Re: First person plural
On 27 Jul 2015, at 22:21, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 1:24 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: you refer to the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W and M. Ok good, this time Bruno Marchal correctly wrote W AND M. You just betray yourself that for you only the 3-views exists. This has a name eliminative materialism. This explain why you don't want to interview the copies. I guess you will never do that. As Quentin said: case closed. Bruno But, in Helsinki, the question is about what you [ the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W and M] expect to live Then obviously you would expect to live in W and M, provided that you was rational, if not then all bets are off as to what you would expect. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. as next first person experience. Bruno forgot a s, if should be next first person experiences And here computationalism provides the solution: it can only be one experience among W and M. What does the pronoun it in the above refer to? I suspect the answer is one experience among W and M in which case I agree, one experience among W and M can only be one experience among W and M. a computer in one room cannot get the information of another computer in another room without being connected to it. If 2 computers are the same and start running the same program at the same time then they don't need to be connected and exchange information in order to be synchronized. That's why talk about telepathy is ridiculous. You are in W and you are in M, but that say nothing about the subjective first person experience, which is what we are looking about in step 3. That is true, step 3 is indeed about looking for the subjective person experience after the duplication has occurred, and that is exactly why I refuse to read step 4. There is no such thing as THE future first person experience, there is only a future first person experience You have agreed that their subjective experiences, being in M and being in W, have become incompatible. They are incompatible with each other but neither is incompatible with the Helsinki Man (aka you). a child can see that they all agrees with the W v M prediction Then get that child to fix step 3 for you, after the kid has corrected your errors then I'll read step 4. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
John, The vulgarity and the insults hides hardly that you are doing the C13 confusion again. Oh, sorry, by C13, I mean your YCT1PAT3P, of course. You really begin to look like this little guy, except it is adorable (I am less sure for you, to be honest): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsqt2ywSqTQ Hmm... taking the risk to annoy a bit Quentin, I will still comment this: If it's important then provide it. Obviously the definition of you as being somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki is not getting the job done, so lets have some extra verbiage in that definition so it could be logically said you will see only one city. you refer to the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W and M. But, in Helsinki, the question is about what you expect to live as next first person experience. And here computationalism provides the solution: it can only be one experience among W and M. Not both, as a computer in one room cannot get the information of another computer in another room without being connected to it. You are in W and you are in M, but that say nothing about the subjective first person experience, which is what we are looking about in step 3. To get it, we can interview both copies. You have agreed that their subjective experiences, being in M and being in W, have become incompatible. so the next possible experiences, when in Helsinki, can only be either W or M. Usually, we can confuse 3-you and 1-you, as it looks like there is a bijection between them, but that is not the case after the duplication (nor before, actually). Each 3-you is in both places (W M), but each 1-you feels to be in either W, or M, satisfying both W v M. Now, what you do, is, instead of listening to the 1-you, you ask yourself where those 1-you are, but this gives the 3-1 view, not the 1- view asked (or the 1-1-view, or the 1-1-1-view ...). You see, C13 again and again and again and again ... The question is not on the 3-you, not even on the 1-you, but to the 1-you, in Helsinki, about what he expects to live as next experience. This makes the only way to verify it into interviewing *all* copies. In this case, a child can see that they all agrees with the W v M prediction, and they all refute the W M prediction. Bruno On 27 Jul 2015, at 00:22, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: you always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki. That is actually a pretty good definition of you in that it's similar to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get from everyday life; it would be even better if Bruno used it consistently. You say that often, but never show the inconsistency Bullshit!. Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people certainly can. But two people is not a person. That is usually the case, but people duplicating machines are not usual. There is no unique first person attached to it, unless you introduce telepathy Again with the idiot telepathy! that is contradicted directly by the two persons whose diaries Again with the idiot diaries! The only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to the definition of you. Then maybe Bruno could logically say you will only see one city even though John Clark will see 2, although I'm not entirely sure what that extra verbiage would be. That verbiage is the important distinction between the first person account of experience, and a third person If it's important then provide it. Obviously the definition of you as being somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki is not getting the job done, so lets have some extra verbiage in that definition so it could be logically said you will see only one city. You have agreed that you don't die in the process, John Clark has agreed that Bruno Marchal will not die in the process, and you will not die in the process either, at least not under the old definition of you; but under the new improved definition of you with the extra verbiage (which nobody has seen yet) it is unknown if you will survive. 