Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Sep 2013, at 23:11, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 25 Sep 2013, at 15:50, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 23 Sep 2013, at 12:41, Telmo Menezes wrote:





Thus your interest in near-death experiences?



Yes. And in all "extreme" altered state of consciousness. Those  
extreme

cases provide key information.



Can this information be recovered?



A part of it, but it is experiential and not really communicable or
rationally justifiable. The wise searcher will remain mute on this,  
or be
precise that it gives only a report of an experience, or perhaps  
suggests a
(meta) theory in which such experience exists and are not  
communicable.


Ok.






For example, is a NDE that did not result in death, was it really a
cul-de-sac?




I would say no. But this is complex question, and the salvia  
experience

confused me on this topic.
In the NDE, people come back, but with salvia, locally, people does  
not come

back, only an approximative copy.


I read several reports on this sensation of having been copied. It's
very intriguing.


I agree. It is *very* intriguing. I thought even that salvia somehow  
refutes comp, but I realize that it was only from the first person  
perspective, and this is coherent with the fact that the "knower" (Bp  
& p) is already quite comp resistant.


It is the diabolical aspect of comp: it predicts that the machine have  
necessarily an hard time with comp. Somehow, like the Gödelian  
sentence, comp says about itself "you can't really believe me". From  
that perspective salvia plays a similar trick, just very realistically!






That's why i say that salvia is not an NDE, but a DE. That is why  
it can be

quite literally "life changing", and why I would not recommend it to
anybody.

For the feeler or observer there is no cul-de-sac (thanks to the "&  
Dt"
added to the Bp, by Gödel's completeness theorem (not  
incompleteness!).


But the scientist part of him has cul-de-sac, perhaps the publish  
or perish,

that is the fact that proofs must be finite, before publication.

But it is hard to interpret all this literally. Caution.


Sure.















We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without  
loosing our


universality.


The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and  
lack of


freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way  
to

write

it:


<>t -> ~[]<>t

<>t -> <> [] f

[]<>t -> [] f


I don't understand how you arrive at this equivalence.


I use only the fact that  (p -> q) is equivalent with (~q -> ~p)  
(the
contraposition rule, which is valid in classical propositional  
logic),

and
the definition of <> p = ~[] ~p. I use also that ~~p is  
equivalent with

p.

Note that []p = ~~[]~~p = ~<> ~p.  And,

~[]p = <> ~p
and
~<>p = [] ~p

Like with the quantifier, a not (~) jumping above a modal sign  
makes it

into
a diamond, if it was a bo, and a box, if it was a diamond.


Starting from <>t -> ~[]<>t.



But where does <>t -> ~[]<>t come from?



<>t -> ~[] <> t

is the same as

~[] f -> ~[] (~[] f)

OK?


Ok.

And that is  the modal writing of Gödel's second incompleteness  
theorem:

if the false is not provable, then that fact (that the false is not
provable) is itself not provable.


Nice, that is very satisfying.


OK. Nice.





Keep in mind that <>t  (which I write also Dt) is the same as —[]  
f, which
is equivalent with "I am consistent", and Gödel's second theorem  
asserts: If
I am consistent then I cannot prove that I am consistent. Note that  
the "I"
is a third person I. (The first person "I" considers his/her  
consistency

trivial).









Contraposition gives ~~[]<>t -> ~<>t, and this
gives by above, []<>t -> []~t, which gives
[]<>t -> []f   (as ~t = f, and ~f = t).

OK?



Ok!

For the third one, starting from the first one again: <>t ->  
~[]<>t, By

contraposition []<>t -> ~<>t , but ~<>t = []~t = [] f.

OK?



Ok! Thanks Bruno. My only problem now is the above.



Tell me if you see that it was the modal version of Gödel's second
incompleteness theorem.

You might as an exercise show that it follows from Löb's theorem:

[] ([] p -> p) -> [] p

Two hints:  1)  "~p" is the same as "p -> f",   2) replace p by f.

OK?

Löb's formula *is* the main axiom of the modal logic G.


Alright, it's simple with the hints:

[] ([] p -> p) -> [] p

repalce p by f:
[] ([] f -> f) -> [] f

[]f -> f = ~[]f:
[](~[]f) -> []f

contraposition:
~[]f -> ~(~[]f)

Thanks!


You are welcome :)

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 25 Sep 2013, at 15:50, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Sep 2013, at 12:41, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>> 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thus your interest in near-death experiences?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. And in all "extreme" altered state of consciousness. Those extreme
>>> cases provide key information.
>>
>>
>> Can this information be recovered?
>
>
> A part of it, but it is experiential and not really communicable or
> rationally justifiable. The wise searcher will remain mute on this, or be
> precise that it gives only a report of an experience, or perhaps suggests a
> (meta) theory in which such experience exists and are not communicable.

Ok.

>
>
>
>> For example, is a NDE that did not result in death, was it really a
>> cul-de-sac?
>
>
>
> I would say no. But this is complex question, and the salvia experience
> confused me on this topic.
> In the NDE, people come back, but with salvia, locally, people does not come
> back, only an approximative copy.

I read several reports on this sensation of having been copied. It's
very intriguing.

> That's why i say that salvia is not an NDE, but a DE. That is why it can be
> quite literally "life changing", and why I would not recommend it to
> anybody.
>
> For the feeler or observer there is no cul-de-sac (thanks to the "& Dt"
> added to the Bp, by Gödel's completeness theorem (not incompleteness!).
>
> But the scientist part of him has cul-de-sac, perhaps the publish or perish,
> that is the fact that proofs must be finite, before publication.
>
> But it is hard to interpret all this literally. Caution.

Sure.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without loosing our
>>>
>>> universality.
>>>
>>>
>>> The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and lack of
>>>
>>> freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way to
>>> write
>>>
>>> it:
>>>
>>>
>>> <>t -> ~[]<>t
>>>
>>> <>t -> <> [] f
>>>
>>> []<>t -> [] f
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't understand how you arrive at this equivalence.
>>>
>>>
>>> I use only the fact that  (p -> q) is equivalent with (~q -> ~p) (the
>>> contraposition rule, which is valid in classical propositional logic),
>>> and
>>> the definition of <> p = ~[] ~p. I use also that ~~p is equivalent with
>>> p.
>>>
>>> Note that []p = ~~[]~~p = ~<> ~p.  And,
>>>
>>> ~[]p = <> ~p
>>> and
>>> ~<>p = [] ~p
>>>
>>> Like with the quantifier, a not (~) jumping above a modal sign makes it
>>> into
>>> a diamond, if it was a bo, and a box, if it was a diamond.
>>>
>>>
>>> Starting from <>t -> ~[]<>t.
>>
>>
>> But where does <>t -> ~[]<>t come from?
>
>
> <>t -> ~[] <> t
>
> is the same as
>
> ~[] f -> ~[] (~[] f)
>
> OK?

Ok.

> And that is  the modal writing of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem:
> if the false is not provable, then that fact (that the false is not
> provable) is itself not provable.

Nice, that is very satisfying.

> Keep in mind that <>t  (which I write also Dt) is the same as —[] f, which
> is equivalent with "I am consistent", and Gödel's second theorem asserts: If
> I am consistent then I cannot prove that I am consistent. Note that the "I"
> is a third person I. (The first person "I" considers his/her consistency
> trivial).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> Contraposition gives ~~[]<>t -> ~<>t, and this
>>> gives by above, []<>t -> []~t, which gives
>>> []<>t -> []f   (as ~t = f, and ~f = t).
>>>
>>> OK?
>>
>>
>> Ok!
>>
>>> For the third one, starting from the first one again: <>t -> ~[]<>t, By
>>> contraposition []<>t -> ~<>t , but ~<>t = []~t = [] f.
>>>
>>> OK?
>>
>>
>> Ok! Thanks Bruno. My only problem now is the above.
>
>
> Tell me if you see that it was the modal version of Gödel's second
> incompleteness theorem.
>
> You might as an exercise show that it follows from Löb's theorem:
>
> [] ([] p -> p) -> [] p
>
> Two hints:  1)  "~p" is the same as "p -> f",   2) replace p by f.
>
> OK?
>
> Löb's formula *is* the main axiom of the modal logic G.

Alright, it's simple with the hints:

[] ([] p -> p) -> [] p

repalce p by f:
[] ([] f -> f) -> [] f

[]f -> f = ~[]f:
[](~[]f) -> []f

contraposition:
~[]f -> ~(~[]f)

Thanks!
Telmo.

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Sep 2013, at 15:50, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 23 Sep 2013, at 12:41, Telmo Menezes wrote:




Thus your interest in near-death experiences?



Yes. And in all "extreme" altered state of consciousness. Those  
extreme

cases provide key information.


Can this information be recovered?


A part of it, but it is experiential and not really communicable or  
rationally justifiable. The wise searcher will remain mute on this, or  
be precise that it gives only a report of an experience, or perhaps  
suggests a (meta) theory in which such experience exists and are not  
communicable.




For example, is a NDE that did not result in death, was it really a  
cul-de-sac?



I would say no. But this is complex question, and the salvia  
experience confused me on this topic.
In the NDE, people come back, but with salvia, locally, people does  
not come back, only an approximative copy.
That's why i say that salvia is not an NDE, but a DE. That is why it  
can be quite literally "life changing", and why I would not recommend  
it to anybody.


For the feeler or observer there is no cul-de-sac (thanks to the "&  
Dt" added to the Bp, by Gödel's completeness theorem (not  
incompleteness!).


But the scientist part of him has cul-de-sac, perhaps the publish or  
perish, that is the fact that proofs must be finite, before publication.


But it is hard to interpret all this literally. Caution.













We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without loosing  
our


universality.


The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and lack of

freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way  
to write


it:


<>t -> ~[]<>t

<>t -> <> [] f

[]<>t -> [] f


I don't understand how you arrive at this equivalence.


I use only the fact that  (p -> q) is equivalent with (~q -> ~p) (the
contraposition rule, which is valid in classical propositional  
logic), and
the definition of <> p = ~[] ~p. I use also that ~~p is equivalent  
with p.


Note that []p = ~~[]~~p = ~<> ~p.  And,

~[]p = <> ~p
and
~<>p = [] ~p

Like with the quantifier, a not (~) jumping above a modal sign  
makes it into

a diamond, if it was a bo, and a box, if it was a diamond.


Starting from <>t -> ~[]<>t.


But where does <>t -> ~[]<>t come from?


<>t -> ~[] <> t

is the same as

~[] f -> ~[] (~[] f)

OK?

And that is  the modal writing of Gödel's second incompleteness  
theorem: if the false is not provable, then that fact (that the false  
is not provable) is itself not provable.


Keep in mind that <>t  (which I write also Dt) is the same as —[] f,  
which is equivalent with "I am consistent", and Gödel's second theorem  
asserts: If I am consistent then I cannot prove that I am consistent.  
Note that the "I" is a third person I. (The first person "I" considers  
his/her consistency trivial).









Contraposition gives ~~[]<>t -> ~<>t, and this
gives by above, []<>t -> []~t, which gives
[]<>t -> []f   (as ~t = f, and ~f = t).

OK?


Ok!

For the third one, starting from the first one again: <>t ->  
~[]<>t, By

contraposition []<>t -> ~<>t , but ~<>t = []~t = [] f.

OK?


Ok! Thanks Bruno. My only problem now is the above.


Tell me if you see that it was the modal version of Gödel's second  
incompleteness theorem.


You might as an exercise show that it follows from Löb's theorem:

[] ([] p -> p) -> [] p

Two hints:  1)  "~p" is the same as "p -> f",   2) replace p by f.

OK?

Löb's formula *is* the main axiom of the modal logic G.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 23 Sep 2013, at 12:41, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 9:43 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Sep 2013, at 15:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal 
>
>
>
> If so, can't we say ~D~t and thus []t?
>
>
>
> Yes, []t is a theorem, of G and most modal logic, but not of Z!
>
>
>
>
>
> Isn't the only situation where ~Dt the one where this is no world?
>
>
>
> ~Dt, that is [] f, inconsistency, is the type of the error, dream, lie, and
>
> "near-death", or in-a-cul-de-sac.
>
>
> Thus your interest in near-death experiences?
>
>
>
> Yes. And in all "extreme" altered state of consciousness. Those extreme
> cases provide key information.

Can this information be recovered?
For example, is a NDE that did not result in death, was it really a cul-de-sac?

>
>
>
> We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without loosing our
>
> universality.
>
>
> The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and lack of
>
> freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way to write
>
> it:
>
>
> <>t -> ~[]<>t
>
> <>t -> <> [] f
>
> []<>t -> [] f
>
>
> I don't understand how you arrive at this equivalence.
>
>
> I use only the fact that  (p -> q) is equivalent with (~q -> ~p) (the
> contraposition rule, which is valid in classical propositional logic), and
> the definition of <> p = ~[] ~p. I use also that ~~p is equivalent with p.
>
> Note that []p = ~~[]~~p = ~<> ~p.  And,
>
> ~[]p = <> ~p
> and
> ~<>p = [] ~p
>
> Like with the quantifier, a not (~) jumping above a modal sign makes it into
> a diamond, if it was a bo, and a box, if it was a diamond.
>
>
> Starting from <>t -> ~[]<>t.

But where does <>t -> ~[]<>t come from?

> Contraposition gives ~~[]<>t -> ~<>t, and this
> gives by above, []<>t -> []~t, which gives
> []<>t -> []f   (as ~t = f, and ~f = t).
>
> OK?

Ok!

> For the third one, starting from the first one again: <>t -> ~[]<>t, By
> contraposition []<>t -> ~<>t , but ~<>t = []~t = [] f.
>
> OK?

Ok! Thanks Bruno. My only problem now is the above.

Telmo.

> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:52:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 23, 2013 4:53:49 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Sep 2013, at 20:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, September 23, 2013 2:21:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Sep 2013, at 05:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think the simulated typhoon would make the virtual person feel 
>>> wet any more than it would make them smell seaweed. Why would it?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Because I assume comp.
>>>
>>
>> lol. Santa comp is comin' ta town..
>>
>>
>>
>> Well, usually it is non-comp which is compared to Santa Klaus, because we 
>> don't  have any evidences for something not Turing emulable in our body.
>>
>  
>
>
> We don't have any evidences for something that is us in our body either.
>
>
> That's a good point, which indeed follows from comp. "Bodies" are mind's 
> construction. Indeed.
>


Which follows from MSR also...computation is the sense which minds have of 
generalized bodies. The intellect cannot construct bodies on its own 
though, not without tactile and/or visual sensitivity. A body is what feels 
touchable and what looks seeable. A body without tangible sensibility is a 
shape. An invisible body is a gas (or maybe dark matter, but I doubt it).

Comp fails because it takes the mind's own 'myth of the given' for granted. 
The logical human intellect is so adept at imitating (quicksilver metaphors 
in alchemy) that is can doubt there can be any more fundamental resource 
than imitation. This is intentional. The mind must seem airtight and pure 
to itself to concentrate attention on its fantasies and figuring. It 
contaminates the intellect to suppose that at its roots are either feelings 
or physics, but in fact, the mind can create nothing in public without a 
physical vehicle, and it cannot access its own physical (public facing) 
vehicle unless it feels its way through the nervous system directly. 

Craig



> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, September 23, 2013 4:53:49 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Sep 2013, at 20:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, September 23, 2013 2:21:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Sep 2013, at 05:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:



I don't think the simulated typhoon would make the virtual person  
feel wet any more than it would make them smell seaweed. Why would  
it?



Because I assume comp.

lol. Santa comp is comin' ta town..



Well, usually it is non-comp which is compared to Santa Klaus,  
because we don't  have any evidences for something not Turing  
emulable in our body.




We don't have any evidences for something that is us in our body  
either.




That's a good point, which indeed follows from comp. "Bodies" are  
mind's construction. Indeed.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, September 23, 2013 4:53:49 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2013, at 20:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 23, 2013 2:21:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Sep 2013, at 05:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>> I don't think the simulated typhoon would make the virtual person feel 
>> wet any more than it would make them smell seaweed. Why would it?
>>
>>
>>
>> Because I assume comp.
>>
>
> lol. Santa comp is comin' ta town..
>
>
>
> Well, usually it is non-comp which is compared to Santa Klaus, because we 
> don't  have any evidences for something not Turing emulable in our body.
>
 


We don't have any evidences for something that is us in our body either.

Craig

 

>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2013, at 20:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, September 23, 2013 2:21:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Sep 2013, at 05:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:



I don't think the simulated typhoon would make the virtual person  
feel wet any more than it would make them smell seaweed. Why would  
it?



Because I assume comp.

lol. Santa comp is comin' ta town..



Well, usually it is non-comp which is compared to Santa Klaus, because  
we don't  have any evidences for something not Turing emulable in our  
body.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, September 23, 2013 2:21:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2013, at 05:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> I don't think the simulated typhoon would make the virtual person feel wet 
> any more than it would make them smell seaweed. Why would it?
>
>
>
> Because I assume comp.
>

lol. Santa comp is comin' ta town..

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2013, at 12:41, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 9:43 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 21 Sep 2013, at 15:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal 




If so, can't we say ~D~t and thus []t?



Yes, []t is a theorem, of G and most modal logic, but not of Z!





Isn't the only situation where ~Dt the one where this is no world?



