither maximum nor
minimum information/entropy but something like "complexity". Here's recent survey of ways
to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette.
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818

Brent

If that /is/ established, then I guess comp becomes one potential route to derive "it
from bit".

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-28 Thread LizR

On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/27/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 28 May 2014 14:12,  wrote:
>
>>  On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue
>>> into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that
>>> either his premises or his argument is wrong...
>>>
>>
>>  I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't
>> gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to
>> drop it. I shall probably try again.
>>
>
> Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the
> arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know
> Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to
> falsification... which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the
> idea that consciousness arises from computation
>
>  I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore
> consciousness) can exist without physics.  That physical instantiation is
> dispensable.
>

Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to
show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than
something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the
entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic
principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black
hole information paradox too?)

I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the "reification
of information" it on, though.

If that *is* established, then I guess comp becomes one potential route to
derive "it from bit".

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-27 Thread meekerdb


On 5/27/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote:

On 28 May 2014 14:12, mailto:ghib...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue 
into a
theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either 
his
premises or his argument is wrong...


I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't gone 
down that
road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop it. I shall 
probably
try again.

Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the arguments you 
and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know Bruno has said he does have a 
theory of everything, which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an 
awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from computation


I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore consciousness) 
can exist without physics.  That physical instantiation is dispensable.


Brent

... but I guess some relatively simple idea can sometimes lead to a huge theory ... 
maybe when (or if) I get to grips with the MGA and the logic involved in deriving some 
features of physics from comp, I might have something more sensible to say on the matter,


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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-27 Thread LizR

On 28 May 2014 14:12,  wrote:

> On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue
>> into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that
>> either his premises or his argument is wrong...
>>
>
> I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't gone
> down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop
> it. I shall probably try again.
>

Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the
arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know
Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to
falsification... which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the
idea that consciousness arises from computation ... but I guess some
relatively simple idea can sometimes lead to a huge theory ... maybe when
(or if) I get to grips with the MGA and the logic involved in deriving some
features of physics from comp, I might have something more sensible to say
on the matter,

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?



On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue 
> into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that 
> either his premises or his argument is wrong...
>

I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't gone 
down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop 
it. I shall probably try again. 

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-27 Thread LizR

As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue
into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that
either his premises or his argument is wrong...

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?



On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 1:13:38 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, May 26, 2014 8:19:01 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>
>
>  On 25 May 2014, at 19:02, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>  
> On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:46:47 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>
>
>  On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>  
> On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>
>
> On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > -Original Message- 
> > From: LizR  
> > To: everything-list  
> > Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm 
> > Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable? 
> > 
> > On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List &
> lt;everyt...@googlegroups.com 
> > > wrote: 
> >  So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in   
> > the scientific sense. 
>
>
> Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is   
> wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its   
> logic of the observable) and its actual testing? 
>
>  
> Because you don't have one. 
>
>
>
> But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional 
> physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis.
>
> So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean logic, 
> like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism.
>
> And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people using the 
> quantum facts to argue against mechanism.
>
> The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable, and 
> infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more complex.
>
> If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in the 
> field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of the 
> possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the structure of the 
> computations going through our states (computational states), and so that 
> logic is determined by the mental ability of the universal machine. 
> Mathematically, we can limit ourselves to machine having simple (true) 
> beliefs, like 0+x = x, etc. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work? 
>
>
>
> Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the physics 
> of the machines.
>
> Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics that I 
> do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics collapse into 
> boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have been refuted, or show 
> trivial, and QM would have been refuted altogether, at least as a physical 
> laws. The real physics would be boolean, and QM would only describe a 
> subpart of it. 
>
> Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts or 
> retrodicts that the observable
> have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like logic. It 
> predicts or retrodicts also a part of the "hamiltonian" under a symmetry 
> conditions.
>
> It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it, but 
> that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to solve to 
> progress.  You just need to understand the technics. It is had, and I have 
> done the best I could. A student and friend of mine, the late Eric 
> Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems.
>
> And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics, 
> which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process.  My interest is 
> in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have one. But 
> does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory. 
>
>
>
> They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck  (or bad 
> luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is exactly the 
> quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that. 
> And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the origin of 
> the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that where UDA and 
> machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we find quantum logic. 
>
> If, as it is probable, such comp QL differ crucially from quantum QL, 
> well, we have to test to evaluate if it is fatal or not for comp.
>
> Oh, but I forget to mention one more things. The comp QL has more axioms, 
> and if it is not defeated by empiry, it does provide new theorems and new 
> physical predictions, like the comp knower S4Grz is not just the classical 
> knower

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?