1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, open the door, and observe the city of Washington. 2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, open the door, and observe the city of Moscow. Both can see that P(W M) was 0 in Helsinki, Both can see that the symbol P in the above is ambiguous. The probability of who seeing what? And both can also see that the probability of Bruno Marchal clearing up that ambiguity without introducing person pronouns with their own ambiguity or using the instead of a is zero. Some could even say that P(W M) is not even zero, but a non- sensical question Yes some could
Re: First person plural
On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 1:24 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: you refer to the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W and M. Ok good, this time Bruno Marchal correctly wrote W *AND* M. But, in Helsinki, the question is about what you [ the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W* and* M ] expect to live Then obviously you would expect to live in W* and* M , provided that you was rational, if not then all bets are off as to what you would expect. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. as next first person experience. Bruno forgot a s, if should be next first person experience *s* And here computationalism provides the solution: it can only be one experience among W and M. What does the pronoun it in the above refer to? I suspect the answer is one experience among W and M in which case I agree, one experience among W and M can only be one experience among W and M . a computer in one room cannot get the information of another computer in another room without being connected to it. If 2 computers are the same and start running the same program at the same time then they don't need to be connected and exchange information in order to be synchronized. That's why talk about telepathy is ridiculous. You are in W and you are in M, but that say nothing about the subjective first person experience, which is what we are looking about in step 3. That is true, step 3 is indeed about looking for the subjective person experience after the duplication has occurred, and that is exactly why I refuse to read step 4. There is no such thing as *THE *future first person experience , there is only *a* future first person experience You have agreed that their subjective experiences, being in M and being in W, have become incompatible. They are incompatible with each other but neither is incompatible with the Helsinki Man (aka you). a child can see that they all agrees with the W v M prediction Then get that child to fix step 3 for you, after the kid has corrected your errors then I'll read step 4. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
On 25 Jul 2015, at 22:38, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Please, quote the whole text I wrote
No. Anybody who wants to read everything you wrote can find it in
about .9 seconds, they don't need me.
It is the answer to them that we ask for.
you always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button
at Helsinki.
That is actually a pretty good definition of you in that it's
similar to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get
from everyday life; it would be even better if Bruno used it
consistently.
You say that often, but never show the inconsistency, nor reply to the
ragument showing your own inconsistency.
Its only *first* person experience accessible are the
incompatible W and M *experience*
Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person
experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people
certainly can.
But two people is not a person. There is no unique first person
attached to it, unless you introduce telepathy, and that would
contradict the protocol and the hypothesis.
And there are now two people who remember pushing the button at
Helsinki, and if you really does always denotes the guy who
remember pushing the button at Helsinki then you will see Moscow
and Washington, the logic is inescapable.
But that is contradicted directly by the two persons, whose diaries
confirms both that they were wrong, they BOTH see only once city.
Bruno Marchal may find that conclusion repugnant
It is just invalid, and directly refuted by the facts.
but logic doesn't care about human tastes, it remains true
regardless. The only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to
the definition of you. Then maybe Bruno could logically say you
will only see one city even though John Clark will see 2, although
I'm not entirely sure what that extra verbiage would be.
That verbiage is the important distinction between the first person
account of experience, and a third person account of it, when we
attribute a consciousness to a different person than oneself.
Such a third person description confirms what you are saying: I will
be in the two cities, there are no problem there, but it avoids
answering the question which is about the subjective experience.
Using computationalism, it is just obvious that only two computational
histories are possible, and they are incompatible as you say above.
Those two experiences are:
1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the
button, open the door, and observe the city of Washington.
2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the
button, open the door, and observe the city of Moscow.
Both can see that P(W M) was 0 in Helsinki, and so learn that it was
erroneous. But the prediction of W v M is satisfied by both outcome,
and so, in Helsinki, the prediction P(W v M) will be believed, and if
the protocol is respected, the prediction is correct.