~Dt, that is [] f, inconsistency, is the type of the error, dream,  
lie, and

"near-death", or in-a-cul-de-sac.


Thus your interest in near-death experiences?



Yes. And in all "extreme" altered state of consciousness. Those  
extreme cases provide key information.






We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without loosing  
our

universality.

The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and lack of
freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way  
to write

it:

<>t -> ~[]<>t
<>t -> <> [] f
[]<>t -> [] f


I don't understand how you arrive at this equivalence.


I use only the fact that  (p -> q) is equivalent with (~q -> ~p) (the  
contraposition rule, which is valid in classical propositional logic),  
and the definition of <> p = ~[] ~p. I use also that ~~p is equivalent  
with p.


Note that []p = ~~[]~~p = ~<> ~p.  And,

~[]p = <> ~p
and
~<>p = [] ~p

Like with the quantifier, a not (~) jumping above a modal sign makes  
it into a diamond, if it was a bo, and a box, if it was a diamond.



Starting from <>t -> ~[]<>t. Contraposition gives ~~[]<>t -> ~<>t, and  
this gives by above, []<>t -> []~t, which gives

[]<>t -> []f   (as ~t = f, and ~f = t).

OK?

For the third one, starting from the first one again: <>t -> ~[]<>t,  
By contraposition []<>t -> ~<>t , but ~<>t = []~t = [] f.


OK?

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2013, at 05:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:



I don't think the simulated typhoon would make the virtual person  
feel wet any more than it would make them smell seaweed. Why would it?



Because I assume comp.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 9:43 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 21 Sep 2013, at 15:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 



 I know, I meant Dt vs. Dp. Was it a typo? Otherwise what's Dt as opposed
 to Dp?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK, sorry. "t" is for the logical constant true. In arithmetic you can
>>> interpret it by "1=1". I use for  the logical constant false.
>>>
>>> As the modal logic G has a Kripke semantics (it is a so-called normal
>>> modal
>>> logic), The intensional nuance Bp & Dp is equivalent with Bp & Dt. "Dt"
>>> will
>>> just means that there is an accessible world, and by Bp, p will be true
>>> in
>>> that world.
>>
>>
>> Ok, thanks.
>> If there is one or more accessible worlds, why not say []t? (I'm using
>> [] for the necessity operator)
>
>
> [] p means that p is true in all accessible worlds. But this makes []p true,
> for all p, in the cul-de-sac worlds. We reason in classical logic. "If alpha
> is accessible then p is true in alpha" is trivially true, because for any
> alpha "alpha is accessible" is false, for a cul-de-sac world.
>
> And incompleteness makes such cul-de-sac worlds unavoidable (from each
> world), in that semantics. In fact [] t is provable in all worlds, but Dt is
> provable in none, meaning, in that semantics, that a cul-de-sac world is
> always accessible.
>
> If you interpret "accessing a culd-de-sac world" as dying, the machine told
> us that she can die at each instant! (of course there are other
> interpretations).

Nice!

>
>
>
>> Is there any conceivable world where D~t?
>
>
> No.
> But the Z logic can have DDf, like the original (non normal) first modal
> logic of Lewis (the S1, S2, S3, less known than S4 (knowlegde) and S5
> (basically Leibniz many-worlds, used by Gödel in his formal "proof of the
> existence of God")
>
>
>
>> If so, can't we say ~D~t and thus []t?
>
>
> Yes, []t is a theorem, of G and most modal logic, but not of Z!
>
>
>
>
>> Isn't the only situation where ~Dt the one where this is no world?
>
>
> ~Dt, that is [] f, inconsistency, is the type of the error, dream, lie, and
> "near-death", or in-a-cul-de-sac.

Thus your interest in near-death experiences?

> We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without loosing our
> universality.
>
> The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and lack of
> freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way to write
> it:
>
> <>t -> ~[]<>t
> <>t -> <> [] f
> []<>t -> [] f

I don't understand how you arrive at this equivalence.

> In G (and thus in arithmetic, with [] = beweisbar, and f = "0 = 1", and t =
> "1= 1".

Thanks!
Telmo.

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, September 21, 2013 1:02:40 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Sep 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:14:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Sep 2013, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>>
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal   
>>> > wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Computers don't use symbols. 
>>> > 
>>> > ? 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> >> They use physics, 
>>> > 
>>> > ??? 
>>> > 
>>> > You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts. 
>>> > 
>>> > If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What   
>>> > symbols does it use? 
>>>
>>> it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,   
>>> for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage. 
>>>
>>
>> The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?
>>
>>
>> Well, actually those numbers are for a human debugger, as the program use 
>> only the gears, like a mechanical clock.
>>
>
> That's my point :)  Computers don't use symbols, symbols are for human 
> debuggers.
>
>
> yes, but only jokingly so.
>

How do you mean?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> But if it needs to use such symbols, he will use third person sensors, 
>> which are just some measuring apparatus. 
>>
>
> Haha.. you have just reduced God to 'some measuring apparatus', and made 
> the janitor king of the universe. 
>
>
> ?
>
> I didn't refer to God.
>

I know, it's just that in my view, the entire cosmos is a sensor. I was 
anticipating that you would reject mentions of 'cosmos' or 'universe', but 
sometimes you use God or theology.

 

>
>
>
>
> Why would a computer ever need to use sensors? It is quite happy to run in 
> a loop for a thousand years. It is we, the human debuggers, who might want 
> to attach devices to extend the machine's engagement with *our* human 
> aesthetic world. The computer doesn't care about sense, because it's 
> unconscious. It is perpetually under anesthetic. 
>
>
> What you say is correct, but only in a relative sense. We have discussed 
> this already (with the simulation of the typhoon capable of making a 
>  virtual person feeling wet).
>

I don't think the simulated typhoon would make the virtual person feel wet 
any more than it would make them smell seaweed. Why would it?
 

>
> Let us try not being in a loop ourselves!
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> Then he will not see, but the seeing will be made by the person (if there 
>> is one) enacted by that program.
>>
>
> That's an assumption that there is such a thing as computationally enacted 
> person. If a program can function without such a person, or proto person, 
> then why should it choose to enact one? Who is doing the enacting of a 
> person if not a digital person?
>
>
> The first person, which is not something entirely digital, as it is 
> infinitely many computations, selected through consciousness. 
>

If you have consciousness, I think that you don't need infinitely many 
computations, you only need the history of experience. Computations are 
only required if you want to make precise measurements from one level of 
experience and import-export them to-from another.
 

>
>
>
>>>
>>>
>> I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental 
>> experience, computer = derived non-experience.
>>
>>
>> Indeed. 
>>
>
> So we agree that aesthetic personhood is more fundamental than computation,
>
>
> I meant 'more fundamental than the physical computer'.  
>
> Then our personhood is more fundamental but only from our first person 
> point of view, which arise from the (immaterial) computations, which arise 
> from + and *.
>

If computations can be immaterial, why do we only see them associated with 
material? To say that anything arises from + and * is speculation. If not 
for our own subjectivity, there would be nothing to give us any idea that 
such a thing could be associated with computation (or physics). Only when 
we start with sense can we find a coherent explanation for the other two.
 

>
>
>
> yet you say that persons are enacted by programs? That's a contradiction, 
> right?
>
>
> False, see just above.
>

As far as I can tell, comp is just demanding that we poke out one of our 
eyes in order to see that depth perception is an illusion.


>
>  
>
>>
>>
>> I'm open to it being the reverse, 
>>
>>
>> I am afraid you are. That's the Aristotelian delusion (in case comp is 
>> true).
>>
>>
> No, I mean I'm open to counter-arguments...I'm not saying that nobody can 
> disagree with me.
>
>
> So there is hope.
>

Sure. I don't have to be right, but I'm certainly not wrong because of any 
of the reasons that have been mentioned here.
 

>
>
>>>
>> Why would non-human people be different?
>>
>>
>> OK, you are right. I wrote to quickly. If comp is correct the physics is 
>> th

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

On 9/21/2013 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Sep 2013, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2013 2:13 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:04 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18, No.
3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .


Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same error
than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is considerably
simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the "everything" list.


Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its dogma.  I
think  Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a rough guide
anyway.

Hi Brent,

Arguably, Occam might gain the status of theory once we accept
self-sampling. Of course you're not forced to accept it -- I'm
agnostic on it myself. But it's not beyond the pale that Occam could
actually be theory. No?


To be a theory there would have to be a clear meaning of what of is not to be 
multiplied beyond necessity.  Occam said 'entities', but by that measure the atomic 
theory of matter is very much contrary to his principle.  It's now usually interpreted 
to mean a simple theory is best, without really specifying how 'simple' is to be 
measured. The are proposals based on information theory and minimum message length, but 
even there it's not clear how to compare the measure of say general relativity and loop 
quantum gravity and string theory.



Just formalize them in first order logic, or in a first order logical theory and count 
the number of bits used.


I can count the bits in a formalization of "There is a differentiable metric manifold" but 
I'm not sure that captures the complexity or whatever it is that we're supposed to be 
minimizing.


Brent

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Sep 2013, at 15:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal 
wrote:




On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:






I know, I meant Dt vs. Dp. Was it a typo? Otherwise what's Dt as  
opposed

to Dp?



OK, sorry. "t" is for the logical constant true. In arithmetic you  
can

interpret it by "1=1". I use for  the logical constant false.

As the modal logic G has a Kripke semantics (it is a so-called  
normal modal
logic), The intensional nuance Bp & Dp is equivalent with Bp & Dt.  
"Dt" will
just means that there is an accessible world, and by Bp, p will be  
true in

that world.


Ok, thanks.
If there is one or more accessible worlds, why not say []t? (I'm using
[] for the necessity operator)


[] p means that p is true in all accessible worlds. But this makes []p  
true, for all p, in the cul-de-sac worlds. We reason in classical  
logic. "If alpha is accessible then p is true in alpha" is trivially  
true, because for any alpha "alpha is accessible" is false, for a cul- 
de-sac world.


And incompleteness makes such cul-de-sac worlds unavoidable (from each  
world), in that semantics. In fact [] t is provable in all worlds, but  
Dt is provable in none, meaning, in that semantics, that a cul-de-sac  
world is always accessible.


If you interpret "accessing a culd-de-sac world" as dying, the machine  
told us that she can die at each instant! (of course there are other  
interpretations).





Is there any conceivable world where D~t?


No.
But the Z logic can have DDf, like the original (non normal) first  
modal logic of Lewis (the S1, S2, S3, less known than S4 (knowlegde)  
and S5 (basically Leibniz many-worlds, used by Gödel in his formal  
"proof of the existence of God")




If so, can't we say ~D~t and thus []t?


Yes, []t is a theorem, of G and most modal logic, but not of Z!




Isn't the only situation where ~Dt the one where this is no world?


~Dt, that is [] f, inconsistency, is the type of the error, dream,  
lie, and "near-death", or in-a-cul-de-sac.


We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without loosing our  
universality.


The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and lack of  
freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way to  
write it:


<>t -> ~[]<>t
<>t -> <> [] f
[]<>t -> [] f

In G (and thus in arithmetic, with [] = beweisbar, and f = "0 = 1",  
and t = "1= 1".


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Sep 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:14:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2013, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Computers don't use symbols.
>
> ?
>
>
>> They use physics,
>
> ???
>
> You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts.
>
> If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What
> symbols does it use?

it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,
for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage.

The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?


Well, actually those numbers are for a human debugger, as the  
program use only the gears, like a mechanical clock.


That's my point :)  Computers don't use symbols, symbols are for  
human debuggers.


yes, but only jokingly so.







But if it needs to use such symbols, he will use third person  
sensors, which are just some measuring apparatus.


Haha.. you have just reduced God to 'some measuring apparatus', and  
made the janitor king of the universe.


?

I didn't refer to God.





Why would a computer ever need to use sensors? It is quite happy to  
run in a loop for a thousand years. It is we, the human debuggers,  
who might want to attach devices to extend the machine's engagement  
with *our* human aesthetic world. The computer doesn't care about  
sense, because it's unconscious. It is perpetually under anesthetic.


What you say is correct, but only in a relative sense. We have  
discussed this already (with the simulation of the typhoon capable of  
making a  virtual person feeling wet).


Let us try not being in a loop ourselves!








Then he will not see, but the seeing will be made by the person (if  
there is one) enacted by that program.


That's an assumption that there is such a thing as computationally  
enacted person. If a program can function without such a person, or  
proto person, then why should it choose to enact one? Who is doing  
the enacting of a person if not a digital person?


The first person, which is not something entirely digital, as it is  
infinitely many computations, selected through consciousness.







I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental  
experience, computer = derived non-experience.


Indeed.

So we agree that aesthetic personhood is more fundamental than  
computation,


I meant 'more fundamental than the physical computer'.

Then our personhood is more fundamental but only from our first person  
point of view, which arise from the (immaterial) computations, which  
arise from + and *.




yet you say that persons are enacted by programs? That's a  
contradiction, right?


False, see just above.







I'm open to it being the reverse,


I am afraid you are. That's the Aristotelian delusion (in case comp  
is true).



No, I mean I'm open to counter-arguments...I'm not saying that  
nobody can disagree with me.


So there is hope.




Why would non-human people be different?


OK, you are right. I wrote to quickly. If comp is correct the  
physics is the same for all conscious entities. (But salvia keeps  
contradicting me on this issue and I don't know what to think about  
that!).


Heheh. I liked Nitrous Oxide, myself. Never tried saliva. It looks  
kind of sloppy from the videos.


Salvia can provide a curious hallucination, which, even as an  
hallucination, seems to be an impossible thing to experience or  
remember. It is close to a total mystery for me.


It is interesting to realize how much altered a consciousness state  
can be.


But unlike most drugs, it is not euphoric. It is classified as  
dysphoric, and most people are very uneasy with that experience.






As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness
appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very
interesting, but it does not need to be postulated.
Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry.

Postulating it is really only a disclaimer - that what this refers  
to is intentionally using a set which includes itself. The real  
substance of what I'm postulating is in the nested relation, where  
all x is not only simply x, but also it is a continuum of becoming  
x by its negative universality.


You should try to explain this like I was a nine years old.

Ok, let's say that the universe is only the visible spectrum. If we  
wanted a really Absolutely complete definition of one color in the  
spectrum - let's say blue, then we would want to reflect the fact  
that blueness includes all of its potential relations with all of  
the colors that are not blue. Blue and red have a certain relation.  
Blue plays a certain role in blue, red, and green, etc.


That set of {all color relations betwe

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Sep 2013, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2013 2:13 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:04 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic,  
Vol. 18, No.

3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .


Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the  
same error
than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is  
considerably
simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the  
"everything" list.



Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its  
dogma.  I
think  Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a  
rough guide

anyway.

Hi Brent,

Arguably, Occam might gain the status of theory once we accept
self-sampling. Of course you're not forced to accept it -- I'm
agnostic on it myself. But it's not beyond the pale that Occam could
actually be theory. No?


To be a theory there would have to be a clear meaning of what of is  
not to be multiplied beyond necessity.  Occam said 'entities', but  
by that measure the atomic theory of matter is very much contrary to  
his principle.  It's now usually interpreted to mean a simple theory  
is best, without really specifying how 'simple' is to be measured.  
The are proposals based on information theory and minimum message  
length, but even there it's not clear how to compare the measure of  
say general relativity and loop quantum gravity and string theory.



Just formalize them in first order logic, or in a first order logical  
theory and count the number of bits used.


Bruno







Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> 
>>
>>
>> But maybe it doesn't. At least some week form of solipsism, where
>> there is in fact only me, but the notion of "I" is extended. No?
>
>
>
>
> I would say that there are as many notion of "I", that there are
> intensional
> nuances.
>
> The most basic is the 3-I, like when the machine says I have two arms,
> (Bp),
> then there is the 1-I, when the machine says that she has two arms, and
> it
> is the case that she has two arms (Bp & p), then there is the observer
> I,
> when the machine says that she has two arms, and it is possible, not
> contradictory, for that machine that she has two arms, or equivalently
> that
> 0=0 is not a contradiction, Bp & Dp,



> equivalent with Bp & Dt. Then the
> "feeler" whioch combines both Dt and "& p".



 Bruno, I don't understand these last two lines. What's Dt? What's a
 feeler?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A feeler is someone who feels. My automated spelling verifier does not
>>> complain, but perhaps he get tired with me :)
>>
>>
>> Ok. No, it's right. I just thought there was something more to it.
>
>
> Nice!
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> D is for diamond. Dp, in modal logic, often written <>p is an
>>> abbreviation
>>> of ~B~p.
>>
>>
>> I know, I meant Dt vs. Dp. Was it a typo? Otherwise what's Dt as opposed
>> to Dp?
>
>
> OK, sorry. "t" is for the logical constant true. In arithmetic you can
> interpret it by "1=1". I use for  the logical constant false.
>
> As the modal logic G has a Kripke semantics (it is a so-called normal modal
> logic), The intensional nuance Bp & Dp is equivalent with Bp & Dt. "Dt" will
> just means that there is an accessible world, and by Bp, p will be true in
> that world.

Ok, thanks.
If there is one or more accessible worlds, why not say []t? (I'm using
[] for the necessity operator)
Is there any conceivable world where D~t? If so, can't we say ~D~t and thus []t?
Isn't the only situation where ~Dt the one where this is no world?