On Monday, May 26, 2014 8:19:01 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>
>
>  On 25 May 2014, at 19:02, ghi...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>  
> On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:46:47 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>
>>
>>  On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>  
>> On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: 
>>>
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > -----Original Message----- 
>>> > From: LizR  
>>> > To: everything-list  
>>> > Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm 
>>> > Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable? 
>>> > 
>>> > On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List &
>>> lt;everyt...@googlegroups.com 
>>> > > wrote: 
>>> >  So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in   
>>> > the scientific sense. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is   
>>> wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its   
>>> logic of the observable) and its actual testing? 
>>>
>>  
>> Because you don't have one. 
>>
>>
>>
>> But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional 
>> physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis.
>>
>> So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean logic, 
>> like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism.
>>
>> And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people using the 
>> quantum facts to argue against mechanism.
>>
>> The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable, and 
>> infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more complex.
>>
>> If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in the 
>> field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of the 
>> possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the structure of the 
>> computations going through our states (computational states), and so that 
>> logic is determined by the mental ability of the universal machine. 
>> Mathematically, we can limit ourselves to machine having simple (true) 
>> beliefs, like 0+x = x, etc. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work? 
>>
>>
>>
>> Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the 
>> physics of the machines.
>>
>> Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics that I 
>> do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics collapse into 
>> boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have been refuted, or show 
>> trivial, and QM would have been refuted altogether, at least as a physical 
>> laws. The real physics would be boolean, and QM would only describe a 
>> subpart of it. 
>>
>> Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts or 
>> retrodicts that the observable
>> have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like logic. It 
>> predicts or retrodicts also a part of the "hamiltonian" under a symmetry 
>> conditions.
>>
>> It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it, but 
>> that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to solve to 
>> progress.  You just need to understand the technics. It is had, and I have 
>> done the best I could. A student and friend of mine, the late Eric 
>> Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems.
>>
>> And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics, 
>> which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process.  My interest is 
>> in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have one. 
>> But does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory. 
>>
>>
>>
>> They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck  (or bad 
>> luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is exactly the 
>> quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that. 
>> And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the origin of 
>> the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that where UDA and 
>> machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we fi

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?


On Monday, May 26, 2014 12:45:50 AM UTC+1, Russell Standish wrote: 
>
> On Sun, May 25, 2014 at 10:02:37AM -0700, ghi...@gmail.com 
> wrote: 
> > qualify for forgiving :O). I mean.I don't know about you but I agree 
> > with Russel Standish's moderation philosophy on this list...or how it 
> > looks.which speaking of killing people.you'd have to kill 
> someone 
> > here to get a ban from Russell, so it looks. 
>
> For a start, the everything list is not my list - Wei Dai is the 
> official owner, but I haven't seen him posting in a while! 
>
> As for FOAR, you don't need to kill someone. Posting obvious spam is 
> enough. Several spammers have been banned from FOAR already. 
>
> But so long as it's vaguely on topic to the eclectic tastes of the 
> lists, and so long as people exercise a little bit of courtesy and 
> moderation in their language, I'm fine with what is posted. There's 
> always a handy delete button for that stuff I don't want to read :). 
>
> Cheers

 
You're still the boss Russell...ownership is for wimps 

>
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Pr...

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 25 May 2014, at 19:02, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:46:47 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: LizR 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm
> Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
>
> On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List  
<everyt...@googlegroups.com

> > wrote:
>  So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in
> the scientific sense.

Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is
wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its
logic of the observable) and its actual testing?

Because you don't have one.

But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional  
physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis.

So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean  
logic, like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism.

And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people  
using the quantum facts to argue against mechanism.

The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable,  
and infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more  
complex.

If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in  
the field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of  
the possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the  
structure of the computations going through our states  
(computational states), and so that logic is determined by the  
mental ability of the universal machine. Mathematically, we can  
limit ourselves to machine having simple (true) beliefs, like 0+x =  
x, etc.

Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work?

Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the  
physics of the machines.

Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics  
that I do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics  
collapse into boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have  
been refuted, or show trivial, and QM would have been refuted  
altogether, at least as a physical laws. The real physics would be  
boolean, and QM would only describe a subpart of it.

Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts  
or retrodicts that the observable
have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like  
logic. It predicts or retrodicts also a part of the "hamiltonian"  
under a symmetry conditions.

It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it,  
but that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to  
solve to progress.  You just need to understand the technics. It is  
had, and I have done the best I could. A student and friend of mine,  
the late Eric Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems.

And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics,  
which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process.  My  
interest is in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul.

If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have  
one. But does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory.

They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck  (or  
bad luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is  
exactly the quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that.
And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the  
origin of the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that  
where UDA and machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we  
find quantum logic.