Similarly, the prediction of the subjective experience in the iterated
case is white noise, and it is indeed confirmed by all possible fair
sample of the population of the copies. On the contrary, despite it
makes sense to say that you are all copies in the 3p view on the 1-
view, it is simply false as a prediction of the subjective experiences
accessible to you from Helsinki.
You just seems to omit that the question is a practical question of
what you can expect to experience. You have agreed that you don't die
in the process, and that the only two possible outcomes are
incompatible from the first person pov. As W and M represents those
outcomes (and not the localization of those outcomes) the answer W
M is simply inconsistent.
You persist in not listening to the question asked in Helsinki (what
first person, subjective, experience do you expect to LIVE after
pushing the button, clarified notably by the means of verification
given: looking at the diaries, which are described above, and
describe incompatible experiences.
In fact, you seems to not realize that after the duplication, the
experience has diverged into two quite different experiences: one get
W, the other get M. For an outsider you (in the 3-1 sense, thus) are
at both places, but for the experiencer itself, in all case, it has
become I see a precise city among {W, M} and imagine intellectually
that I have a doppelganger in the other city. As the question bears
on the subjective experience, the simple prediction P(W v M) = 1, and
P(W M) = 0. Some could even say that P(W M) is not even zero, but
a non-sensical question as for them it is directly obvious that W M
does not even describe a possible experience. That is a splitting hair
detail, as the point is that P(W v M) = 1. The experience of living in
W or in M, and not in both, is lived by all the people concerned that
we will
Re: First person plural
Bruno, don't bother, he will not understand, because he already does, and
he will never admit it, because he's a troll. Case closed, ignore him, he
won't go from this list, seems to joyful for him, so the only way is to
ignore him.
Quentin
2015-07-26 11:58 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 25 Jul 2015, at 22:38, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Please, quote the whole text I wrote
No. Anybody who wants to read everything you wrote can find it in about
.9 seconds, they don't need me.
It is the answer to them that we ask for.
you always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki.
That is actually a pretty good definition of you in that it's similar
to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get from everyday
life; it would be even better if Bruno used it consistently.
You say that often, but never show the inconsistency, nor reply to the
ragument showing your own inconsistency.
Its only *first* person experience accessible are the incompatible W and M
*experience*
Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person
experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people certainly
can.
But two people is not a person. There is no unique first person attached
to it, unless you introduce telepathy, and that would contradict the
protocol and the hypothesis.
And there are now two people who remember pushing the button at Helsinki,
and if you really does always denotes the guy who remember pushing the
button at Helsinki then you will see Moscow *and *Washington, the
logic is inescapable.
But that is contradicted directly by the two persons, whose diaries
confirms both that they were wrong, they BOTH see only once city.
Bruno Marchal may find that conclusion repugnant
It is just invalid, and directly refuted by the facts.
but logic doesn't care about human tastes, it remains true regardless. The
only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to the definition of you.
Then maybe Bruno could logically say you will only see one city even
though John Clark will see 2, although I'm not entirely sure what that
extra verbiage would be.
That verbiage is the important distinction between the first person
account of experience, and a third person account of it, when we attribute
a consciousness to a different person than oneself.
Such a third person description confirms what you are saying: I will be in
the two cities, there are no problem there, but it avoids answering the
question which is about the subjective experience.
Using computationalism, it is just obvious that only two computational
histories are possible, and they are incompatible as you say above. Those
two experiences are:
1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button,
open the door, and observe the city of Washington.
2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button,
open the door, and observe the city of Moscow.
Both can see that P(W M) was 0 in Helsinki, and so learn that it was
erroneous. But the prediction of W v M is satisfied by both outcome, and
so, in Helsinki, the prediction P(W v M) will be believed, and if the
protocol is respected, the prediction is correct.
Similarly, the prediction of the subjective experience in the iterated
case is white noise, and it is indeed confirmed by all possible fair
sample of the population of the copies. On the contrary, despite it makes
sense to say that you are all copies in the 3p view on the 1-view, it is
simply false as a prediction of the subjective experiences accessible to
you from Helsinki.
You just seems to omit that the question is a practical question of what
you can expect to experience. You have agreed that you don't die in the
process, and that the only two possible outcomes are incompatible from the
first person pov. As W and M represents those outcomes (and not the
localization of those outcomes) the answer W M is simply inconsistent.