>
>
>
>>
>>> For example (possible p) is the same as (not necessarily not p). Like "it
>>> exists x such that p(x)" is the same as not for all x do e have not p(x).
>>>
>>> Bp & Dp, really means that p is true in all worlds (that I can access)
>>> and
>>> Dp really means that there is such a world (if not, classically Bp can be
>>> vacuously true). Normally there will be some explanations of modal logic
>>> (on
>>> FOAR). Older explanations on this list exists also, may be by searching
>>> on
>>> "modal" (hmm... you will probably get too many posts ...).
>>
>>
>> I've been slowly going through Chellas.
>
>
> It is a very good book. Boolos 1979 (and 1993) sum up very well Modal Logic
> too.
>
>>
>> Thanks!
>
>
> Welcome!
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 6:36 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 9/20/2013 2:13 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:04 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>> Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.
>>>
>>> The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
>>> Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18,
>>> No.
>>> 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
>>> http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .
>>>
>>>
>>> Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same
>>> error
>>> than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is
>>> considerably
>>> simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the "everything"
>>> list.
>>>
>>>
>>> Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its dogma.
>>> I
>>> think  Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a rough
>>> guide
>>> anyway.
>>
>> Hi Brent,
>>
>> Arguably, Occam might gain the status of theory once we accept
>> self-sampling. Of course you're not forced to accept it -- I'm
>> agnostic on it myself. But it's not beyond the pale that Occam could
>> actually be theory. No?
>
>
> To be a theory there would have to be a clear meaning of what of is not to
> be multiplied beyond necessity.
> Occam said 'entities', but by that measure
> the atomic theory of matter is very much contrary to his principle.

Yes, if you consider two hydrogen atoms to be distinct entities. But
physics never does that. Hydrogen atoms are fungible in all of
physics. But I agree with your point, it's not clear.

>  It's
> now usually interpreted to mean a simple theory is best, without really
> specifying how 'simple' is to be measured.

I've been doing this work where I use evolutionary computation to
automatically generate theories that explain network growth. Theories
are mathematical expressions represented as Lisp-style computer
programs. I also automatically apply Occam by preferring the
explanations that can be expressed in the shortest possible program.
Maybe this sort of approach could be extended?

> The are proposals based on
> information theory and minimum message length, but even there it's not clear
> how to compare the measure of say general relativity and loop quantum
> gravity and string theory.

Good point.

Telmo

>
> Brent
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:14:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Sep 2013, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal   
>> > wrote: 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> Computers don't use symbols. 
>> > 
>> > ? 
>> > 
>> > 
>> >> They use physics, 
>> > 
>> > ??? 
>> > 
>> > You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts. 
>> > 
>> > If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What   
>> > symbols does it use? 
>>
>> it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,   
>> for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage. 
>>
>
> The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?
>
>
> Well, actually those numbers are for a human debugger, as the program use 
> only the gears, like a mechanical clock.
>

That's my point :)  Computers don't use symbols, symbols are for human 
debuggers.
 

> But if it needs to use such symbols, he will use third person sensors, 
> which are just some measuring apparatus. 
>

Haha.. you have just reduced God to 'some measuring apparatus', and made 
the janitor king of the universe. 

Why would a computer ever need to use sensors? It is quite happy to run in 
a loop for a thousand years. It is we, the human debuggers, who might want 
to attach devices to extend the machine's engagement with *our* human 
aesthetic world. The computer doesn't care about sense, because it's 
unconscious. It is perpetually under anesthetic. 

 

> Then he will not see, but the seeing will be made by the person (if there 
> is one) enacted by that program.
>

That's an assumption that there is such a thing as computationally enacted 
person. If a program can function without such a person, or proto person, 
then why should it choose to enact one? Who is doing the enacting of a 
person if not a digital person?
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> >> and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic   
>> >> universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about   
>> >> symbols though, or output formats. 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but   
>> > brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle. 
>> > 
>> > We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and   
>> > focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory   
>> > aesthetics? 
>>
>> Because those things have to be related if we proceed in the comp   
>> theory. 
>>
>>
> I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental 
> experience, computer = derived non-experience.
>
>
> Indeed. 
>

So we agree that aesthetic personhood is more fundamental than computation, 
yet you say that persons are enacted by programs? That's a contradiction, 
right?
 

>
>
> I'm open to it being the reverse, 
>
>
> I am afraid you are. That's the Aristotelian delusion (in case comp is 
> true).
>
>
No, I mean I'm open to counter-arguments...I'm not saying that nobody can 
disagree with me.
 

>
>
> but if the only reason to suspect that it is the reverse is because we 
> want to call it comp theory rather than person theory (or sense theory :) ) 
> then that doesn't seem like a very scientific reason.
>
>
> The comp theory is just arithmetic, + the idea that we are digitalizable 
> machine. Its main advantage is that it gives a clear account where the 
> belief in the physical laws come from, and why it is stable, or could be 
> stable, making comp hard to refute. It explains retrospectively the 
> many-worlds, some formal aspect of the quantum, and it gives the complete 
> theory, which means that it is only a matter of work to get the unitary 
> groups, the particles and fields, etc. The precise equations are there, but 
> hard to solve, and not very well knows, as they need some mathematical 
> logic baggage.
>

Ohh. I'm ok with comp being responsible for the belief in physical laws. 
That's what I get too. Qualia is derived from sense by means of quanta.  In 
a very real way, quanta is the 'thickening agent' which turns the 
primordial stew into thermodynamically irreversible experiences. You're 
talking about the event horizon where 1p meets 3p, but I'm talking about 
the totality of sense - the origin of the discernment of 1p and 3p in the 
first place.


>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> The big mystery is 
>> >> how they become qualia. 
>> >> 
>> >> That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer.   
>> >> In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling   
>> >> or 'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished   
>> >> feelings. 
>> > 
>> > OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That   
>> > becomes circular, it seems to me. 
>> > 

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

On 9/20/2013 2:13 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:04 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18, No.
3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .


Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same error
than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is considerably
simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the "everything" list.


Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its dogma.  I
think  Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a rough guide
anyway.

Hi Brent,

Arguably, Occam might gain the status of theory once we accept
self-sampling. Of course you're not forced to accept it -- I'm
agnostic on it myself. But it's not beyond the pale that Occam could
actually be theory. No?


To be a theory there would have to be a clear meaning of what of is not to be multiplied 
beyond necessity.  Occam said 'entities', but by that measure the atomic theory of matter 
is very much contrary to his principle.  It's now usually interpreted to mean a simple 
theory is best, without really specifying how 'simple' is to be measured. The are 
proposals based on information theory and minimum message length, but even there it's not 
clear how to compare the measure of say general relativity and loop quantum gravity and 
string theory.


Brent

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Sep 2013, at 21:04, meekerdb wrote:




Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic,  
Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by:  
SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .




Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the  
same error than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes  
more is considerably simpler than less, and that's the very  
inspiration of the "everything" list.


Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its  
dogma.


Fair enough.
But I would not call it a dogma. It seems to me it is a sort of  
consequence of Occam razor.




I think  Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a  
rough guide anyway.  The point is that he shows how mathematics can  
be done with infinities.


I think comp gives this too, without requiring ultrafinitism. I can't  
get Mylcielski paper, so if you want explain it, don't hesitate.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Sep 2013, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Computers don't use symbols.
>
> ?
>
>
>> They use physics,
>
> ???
>
> You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts.
>
> If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What
> symbols does it use?

it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,
for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage.

The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?


Well, actually those numbers are for a human debugger, as the program  
use only the gears, like a mechanical clock. But if it needs to use  
such symbols, he will use third person sensors, which are just some  
measuring apparatus. Then he will not see, but the seeing will be made  
by the person (if there is one) enacted by that program.











>
>
>
>
>
>> and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic
>> universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about
>> symbols though, or output formats.
>
>
> Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but
> brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local  
vehicle.

>
> We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and
> focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory
> aesthetics?

Because those things have to be related if we proceed in the comp
theory.


I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental  
experience, computer = derived non-experience.


Indeed.



I'm open to it being the reverse,


I am afraid you are. That's the Aristotelian delusion (in case comp is  
true).




but if the only reason to suspect that it is the reverse is because  
we want to call it comp theory rather than person theory (or sense  
theory :) ) then that doesn't seem like a very scientific reason.


The comp theory is just arithmetic, + the idea that we are  
digitalizable machine. Its main advantage is that it gives a clear  
account where the belief in the physical laws come from, and why it is  
stable, or could be stable, making comp hard to refute. It explains  
retrospectively the many-worlds, some formal aspect of the quantum,  
and it gives the complete theory, which means that it is only a matter  
of work to get the unitary groups, the particles and fields, etc. The  
precise equations are there, but hard to solve, and not very well  
knows, as they need some mathematical logic baggage.









>
>
>
>>
>> The big mystery is
>> how they become qualia.
>>
>> That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer.
>> In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling
>> or 'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished
>> feelings.
>
> OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That
> becomes circular, it seems to me.
>
> Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all
> experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute.

OK. (for the human people).

Why would non-human people be different?


OK, you are right. I wrote to quickly. If comp is correct the physics  
is the same for all conscious entities. (But salvia keeps  
contradicting me on this issue and I don't know what to think about  
that!).







>
>
>
>
>>
>> Which leads me to a point where I can
>> definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private
>> experiences have at least the same reality status as public
>> experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you  
throw

>> too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water.
>>
>> I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not
>> private. There are experiences, and there are private experiences
>> in which other private experiences are re-presented as public form-
>> functions.
>
> OK,
>
> Cool
>
> Craig
>
> PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense
> to you...there's a new one:
>
> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/18/pink-floyd-money/
>
> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/16/non-well-founded-identity-principle/


As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness
appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very
interesting, but it does not need to be postulated.
Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry.

Postulating it is really only a disclaimer - that what this refers  
to is intentionally using a set which includes itself. The real  
substance of what I'm postulating is in the nested relation, where  
all x is not only simply x, but also it is a continuum of becoming x  
by its negative universality.


You should try to explain this like I was a nine years old.




Each aspect of x is defined by the difference between every other  
identity 

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:





But maybe it doesn't. At least some week form of solipsism, where
there is in fact only me, but the notion of "I" is extended. No?




I would say that there are as many notion of "I", that there are
intensional
nuances.

The most basic is the 3-I, like when the machine says I have two  
arms,

(Bp),
then there is the 1-I, when the machine says that she has two  
arms, and

it
is the case that she has two arms (Bp & p), then there is the  
observer I,
when the machine says that she has two arms, and it is possible,  
not
contradictory, for that machine that she has two arms, or  
equivalently

that
0=0 is not a contradiction, Bp & Dp,




equivalent with Bp & Dt. Then the
"feeler" whioch combines both Dt and "& p".



Bruno, I don't understand these last two lines. What's Dt? What's a
feeler?



A feeler is someone who feels. My automated spelling verifier does  
not

complain, but perhaps he get tired with me :)


Ok. No, it's right. I just thought there was something more to it.


Nice!





D is for diamond. Dp, in modal logic, often written <>p is an  
abbreviation

of ~B~p.


I know, I meant Dt vs. Dp. Was it a typo? Otherwise what's Dt as  
opposed to Dp?


OK, sorry. "t" is for the logical constant true. In arithmetic you can  
interpret it by "1=1". I use for  the logical constant false.


As the modal logic G has a Kripke semantics (it is a so-called normal  
modal logic), The intensional nuance Bp & Dp is equivalent with Bp &  
Dt. "Dt" will just means that there is an accessible world, and by Bp,  
p will be true in that world.






For example (possible p) is the same as (not necessarily not p).  
Like "it
exists x such that p(x)" is the same as not for all x do e have not  
p(x).


Bp & Dp, really means that p is true in all worlds (that I can  
access) and
Dp really means that there is such a world (if not, classically Bp  
can be
vacuously true). Normally there will be some explanations of modal  
logic (on
FOAR). Older explanations on this list exists also, may be by  
searching on

"modal" (hmm... you will probably get too many posts ...).


I've been slowly going through Chellas.


It is a very good book. Boolos 1979 (and 1993) sum up very well Modal  
Logic too.




Thanks!


Welcome!

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:04 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.
>
> The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
> Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18, No.
> 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
> http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .
>
>
> Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same error
> than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is considerably
> simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the "everything" list.
>
>
> Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its dogma.  I
> think  Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a rough guide
> anyway.

Hi Brent,

Arguably, Occam might gain the status of theory once we accept
self-sampling. Of course you're not forced to accept it -- I'm
agnostic on it myself. But it's not beyond the pale that Occam could
actually be theory. No?

Cheers,
Telmo.

> The point is that he shows how mathematics can be done with
> infinities.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug., 
1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .




Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same error than 
believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is considerably simpler than less, 
and that's the very inspiration of the "everything" list.


Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its dogma.  I think  
Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a rough guide anyway.  The point is 
that he shows how mathematics can be done with infinities.


Brent

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal   
> > wrote: 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Computers don't use symbols. 
> > 
> > ? 
> > 
> > 
> >> They use physics, 
> > 
> > ??? 
> > 
> > You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts. 
> > 
> > If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What   
> > symbols does it use? 
>
> it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,   
> for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage. 
>

The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?
 

>
>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic   
> >> universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about   
> >> symbols though, or output formats. 
> > 
> > 
> > Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but   
> > brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle. 
> > 
> > We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and   
> > focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory   
> > aesthetics? 
>
> Because those things have to be related if we proceed in the comp   
> theory. 
>
>
I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental 
experience, computer = derived non-experience. I'm open to it being the 
reverse, but if the only reason to suspect that it is the reverse is 
because we want to call it comp theory rather than person theory (or sense 
theory :) ) then that doesn't seem like a very scientific reason.


>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >> The big mystery is 
> >> how they become qualia. 
> >> 
> >> That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer.   
> >> In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling   
> >> or 'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished   
> >> feelings. 
> > 
> > OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That   
> > becomes circular, it seems to me. 
> > 
> > Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all   
> > experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute. 
>
> OK. (for the human people). 
>

Why would non-human people be different?
 

>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Which leads me to a point where I can 
> >> definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private 
> >> experiences have at least the same reality status as public 
> >> experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw 
> >> too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water. 
> >> 
> >> I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not   
> >> private. There are experiences, and there are private experiences   
> >> in which other private experiences are re-presented as public form- 
> >> functions. 
> > 
> > OK, 
> > 
> > Cool 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
> > PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense   
> > to you...there's a new one: 
> > 
> > http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/18/pink-floyd-money/ 
> > 
> > 
> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/16/non-well-founded-identity-principle/ 
>
>
> As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness   
> appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very   
> interesting, but it does not need to be postulated. 
> Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry. 
>

Postulating it is really only a disclaimer - that what this refers to is 
intentionally using a set which includes itself. The real substance of what 
I'm postulating is in the nested relation, where all x is not only simply 
x, but also it is a continuum of becoming x by its negative universality. 
Each aspect of x is defined by the difference between every other identity 
(not x) and what they cause x to become in their local frame of reference.

Craig


> Bruno 
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[John Mikes]

Bruno, do you hold Occam a panacea? I hold it an extremely sharp version
for medieval primitive ignorance made as scientific: to disregard the
'total' we don't know and concentrate on the 'known' (knowable?) part only.
Just as the position of conventioal sciences nowadays. The ultimate
Occanism is: "- The World "IS".- "  May include diverse levels of
solipsism, which I cannot reject flatly: MY thinking is that includes MY
world.
I also wonder what is 'inspirational' to the Everything List: especially
after the deluge by Roger and inclusion of actual politics lately. I
consider the List a Forum for smart and reasonable friends I enjoy for the
past 2 decades and sometimes bore with my agnostic remarks. I even endure
the extreme mathematical (quantum-leaning physical?) posts (I don't have to
read it all)
with loving your utopistic thoughts and Brent's sharp remarks.

Occam IMO was the visionary early mind realizing that we have untrue and
unfounded ideas about a small portion of the existence only, so if he wants
to stay sane, he has to concentrate on 'simple' details he MAY accept. I
find him a predecessor to you (Platonistic/Logical 24th c. universal
machine ... etc.).

I am humble enough to live with my agnostic (ignorant?) views and confess
to 'I dunno'. Yet an increase of our continuing knowledge-base can be seen
in the inductional view of retrospective development of human thinking over
the millennia. And we have no evidence for having reached the end. Not in
Platonism, not in religions (theology, yours included), not in philosophy.

Thanks to the List for contribution to my staying sane.

John Mikes


On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 18 Sep 2013, at 20:54, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 9/18/2013 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>  I naturally took an extreme example to make my point.
>
>
>  I do that often too, but here it weakened your point. Everyone (except
> Sunday philosopher) agree on 0, and its successor.
>
>
> Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.
>
> The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
> Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18,
> No. 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
> http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .
>
>
> Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same
> error than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is
> considerably simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the
> "everything" list.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Locally Finite Theories
> Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 51,
> No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 59-62Published by: Association for Symbolic
> LogicStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2273942 .
>
> Brent
>
> --
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 


 But maybe it doesn't. At least some week form of solipsism, where
 there is in fact only me, but the notion of "I" is extended. No?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I would say that there are as many notion of "I", that there are
>>> intensional
>>> nuances.
>>>
>>> The most basic is the 3-I, like when the machine says I have two arms,
>>> (Bp),
>>> then there is the 1-I, when the machine says that she has two arms, and
>>> it
>>> is the case that she has two arms (Bp & p), then there is the observer I,
>>> when the machine says that she has two arms, and it is possible, not
>>> contradictory, for that machine that she has two arms, or equivalently
>>> that
>>> 0=0 is not a contradiction, Bp & Dp,
>>
>>
>>> equivalent with Bp & Dt. Then the
>>> "feeler" whioch combines both Dt and "& p".
>>
>>
>> Bruno, I don't understand these last two lines. What's Dt? What's a
>> feeler?
>
>
> A feeler is someone who feels. My automated spelling verifier does not
> complain, but perhaps he get tired with me :)

Ok. No, it's right. I just thought there was something more to it.