If, as it is probable, such comp QL differ crucially from quantum  
QL, well, we have to test to evaluate if it is fatal or not for comp.

Oh, but I forget to mention one more things. The comp QL has more  
axioms, and if it is not defeated by empiry, it does provide new  
theorems and new physical predictions, like the comp knower S4Grz is  
not just the classical knower S4, the comp QL (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*)  
have axioms inherited from the Löb formula, from which we get  
information not available. In their first order arithmetical  
extensions, there is an infinities of such information.

Hi Bruno - you can definitely rest easy about the 'rumours'.I've  
no access to such things and don't seek them out. So far as I'm  
concerned a 'list' - even a public one like this - is sacrosanct and  
private. Like fight club geezer...that silly film: what happens on  
everything list, stays on everything list. My blood my pledge!  
SeriouslyI'm always aware arguing with you in this long running  
way, of your ex

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-25 Thread Russell Standish

On Sun, May 25, 2014 at 10:02:37AM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
> qualify for forgiving :O). I mean.I don't know about you but I agree 
> with Russel Standish's moderation philosophy on this list...or how it 
> looks.which speaking of killing people.you'd have to kill someone 
> here to get a ban from Russell, so it looks. 

For a start, the everything list is not my list - Wei Dai is the
official owner, but I haven't seen him posting in a while!

As for FOAR, you don't need to kill someone. Posting obvious spam is
enough. Several spammers have been banned from FOAR already.

But so long as it's vaguely on topic to the eclectic tastes of the
lists, and so long as people exercise a little bit of courtesy and
moderation in their language, I'm fine with what is posted. There's
always a handy delete button for that stuff I don't want to read :).

Cheers

-- 

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-25 Thread ghibbsa


On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:46:47 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghi...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: 
>>
>> > 
>> > 
>> > -Original Message- 
>> > From: LizR  
>> > To: everything-list  
>> > Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm 
>> > Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable? 
>> > 
>> > On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List &
>> lt;everyt...@googlegroups.com 
>> > > wrote: 
>> >  So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in   
>> > the scientific sense. 
>>
>>
>> Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is   
>> wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its   
>> logic of the observable) and its actual testing? 
>>
>  
> Because you don't have one. 
>
>
>
> But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional 
> physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis.
>
> So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean logic, 
> like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism.
>
> And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people using the 
> quantum facts to argue against mechanism.
>
> The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable, and 
> infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more complex.
>
> If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in the 
> field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of the 
> possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the structure of the 
> computations going through our states (computational states), and so that 
> logic is determined by the mental ability of the universal machine. 
> Mathematically, we can limit ourselves to machine having simple (true) 
> beliefs, like 0+x = x, etc. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work? 
>
>
>
> Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the physics 
> of the machines.
>
> Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics that I 
> do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics collapse into 
> boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have been refuted, or show 
> trivial, and QM would have been refuted altogether, at least as a physical 
> laws. The real physics would be boolean, and QM would only describe a 
> subpart of it. 
>
> Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts or 
> retrodicts that the observable
> have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like logic. It 
> predicts or retrodicts also a part of the "hamiltonian" under a symmetry 
> conditions.
>
> It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it, but 
> that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to solve to 
> progress.  You just need to understand the technics. It is had, and I have 
> done the best I could. A student and friend of mine, the late Eric 
> Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems.
>
> And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics, 
> which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process.  My interest is 
> in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have one. But 
> does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory. 
>
>
>
> They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck  (or bad 
> luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is exactly the 
> quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that. 
> And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the origin of 
> the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that where UDA and 
> machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we find quantum logic. 
>
> If, as it is probable, such comp QL differ crucially from quantum QL, 
> well, we have to test to evaluate if it is fatal or not for comp.
>
> Oh, but I forget to mention one more things. The comp QL has more axioms, 
> and if it is not defeated by empiry, it does provide new theorems and new 
> physical predictions, like the comp knower S4Grz is not just the classical 
> knower S4, the comp QL (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*) have axioms inherited from the 
> Löb formula, from which we get information not available. In their f

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: LizR 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm
> Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
>
> On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List  
<everyt...@googlegroups.com

> > wrote:
>  So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in
> the scientific sense.

Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is
wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its
logic of the observable) and its actual testing?

Because you don't have one.

But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional  
physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis.

So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean  
logic, like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism.

And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people using  
the quantum facts to argue against mechanism.

The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable, and  
infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more complex.

If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in the  
field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of the  
possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the structure of  
the computations going through our states (computational states), and  
so that logic is determined by the mental ability of the universal  
machine. Mathematically, we can limit ourselves to machine having  
simple (true) beliefs, like 0+x = x, etc.

Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work?

Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the  
physics of the machines.

Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics  
that I do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics  
collapse into boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have been  
refuted, or show trivial, and QM would have been refuted altogether,  
at least as a physical laws. The real physics would be boolean, and QM  
would only describe a subpart of it.

Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts or  
retrodicts that the observable
have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like logic.  
It predicts or retrodicts also a part of the "hamiltonian" under a  
symmetry conditions.

It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it,  
but that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to  
solve to progress.  You just need to understand the technics. It is  
had, and I have done the best I could. A student and friend of mine,  
the late Eric Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems.

And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics,  
which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process.  My  
interest is in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul.

If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have one.  
But does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory.

They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck  (or  
bad luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is  
exactly the quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that.
And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the origin  
of the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that where  
UDA and machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we find  
quantum logic.

If, as it is probable, such comp QL differ crucially from quantum QL,  
well, we have to test to evaluate if it is fatal or not for comp.

Oh, but I forget to mention one more things. The comp QL has more  
axioms, and if it is not defeated by empiry, it does provide new  
theorems and new physical predictions, like the comp knower S4Grz is  
not just the classical knower S4, the comp QL (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*) have  
axioms inherited from the Löb formula, from which we get information  
not available. In their first order arithmetical extensions, there is  
an infinities of such information.

> No one calls you on this.here.but then again.let's face
> it no one answered my question either.

I did.

You did. And you have many times before. But the question was, could  
anyone OTHER than you answer it.

Can anyone other than you ask such a question?.

Of course, everyone who understand the work can explain it to others.  
I mean UDA, of course, as for AUDA you need a more rare familiarity  
with a large spectrum of logics and mathematical logics, and  
theoretical computer science.

Do the other understand your question.

You do seem skept

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-23 Thread ghibbsa


On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > -Original Message- 
> > From: LizR > 
> > To: everything-list > 
> > Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm 
> > Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable? 
> > 
> > On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List &
> lt;everyt...@googlegroups.com  
> > > wrote: 
> >  So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in   
> > the scientific sense. 
>
>
> Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is   
> wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its   
> logic of the observable) and its actual testing? 
>
 
Because you don't have one. Is anyone independent working on a prediction 
unique to your work? If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you 
won't have one. But does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable 
theory. 
 

>
>
>
>
> > No one calls you on this.here.but then again.let's face   
> > it no one answered my question either. 
>
> I did. 
>
 
You did. And you have many times before. But the question was, could anyone 
OTHER than you answer it. 
 
See that's the issue. I don't think anyone really understands whether you 
have a falsifiable prediction or not. And these things are 3p if you like. 

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-22 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

-Original Message-
From: LizR 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm
Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> wrote:
 So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in  
the scientific sense.

Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is  
wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its  
logic of the observable) and its actual testing?

No one calls you on this.here.but then again.let's face  
it no one answered my question either.

I did.

But other thereall you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be  
ignored and written off. Which you probably are, by and large.  
And...I wanted to add value for youfor my part I would actually  
question the way your friends write you a pass about this, because  
this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude.

I do have a theory which is hardly not being falsifiable, as it gives  
a non trivial propositional physics, already proved to be non boolean  
and close of equal to quantum logic. That is the subject of the whole  
work.

I will ask you to read my post and perhaps try to make a specific  
remark, please.

Bruno

I don't think Bruno claims to have a testable scientific theory. He  
claims to have a logical argument applied to the assumption made by  
most scientists who believe in primary materialism - that  
consciousness is computable. Given this assumption and a couple of  
others, he argues to a certain conclusion, which is that primary  
materialism fails.

Hence surely he is in the position of someone testing a scientific  
theory, rather than claiming to have one?

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-21 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

-Original Message-
From: LizR 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm
Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List 
<everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
 So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the 
scientific sense.  No one calls you on this.here.but then 
again.let's face it no one answered my question either. But other 
thereall you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and 
written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to 
add value for youfor my part I would actually question the way your 
friends write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish 
bowl dude.

I don't think Bruno claims to have a testable scientific theory. He 
claims to have a logical argument applied to the assumption made by 
most scientists who believe in primary materialism - that consciousness 
is computable. Given this assumption and a couple of others, he argues 
to a certain conclusion, which is that primary materialism fails.

Hence surely he is in the position of someone testing a scientific 
theory, rather than claiming to have one?

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 May 2014, at 20:24, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/20/2014 7:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The implications might be the abandon of materialism, which is  
good, as it is a person eliminativist position.
Then the machine's theology provides a vaccine against the  
reductionist conception of numbers, machines and a fortiori humans.
The main general implications is a tool for coming back to  
seriousness in theology, including the origin of the physical  
realities.


This announces a super-big paradigm shift where the person notion  
plays a key role.