You persist in not listening to the question asked in Helsinki (what first
person, subjective, experience do you expect to LIVE after pushing the
button, clarified notably by the means of verification given: looking at
the diaries, which are described above, and describe incompatible
experiences.
In fact, you seems to not realize that after the duplication, the
experience has diverged into two quite different experiences: one get W,
the other get M. For an outsider you (in the 3-1 sense, thus) are at both
places, but for the experiencer itself, in all case, it has become I see a
precise city among {W, M} and imagine intellectually that I have a
doppelganger in the other city. As the question bears on the subjective
experience, the simple prediction P(W v M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0. Some
could even say that P(W M) is not even zero, but a non-sensical question
as for
Re: First person plural
On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: you always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki. That is actually a pretty good definition of you in that it's similar to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get from everyday life; it would be even better if Bruno used it consistently. You say that often, but never show the inconsistency Bullshit!. Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people certainly can. But two people is not a person. That is usually the case, but people duplicating machines are not usual. There is no unique first person attached to it, unless you introduce telepathy Again with the idiot telepathy! that is contradicted directly by the two persons whose diaries Again with the idiot diaries! The only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to the definition of you. Then maybe Bruno could logically say you will only see one city even though John Clark will see 2, although I'm not entirely sure what that extra verbiage would be. That verbiage is the important distinction between the first person account of experience, and a third person If it's important then provide it. Obviously the definition of you as being somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki is not getting the job done, so lets have some extra verbiage in that definition so it could be logically said you will see only one city. You have agreed that you don't die in the process, John Clark has agreed that Bruno Marchal will not die in the process, and you will not die in the process either, at least not under the old definition of you; but under the new improved definition of you with the extra verbiage (which nobody has seen yet) it is unknown if you will survive. 1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, open the door, and observe the city of Washington. 2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, open the door, and observe the city of Moscow. B oth can see that P(W M) was 0 in Helsinki, Both can see that the symbol P in the above is ambiguous. The probability of who seeing what? And both can also see that the probability of Bruno Marchal clearing up that ambiguity without introducing person pronouns with their own ambiguity or using the instead of a is zero. Some could even say that P(W M) is not even zero, but a non-sensical question Yes some could say that. And some would say that P(W)=1 because the probability of the Washington Man seeing Washington is 1, and some would say that P( M ) =1 because the probability of the Moscow Man seeing Moscow is 1, and Bruno himself says that H= WM, so some would say that P(WM) =1 means that the probability The Helsinki Man will see W and M is 1. But then Bruno says that is not what P(WM) means what it does mean remains ambiguous. you seems to not realize that after the duplication, the experience has diverged into two quite different experiences: Don't be ridiculous, of course I realize that because that is what diverged means, one thing becoming 2 things. The point of divergence occurs when past experiences are the same but future experiences are different. T he experience of living in W or in M, and not in both, But the question was not asked of the man in W or of the man in M, it was asked of the man in H. Do you understand now? Oh yes. Do you? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
On 24 Jul 2015, at 21:56, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I understand that Mr. You is now in Helsinki but Mr. You has no idea what P(W M) = 1 means. How many times this need to be repeated. Until it is not gibberish. W refers to the experience of self-localization done after opening the door after the duplication So the probability the Helsinki Man aka you will self-localize (Pompous-speak for see) Washington is 1. cut in Helsinki, and paste in M and in W So the probability the Helsinki Man aka you will self-localize Moscow is 1. So the probability the Helsinki Man, aka you, will see both cities is ___ [fill in the blank] Please explain exactly what the bet is. You will push on the button, in the cut and double paste of the step 3 protocol, and you have been asked to predict if you will see one city or two cities. That's 3 usages of that damn personal pronoun in just 33 words, and so John Clark will ask for the 100^100 time, WHO THE HELL IS YOU ?! Please, quote the whole text I wrote, and tell me what you don't understand there, as it answers completely and clearly, at everyone satisfaction, that very question, and why it entails the first person indeterminism or indeterminacy. you always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki. Its only *first* person experience