> D is for diamond. Dp, in modal logic, often written <>p is an abbreviation
> of ~B~p.

I know, I meant Dt vs. Dp. Was it a typo? Otherwise what's Dt as opposed to Dp?

> For example (possible p) is the same as (not necessarily not p). Like "it
> exists x such that p(x)" is the same as not for all x do e have not p(x).
>
> Bp & Dp, really means that p is true in all worlds (that I can access) and
> Dp really means that there is such a world (if not, classically Bp can be
> vacuously true). Normally there will be some explanations of modal logic (on
> FOAR). Older explanations on this list exists also, may be by searching on
> "modal" (hmm... you will probably get too many posts ...).

I've been slowly going through Chellas.

Thanks!
Telmo.

> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:




Computers don't use symbols.


?



They use physics,


???

You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts.

If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What  
symbols does it use?


it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,  
for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage.











and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic  
universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about  
symbols though, or output formats.



Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but  
brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle.


We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and  
focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory  
aesthetics?


Because those things have to be related if we proceed in the comp  
theory.











The big mystery is
how they become qualia.

That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer.  
In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling  
or 'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished  
feelings.


OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That  
becomes circular, it seems to me.


Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all  
experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute.


OK. (for the human people).









Which leads me to a point where I can
definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private
experiences have at least the same reality status as public
experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw
too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water.

I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not  
private. There are experiences, and there are private experiences  
in which other private experiences are re-presented as public form- 
functions.


OK,

Cool

Craig

PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense  
to you...there's a new one:


http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/18/pink-floyd-money/

http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/16/non-well-founded-identity-principle/



As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness  
appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very  
interesting, but it does not need to be postulated.

Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2013, at 20:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/18/2013 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I naturally took an extreme example to make my point.


I do that often too, but here it weakened your point. Everyone  
(except Sunday philosopher) agree on 0, and its successor.


Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol.  
18, No. 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 
 .




Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same  
error than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is  
considerably simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the  
"everything" list.



Bruno






Locally Finite Theories
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol.  
51, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 59-62Published by: Association for  
Symbolic LogicStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2273942 .


Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:




But maybe it doesn't. At least some week form of solipsism, where
there is in fact only me, but the notion of "I" is extended. No?



I would say that there are as many notion of "I", that there are  
intensional

nuances.

The most basic is the 3-I, like when the machine says I have two  
arms, (Bp),
then there is the 1-I, when the machine says that she has two arms,  
and it
is the case that she has two arms (Bp & p), then there is the  
observer I,

when the machine says that she has two arms, and it is possible, not
contradictory, for that machine that she has two arms, or  
equivalently that

0=0 is not a contradiction, Bp & Dp,



equivalent with Bp & Dt. Then the
"feeler" whioch combines both Dt and "& p".


Bruno, I don't understand these last two lines. What's Dt? What's a  
feeler?


A feeler is someone who feels. My automated spelling verifier does not  
complain, but perhaps he get tired with me :)


D is for diamond. Dp, in modal logic, often written <>p is an  
abbreviation of ~B~p.


For example (possible p) is the same as (not necessarily not p). Like  
"it exists x such that p(x)" is the same as not for all x do e have  
not p(x).


Bp & Dp, really means that p is true in all worlds (that I can access)  
and Dp really means that there is such a world (if not, classically Bp  
can be vacuously true). Normally there will be some explanations of  
modal logic (on FOAR). Older explanations on this list exists also,  
may be by searching on "modal" (hmm... you will probably get too many  
posts ...).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Sep 2013, at 19:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 17, 2013 6:07:23 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 7:47 PM, Craig Weinberg  
>> wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg  
>> >> wrote: 
>> >> > 
>> >> > 
>> >> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: 
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg  
>>
>> >> >> wrote: 
>> >> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false? 
>> >> >> > 
>> >> >> > Here's what I'm thinking: 
>> >> >> > 
>> >> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I 
>> am 
>> >> >> > not 
>> >> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised 
>> >> >> > about. 
>> >> >> > By 
>> >> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include 
>> >> >> > being 
>> >> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft 
>> >> >> > contingencies 
>> >> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. 
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no 
>> >> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been 
>> sure 
>> >> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the 
>> door 
>> >> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe 
>> the 
>> >> >> paradox still holds. 
>> >> > 
>> >> > 
>> >> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If 
>> I 
>> >> > say 
>> >> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise 
>> when', 
>> >> > that 
>> >> > is already a contradiction. 
>> >> 
>> >> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this. 
>> >> The judge lied. You convinced me! :) 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me resurrect 
>> some 
>> > lost mathematical-logical ability. 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> (with due credit to Alberto and 
>> >> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be 
>> >> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise 
>> >> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if 
>> >> you do". 
>> >> 
>> >> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5 
>> >> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns 
>> >> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to 
>> >> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the 
>> >> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker 
>> >> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that 
>> >> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge) 
>> >> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there 
>> >> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple 
>> >> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the 
>> >> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will 
>> >> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one 
>> >> can do. 
>> >> 
>> >> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better. 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Nice. 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> I 
>> >> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily 
>> >> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are 
>> >> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as 
>> >> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability? 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but since 
>> > falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist on 
>> the 
>> > same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in public 
>> > physics. 
>>
>> Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of 
>> phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think 
>> this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of 
>> accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what 
>> characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality 
>> irrelevant or even reject its existence. 
>>
>>
> Which makes sense, since from that kind of fundamentalist 3p perspective, 
> we can only take consciousness for granted. From there, we can either admit 
> or deny that we are taking it for granted, and if we admit it, then we 
> would want to minimize the significance of that.
>
> >> 
>> >> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're 
>> >> proposing? 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of 
>> understanding by 
>> > correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's more 
>> at the 
>> > hypothesis stage than the testing stag

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 17 Sep 2013, at 11:49, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On 15 Sep 2013, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 
>
>
>
> With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the
> ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So
> number
> exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ..., because they make
> true
> Ex(x = x). And then (and only then), we can define different notions of
> epistemological existence, and they will be as many notion of existence
> as
> we have modalities (notably those coming from incompleteness, as they
> are
> unavoidable.  They will make true proposition with the shape [] Ex []
> P(x),
> or []<> Ex [] <> P(x), etc...



 Ok, nice. I'm slowly getting used to modal logic. It's a weird thing
 to learn because it seems to require removing things from your thought
 process rather than adding them (at least for me). It's hard because
 it's simple.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That's the idea of math and logic. It is abstraction. it simplifies,
>>> indeed.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

> So we will get notions of psychological
> existence, physical existence, etc.



 Ok, but what is the computational substrate?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *any* first order logical specification of *any* turing universal system
>>> will do.
>>>
>>> I suggest a very tiny part of arithmetic, but the S and K combinators
>>> will
>>> do as well, or the Unitary group, etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
 There is still a
 dissatisfaction in having to just accept it. I guess one can go back
 to the idea of God, in a way.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> God created 0, and its successors, and then said to them add, and
>>> multiply.
>>
>>
>> Ok. I'm agnostic, so I don't cringe at this sort of statement. I guess
>> I'm also an atheist, because I reject the idea of anthropomorphised
>> gods, but that's irrelevant here. My dissatisfaction with this is
>> empirical: god has been used so many times to cover up for our lack of
>> knowledge that, when confronted with current lack of knowledge and one
>> hears the word "god" one tends to become suspicious. On the other
>> hand, if there is something fundamental we provably can't know, I
>> guess it's fair enough to call that thing "god". But I think we should
>> be extra-extra-careful before making that move.
>
>
>
> I am agnostic too. But, like for consciousness, we can agree on some
> proposition about those notion, and reason from there.
>
> As you know I use "god" in a very large sense, and then, with comp and the
> classical theory of knowledge, "god" or "divine" means mainly "true", or
> related to true, with in mind the idea that "truth" is not something
> definable, although we can agree on many truth.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> All the rest is what emerge from a universal matrix of cohering
>>> Computations/dreams (1-computations, 3-computation) provably existing as
>>> a
>>> consequence of the addition and multiplication laws.
>>>
>>> If you can believe that 17 is prime, independently of you, then you can
>>> understand, that, if you assume computationalism, arithmetic, as seen
>>> from
>>> different internal self-referential view, contains such "universal
>>> matrix",
>>> or the universal dovetailing or any sigma_1 complete set of number, or a
>>> Post creative set, a universal purpose computer, reflecting itself.
>>>
>>> Arithmetic provides the block-mindscape. The existence and unicity of a
>>> block multiverse emerging from it is basically unsolved, nor even yet
>>> made
>>> enough precise.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
 It's just what is. But then this is an
 ontological statement. Does this substrate exist? You can not use the
 previous reasoning to support its existence, or can you?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I can't.  I only justify why machines develop such beliefs, even for
>>> "good"
>>> (relatively correct for they local purpose in their probable history)
>>> reason. Just that the physical reality is not the fundamental reality.
>>> The
>>> physical reality is a complex self-referential sum made by a universal
>>> machine/number, and selected or varied through first person (sometimes
>>> plural) experiences.
>>>
>>> There is no substrate (in that picture). Just dreams, or limit on
>>> computations, probably related to (Turing) Universal group, braids, as
>>> the
>>> empirical evidences suggest, but that is what we must recover from the
>>> machine looking inside (in different ways corresponding to th

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

On 9/18/2013 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I naturally took an extreme example to make my point.


I do that often too, but here it weakened your point. Everyone (except Sunday 
philosopher) agree on 0, and its successor.


Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug., 
1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .



Locally Finite Theories
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 
1986), pp. 59-62Published by: Association for Symbolic LogicStable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2273942 .


Brent

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Liz R]

If someone told me that I was going to be hung, I can assure you I would be 
expecting it every day. I wouldn't bother with any logical analysis.

(The unexpected exam, on the other hand...)


On Thursday, 12 September 2013 21:33:24 UTC+12, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> Time for some philosophy then :) 
>
> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
>
> Probably many of you already know about it. 
>
> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that 
> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
>
> Cheers, 
> Telmo. 
>

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 17 Sep 2013, at 11:49, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 15 Sep 2013, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal 
wrote:




On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:







With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at  
the
ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So  
number
exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ..., because  
they make

true
Ex(x = x). And then (and only then), we can define different  
notions of
epistemological existence, and they will be as many notion of  
existence

as
we have modalities (notably those coming from incompleteness, as  
they are
unavoidable.  They will make true proposition with the shape []  
Ex []

P(x),
or []<> Ex [] <> P(x), etc...



Ok, nice. I'm slowly getting used to modal logic. It's a weird thing
to learn because it seems to require removing things from your  
thought

process rather than adding them (at least for me). It's hard because
it's simple.




That's the idea of math and logic. It is abstraction. it  
simplifies, indeed.











So we will get notions of psychological
existence, physical existence, etc.



Ok, but what is the computational substrate?



*any* first order logical specification of *any* turing universal  
system

will do.

I suggest a very tiny part of arithmetic, but the S and K  
combinators will

do as well, or the Unitary group, etc.








There is still a
dissatisfaction in having to just accept it. I guess one can go back
to the idea of God, in a way.



God created 0, and its successors, and then said to them add, and  
multiply.


Ok. I'm agnostic, so I don't cringe at this sort of statement. I guess
I'm also an atheist, because I reject the idea of anthropomorphised
gods, but that's irrelevant here. My dissatisfaction with this is
empirical: god has been used so many times to cover up for our lack of
knowledge that, when confronted with current lack of knowledge and one
hears the word "god" one tends to become suspicious. On the other
hand, if there is something fundamental we provably can't know, I
guess it's fair enough to call that thing "god". But I think we should
be extra-extra-careful before making that move.



I am agnostic too. But, like for consciousness, we can agree on some  
proposition about those notion, and reason from there.


As you know I use "god" in a very large sense, and then, with comp and  
the classical theory of knowledge, "god" or "divine" means mainly  
"true", or related to true, with in mind the idea that "truth" is not  
something definable, although we can agree on many truth.







All the rest is what emerge from a universal matrix of cohering
Computations/dreams (1-computations, 3-computation) provably  
existing as a

consequence of the addition and multiplication laws.

If you can believe that 17 is prime, independently of you, then you  
can
understand, that, if you assume computationalism, arithmetic, as  
seen from
different internal self-referential view, contains such "universal  
matrix",
or the universal dovetailing or any sigma_1 complete set of number,  
or a

Post creative set, a universal purpose computer, reflecting itself.

Arithmetic provides the block-mindscape. The existence and unicity  
of a
block multiverse emerging from it is basically unsolved, nor even  
yet made

enough precise.






It's just what is. But then this is an
ontological statement. Does this substrate exist? You can not use  
the

previous reasoning to support its existence, or can you?



I can't.  I only justify why machines develop such beliefs, even  
for "good"

(relatively correct for they local purpose in their probable history)
reason. Just that the physical reality is not the fundamental  
reality. The
physical reality is a complex self-referential sum made by a  
universal
machine/number, and selected or varied through first person  
(sometimes

plural) experiences.

There is no substrate (in that picture). Just dreams, or limit on
computations, probably related to (Turing) Universal group, braids,  
as the
empirical evidences suggest, but that is what we must recover from  
the
machine looking inside (in different ways corresponding to the  
intensional

variants, the arithmetical hypostases).









Even events seen in dreams get some
notion of existence, for example.



That's nice. I even have problems with statements like "batman  
doesn't

exist".



Really?

I will send you a video!




Doesn't he, in some sense?



Certainly, in many sense. He has "real" cousins, like jetman:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=BE&v=x2sT9KoII_M


A batman with a french accent! Coincidence?


Europa is full of thinks. Dracula has also many cousins ...

Are there any coincidence?  Well, they are all relative too.







And certainly not, in

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2013, at 05:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, September 15, 2013 3:54:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, September 13, 2013 9:42:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Sep 2013, at 18:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> Time for some philosophy then :)
>
> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
>
> Probably many of you already know about it.
>
> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning  
that

> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?


Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that  
it is

the Epimenides paradox in disguise,

It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative  
perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The  
expectation of truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic  
truth, it is a boundary condition that belongs to sense.


i think you mix first person truth, that we can sometimes apprehend  
(like knowing that we are conscious here and now), and third person  
truth, which does not depend of any entity *sensing* them.


How do you justify the assumption of entities that do not depend on  
any phenomenological participation though?


That is called "realism". I guess you know I am realist about facts  
like "14 is not prime" and the like. We have discussed already on  
that, and I think, agree that we disagree on that.


I don't see any realism in assuming anything that is disconnected  
from all forms of phenomenology. How would such a thing be part of a  
universe?


That depends what you mean by "universe".
By definition, realism assumes something which can be disconnected  
from phenomenology, but which can be connected to it for some occasion.











Certainly there are truths which are independent of *our* sensing  
as individuals, or as human beings, or as fleshy objects or  
temporal spans of felt experience, but how can we know, or rather  
why should we jump to conclusions that there are things that simply  
'are' independently of a sensed experience (note I omit 'entity',  
since it is not clear that an experience must be felt by a  
particular being (it could be felt by a class of beings, an era of  
being, or an eternity of being). Third person truth is not anchored  
in the firmament of fact, it is simply a lowest common denominator  
of sensitivity among all participants.


I am OK with this, but as I defined entities from what I am realist  
about, I prefer to make it simple and refer to an arithmetic  
independent of us.


I agree that arithmetic is independent of us as human beings, but I  
see nothing to suggest that it is independent of all experience.



I can agree with this, if you include some God experience, for  
example. But I don't really need this.












If third person truth were sense independent, what would be the  
point of having sense actually experienced?


The presence of far away galaxies does not depend on us (human  
beings), but we still need sense (Hubble) to acknowledge their  
existence.


Of course, but far away galaxies do depend on the sensitivity of the  
matter of the Hubble, or other galaxies, or our eyeball and brain,  
to 'exist' in some particular form. Otherwise what is the difference  
between a galaxy existing and not existing?


For a physical object like a galaxy, you have many situations:

It exists in our branch of the multiverse, and is accessible to our  
measuring instruments.
It exists in our branch of the multiverse, but is not accessible to  
our measuring instruments (for some reason)


It exists in another term of the universal superposition (a  
physicalist would still call it physical)


It exists as a solution of a diophantine equation, but appears in no  
term of "our" multiverse (that is doubtful if our multiverse is really  
the state of the quantum void, but it can make sense logically).


It does not exist at all, because the galaxy would contains impossible  
objects,


etc.










How would it create sensation mechanically, and how would whatever  
is used to attach first person phenomena to third person phenomena  
be itself attached to either one?