I think you're too much immersed in science.  "The person notion" is  
still the dominant metaphysics in 99% of the world.  "Person" is at  
the center of politics, religion, art, economics,...  Science is  
about the only human endeavor that is not person centered.



I was thinking about a shift in the fundamental science, consisting  
mainly in the coming back to (neo) or (neoneo) platonism, and shifting  
from Aristotle theology (on all its "gods" including the primary matter.


Then the person I talk about is not the human person, but the person  
that we can (if not: have to) associated to any universal numbers.


It is NOT the human person. It is the much general Löbian one.



"Religions talk about humility.  Science has humbled us."


Very nice quote. It is why I think that science is the only tool of  
religion (beyong private experience we could report but not taken  
literally).


As long as we believe that science and religion are separated, the  
religious conceited people, and the fundamentalists,  will get large  
audience.


Bruno







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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-20 Thread LizR

On 21 May 2014 12:35, meekerdb  wrote:

> Only 1% of the world views, and specifically as they bear on ethics and
> morals - which is where Bruno thinks the "person centered" view will be a
> big paradigm shift.
>

OK, in that sense I agree. I also have doubts about Bruno's views on this
(but if comp ever becomes mainstream science it would certainly be a
paradigm shift of *some* sort!)

  But of course that isn't what you were thinking of. The "dominant
metaphysics" on Earth is religion, which is person centred, especialyl when
it comes to saying what people can and can't do. But I'm still not sure
it's at 99%, even so.

 So maybe I exaggerated a little and it's 4% (the fraction of Americans
> that self identify as atheists).
>

Well, to start with we were talking about the World, not America. The
population of the USA is only around 5% of the world's population (if I've
done my sums right), and they also have one of the highest standards of
living on the planet (not to mention one of the most wasteful societies),
so they're hardly representative.

But more to the point, being an atheist and subscribing to a scientific
viewpoint aren't necessarily the same thing. There have been plenty of
scientists with religious beliefs, and there are atheists whose worldview
is only vaguely scientific. For example, a friend of mine who's a fairly
famous poet and novelist is a "militant atheist", but I wouldn't say he
particularly subscribes to a science based view, (except in a vague sort of
way, as most people in the West probably do). It's much more that he thinks
religion is a bad thing.

Contrariwise, I'd say a lot of people in the West pay lip service to the
scientific worldview without necessarily understanding it. So if you asked
the person in the street if s/he considers science to have the potential to
answer most fundamental questions, I suspect rather more than 4% would say
yes, including many who also profess to be at least nominally religious. So
like my friend I suspect a lot of people are "nominally" science-oriented,
and would probably only consider that science can't explain abstruse
philosophical questions like why there is something rather than nothing
(perhaps) .

So IMHO it's actually quite hard to distinguish what proportion of the
world takes a science oriented view, or indeed to even determine to what
extent a given person does. Given its pervasiveness in Western society I
suspect science has quite a large influence, but it's hard to quantify.

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-20 Thread meekerdb


On 5/20/2014 4:07 PM, LizR wrote:




On 21 May 2014 06:24, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/20/2014 7:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The implications might be the abandon of materialism, which is good, as it 
is a
person eliminativist position.
Then the machine's theology provides a vaccine against the reductionist 
conception
of numbers, machines and a fortiori humans.
The main general implications is a tool for coming back to seriousness in 
theology,
including the origin of the physical realities.

This announces a super-big paradigm shift where the person notion plays a 
key role.


I think you're too much immersed in science.  "The person notion" is still 
the
dominant metaphysics in 99% of the world.  "Person" is at the center of 
politics,
religion, art, economics,...  Science is about the only human endeavor that 
is not
person centered.


You think science is only 1% of the world? As someone with a computer and mobile phone 
and TV and washing machine and so on, I find that science has made quite a large 
contribution to just about every aspect of my everyday life.


Only 1% of the world views, and specifically as they bear on ethics and morals - which is 
where Bruno thinks the "person centered" view will be a big paradigm shift.




But of course that isn't what you were thinking of. The "dominant metaphysics" on Earth 
is religion, which is person centred, especialyl when it comes to saying what people can 
and can't do. But I'm still not sure it's at 99%, even so.


So maybe I exaggerated a little and it's 4% (the fraction of Americans that self identify 
as atheists).