accessible are the incompatible W and M *experience* described yesterday, and which excludes already your P(W M) = 1. If you omit quoting the explanation, and saying what you don't understand, ,it is obvious it makes no sense I repeat the explanations. I wrote that yesterday, so they are not far. Please do that. Bruno John K Clark And if one city, which one, with which expectation. No ambiguity in pronouns at all, Correct, this time the ambiguity is in P(W M) = 1 *you* told me that P(W M) = 1. You seem to forget that W refers to an experience, a subjective sensation of seeing something after opening a door. P(W M) is not ambiguous, it is simply wrong. P(W M) = 0, as none of the copies will write in the diary: I opened the door and saw the cities of Washington and Moscow fused together. All copies wrote: I opened the door and saw only one city, and all write down the name of the unique city they saw, in their personal memory/diary, and all the description are ether M or W., making P(W v M) true. It is because we use the definition based on the personal memory for the identity, that we understand the divergence, and the P(one city) = 1, and thus the P(W v M) = 1. Then by numerical identity, assumed in the assumption of the right comp level, P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 is the simplest reasonable expectation, in that simple protocol, like white noise is the simplest reasonable expectation in its iteration. I think you need just to keep in mind that W and M do not refer to city, or body, nor even to first person experience that we can attribute to an other. W and M refer to the proposition describing the subjective experience the helsinki guy get when opening the, or a if you prefer, reconstitution box. You agree that the experience diverges, and the question is about the expectation of the outcomes making that divergence. The prediction is written in the diary in Helsinki. Exemples: I predict that I will find myself in a reconstitution box in front of a door. I predict that whatever the city I will find myself in, I will drink a cup of coffee. I predict that after opening the door of the reconstitution box, I will see only one city, among Washington and Moscow. And the quality of the prediction is measured by sampling what has been written in the diaries of the copies. In this case there is only two diaries, and we can see that the predictions have all been confirmed, as both diaries describes the experience of seeing a door, opening a door and seeing, ..., a well defined unique city, among Washington and Moscow. All right? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: First person plural
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Please, quote the whole text I wrote No. Anybody who wants to read everything you wrote can find it in about .9 seconds, they don't need me. you always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki. That is actually a pretty good definition of you in that it's similar to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get from everyday life; it would be even better if Bruno used it consistently. Its only *first* person experience accessible are the incompatible W and M *experience* Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people certainly can. And there are now two people who remember pushing the button at Helsinki, and if you really does always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki then you will see Moscow *and *Washington, the logic is inescapable. Bruno Marchal may find that conclusion repugnant but logic doesn't care about human tastes, it remains true regardless. The only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to the definition of you. Then maybe Bruno could logically say you will only see one city even though John Clark will see 2, although I'm not entirely sure what that extra verbiage would be. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: This illustrate well the notion of first person plural, and show that both in Comp and [blah blah] I don't know what Comp is and I don't think you do either, although you think you do. You and I are in Helsinki, and we will both enter the annihilation-duplication box. Your bet is P(W M) = 1, I understand that Mr. You is now in Helsinki but Mr. You has no idea what P(W M) = 1 means. Please explain exactly what the bet is. No ambiguity in pronouns at all, Correct, this time the ambiguity is in P(W M) = 1 John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:22, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: This illustrate well the notion of first person plural, and show that both in Comp and [blah blah] You and I are in Helsinki, and we will both enter the annihilation- duplication box. Your bet is P(W M) = 1, I understand that Mr. You is now in Helsinki but Mr. You has no idea what P(W M) = 1 means. How many times this need to be repeated. I will repeat it 100^100 times, but not one more. You could also consult the papers, or ancient post. W refers to the experience of self-localization done after opening the door after the duplication of the step 3 protocole (cut in Helsinki, and paste in M and in W). Then you told me that you predict that you will *experience* W and M. Which is already a nonsense, as obviously nobody can experience two cities at once FROM THE FIRST PERSON VIEW (without telepathy or special apparatus absent per default in the step 3 protocol). It is your prediction. The prediction that you will feel to be in both city at once. Please explain exactly what the bet is. You will push on the button, in the cut and double paste of the