Through two things: self-reference and truth.

Those are abstractions though, not mechanisms.You could say  
'tenacity' and 'ingenuity' too, but that doesn't put 'orange' in a  
digital sequence.


Self-referential mechanism exist tough.
Orange is in some digital sequence relative to some universal machine  
(Keep in mind that my answer assume computationalism).







the first in technically mana

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Sep 2013, at 19:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, September 17, 2013 6:07:23 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 7:47 PM, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes  
wrote:

>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg  


>> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes  
wrote:

>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg  


>> >> wrote:
>> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false?
>> >> >
>> >> > Here's what I'm thinking:
>> >> >
>> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday  
if I am

>> >> > not
>> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be  
surprised

>> >> > about.
>> >> > By
>> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could  
include

>> >> > being
>> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft
>> >> > contingencies
>> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome.
>> >>
>> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there  
are no
>> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having  
been sure
>> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at  
the door
>> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I  
believe the

>> >> paradox still holds.
>> >
>> >
>> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just  
contradiction. If I

>> > say
>> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise  
when',

>> > that
>> > is already a contradiction.
>>
>> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this.
>> The judge lied. You convinced me! :)
>
>
> Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me  
resurrect some

> lost mathematical-logical ability.
>
>>
>> (with due credit to Alberto and
>> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement  
would be

>> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise
>> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a  
surprise if

>> you do".
>>
>> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There  
are 5
>> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those  
turns
>> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal  
is to

>> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the
>> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the  
attacker

>> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that
>> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker  
(judge)
>> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot,  
there

>> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple
>> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the
>> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will
>> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing  
better one

>> can do.
>>
>> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better.
>
>
> Nice.
>
>>
>> I
>> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily
>> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are
>> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as
>> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about  
falsifiability?

>
>
> Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but  
since
> falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist  
on the
> same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in  
public

> physics.

Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of
phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think
this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of
accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what
characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality
irrelevant or even reject its existence.


Which makes sense, since from that kind of fundamentalist 3p  
perspective, we can only take consciousness for granted. From there,  
we can either admit or deny that we are taking it for granted, and  
if we admit it, then we would want to minimize the significance of  
that.


>>
>> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're
>> proposing?
>
>
> There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of  
understanding by
> correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's  
more at the

> hypothesis stage than the testing stage.
>
>>
>>
>> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it.
>> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the
>> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting.  
Assuming
>> that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of  
neural
>> firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to  
neural

>> firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the
>> symbols. Wh

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Sep 2013, at 19:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/17/2013 1:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Sep 2013, at 19:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/16/2013 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at  
the ontological level, is what make true a sentence like  
"ExP(x)". So number exists, once we assume arithmetic or  
combinators ..., because they make true Ex(x = x).


But this notion of 'exists' as 'satisfying a propositional  
function' is completely different from "kicks back when I kick it"  
existence.


Why? It kicks back too, like in credit carts.


My credit card is made of plastic - and all the processes that  
depend on it's number are realized in stuff that kicks back too.


But that will do in the relevant way thanks to the abstract truth that  
factorizing large number takes time. The plastic of the card plays  
only a role of support.






And with comp it kicks back in making you dreaming of things  
kicking back, sometimes in persistent way.




You say "number exists, once we assume arithmetic"; which is about  
as useful as "hobbits exist once we assume middle Earth".


Not at all. Arithmetic asks for very few rather clear assumptions,  
and it explains a lot, as all physical theories assumes it.


Arithmetic is a model of countable objects, but it's not that clear  
that "every number has a successor" correctly models countable  
objects.


?





Then with comp we need, nor can use anything more. Hobbits and  
middle Earth assumes many things and explain nothing. I suspect you  
are a little bit disingenuous, isn't it?


I naturally took an extreme example to make my point.


I do that often too, but here it weakened your point. Everyone (except  
Sunday philosopher) agree on 0, and its successor. That is typically  
not the case for Hobbits and Middle Earth.


Bruno





Brent



Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 17 Sep 2013, at 11:49, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 15 Sep 2013, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> 
>>>
>>>
>>> With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the
>>> ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So number
>>> exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ..., because they make
>>> true
>>> Ex(x = x). And then (and only then), we can define different notions of
>>> epistemological existence, and they will be as many notion of existence
>>> as
>>> we have modalities (notably those coming from incompleteness, as they are
>>> unavoidable.  They will make true proposition with the shape [] Ex []
>>> P(x),
>>> or []<> Ex [] <> P(x), etc...
>>
>>
>> Ok, nice. I'm slowly getting used to modal logic. It's a weird thing
>> to learn because it seems to require removing things from your thought
>> process rather than adding them (at least for me). It's hard because
>> it's simple.
>
>
>
> That's the idea of math and logic. It is abstraction. it simplifies, indeed.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> So we will get notions of psychological
>>> existence, physical existence, etc.
>>
>>
>> Ok, but what is the computational substrate?
>
>
> *any* first order logical specification of *any* turing universal system
> will do.
>
> I suggest a very tiny part of arithmetic, but the S and K combinators will
> do as well, or the Unitary group, etc.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> There is still a
>> dissatisfaction in having to just accept it. I guess one can go back
>> to the idea of God, in a way.
>
>
> God created 0, and its successors, and then said to them add, and multiply.

Ok. I'm agnostic, so I don't cringe at this sort of statement. I guess
I'm also an atheist, because I reject the idea of anthropomorphised
gods, but that's irrelevant here. My dissatisfaction with this is
empirical: god has been used so many times to cover up for our lack of
knowledge that, when confronted with current lack of knowledge and one
hears the word "god" one tends to become suspicious. On the other
hand, if there is something fundamental we provably can't know, I
guess it's fair enough to call that thing "god". But I think we should
be extra-extra-careful before making that move.

> All the rest is what emerge from a universal matrix of cohering
> Computations/dreams (1-computations, 3-computation) provably existing as a
> consequence of the addition and multiplication laws.
>
> If you can believe that 17 is prime, independently of you, then you can
> understand, that, if you assume computationalism, arithmetic, as seen from
> different internal self-referential view, contains such "universal matrix",
> or the universal dovetailing or any sigma_1 complete set of number, or a
> Post creative set, a universal purpose computer, reflecting itself.
>
> Arithmetic provides the block-mindscape. The existence and unicity of a
> block multiverse emerging from it is basically unsolved, nor even yet made
> enough precise.
>
>
>
>
>
>> It's just what is. But then this is an
>> ontological statement. Does this substrate exist? You can not use the
>> previous reasoning to support its existence, or can you?
>
>
> I can't.  I only justify why machines develop such beliefs, even for "good"
> (relatively correct for they local purpose in their probable history)
> reason. Just that the physical reality is not the fundamental reality. The
> physical reality is a complex self-referential sum made by a universal
> machine/number, and selected or varied through first person (sometimes
> plural) experiences.
>
> There is no substrate (in that picture). Just dreams, or limit on
> computations, probably related to (Turing) Universal group, braids, as the
> empirical evidences suggest, but that is what we must recover from the
> machine looking inside (in different ways corresponding to the intensional
> variants, the arithmetical hypostases).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> Even events seen in dreams get some
>>> notion of existence, for example.
>>
>>
>> That's nice. I even have problems with statements like "batman doesn't
>> exist".
>
>
> Really?
>
> I will send you a video!
>
>
>
>> Doesn't he, in some sense?
>
>
> Certainly, in many sense. He has "real" cousins, like jetman:
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=BE&v=x2sT9KoII_M

A batman with a french accent! Coincidence?

>
> And certainly not, in some common sense.
>
> Here, with comp, it is easy at the start, only 0, s(0), s(s(0), ... exist.
>
> The rest will come from the many relationships the number inherits from the
> + and * laws. (+ the comp invariance of consciousness manifestation and
> experience for the digital substitution at some level). That gives the
> relative perceptions, the dreams, the beliefs, a

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 17, 2013 3:31:28 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 9/17/2013 10:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>  
> Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of 
>> phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think 
>> this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of 
>> accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what 
>> characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality 
>> irrelevant or even reject its existence. 
>>
>>  
> Which makes sense, since from that kind of fundamentalist 3p perspective, 
> we can only take consciousness for granted. From there, we can either admit 
> or deny that we are taking it for granted, and if we admit it, then we 
> would want to minimize the significance of that.
>
>
> I'd say that from the 3p perspective we don't take it for granted and 
> neither do we consider it's content 'real'.  We are well aware of illusion, 
> misperception, and hallucinations so that we try to construct a 3p model of 
> the world that resolves the differences in 1p perspectives.  
>

But illusions, misperceptions, and hallucinations are only presentations 
within consciousness. They have no meaning from a 3p model. An illusion can 
only be a mismatch between expectations from one context of 1p perception 
to another. There is no 3p 'illusion' because objects have no expectations 
at all.
 

> This not to deny the 1p experiences, but it puts them in the category of 
> descriptions, like written descriptions or photographs.
>

Again, 'descriptions' smuggle 1p phenomenology in. Does an atom have a 
'description'? How is that produced? What is the nature of this entity of 
'description'? This is what I mean by taking 1p for granted. It is to say, 
"We do not eat pumpkin pie, for we are full already of orange squash 
dessert".

 

>   For example if you ask are circles real, the answer is that (perfect) 
> circles don't exist in the world, but they exist as descriptions in brains 
> and computers and math texts.
>

Descriptions aren't literally "in brains" or "in computers" or even "in 
math texts" though. What you mean is that we record our 1p descriptions as 
physical changes in brains, computers, or publications, which we can 
transport and reconstruct through our awareness. Brains have nothing in 
them but microorganisms. Computer have only switches. Math texts only blobs 
of ink or pixel drawing instruction codes. Without a living person who can 
read or think, they are so much debris decaying in unconscious, invisible 
silence.

Craig


> Brent
>  

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, September 15, 2013 3:54:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2013 9:42:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Sep 2013, at 18:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
>>>
>>> > Time for some philosophy then :) 
>>> > 
>>> > Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
>>> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
>>> > 
>>> > Probably many of you already know about it. 
>>> > 
>>> > What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
>>> > introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
>>> > clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
>>> > false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that 
>>> > I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
>>>
>>>
>>> Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it is   
>>> the Epimenides paradox in disguise, 
>>
>>
>> It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative 
>> perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The expectation of 
>> truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic truth, it is a boundary 
>> condition that belongs to sense. 
>>
>>
>> i think you mix first person truth, that we can sometimes apprehend (like 
>> knowing that we are conscious here and now), and third person truth, which 
>> does not depend of any entity *sensing* them.
>>
>
> How do you justify the assumption of entities that do not depend on any 
> phenomenological participation though? 
>
>
> That is called "realism". I guess you know I am realist about facts like 
> "14 is not prime" and the like. We have discussed already on that, and I 
> think, agree that we disagree on that.
>

I don't see any realism in assuming anything that is disconnected from all 
forms of phenomenology. How would such a thing be part of a universe?

 

>
>
>
> Certainly there are truths which are independent of *our* sensing as 
> individuals, or as human beings, or as fleshy objects or temporal spans of 
> felt experience, but how can we know, or rather why should we jump to 
> conclusions that there are things that simply 'are' independently of a 
> sensed experience (note I omit 'entity', since it is not clear that an 
> experience must be felt by a particular being (it could be felt by a class 
> of beings, an era of being, or an eternity of being). Third person truth is 
> not anchored in the firmament of fact, it is simply a lowest common 
> denominator of sensitivity among all participants. 
>
>
> I am OK with this, but as I defined entities from what I am realist about, 
> I prefer to make it simple and refer to an arithmetic independent of us.
>

I agree that arithmetic is independent of us as human beings, but I see 
nothing to suggest that it is independent of all experience.
 

>
>
>
>
> If third person truth were sense independent, what would be the point of 
> having sense actually experienced? 
>
>
> The presence of far away galaxies does not depend on us (human beings), 
> but we still need sense (Hubble) to acknowledge their existence.
>

Of course, but far away galaxies do depend on the sensitivity of the matter 
of the Hubble, or other galaxies, or our eyeball and brain, to 'exist' in 
some particular form. Otherwise what is the difference between a galaxy 
existing and not existing?
 

>
>
>
>
> How would it create sensation mechanically, and how would whatever is used 
> to attach first person phenomena to third person phenomena be itself 
> attached to either one?
>
>
> Through two things: self-reference and truth.
>

Those are abstractions though, not mechanisms.You could say 'tenacity' and 
'ingenuity' too, but that doesn't put 'orange' in a digital sequence.

 

> the first in technically manageable, the second is not. But we have both 
> once we assume the independent truth of arithmetical relations.
>

Independent of what though? That implies that there exists something 
outside of arithmetic relations, but then claims them at the same time. 
It's stage magic.

 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Computers cannot lie intentionally, 
>>
>>
>>
>> Hmm... That is your usual anti-mechanist  propaganda. 
>>
>
> It's not too late to discover a new perspective... 
> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/12/why-computers-cant-lie-and-dont-know-your-name/
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> they can only report a local truth which is misinterpreted as being false 
>> in some sense that is not local to the computation.
>>
>> For the same reason, computers cannot intend to tell the truth either. As 
>> in the Chinese Room - the output of a program is not known by the program 
>> to be true, it simply is a report of the truth of some internal process. 
>>
>>
>> You confuse a person, and a program or body responsible for that person 
>>

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

On 9/17/2013 10:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of
phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think
this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of
accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what
characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality
irrelevant or even reject its existence.


Which makes sense, since from that kind of fundamentalist 3p perspective, we can only 
take consciousness for granted. From there, we can either admit or deny that we are 
taking it for granted, and if we admit it, then we would want to minimize the 
significance of that.


I'd say that from the 3p perspective we don't take it for granted and neither do we 
consider it's content 'real'.  We are well aware of illusion, misperception, and 
hallucinations so that we try to construct a 3p model of the world that resolves the 
differences in 1p perspectives.  This not to deny the 1p experiences, but it puts them in 
the category of descriptions, like written descriptions or photographs.  For example if 
you ask are circles real, the answer is that (perfect) circles don't exist in the world, 
but they exist as descriptions in brains and computers and math texts.


Brent

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 17, 2013 6:07:23 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 7:47 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg  
> >> wrote: 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: 
> >> >> 
> >> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg  
>
> >> >> wrote: 
> >> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false? 
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > Here's what I'm thinking: 
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I 
> am 
> >> >> > not 
> >> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised 
> >> >> > about. 
> >> >> > By 
> >> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include 
> >> >> > being 
> >> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft 
> >> >> > contingencies 
> >> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no 
> >> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure 
> >> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the 
> door 
> >> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe 
> the 
> >> >> paradox still holds. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If 
> I 
> >> > say 
> >> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when', 
> >> > that 
> >> > is already a contradiction. 
> >> 
> >> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this. 
> >> The judge lied. You convinced me! :) 
> > 
> > 
> > Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me resurrect 
> some 
> > lost mathematical-logical ability. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> (with due credit to Alberto and 
> >> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be 
> >> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise 
> >> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if 
> >> you do". 
> >> 
> >> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5 
> >> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns 
> >> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to 
> >> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the 
> >> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker 
> >> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that 
> >> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge) 
> >> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there 
> >> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple 
> >> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the 
> >> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will 
> >> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one 
> >> can do. 
> >> 
> >> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better. 
> > 
> > 
> > Nice. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> I 
> >> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily 
> >> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are 
> >> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as 
> >> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability? 
> > 
> > 
> > Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but since 
> > falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist on 
> the 
> > same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in public 
> > physics. 
>
> Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of 
> phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think 
> this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of 
> accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what 
> characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality 
> irrelevant or even reject its existence. 
>
>
Which makes sense, since from that kind of fundamentalist 3p perspective, 
we can only take consciousness for granted. From there, we can either admit 
or deny that we are taking it for granted, and if we admit it, then we 
would want to minimize the significance of that.

>> 
> >> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're 
> >> proposing? 
> > 
> > 
> > There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of understanding 
> by 
> > correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's more at 
> the 
> > hypothesis stage than the testing stage. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it. 
> >> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the 
> >> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming 
> >> that neuroscien

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Sep 2013, at 11:49, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 15 Sep 2013, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:






With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the
ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So  
number
exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ..., because they  
make true
Ex(x = x). And then (and only then), we can define different  
notions of
epistemological existence, and they will be as many notion of  
existence as
we have modalities (notably those coming from incompleteness, as  
they are
unavoidable.  They will make true proposition with the shape [] Ex  
[] P(x),

or []<> Ex [] <> P(x), etc...


Ok, nice. I'm slowly getting used to modal logic. It's a weird thing
to learn because it seems to require removing things from your thought
process rather than adding them (at least for me). It's hard because
it's simple.



That's the idea of math and logic. It is abstraction. it simplifies,  
indeed.










So we will get notions of psychological
existence, physical existence, etc.


Ok, but what is the computational substrate?


*any* first order logical specification of *any* turing universal  
system will do.


I suggest a very tiny part of arithmetic, but the S and K combinators  
will do as well, or the Unitary group, etc.








There is still a
dissatisfaction in having to just accept it. I guess one can go back
to the idea of God, in a way.


God created 0, and its successors, and then said to them add, and  
multiply.