Brent

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-20 Thread LizR

On 21 May 2014 06:24, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/20/2014 7:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> The implications might be the abandon of materialism, which is good, as it
> is a person eliminativist position.
> Then the machine's theology provides a vaccine against the reductionist
> conception of numbers, machines and a fortiori humans.
> The main general implications is a tool for coming back to seriousness in
> theology, including the origin of the physical realities.
>
>  This announces a super-big paradigm shift where the person notion plays
> a key role.
>
>
> I think you're too much immersed in science.  "The person notion" is still
> the dominant metaphysics in 99% of the world.  "Person" is at the center of
> politics, religion, art, economics,...  Science is about the only human
> endeavor that is not person centered.
>

You think science is only 1% of the world? As someone with a computer and
mobile phone and TV and washing machine and so on, I find that science has
made quite a large contribution to just about every aspect of my everyday
life.

But of course that isn't what you were thinking of. The "dominant
metaphysics" on Earth is religion, which is person centred, especialyl when
it comes to saying what people can and can't do. But I'm still not sure
it's at 99%, even so.

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-20 Thread meekerdb


On 5/20/2014 7:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The implications might be the abandon of materialism, which is good, as it is a person 
eliminativist position.
Then the machine's theology provides a vaccine against the reductionist conception of 
numbers, machines and a fortiori humans.
The main general implications is a tool for coming back to seriousness in theology, 
including the origin of the physical realities.


This announces a super-big paradigm shift where the person notion plays a key 
role.


I think you're too much immersed in science.  "The person notion" is still the dominant 
metaphysics in 99% of the world.  "Person" is at the center of politics, religion, art, 
economics,...  Science is about the only human endeavor that is not person centered.


Brent
"Religions talk about humility.  Science has humbled us."

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-20 Thread meekerdb


On 5/20/2014 6:22 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 2:21 AM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 5/19/2014 4:56 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 9:33 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/19/2014 11:31 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 8:09 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/19/2014 10:24 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 7:06 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/19/2014 2:38 AM, LizR wrote:


His main interest is the mind-body problem; and my interest 
in
that problem is more from an engineering viewpoint. What 
does it
take to make a conscious machine and what are the 
advantages or
disadvantages of doing so. Bruno says a machine that can 
learn
and do induction is conscious, which might be testable - 
but I
think it would fail.  I think that might be necessary for
consciousness, but for a machine to appear conscious it 
must be
intelligent and it must be able to act so as to convince us 
that
it's intelligent.

That is fair enough, but it (of course) assumes primary 
materialism -


No it doesn't. Why do you think that?  I think "assuming primary
materialism" is a largely imaginary fault Bruno accuses his 
critics
of.  Sure physicists study physics and it's a reasonable working
hypothesis; but nobody tries to even define "primary matter" 
they
just look to see if another layer will be a better layer of 
physics
or not.


But I think Bruno's criticism is that physics->psychology is 
assumed,


Assumed by whom though? Physicists working on physics?  Probably.
Philosophers working on consciousness?  Some do, some don't.


By scientists in general, I would say. Physicists are the easiest to 
forgive,
their work seems valid either way. Neuroscientists, psychologists and 
social
scientists are not so easy to forgive. I personally have no problem with
assuming primary materialism, provided that you are aware that it is an
assumption.


For thousands of years humans looked for consciousness and agency in
everything. Then one day someone said let's just forget about ulimate 
truth and
God and what's primary and let's just see what we can say about the
shadows...and that's when modern science took off.


The discovery of the scientific method had nothing to do with the 
abandonment of
deep questions. It had to do with a rejection of appeals to authority. Don't
believe the guy in the funny robe, do the experiment -- and sometimes the 
thought
experiment.


But the authorities being abandoned, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas 
were all
of the opinion that thinking about deep questions was the way to learn 
about the
world.  What was the perfect form?  What was the natural state of a substance? 
Plato denigrated observation as "looking at shadows" and the world as an imperfect

reflection of ideal forms.  Sure there was rejection of the authority of 
the Church
and the ancients - but in favor of what?  The protestants just changed to 
the Bible
as the sole authority (and invented fundamentalism).  Science arose from 
rejecting
authority in favor of observation of "the shadows".  You can't observe the 
ur-stuff
of the world,


I think you can, but what you find is not communicable.

you can only make up models, show they work, and see what ontology they 
imply.


From the 3p view sure. There's nothing wrong with doing those things, in fact it's what 
my paycheck says that I do for a living. I don't feel that thinking about philosophy 
interferes with my ability to apply the scientific method. I don't see why it would have 
to be an either-or proposition. Self-appointed authorities come in many forms, of 
course, and it's important to not fall for that trap. I'm not sure we even disagree when 
making things concrete.









Which leads us to philosophers, which are largely irrelevant at the 
moment --
because of their own sort-comings and because there is a strong bias 
against
deep questions in current culture. I think.

For me, the relevance of this sort of issue is personal (another 
preoccupation
that goes a bit against the zeitgeist, which is increasingly 
self-centred but
in a superficial fashion). For example, ISTM that it has strong 
implications
in terms of deriving a rational code of ethics and in making life 
choices.