step 3 protocol, and you have been asked to predict if you will see one city or two cities. And if one city, which one, with which expectation. No ambiguity in pronouns at all, Correct, this time the ambiguity is in P(W M) = 1 *you* told me that P(W M) = 1. You seem to forget that W refers to an experience, a subjective sensation of seeing something after opening a door. P(W M) is not ambiguous, it is simply wrong. P(W M) = 0, as none of the copies will write in the diary: I opened the door and saw the cities of Washington and Moscow fused together. All copies wrote: I opened the door and saw only one city, and all write down the name of the unique city they saw, in their personal memory/diary, and all the description are ether M or W., making P(W v M) true. It is because we use the definition based on the personal memory for the identity, that we understand the divergence, and the P(one city) = 1, and thus the P(W v M) = 1. Then by numerical identity, assumed in the assumption of the right comp level, P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 is the simplest reasonable expectation, in that simple protocol, like white noise is the simplest reasonable expectation in its iteration. I think you need just to keep in mind that W and M do not refer to city, or body, nor even to first person experience that we can attribute to an other. W and M refer to the proposition describing the subjective experience the helsinki guy get when opening the, or a if you prefer, reconstitution box. You agree that the experience diverges, and the question is about the expectation of the outcomes making that divergence. The prediction is written in the diary in Helsinki. Exemples: I predict that I will find myself in a reconstitution box in front of a door. I predict that whatever the city I will find myself in, I will drink a cup of coffee. I predict that after opening the door of the reconstitution box, I will see only one city, among Washington and Moscow. And the quality of the prediction is measured by sampling what has been written in the diaries of the copies. In this case there is only two diaries, and we can see that the predictions have all been confirmed, as both diaries describes the experience of seeing a door, opening a door and seeing, ..., a well defined unique city, among Washington and Moscow. All right? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I understand that Mr. You is now in Helsinki but Mr. You has no idea what P(W M) = 1 means. How many times this need to be repeated. Until it is not gibberish. W refers to the experience of self-localization done after opening the door after the duplication So the probability the Helsinki Man aka you will self-localize (Pompous-speak for see) Washington is 1. cut in Helsinki, and paste in M and in W So the probability the Helsinki Man aka you will self-localize Moscow is 1. So the probability the Helsinki Man, aka you, will see both cities is ___ [fill in the blank] Please explain exactly what the bet is. You will push on the button, in the cut and double paste of the step 3 protocol, and you have been asked to predict if you will see one city or two cities. That's 3 usages of that damn personal pronoun in just 33 words, and so John Clark will ask for the 100^100 time , *WHO THE HELL IS YOU ?!* John K Clark And if one city, which one, with which expectation. No ambiguity in pronouns at all, Correct, this time the ambiguity is in P(W M) = 1 *you* told me that P(W M) = 1. You seem to forget that W refers to an experience, a subjective sensation of seeing something after opening a door. P(W M) is not ambiguous, it is simply wrong. P(W M) = 0, as none of the copies will write in the diary: I opened the door and saw the cities of Washington and Moscow fused together. All copies wrote: I opened the door and saw only one city, and all write down the name of the unique city they saw, in their personal memory/diary, and all the description are ether M or W., making P(W v M) true. It is because we use the definition based on the personal memory for the identity, that we understand the divergence, and the P(one city) = 1, and thus the P(W v M) = 1. Then by numerical identity, assumed in the assumption of the right comp level, P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 is the simplest reasonable expectation, in that simple protocol, like white noise is the simplest reasonable expectation in its iteration. I think you need just to keep in mind that W and M do not refer to city, or body, nor even to first person experience that we can attribute to an other. W and M refer to the proposition describing the subjective experience the helsinki guy get when opening the, or a if you prefer, reconstitution box. You agree that the experience diverges, and the question is about the expectation of the outcomes making that divergence. The prediction is written in the diary in Helsinki. Exemples: I predict that I will find myself in a reconstitution box in front of a door. I predict that whatever the city I will find myself in, I will drink a cup of coffee. I predict that after opening the door of the reconstitution box, I will see only one city, among Washington and Moscow. And the quality of the prediction is measured by sampling what has been written in the diaries of the copies. In this case there is only two diaries, and we can see that the predictions have all been confirmed, as both diaries describes the experience of seeing a door, opening a door and seeing, ..., a well defined unique city, among Washington and Moscow. All right? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