All the rest is what emerge from a universal matrix of cohering  
Computations/dreams (1-computations, 3-computation) provably existing  
as a consequence of the addition and multiplication laws.


If you can believe that 17 is prime, independently of you, then you  
can understand, that, if you assume computationalism, arithmetic, as  
seen from different internal self-referential view, contains such  
"universal matrix", or the universal dovetailing or any sigma_1  
complete set of number, or a Post creative set, a universal purpose  
computer, reflecting itself.


Arithmetic provides the block-mindscape. The existence and unicity of  
a block multiverse emerging from it is basically unsolved, nor even  
yet made enough precise.






It's just what is. But then this is an
ontological statement. Does this substrate exist? You can not use the
previous reasoning to support its existence, or can you?


I can't.  I only justify why machines develop such beliefs, even for  
"good" (relatively correct for they local purpose in their probable  
history) reason. Just that the physical reality is not the fundamental  
reality. The physical reality is a complex self-referential sum made  
by a universal machine/number, and selected or varied through first  
person (sometimes plural) experiences.


There is no substrate (in that picture). Just dreams, or limit on  
computations, probably related to (Turing) Universal group, braids, as  
the empirical evidences suggest, but that is what we must recover from  
the machine looking inside (in different ways corresponding to the  
intensional variants, the arithmetical hypostases).









Even events seen in dreams get some
notion of existence, for example.


That's nice. I even have problems with statements like "batman doesn't
exist".


Really?

I will send you a video!



Doesn't he, in some sense?


Certainly, in many sense. He has "real" cousins, like jetman:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=BE&v=x2sT9KoII_M


And certainly not, in some common sense.

Here, with comp, it is easy at the start, only 0, s(0), s(s(0), ...  
exist.


The rest will come from the many relationships the number inherits  
from the + and * laws. (+ the comp invariance of consciousness  
manifestation and experience for the digital substitution at some  
level). That gives the relative perceptions, the dreams, the beliefs,  
and (but only God knows), the truth.


If we don't recover common sense existence, we fail. But unless comp  
is false, why should it contradicts common sense? Thanks to Everett we  
do have evidence of sharable histories and stable first person  
scenarios. Comp get close to solipsism, but should avoid it. Comp will  
doubtfully change most of physics, no more than evolution can changed  
actual biology.





We cannot invite him for coffee but
we can talk about him and we all know what we're talking about.


No doubt.

I think that with comp you don't have to believe in anything more than  
the independence of the numbers' properties and relationships.


Plato's God is truth, and with comp, if sigma_1 truth is enough for  
the ontology, you need much more than the arithmetical truth, to get  
the inside view(s) and their mathematics.


Fortunately, this is reflected only on the first order extensions of  
the arithmetic h

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

On 9/17/2013 1:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Sep 2013, at 19:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/16/2013 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the ontological 
level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So number exists, once we assume 
arithmetic or combinators ..., because they make true Ex(x = x).


But this notion of 'exists' as 'satisfying a propositional function' is completely 
different from "kicks back when I kick it" existence.


Why? It kicks back too, like in credit carts.


My credit card is made of plastic - and all the processes that depend on it's number are 
realized in stuff that kicks back too.


And with comp it kicks back in making you dreaming of things kicking back, sometimes in 
persistent way.




You say "number exists, once we assume arithmetic"; which is about as useful as 
"hobbits exist once we assume middle Earth".


Not at all. Arithmetic asks for very few rather clear assumptions, and it explains a 
lot, as all physical theories assumes it.


Arithmetic is a model of countable objects, but it's not that clear that "every number has 
a successor" correctly models countable objects.


Then with comp we need, nor can use anything more. Hobbits and middle Earth assumes many 
things and explain nothing. I suspect you are a little bit disingenuous, isn't it?


I naturally took an extreme example to make my point.

Brent



Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 7:47 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg 
>> >> wrote:
>> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false?
>> >> >
>> >> > Here's what I'm thinking:
>> >> >
>> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am
>> >> > not
>> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised
>> >> > about.
>> >> > By
>> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include
>> >> > being
>> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft
>> >> > contingencies
>> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome.
>> >>
>> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no
>> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure
>> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door
>> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the
>> >> paradox still holds.
>> >
>> >
>> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If I
>> > say
>> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when',
>> > that
>> > is already a contradiction.
>>
>> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this.
>> The judge lied. You convinced me! :)
>
>
> Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me resurrect some
> lost mathematical-logical ability.
>
>>
>> (with due credit to Alberto and
>> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be
>> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise
>> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if
>> you do".
>>
>> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5
>> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns
>> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to
>> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the
>> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker
>> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that
>> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge)
>> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there
>> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple
>> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the
>> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will
>> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one
>> can do.
>>
>> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better.
>
>
> Nice.
>
>>
>> I
>> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily
>> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are
>> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as
>> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability?
>
>
> Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but since
> falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist on the
> same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in public
> physics.

Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of
phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think
this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of
accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what
characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality
irrelevant or even reject its existence.

>>
>> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're
>> proposing?
>
>
> There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of understanding by
> correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's more at the
> hypothesis stage than the testing stage.
>
>>
>>
>> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it.
>> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the
>> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming
>> that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural
>> firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural
>> firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the
>> symbols. Why not?
>
>
> Still there's the hard problem. Why would neural firing patterns have a
> smell?

I don't know! But I think the mystery is not so much how symbols
appear or why they appear. Computers can do that. The big mystery is
how they become qualia. Which leads me to a point where I can
definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private
experiences have at least the same reality status as public
experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw
too m

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 15 Sep 2013, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2013 9:42:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 On 12 Sep 2013, at 18:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> Time for some philosophy then :)
>>
>> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
>>
>> Probably many of you already know about it.
>>
>> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
>> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
>> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
>> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
>> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?
>
>
>
> Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it is
> the Epimenides paradox in disguise,



 It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative
 perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The expectation of
 truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic truth, it is a
 boundary
 condition that belongs to sense.


 i think you mix first person truth, that we can sometimes apprehend
 (like
 knowing that we are conscious here and now), and third person truth,
 which
 does not depend of any entity *sensing* them.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> How do you justify the assumption of entities that do not depend on any
>>> phenomenological participation though?
>>>
>>>
>>> That is called "realism". I guess you know I am realist about facts like
>>> "14
>>> is not prime" and the like. We have discussed already on that, and I
>>> think,
>>> agree that we disagree on that.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Certainly there are truths which are independent of *our* sensing as
>>> individuals, or as human beings, or as fleshy objects or temporal spans
>>> of
>>> felt experience, but how can we know, or rather why should we jump to
>>> conclusions that there are things that simply 'are' independently of a
>>> sensed experience (note I omit 'entity', since it is not clear that an
>>> experience must be felt by a particular being (it could be felt by a
>>> class
>>> of beings, an era of being, or an eternity of being). Third person truth
>>> is
>>> not anchored in the firmament of fact, it is simply a lowest common
>>> denominator of sensitivity among all participants.
>>>
>>>
>>> I am OK with this, but as I defined entities from what I am realist
>>> about, I
>>> prefer to make it simple and refer to an arithmetic independent of us.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If third person truth were sense independent, what would be the point of
>>> having sense actually experienced?
>>>
>>>
>>> The presence of far away galaxies does not depend on us (human beings),
>>> but
>>> we still need sense (Hubble) to acknowledge their existence.
>>
>>
>> But the precise details of the galaxies may be indeterminate until
>> someone looks, à la Schrödinger's cat no? Of course with things like
>> the MWI or FPI "existance" is no longer such a clear term. Or is it?
>
>
>
>
>
> "Existence" is not so much a difficulty for a logician (who theorize about
> something) because it will be contained in some standard semantics for
> expression like "it exists ...". Now, physicalist are usually too much
> informal to proceed in such a way.
>
> So, to be short, with physicalism I would distinguish two form of existence.
> 1) a notion of accessible existence, like that particle exist "in my branch
> of the universal superposition. In that case a particle might exist in some
> clear way, despite its attributes can be "dispersed" on many branch, making
> that particles behaving in a somehow fuzzy, or wavy way.
> 2) ... but with QED, even the number of particles can be in a superposition
> state, making this more complex. So we can say that a particle exist if it
> exists in some branch of the superposition, for example. So what exist are
> basically what an observer can observe, when the observer and the observed
> are described in the universal wave.
> Note that the advantage of Everett, is that any interaction between two
> objects can be considered as an observation, so that even if we don't look
> at the far away galaxies, they have de-cohere enough to be said as existing
> in our branch, before we look at them.
>
> With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the
> ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So number
> exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ..., because they make true
> Ex(x = x). And

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Sep 2013, at 19:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/16/2013 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at  
the ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)".  
So number exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ...,  
because they make true Ex(x = x).


But this notion of 'exists' as 'satisfying a propositional function'  
is completely different from "kicks back when I kick it" existence.


Why? It kicks back too, like in credit carts. And with comp it kicks  
back in making you dreaming of things kicking back, sometimes in  
persistent way.




You say "number exists, once we assume arithmetic"; which is about  
as useful as "hobbits exist once we assume middle Earth".


Not at all. Arithmetic asks for very few rather clear assumptions, and  
it explains a lot, as all physical theories assumes it. Then with comp  
we need, nor can use anything more. Hobbits and middle Earth assumes  
many things and explain nothing. I suspect you are a little bit  
disingenuous, isn't it?


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg  
> >> wrote: 
> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false? 
> >> > 
> >> > Here's what I'm thinking: 
> >> > 
> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am 
> not 
> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised 
> about. 
> >> > By 
> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include 
> being 
> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft 
> contingencies 
> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. 
> >> 
> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no 
> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure 
> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door 
> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the 
> >> paradox still holds. 
> > 
> > 
> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If I 
> say 
> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when', 
> that 
> > is already a contradiction. 
>
> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this. 
> The judge lied. You convinced me! :)


Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me resurrect some 
lost mathematical-logical ability.
 

> (with due credit to Alberto and 
> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be 
> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise 
> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if 
> you do". 
>
> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5 
> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns 
> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to 
> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the 
> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker 
> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that 
> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge) 
> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there 
> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple 
> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the 
> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will 
> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one 
> can do. 
>
> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better.


Nice.
 

> I 
> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily 
> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are 
> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as 
> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability? 
>

Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but since 
falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist on the 
same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in public 
physics. 
 

> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're 
> proposing? 
>

There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of understanding by 
correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's more at 
the hypothesis stage than the testing stage.
 

>
> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it. 
> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the 
> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming 
> that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural 
> firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural 
> firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the 
> symbols. Why not? 
>

Still there's the hard problem. Why would neural firing patterns have a 
smell?

Thanks,
Craig
 

>
> Cheers, 
> Telmo. 
>
> > Adding the conceit of precise times doesn't 
> > alter the fundamental contradiction that you can be surprised when 
> someone's 
> > true prediction comes true. The week already includes every hour of 
> every 
> > day of the week, so it can't be a surprise on that level, but if the 
> judge 
> > doesn't specify a single time then it also has to be a surprise on 
> another 
> > level. You just have to pick on which level you are talking about, or 
> decide 
> > that one level automatically takes precedence over the other. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> > The condition of expectation 
> >> > isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference. 
> >> > Objectively, 
> >> > there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything. 
> >> 
> >> I would say that surprise in this context can be defined formally and 
> >> objectively. The moment 

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

On 9/16/2013 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the ontological level, 
is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So number exists, once we assume arithmetic 
or combinators ..., because they make true Ex(x = x).


But this notion of 'exists' as 'satisfying a propositional function' is completely 
different from "kicks back when I kick it" existence.  You say "number exists, once we 
assume arithmetic"; which is about as useful as "hobbits exist once we assume middle Earth".


Brent

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Sep 2013, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, September 13, 2013 9:42:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 12 Sep 2013, at 18:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:



On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote:


Time for some philosophy then :)

Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox

Probably many of you already know about it.

What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning  
that

I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?



Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that  
it is

the Epimenides paradox in disguise,



It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative
perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The  
expectation of
truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic truth, it is a  
boundary

condition that belongs to sense.


i think you mix first person truth, that we can sometimes  
apprehend (like
knowing that we are conscious here and now), and third person  
truth, which

does not depend of any entity *sensing* them.



How do you justify the assumption of entities that do not depend on  
any

phenomenological participation though?


That is called "realism". I guess you know I am realist about facts  
like "14
is not prime" and the like. We have discussed already on that, and  
I think,

agree that we disagree on that.



Certainly there are truths which are independent of *our* sensing as
individuals, or as human beings, or as fleshy objects or temporal  
spans of

felt experience, but how can we know, or rather why should we jump to
conclusions that there are things that simply 'are' independently  
of a
sensed experience (note I omit 'entity', since it is not clear that  
an
experience must be felt by a particular being (it could be felt by  
a class
of beings, an era of being, or an eternity of being). Third person  
truth is

not anchored in the firmament of fact, it is simply a lowest common
denominator of sensitivity among all participants.


I am OK with this, but as I defined entities from what I am realist  
about, I
prefer to make it simple and refer to an arithmetic independent of  
us.





If third person truth were sense independent, what would be the  
point of

having sense actually experienced?


The presence of far away galaxies does not depend on us (human  
beings), but

we still need sense (Hubble) to acknowledge their existence.


But the precise details of the galaxies may be indeterminate until
someone looks, à la Schrödinger's cat no? Of course with things like
the MWI or FPI "existance" is no longer such a clear term. Or is it?





"Existence" is not so much a difficulty for a logician (who theorize  
about something) because it will be contained in some standard  
semantics for expression like "it exists ...". Now, physicalist are  
usually too much informal to proceed in such a way.


So, to be short, with physicalism I would distinguish two form of  
existence.
1) a notion of accessible existence, like that particle exist "in my  
branch of the universal superposition. In that case a particle might  
exist in some clear way, despite its attributes can be "dispersed" on  
many branch, making that particles behaving in a somehow fuzzy, or  
wavy way.
2) ... but with QED, even the number of particles can be in a  
superposition state, making this more complex. So we can say that a  
particle exist if it exists in some branch of the superposition, for  
example. So what exist are basically what an observer can observe,  
when the observer and the observed are described in the universal wave.
Note that the advantage of Everett, is that any interaction between  
two objects can be considered as an observation, so that even if we  
don't look at the far away galaxies, they have de-cohere enough to be  
said as existing in our branch, before we look at them.


With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the  
ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So  
number exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ..., because  
they make true Ex(x = x). And then (and only then), we can define  
different notions of epistemological existence, and they will be as  
many notion of existence as we have modalities (notably those coming  
from incompleteness, as they are unavoidable.  They will make true  
proposition with the shape [] Ex [] P(x), or []<> Ex [] <> P(x),  
etc... So we will get notions of psychological existence, physical  
existence, etc. Even events seen in dreams get some notion of  
exi

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2013 9:42:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Sep 2013, at 18:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>> > Time for some philosophy then :)
>>> >
>>> > Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
>>> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
>>> >
>>> > Probably many of you already know about it.
>>> >
>>> > What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
>>> > introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
>>> > clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
>>> > false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
>>> > I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?
>>>
>>>
>>> Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it is
>>> the Epimenides paradox in disguise,
>>
>>
>> It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative
>> perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The expectation of
>> truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic truth, it is a boundary
>> condition that belongs to sense.
>>
>>
>> i think you mix first person truth, that we can sometimes apprehend (like
>> knowing that we are conscious here and now), and third person truth, which
>> does not depend of any entity *sensing* them.
>
>
> How do you justify the assumption of entities that do not depend on any
> phenomenological participation though?
>
>
> That is called "realism". I guess you know I am realist about facts like "14
> is not prime" and the like. We have discussed already on that, and I think,
> agree that we disagree on that.
>
>
>
> Certainly there are truths which are independent of *our* sensing as
> individuals, or as human beings, or as fleshy objects or temporal spans of
> felt experience, but how can we know, or rather why should we jump to
> conclusions that there are things that simply 'are' independently of a
> sensed experience (note I omit 'entity', since it is not clear that an
> experience must be felt by a particular being (it could be felt by a class
> of beings, an era of being, or an eternity of being). Third person truth is
> not anchored in the firmament of fact, it is simply a lowest common
> denominator of sensitivity among all participants.
>
>
> I am OK with this, but as I defined entities from what I am realist about, I
> prefer to make it simple and refer to an arithmetic independent of us.
>
>
>
>
> If third person truth were sense independent, what would be the point of
> having sense actually experienced?
>
>
> The presence of far away galaxies does not depend on us (human beings), but
> we still need sense (Hubble) to acknowledge their existence.

But the precise details of the galaxies may be indeterminate until
someone looks, à la Schrödinger's cat no? Of course with things like
the MWI or FPI "existance" is no longer such a clear term. Or is it?