Really?  I don't see the implications. Bruno proposes to deriv

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?



On 20 May 2014, at 04:35, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 01:12:20PM -0400, spudboy100 via Everything  
List wrote:
Accordingto Deutsch, MWI is falsifiable, with some actions of a  
quantum computer. These would be the heavy hitters of QC, and not  
the lab toys we have today, but we'd potentially have access to  
electrons in parallel cosmii.




Hmm - I'm not completely convinced by Deutsch's argument, interesting
though it is. It smells of being a rhetorical trick.

I am convinced of the MWI, however, for completely independent  
reasons.





Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet  
MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.





COMP predicts FPI, actually. The MWI is a consequence of assuming a
"robust universe", namely one in which there is a UD that runs  
forever.


If you stop at step 7. OK. But how could a machine distinguish if she  
comes from the UD running for ever from the robust universe, or if she  
comes from the UD running for ever in the arithmetical reality?






Moreover, the MWI entails a robust universe.



Yes. But not necessarily a primitive one. Here we should define  
"universe", somehow (a quite non trivial task).





I don't think COMP is incompatible with nonrobust universes, however,
otherwise step 8 (the MGA) becomes completely unnecessary.


Yes, and with comp we have to take into account all computations, with  
all their redundancies in the enumeration of all their executions.
That is why the "white rabbit problem" can be said, in that context,  
to be unsolved, although I would argue that finding arithmetical  
quantizations helps to understand how eventually the white rabbits  
might be phased out of the normal (Gaussian) realities, in the  
personal views of the surviving average universal machine.


Cheers,

Bruno





Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
(http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?



On 20 May 2014, at 02:21, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/19/2014 4:56 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 9:33 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 5/19/2014 11:31 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 8:09 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 5/19/2014 10:24 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 7:06 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 5/19/2014 2:38 AM, LizR wrote:
His main interest is the mind-body problem; and my interest in  
that problem is more from an engineering viewpoint.  What does  
it take to make a conscious machine and what are the advantages  
or disadvantages of doing so.  Bruno says a machine that can  
learn and do induction is conscious, which might be testable -  
but I think it would fail.  I think that might be necessary for  
consciousness, but for a machine to appear conscious it must be  
intelligent and it must be able to act so as to convince us that  
it's intelligent.


That is fair enough, but it (of course) assumes primary  
materialism -


No it doesn't.  Why do you think that?  I think "assuming primary  
materialism" is a largely imaginary fault Bruno accuses his  
critics of.  Sure physicists study physics and it's a reasonable  
working hypothesis; but nobody tries to even define "primary  
matter" they just look to see if another layer will be a better  
layer of physics or not.


But I think Bruno's criticism is that physics->psychology is  
assumed,


Assumed by whom though?  Physicists working on physics?   
Probably.  Philosophers working on consciousness?  Some do, some  
don't.


By scientists in general, I would say. Physicists are the easiest  
to forgive, their work seems valid either way. Neuroscientists,  
psychologists and social scientists are not so easy to forgive. I  
personally have no problem with assuming primary materialism,  
provided that you are aware that it is an assumption.


For thousands of years humans looked for consciousness and agency  
in everything.  Then one day someone saidlet's just  
forget about ulimate truth and God and what's primary and let's  
just see what we can say about the shadows...and that's when modern  
science took off.


The discovery of the scientific method had nothing to do with the  
abandonment of deep questions. It had to do with a rejection of  
appeals to authority. Don't believe the guy in the funny robe, do  
the experiment -- and sometimes the thought experiment.


But the authorities being abandoned, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,  
Aquinas were all of the opinion that thinking about deep questions  
was the way to learn about the world.  What was the perfect form?   
What was the natural state of a substance?  Plato denigrated  
observation as "looking at shadows" and the world as an imperfect  
reflection of ideal forms.


OK. Well, Platonists just believe in another non physical reality,  
capable of explaining the existence or appearance of reality. God, if  
you want, but not in any popular stop-asking sense. It might be a  
mathematical reality, or an aritmetical one, like with mechanism.




Sure there was rejection of the authority of the Church and the  
ancients - but in favor of what?  The protestants just changed to  
the Bible as the sole authority (and invented fundamentalism).   
Science arose from rejecting authority in favor of observation of  
"the shadows".


Yes, and it favors the shorter and conceptually simpler attempt to  
relate what we can verify on the shadow on different circumstances.







You can't observe the ur-stuff of the world, you can only make up  
models, show they work, and see what ontology they imply.


Exactly.

Bruno










Which leads us to philosophers, which are largely irrelevant at  
the moment -- because of their own sort-comings and because there  
is a strong bias against deep questions in current culture. I think.