> How would it create sensation mechanically, and how would whatever is used
> to attach first person phenomena to third person phenomena be itself
> attached to either one?
>
>
> Through two things: self-reference and truth. the first in technically
> manageable, the second is not. But we have both once we assume the
> independent truth of arithmetical relations.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Computers cannot lie intentionally,
>>
>>
>>
>> Hmm... That is your usual anti-mechanist  propaganda.
>
>
> It's not too late to discover a new perspective...
> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/12/why-computers-cant-lie-and-dont-know-your-name/
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> they can only report a local truth which is misinterpreted as being false
>> in some sense that is not local to the computation.
>>
>> For the same reason, computers cannot intend to tell the truth either. As
>> in the Chinese Room - the output of a program is not known by the program to
>> be true, it simply is a report of the truth of some internal process.
>>
>>
>> You confuse a person, and a program or body responsible for that person
>> being able to communicate with you (that might explain why you believe a
>> computer cannot think. Of course when we say "a computer can think", with
>> comp we mean only that a computer can have an activity making it possible
>> for a person to think relatively to some universal number/machine.
>
>
> My intuition is to support the use of 'personal' to describe private
> physics, but the word person seems too loaded to me. I am ok with everything
> that I see around me now being 'personal' in some sense, but I do not see
> that every line and curve, every sparkle and shadow arc is a 'person' or
> collection of persons. Also I think that the universal number has no reason
> to feel, but a universal feeling has every reason to count.
>

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, September 13, 2013 9:42:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Sep 2013, at 18:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> Time for some philosophy then :)
>
> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
>
> Probably many of you already know about it.
>
> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning  
that

> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?


Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it  
is

the Epimenides paradox in disguise,

It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative  
perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The  
expectation of truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic  
truth, it is a boundary condition that belongs to sense.


i think you mix first person truth, that we can sometimes apprehend  
(like knowing that we are conscious here and now), and third person  
truth, which does not depend of any entity *sensing* them.


How do you justify the assumption of entities that do not depend on  
any phenomenological participation though?


That is called "realism". I guess you know I am realist about facts  
like "14 is not prime" and the like. We have discussed already on  
that, and I think, agree that we disagree on that.




Certainly there are truths which are independent of *our* sensing as  
individuals, or as human beings, or as fleshy objects or temporal  
spans of felt experience, but how can we know, or rather why should  
we jump to conclusions that there are things that simply 'are'  
independently of a sensed experience (note I omit 'entity', since it  
is not clear that an experience must be felt by a particular being  
(it could be felt by a class of beings, an era of being, or an  
eternity of being). Third person truth is not anchored in the  
firmament of fact, it is simply a lowest common denominator of  
sensitivity among all participants.


I am OK with this, but as I defined entities from what I am realist  
about, I prefer to make it simple and refer to an arithmetic  
independent of us.






If third person truth were sense independent, what would be the  
point of having sense actually experienced?


The presence of far away galaxies does not depend on us (human  
beings), but we still need sense (Hubble) to acknowledge their  
existence.





How would it create sensation mechanically, and how would whatever  
is used to attach first person phenomena to third person phenomena  
be itself attached to either one?


Through two things: self-reference and truth. the first in technically  
manageable, the second is not. But we have both once we assume the  
independent truth of arithmetical relations.











Computers cannot lie intentionally,



Hmm... That is your usual anti-mechanist  propaganda.

It's not too late to discover a new perspective... 
http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/12/why-computers-cant-lie-and-dont-know-your-name/




they can only report a local truth which is misinterpreted as being  
false in some sense that is not local to the computation.


For the same reason, computers cannot intend to tell the truth  
either. As in the Chinese Room - the output of a program is not  
known by the program to be true, it simply is a report of the truth  
of some internal process.


You confuse a person, and a program or body responsible for that  
person being able to communicate with you (that might explain why  
you believe a computer cannot think. Of course when we say "a  
computer can think", with comp we mean only that a computer can have  
an activity making it possible for a person to think relatively to  
some universal number/machine.


My intuition is to support the use of 'personal' to describe private  
physics, but the word person seems too loaded to me. I am ok with  
everything that I see around me now being 'personal' in some sense,  
but I do not see that every line and curve, every sparkle and shadow  
arc is a 'person' or collection of persons. Also I think that the  
universal number has no reason to feel, but a universal feeling has  
every reason to count.


I know that is what you feel. I have explained why numbers feels this  
to, as the truth here has to be logically counter-intuitive. Young  
machines have hard to believe that they are machines, and eventually  
this asks for a strong philosophical, even theological, bet. That is  
why "mechanist proselytism" is forbidden.










The interesting part is that besides being true locally, the  
computer's report is also true arithmetically, whic

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sat, Sep 14, 2013 at 11:53 AM, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg  
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg 
>>> wrote:
>>> > Which reasoning is clearly false?
>>> >
>>> > Here's what I'm thinking:
>>> >
>>> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am not
>>> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised about.
>>> > By
>>> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include being
>>> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft contingencies
>>> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome.
>>>
>>> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no
>>> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure
>>> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door
>>> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the
>>> paradox still holds.
>>
>>
>> I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If I say
>> 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when', that
>> is already a contradiction.
>
> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this.
> The judge lied. You convinced me! :) (with due credit to Alberto and
> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be
> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise
> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if
> you do".
>
> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5
> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns
> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to
> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the
> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker
> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that
> the attacker button is automatically pressed.

I meant: automated so that the attacker button is pressed on turn 5.

> Now the attacker (judge)
> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there
> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple
> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the
> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will
> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one
> can do.
>
> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better. I
> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily
> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are
> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as
> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability?
> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're
> proposing?
>
> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it.
> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the
> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming
> that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural
> firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural
> firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the
> symbols. Why not?
>
> Cheers,
> Telmo.
>
>> Adding the conceit of precise times doesn't
>> alter the fundamental contradiction that you can be surprised when someone's
>> true prediction comes true. The week already includes every hour of every
>> day of the week, so it can't be a surprise on that level, but if the judge
>> doesn't specify a single time then it also has to be a surprise on another
>> level. You just have to pick on which level you are talking about, or decide
>> that one level automatically takes precedence over the other.
>>
>>>
>>> > The condition of expectation
>>> > isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference.
>>> > Objectively,
>>> > there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything.
>>>
>>> I would say that surprise in this context can be defined formally and
>>> objectively. The moment someone knocks at the door, the prisoner must
>>> have assigned a probability < 1 that he would be executed that day.
>>> This is clearly not the case for Friday, where p=1.
>>
>>
>> Even on Friday it can still be a surprise, a meta-surprise, when he finds
>> out the judge lied, or knocks on the door an hour later. If we say that
>> can't happen though, p=1 is still limited to Friday only if it's Thursday.
>> It doesn't accumulate. On Wednesday it's still 50-50 for Thursday and Friday
>> each. On Tuesday it's .33 for Wednesday-Friday each, so on Wednesday, when
>> the knock comes, he is 66% surprised - unless there's something I'm missing.
>>
>>>
>>> If we assume a
>>> rational prisoner, we can replace it with an object. Some computer
>>> running an algorithm. He

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>> > Which reasoning is clearly false?
>> >
>> > Here's what I'm thinking:
>> >
>> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am not
>> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised about.
>> > By
>> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include being
>> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft contingencies
>> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome.
>>
>> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no
>> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure
>> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door
>> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the
>> paradox still holds.
>
>
> I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If I say
> 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when', that
> is already a contradiction.

Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this.
The judge lied. You convinced me! :) (with due credit to Alberto and
Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be
"you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise
when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if
you do".

My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5
turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns
to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to
predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the
defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker
wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that
the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge)
is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there
is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple
instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the
attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will
offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one
can do.

I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better. I
am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily
attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are
equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as
Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability?
If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're
proposing?

The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it.
It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the
answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming
that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural
firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural
firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the
symbols. Why not?

Cheers,
Telmo.

> Adding the conceit of precise times doesn't
> alter the fundamental contradiction that you can be surprised when someone's
> true prediction comes true. The week already includes every hour of every
> day of the week, so it can't be a surprise on that level, but if the judge
> doesn't specify a single time then it also has to be a surprise on another
> level. You just have to pick on which level you are talking about, or decide
> that one level automatically takes precedence over the other.
>
>>
>> > The condition of expectation
>> > isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference.
>> > Objectively,
>> > there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything.
>>
>> I would say that surprise in this context can be defined formally and
>> objectively. The moment someone knocks at the door, the prisoner must
>> have assigned a probability < 1 that he would be executed that day.
>> This is clearly not the case for Friday, where p=1.
>
>
> Even on Friday it can still be a surprise, a meta-surprise, when he finds
> out the judge lied, or knocks on the door an hour later. If we say that
> can't happen though, p=1 is still limited to Friday only if it's Thursday.
> It doesn't accumulate. On Wednesday it's still 50-50 for Thursday and Friday
> each. On Tuesday it's .33 for Wednesday-Friday each, so on Wednesday, when
> the knock comes, he is 66% surprised - unless there's something I'm missing.
>
>>
>> If we assume a
>> rational prisoner, we can replace it with an object. Some computer
>> running an algorithm. Here we can define the computer belief as some
>> output it produces somehow. We can even make this problem fully
>> abstract and get rid of the colourful story with hangings and judges.
>
>
> That's a problem if you fall for the Pathetic Fallacy and assume that
> compu

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, September 13, 2013 9:42:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Sep 2013, at 18:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
>>
>> > Time for some philosophy then :) 
>> > 
>> > Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
>> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
>> > 
>> > Probably many of you already know about it. 
>> > 
>> > What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
>> > introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
>> > clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
>> > false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that 
>> > I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
>>
>>
>> Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it is   
>> the Epimenides paradox in disguise, 
>
>
> It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative 
> perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The expectation of 
> truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic truth, it is a boundary 
> condition that belongs to sense. 
>
>
> i think you mix first person truth, that we can sometimes apprehend (like 
> knowing that we are conscious here and now), and third person truth, which 
> does not depend of any entity *sensing* them.
>

How do you justify the assumption of entities that do not depend on any 
phenomenological participation though? Certainly there are truths which are 
independent of *our* sensing as individuals, or as human beings, or as 
fleshy objects or temporal spans of felt experience, but how can we know, 
or rather why should we jump to conclusions that there are things that 
simply 'are' independently of a sensed experience (note I omit 'entity', 
since it is not clear that an experience must be felt by a particular being 
(it could be felt by a class of beings, an era of being, or an eternity of 
being). Third person truth is not anchored in the firmament of fact, it is 
simply a lowest common denominator of sensitivity among all participants. 

If third person truth were sense independent, what would be the point of 
having sense actually experienced? How would it create sensation 
mechanically, and how would whatever is used to attach first person 
phenomena to third person phenomena be itself attached to either one?

 

>
>
>
> Computers cannot lie intentionally, 
>
>
>
> Hmm... That is your usual anti-mechanist  propaganda. 
>

It's not too late to discover a new perspective... 
http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/12/why-computers-cant-lie-and-dont-know-your-name/
 

>
>
>
> they can only report a local truth which is misinterpreted as being false 
> in some sense that is not local to the computation.
>
> For the same reason, computers cannot intend to tell the truth either. As 
> in the Chinese Room - the output of a program is not known by the program 
> to be true, it simply is a report of the truth of some internal process. 
>
>
> You confuse a person, and a program or body responsible for that person 
> being able to communicate with you (that might explain why you believe a 
> computer cannot think. Of course when we say "a computer can think", with 
> comp we mean only that a computer can have an activity making it possible 
> for a person to think relatively to some universal number/machine.
>

My intuition is to support the use of 'personal' to describe private 
physics, but the word person seems too loaded to me. I am ok with 
everything that I see around me now being 'personal' in some sense, but I 
do not see that every line and curve, every sparkle and shadow arc is a 
'person' or collection of persons. Also I think that the universal number 
has no reason to feel, but a universal feeling has every reason to count.
 

>
>
>
>
> The interesting part is that besides being true locally, the computer's 
> report is also true arithmetically, which is to say that it is true two 
> ways (or senses):
>
> 1) the most specific/proprietary sense which is unique, private, 
> instantaneous and local
> 2) the most universal/generic sense which is promiscuous, public, eternal, 
> and omni-local
>
> The computer's report is, however not true in any sense in between, i.e. 
> in any sense which relates specifically to real experienced events in space 
> time.
>
> Real events in spacetime (which occur orthogonally through mass-energy, or 
> rather mass-energy is the orthogonal cross section of events) are:
>
> 3) semi-unique, semi-private, semi-spatiotemporal, semi-local, 
> semi-specific, semi-universal.
>
>
> I am quite skeptical about "real events in spacetime". I can ascribe a 
> local sense to that, but not an absolute one. I don't buy even weak 
> materialism. It contradicts most things I find much more plausible 
> (consciousness, persons, souls, dreams, monism, ...). 
>

I'm trying to make an informal 

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, September 13, 2013 9:31:56 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Sep 2013, at 17:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Which reasoning is clearly false?
>
> Here's what I'm thinking:
>
> 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am not 
> hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised about. By 
> leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include being 
> surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft contingencies 
> that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. The condition of expectation 
> isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference. Objectively, 
> there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything.
>
> 2) If we want to close in tightly on the quantitative logic of whether 
> deducibility can be deduced - given five coin flips and a certainty that 
> one will be heads, each successive tails coin flip increases the odds that 
> one the remaining flips will be heads. The fifth coin will either be 100% 
> likely to be heads, or will prove that the certainty assumed was 100% wrong.
>
> I think the paradox hinges on 1) the false inference of objectivity in the 
> use of the word surprise and 2) the false assertion of omniscience by the 
> judge. It's like an Escher drawing. In real life, surprise cannot be 
> predicted with certainty and the quality of unexpectedness it is not an 
> objective thing, just as expectation is not an objective thing.
>
> Or not?
>
>
> That's not to bad. In fact to get the paradox you need to assume that the 
> teacher (for the unexpected exam) is rational, but it can't be.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Thanks Bruno! 


>
>
>
> Craig
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2013 5:33:24 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> Time for some philosophy then :) 
>>
>> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
>>
>> Probably many of you already know about it. 
>>
>> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
>> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
>> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
>> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that 
>> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
>>
>> Cheers, 
>> Telmo. 
>>
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

On 9/13/2013 2:37 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

On 9/12/2013 2:33 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Time for some philosophy then :)

Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox

Probably many of you already know about it.

What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?


The wiki article gives most resolutions of the antinomy.  The logical
contradiction is seen most clearly in case of the man who says to his wife,
"Here's your anniversary present.  You'll be completely surprised by what it
is when you open it.  It's diamond earrings."  So, does the wife reason that
she'll be surprised, yet he's said it's diamond earrings; so it can't be
diamond earrings because then she wouldn't be surprised.  Then she opens the
box and it's diamond earrings AND she's surprised.

I don't think this is equivalent because in your scenario the
statement is necessarily a lie. Either the wife will not be surprised
or the present is not diamond earrings.


No it's not.  The husband is telling the truth and his statement is verified by the 
events: His wife is surprised and it is diamond earrings.



In the unexpected hanging
scenario, the judge is not lying. It is clearly possible for the
prisoner to get a knock at his door Monday or maybe Wednesday and be
surprised. The judge did not lie, but the reasoning seems to indicate
that the surprise is impossible. I think there's something deeper
going on here.


No, the judge makes a set of self contradictory statements, just like the husband, when he 
tells the prisoner he won't know beforehand which day he will hang.  The prisoner reasons 
then that he can't be hanged at all, which is a contradiction of the judges statement that 
he will be hanged.  So it's a little more roundabout, but it's just like the anniversary gift.


Brent



Telmo.


It just shows that if you reason from contradictory statements you can
arrive at any conclusion.

Brent


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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Sep 2013, at 18:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> Time for some philosophy then :)
>
> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
>
> Probably many of you already know about it.
>
> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning  
that

> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?


Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it is
the Epimenides paradox in disguise,

It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative  
perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The  
expectation of truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic  
truth, it is a boundary condition that belongs to sense.


i think you mix first person truth, that we can sometimes apprehend  
(like knowing that we are conscious here and now), and third person  
truth, which does not depend of any entity *sensing* them.





Computers cannot lie intentionally,



Hmm... That is your usual anti-mechanist  propaganda.



they can only report a local truth which is misinterpreted as being  
false in some sense that is not local to the computation.


For the same reason, computers cannot intend to tell the truth  
either. As in the Chinese Room - the output of a program is not  
known by the program to be true, it simply is a report of the truth  
of some internal process.


You confuse a person, and a program or body responsible for that  
person being able to communicate with you (that might explain why you  
believe a computer cannot think. Of course when we say "a computer can  
think", with comp we mean only that a computer can have an activity  
making it possible for a person to think relatively to some universal  
number/machine.






The interesting part is that besides being true locally, the  
computer's report is also true arithmetically, which is to say that  
it is true two ways (or senses):


1) the most specific/proprietary sense which is unique, private,  
instantaneous and local
2) the most universal/generic sense which is promiscuous, public,  
eternal, and omni-local


The computer's report is, however not true in any sense in between,  
i.e. in any sense which relates specifically to real experienced  
events in space time.


Real events in spacetime (which occur orthogonally through mass- 
energy, or rather mass-energy is the orthogonal cross section of  
events) are:


3) semi-unique, semi-private, semi-spatiotemporal, semi-local, semi- 
specific, semi-universal.


I am quite skeptical about "real events in spacetime". I can ascribe a  
local sense to that, but not an absolute one. I don't buy even weak  
materialism. It contradicts most things I find much more plausible  
(consciousness, persons, souls, dreams, monism, ...).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Sep 2013, at 17:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Which reasoning is clearly false?