For me, the relevance of this sort of issue is personal (another  
preoccupation that goes a bit against the zeitgeist, which is  
increasingly self-centred but in a superficial fashion). For  
example, ISTM that it has strong implications in terms of deriving  
a rational code of ethics and in making life choices.


Really?  I don't see the implications.  Bruno proposes to derive  
physics, specifically QM from his theory; not change it.  So there  
are no new implications there.  Deepak Chopra will no doubt take  
advantage of it to get rich on some more "thinking will make it so"  
woo-woo...when he hears about it. What implications do you refer to?


Brent, with all due respect. I value your contributions to the  
mailing list and learned from them. Even when I disagree with you,  
you have interesting things to say. But you are too quick with the  
labelling. It's not really fair play. I think it's quite obvious  
that I am not defending guys in funny robes or Deepak Chopra.


Sorry I didn't mean to imply you did and I certainly know that you  
don't.  I just mentioned him as someone who will try to draw (his

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?



On 19 May 2014, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/19/2014 11:31 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 8:09 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 5/19/2014 10:24 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 7:06 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 5/19/2014 2:38 AM, LizR wrote:
His main interest is the mind-body problem; and my interest in  
that problem is more from an engineering viewpoint.  What does it  
take to make a conscious machine and what are the advantages or  
disadvantages of doing so.  Bruno says a machine that can learn  
and do induction is conscious, which might be testable - but I  
think it would fail.  I think that might be necessary for  
consciousness, but for a machine to appear conscious it must be  
intelligent and it must be able to act so as to convince us that  
it's intelligent.


That is fair enough, but it (of course) assumes primary  
materialism -


No it doesn't.  Why do you think that?  I think "assuming primary  
materialism" is a largely imaginary fault Bruno accuses his  
critics of.  Sure physicists study physics and it's a reasonable  
working hypothesis; but nobody tries to even define "primary  
matter" they just look to see if another layer will be a better  
layer of physics or not.


But I think Bruno's criticism is that physics->psychology is  
assumed,


Assumed by whom though?  Physicists working on physics?  Probably.   
Philosophers working on consciousness?  Some do, some don't.


By scientists in general, I would say. Physicists are the easiest  
to forgive, their work seems valid either way. Neuroscientists,  
psychologists and social scientists are not so easy to forgive. I  
personally have no problem with assuming primary materialism,  
provided that you are aware that it is an assumption.


For thousands of years humans looked for consciousness and agency in  
everything.  Then one day someone said let's just forget about  
ulimate truth and God and what's primary and let's just see what we  
can say about the shadows...and that's when modern science took off.


Not at all. That would have been "scientific" if they were saying, let  
us do a simplifying assumption. It is a brilliant idea to look at the  
"shadows", and that is why Plato did not bannish Aristotle (against  
Xeusippes opinion, which was the first explicit mathematicalist  
(beyond Pythagorus).


But forgetting that the shadow are shadows, and telling us that they  
are the real thing, is confusing a simplification with a metaphysical  
principles, and this is just wrong in rigorous metaphysics.









Which leads us to philosophers, which are largely irrelevant at the  
moment -- because of their own sort-comings and because there is a  
strong bias against deep questions in current culture. I think.


For me, the relevance of this sort of issue is personal (another  
preoccupation that goes a bit against the zeitgeist, which is  
increasingly self-centred but in a superficial fashion). For  
example, ISTM that it has strong implications in terms of deriving  
a rational code of ethics and in making life choices.


Really?  I don't see the implications.  Bruno proposes to derive  
physics, specifically QM from his theory; not change it.  So there  
are no new implications there.  Deepak Chopra will no doubt take  
advantage of it to get rich on some more "thinking will make it so"  
woo-woo...when he hears about it. What implications do you refer to?



The implications might be the abandon of materialism, which is good,  
as it is a person eliminativist position.
Then the machine's theology provides a vaccine against the  
reductionist conception of numbers, machines and a fortiori humans.
The main general implications is a tool for coming back to seriousness  
in theology, including the origin of the physical realities.


This announces a super-big paradigm shift where the person notion  
plays a key role. It might take time for obvious "cultural" reasons.


Bruno








and that the reversal hypothesis is rejected a priori. So it's not  
just a matter of "another layer".


"Rejected" implies they're writing papers refuting something.

That would be great. It would mean that people are aware of the  
assumption.


  First, there are essentially zero physicists writing papers about  
consciousness.  Second, there are lots of psychologists writing  
papers; do you expect them to be assuming psychology->physics?   
What would they do with that assumption?


I agree. I was not attacking physicists. In fact, I mostly admire  
them. To give an example in other fields, Manuel Damásio annoys me  
a bit.


Antonio Damasio?

Brent

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?