Here's what I'm thinking:

1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am  
not hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised  
about. By leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could  
include being surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other  
soft contingencies that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. The  
condition of expectation isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a  
subjective inference. Objectively, there is no surprise as objects  
don't anticipate anything.


2) If we want to close in tightly on the quantitative logic of  
whether deducibility can be deduced - given five coin flips and a  
certainty that one will be heads, each successive tails coin flip  
increases the odds that one the remaining flips will be heads. The  
fifth coin will either be 100% likely to be heads, or will prove  
that the certainty assumed was 100% wrong.


I think the paradox hinges on 1) the false inference of objectivity  
in the use of the word surprise and 2) the false assertion of  
omniscience by the judge. It's like an Escher drawing. In real life,  
surprise cannot be predicted with certainty and the quality of  
unexpectedness it is not an objective thing, just as expectation is  
not an objective thing.


Or not?


That's not to bad. In fact to get the paradox you need to assume that  
the teacher (for the unexpected exam) is rational, but it can't be.


Bruno







Craig

On Thursday, September 12, 2013 5:33:24 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
Time for some philosophy then :)

Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox

Probably many of you already know about it.

What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?

Cheers,
Telmo.

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Alberto G. Corona]

That is related with the rusell paradox, since Th juzge does not say whaw
type of surprise will be. He is telling: you will receive a surprise.. but
not the type of the surprise:

a surprise about being hange plainly , or
a meta-surprise for being hangled because what I said or
a meta-meta-surprise for being hanged because what i said and you though
about  etc etc.

That is similar to the problem of the sets of all sets etc.

Rusell solved his paradox using type theory:  The objects have to have a
type . The type of set is one, the set of all sets is other etc.   That is
why to avoid contradictions one has to specify the types.


2013/9/13 Alberto G. Corona 

> The surprise can appear in a single day: "You will be hanged on monday
> and you will be surprised by it". Then he reason that he will not be
> surprised. But he is hanged and surprised by it.
>
> Thar reduces the problem to the example of the Diamonds from
> Brent. So the reasoning is:
>
> 1)  The statement of the judge is self contradictory, so it is false: He
> can not tell me the hanging day and be surprised.
>
> but the judge tells the truth  and the surprise in this case is a
> metasurprise; it is not surprised for being hanged; I´m surprised by
> its reasoning.
>
> But the reasoning is about the problem, not the metaproblem of either
> if the judge is lying or not. the
> word "surprised" in 1) is about being hanged, not about the truth
> value of the judge words.
>
> The metaproblem reasoning is:
>
> 2) taking the problem I reason that the Judge is lying. but if that
> occurs, I will be surprised for this reason. So I will be hanged.
>
>
> Yet there is a level-three problem, because if I reason the
> metaproblem as 2), I will not be surprised If get hanged on
> monday.. and so on
>
> 2013/9/13, meekerdb :
> > On 9/12/2013 2:33 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> >> Time for some philosophy then :)
> >>
> >> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
> >>
> >> Probably many of you already know about it.
> >>
> >> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
> >> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
> >> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
> >> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
> >> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?
> >
> > The wiki article gives most resolutions of the antinomy.  The logical
> > contradiction is
> > seen most clearly in case of the man who says to his wife, "Here's your
> > anniversary
> > present.  You'll be completely surprised by what it is when you open it.
> > It's diamond
> > earrings."  So, does the wife reason that she'll be surprised, yet he's
> said
> > it's diamond
> > earrings; so it can't be diamond earrings because then she wouldn't be
> > surprised.  Then
> > she opens the box and it's diamond earrings AND she's surprised.
> >
> > It just shows that if you reason from contradictory statements you can
> > arrive at any
> > conclusion.
> >
> > Brent
> >
> > --
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>
>
> --
> Alberto.
>
>
>
> --
> Alberto.
>



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:37:19 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb > 
> wrote: 
> > On 9/12/2013 2:33 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> >> 
> >> Time for some philosophy then :) 
> >> 
> >> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
> >> 
> >> Probably many of you already know about it. 
> >> 
> >> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
> >> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
> >> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
> >> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that 
> >> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
> > 
> > 
> > The wiki article gives most resolutions of the antinomy.  The logical 
> > contradiction is seen most clearly in case of the man who says to his 
> wife, 
> > "Here's your anniversary present.  You'll be completely surprised by 
> what it 
> > is when you open it.  It's diamond earrings."  So, does the wife reason 
> that 
> > she'll be surprised, yet he's said it's diamond earrings; so it can't be 
> > diamond earrings because then she wouldn't be surprised.  Then she opens 
> the 
> > box and it's diamond earrings AND she's surprised. 
>
> I don't think this is equivalent because in your scenario the 
> statement is necessarily a lie. Either the wife will not be surprised 
> or the present is not diamond earrings. In the unexpected hanging 
> scenario, the judge is not lying. It is clearly possible for the 
> prisoner to get a knock at his door Monday or maybe Wednesday and be 
> surprised. The judge did not lie, but the reasoning seems to indicate 
> that the surprise is impossible. I think there's something deeper 
> going on here. 
>


Why do you think that the judge didn't lie? If the premise contains the 
fact of his truthfulness as a solution to the riddle, it has to make the 
justification for that evident. You can't just say "The frog says two times 
two is nine, and frogs are always right" without giving some justification 
of one statement or the other.

Craig

>
> Telmo. 
>
> > It just shows that if you reason from contradictory statements you can 
> > arrive at any conclusion. 
> > 
> > Brent 
> > 
> > 
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > Which reasoning is clearly false? 
> > 
> > Here's what I'm thinking: 
> > 
> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am not 
> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised about. 
> By 
> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include being 
> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft contingencies 
> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. 
>
> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no 
> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure 
> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door 
> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the 
> paradox still holds. 
>

I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If I say 
'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when', that 
is already a contradiction. Adding the conceit of precise times doesn't 
alter the fundamental contradiction that you can be surprised when 
someone's true prediction comes true. The week already includes every hour 
of every day of the week, so it can't be a surprise on that level, but if 
the judge doesn't specify a single time then it also has to be a surprise 
on another level. You just have to pick on which level you are talking 
about, or decide that one level automatically takes precedence over the 
other.


> > The condition of expectation 
> > isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference. 
> Objectively, 
> > there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything. 
>
> I would say that surprise in this context can be defined formally and 
> objectively. The moment someone knocks at the door, the prisoner must 
> have assigned a probability < 1 that he would be executed that day. 
> This is clearly not the case for Friday, where p=1. 


Even on Friday it can still be a surprise, a meta-surprise, when he finds 
out the judge lied, or knocks on the door an hour later. If we say that 
can't happen though, p=1 is still limited to Friday only if it's Thursday. 
It doesn't accumulate. On Wednesday it's still 50-50 for Thursday and 
Friday each. On Tuesday it's .33 for Wednesday-Friday each, so on 
Wednesday, when the knock comes, he is 66% surprised - unless there's 
something I'm missing.
 

> If we assume a 
> rational prisoner, we can replace it with an object. Some computer 
> running an algorithm. Here we can define the computer belief as some 
> output it produces somehow. We can even make this problem fully 
> abstract and get rid of the colourful story with hangings and judges. 
>

That's a problem if you fall for the Pathetic Fallacy and assume that 
computer 'beliefs' are literal rather than figures of speech. I posted more 
about this here: 
http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/12/why-computers-cant-lie-and-dont-know-your-name/
 


>
> > 2) If we want to close in tightly on the quantitative logic of whether 
> > deducibility can be deduced - given five coin flips and a certainty that 
> one 
> > will be heads, each successive tails coin flip increases the odds that 
> one 
> > the remaining flips will be heads. The fifth coin will either be 100% 
> likely 
> > to be heads, or will prove that the certainty assumed was 100% wrong. 
>
> Coin flips are independent events. Knock/no-knock events are not 
> independent. Each day that passes without a knock increases the 
> probability of a knock the next day. 
>

Ok, but his surprise is not independent either. In a Wednesday knock, that 
means he is 33% unsurprised. From the outset he can only be 20% unsurprised 
at the minimum just by virtue of his knowing it has to be 1 out of 5 
days...including Friday, because Friday is only p=1 on Thursday after noon. 
On on level, the knocks are independent events also - they either happen or 
they don't - so probability breaks down at any moment of incidence. The 
probability is a subjective expectation, it cannot be relied on as an 
object. Probability is an abstraction layer that is a posteriori to events. 
Spacetime is a museum of causally closed tokens which can represent and 
embody subjective experience, not the other way around.


> > I think the paradox hinges on 1) the false inference of objectivity in 
> the 
> > use of the word surprise 
>
> Ok, let's replace the judge and the prisoner. A computer sits in a 
> room for 5 days. One of those days, at noon, an input will be fed to 
> the computer. If the computer fires an output at the exact same time 
> that the input is received, it wins. The computer is only allowed to 
> fire its response once. It's now a game between the programmer of the 
> computer and the programmer of the system that emits the signal to the 
> computer. How would you program these systems? It's clear that, if you 
> are programm

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:56 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> Time for some philosophy then :)
>>
>> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
>>
>> Probably many of you already know about it.
>>
>> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
>> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
>> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
>> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
>> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?
>
>
>
> Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it is the
> Epimenides paradox in disguise, and so it can be said to be solved in the
> same way (by Tarski theorem and Gödel's theorem), at least for
> self-referentially correct machine.
>
> I can follow Smullyan here, but I think also that this form of Epimenides,
> by the use of time, run probably deeper, and that it might lead to deeper
> explanations. In fact intensional fixed point à-la-Rosser are probably
> closer to it (we might come back on this, it is technical).

Thanks Bruno! I really have to find some time to read Forever
Undecided, and hope you can come back to the intensional fixed point.

Telmo.

> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 9/12/2013 2:33 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> Time for some philosophy then :)
>>
>> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
>>
>> Probably many of you already know about it.
>>
>> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
>> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
>> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
>> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
>> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?
>
>
> The wiki article gives most resolutions of the antinomy.  The logical
> contradiction is seen most clearly in case of the man who says to his wife,
> "Here's your anniversary present.  You'll be completely surprised by what it
> is when you open it.  It's diamond earrings."  So, does the wife reason that
> she'll be surprised, yet he's said it's diamond earrings; so it can't be
> diamond earrings because then she wouldn't be surprised.  Then she opens the
> box and it's diamond earrings AND she's surprised.

I don't think this is equivalent because in your scenario the
statement is necessarily a lie. Either the wife will not be surprised
or the present is not diamond earrings. In the unexpected hanging
scenario, the judge is not lying. It is clearly possible for the
prisoner to get a knock at his door Monday or maybe Wednesday and be
surprised. The judge did not lie, but the reasoning seems to indicate
that the surprise is impossible. I think there's something deeper
going on here.

Telmo.

> It just shows that if you reason from contradictory statements you can
> arrive at any conclusion.
>
> Brent
>
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Telmo Menezes]

On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> Which reasoning is clearly false?
>
> Here's what I'm thinking:
>
> 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am not
> hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised about. By
> leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include being
> surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft contingencies
> that could render an 'unexpected' outcome.

Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no
soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure
the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door
at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the
paradox still holds.

> The condition of expectation
> isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference. Objectively,
> there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything.

I would say that surprise in this context can be defined formally and
objectively. The moment someone knocks at the door, the prisoner must
have assigned a probability < 1 that he would be executed that day.
This is clearly not the case for Friday, where p=1. If we assume a
rational prisoner, we can replace it with an object. Some computer
running an algorithm. Here we can define the computer belief as some
output it produces somehow. We can even make this problem fully
abstract and get rid of the colourful story with hangings and judges.

> 2) If we want to close in tightly on the quantitative logic of whether
> deducibility can be deduced - given five coin flips and a certainty that one
> will be heads, each successive tails coin flip increases the odds that one
> the remaining flips will be heads. The fifth coin will either be 100% likely
> to be heads, or will prove that the certainty assumed was 100% wrong.

Coin flips are independent events. Knock/no-knock events are not
independent. Each day that passes without a knock increases the
probability of a knock the next day.

> I think the paradox hinges on 1) the false inference of objectivity in the
> use of the word surprise

Ok, let's replace the judge and the prisoner. A computer sits in a
room for 5 days. One of those days, at noon, an input will be fed to
the computer. If the computer fires an output at the exact same time
that the input is received, it wins. The computer is only allowed to
fire its response once. It's now a game between the programmer of the
computer and the programmer of the system that emits the signal to the
computer. How would you program these systems? It's clear that, if you
are programming the computer, you will mostly certainly add a rule to
fire the response if it's Friday. And then...

> and 2) the false assertion of omniscience by the
> judge. It's like an Escher drawing. In real life, surprise cannot be
> predicted with certainty and the quality of unexpectedness it is not an
> objective thing, just as expectation is not an objective thing.
>
> Or not?

I am open to the possibility that this is a language trick, but not
yet convinced.

Telmo.

> Craig
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2013 5:33:24 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> Time for some philosophy then :)
>>
>> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
>>
>> Probably many of you already know about it.
>>
>> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
>> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
>> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
>> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
>> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Telmo.
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[meekerdb]

On 9/12/2013 2:33 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Time for some philosophy then :)

Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox

Probably many of you already know about it.

What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?


The wiki article gives most resolutions of the antinomy.  The logical contradiction is 
seen most clearly in case of the man who says to his wife, "Here's your anniversary 
present.  You'll be completely surprised by what it is when you open it.  It's diamond 
earrings."  So, does the wife reason that she'll be surprised, yet he's said it's diamond 
earrings; so it can't be diamond earrings because then she wouldn't be surprised.  Then 
she opens the box and it's diamond earrings AND she's surprised.


It just shows that if you reason from contradictory statements you can arrive at any 
conclusion.


Brent

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

Which reasoning is clearly false?

Here's what I'm thinking:

1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am not 
hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised about. By 
leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include being 
surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft contingencies 
that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. The condition of expectation 
isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference. Objectively, 
there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything.

2) If we want to close in tightly on the quantitative logic of whether 
deducibility can be deduced - given five coin flips and a certainty that 
one will be heads, each successive tails coin flip increases the odds that 
one the remaining flips will be heads. The fifth coin will either be 100% 
likely to be heads, or will prove that the certainty assumed was 100% wrong.

I think the paradox hinges on 1) the false inference of objectivity in the 
use of the word surprise and 2) the false assertion of omniscience by the 
judge. It's like an Escher drawing. In real life, surprise cannot be 
predicted with certainty and the quality of unexpectedness it is not an 
objective thing, just as expectation is not an objective thing.

Or not?
Craig

On Thursday, September 12, 2013 5:33:24 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> Time for some philosophy then :) 
>
> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
>
> Probably many of you already know about it. 
>
> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that 
> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
>
> Cheers, 
> Telmo. 
>

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote:


Time for some philosophy then :)

Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox

Probably many of you already know about it.

What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?



Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it is  
the Epimenides paradox in disguise, and so it can be said to be solved  
in the same way (by Tarski theorem and Gödel's theorem), at least for  
self-referentially correct machine.


I can follow Smullyan here, but I think also that this form of  
Epimenides, by the use of time, run probably deeper, and that it might  
lead to deeper explanations. In fact intensional fixed point à-la- 
Rosser are probably closer to it (we might come back on this, it is  
technical).


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, September 12, 2013 11:56:12 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Sep 2013, at 11:33, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
>
> > Time for some philosophy then :) 
> > 
> > Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
> > 
> > Probably many of you already know about it. 
> > 
> > What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
> > introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
> > clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
> > false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that 
> > I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
>
>
> Smullyan argues, in Forever Undecided, rather convincingly, that it is   
> the Epimenides paradox in disguise, 


It's the symbol grounding problem too. From a purely quantitative 
perspective, a truth can only satisfy some condition. The expectation of 
truth being true is not a condition of arithmetic truth, it is a boundary 
condition that belongs to sense. Computers cannot lie intentionally, they 
can only report a local truth which is misinterpreted as being false in 
some sense that is not local to the computation.

For the same reason, computers cannot intend to tell the truth either. As 
in the Chinese Room - the output of a program is not known by the program 
to be true, it simply is a report of the truth of some internal process. 

The interesting part is that besides being true locally, the computer's 
report is also true arithmetically, which is to say that it is true two 
ways (or senses):

1) the most specific/proprietary sense which is unique, private, 
instantaneous and local
2) the most universal/generic sense which is promiscuous, public, eternal, 
and omni-local

The computer's report is, however not true in any sense in between, i.e. in 
any sense which relates specifically to real experienced events in space 
time.

Real events in spacetime (which occur orthogonally through mass-energy, or 
rather mass-energy is the orthogonal cross section of events) are:

3) semi-unique, semi-private, semi-spatiotemporal, semi-local, 
semi-specific, semi-universal.

Thanks,
Craig

 

> and so it can be said to be solved   
> in the same way (by Tarski theorem and Gödel's theorem), at least for   
> self-referentially correct machine. 
>
> I can follow Smullyan here, but I think also that this form of   
> Epimenides, by the use of time, run probably deeper, and that it might   
> lead to deeper explanations. In fact intensional fixed point à-la- 
> Rosser are probably closer to it (we might come back on this, it is   
> technical). 
>
> Best, 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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