Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On 23 Oct 2012, at 15:17, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Numbers and calculations are not subjective, Right. for they are mindless. Hmm... OK. Which means they can't experience anything. They're dead in the water. This is too ambiguous. I can say that you are right. Numbers cannot be conscious, but if comp is correct, that is if the brain is some local relative machine, then you have to accept that consciousness is associated to complex (infinite) arithmetical relations, involving self (Bp) and person or knower (Bp and p). You just beg the question by assuming that machines cannot be conscious or support consciousness. The math explains that tehere are reason to guess the contrary, as machines have both a 3p self, and an 1p self, when accepting the classical theory of knowledge (axiomatized by the S4 modal logic). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/23/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-22, 12:49:30 Subject: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:51, Roger Clough wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. BRUNO: I agree with you on this. Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong. Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's dream statistics). This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence of consciousness and altered consciousness states. ROGER: OK. As long as the computer stays 3p, then anything is possible. You can't. Machines have 1p, personal memory, and personal relative incarnation and relation with some truth. 1p = experiencing (only humans can do this). What? Are you saying that dogs and cats have no 1p? 3p(1p) = a way of saying that a human can publicly describe his experience. He cannot really do that, but he can communicate something, and then the others, by using their own experience can, or cannot relate. 1p(3p) = a way of saying that a human can experience any description or proposition (by himself, by a computer, by others) OK. 3p = a description or proposition given by a human, or by a machine. OK. 3p(3p) = computer knowledge of a proposition or description I really don't know what it means to say that a computer knows something. With comp you know perfectly well what it means, as comp is the hypothesis that you are a computer. So a particular case of what a computer knows something is what it means for you know something. Ah! A computer can only know things by description, but not by acquaintance. Forget the current man-made computer. We talk about a special sort of machine. There is nothing in the brain that a computer cannot imitate, at some fine grained level. So if you believe that brain can do something that acomputer can do, you will have to give a 3p description of the brain which is not Turing emulable. Then, first you are still stuck with a pre 3-things, so it will not help you for the mind-body problem, and second, well, nobody find in Nature (as opposed in math) non Turing emulable things in our neighborhood, except, importantly, for the souls of machines and humans, and for their detailed material reality. The soul of the machine, is not a machine, from the point of view of the machine. Machine's naturally believe that their are not machine, especially when growing ego. Only humans can know things by either route. Looks like a dogma. frankly, a very sad dogma. The Bp and Bp p arithmetical modalities already exemplifies why and how the machines (actually, not the universal computer, but the L?ian believer) is sensible to the two routes. Humans can be cute, and terrible, but for human and non human, it is always a sort of error of declaring oneself superior, especially in feeling and subjective matter. You don't know that. Bruno http
Re: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
Hi Bruno Marchal Numbers and calculations are not subjective, for they are mindless. Which means they can't experience anything. They're dead in the water. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/23/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-22, 12:49:30 Subject: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:51, Roger Clough wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. BRUNO: I agree with you on this. Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong. Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's dream statistics). This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence of consciousness and altered consciousness states. ROGER: OK. As long as the computer stays 3p, then anything is possible. You can't. Machines have 1p, personal memory, and personal relative incarnation and relation with some truth. 1p = experiencing (only humans can do this). What? Are you saying that dogs and cats have no 1p? 3p(1p) = a way of saying that a human can publicly describe his experience. He cannot really do that, but he can communicate something, and then the others, by using their own experience can, or cannot relate. 1p(3p) = a way of saying that a human can experience any description or proposition (by himself, by a computer, by others) OK. 3p = a description or proposition given by a human, or by a machine. OK. 3p(3p) = computer knowledge of a proposition or description I really don't know what it means to say that a computer knows something. With comp you know perfectly well what it means, as comp is the hypothesis that you are a computer. So a particular case of what a computer knows something is what it means for you know something. Ah! A computer can only know things by description, but not by acquaintance. Forget the current man-made computer. We talk about a special sort of machine. There is nothing in the brain that a computer cannot imitate, at some fine grained level. So if you believe that brain can do something that acomputer can do, you will have to give a 3p description of the brain which is not Turing emulable. Then, first you are still stuck with a pre 3-things, so it will not help you for the mind-body problem, and second, well, nobody find in Nature (as opposed in math) non Turing emulable things in our neighborhood, except, importantly, for the souls of machines and humans, and for their detailed material reality. The soul of the machine, is not a machine, from the point of view of the machine. Machine's naturally believe that their are not machine, especially when growing ego. Only humans can know things by either route. Looks like a dogma. frankly, a very sad dogma. The Bp and Bp p arithmetical modalities already exemplifies why and how the machines (actually, not the universal computer, but the L?ian believer) is sensible to the two routes. Humans can be cute, and terrible, but for human and non human, it is always a sort of error of declaring oneself superior, especially in feeling and subjective matter. You don't know that. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:51, Roger Clough wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. BRUNO: I agree with you on this. Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong. Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's dream statistics). This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence of consciousness and altered consciousness states. ROGER: OK. As long as the computer stays 3p, then anything is possible. You can't. Machines have 1p, personal memory, and personal relative incarnation and relation with some truth. 1p = experiencing (only humans can do this). What? Are you saying that dogs and cats have no 1p? 3p(1p) = a way of saying that a human can publicly describe his experience. He cannot really do that, but he can communicate something, and then the others, by using their own experience can, or cannot relate. 1p(3p) = a way of saying that a human can experience any description or proposition (by himself, by a computer, by others) OK. 3p = a description or proposition given by a human, or by a machine. OK. 3p(3p) = computer knowledge of a proposition or description I really don't know what it means to say that a computer knows something. With comp you know perfectly well what it means, as comp is the hypothesis that you are a computer. So a particular case of what a computer knows something is what it means for you know something. Ah! A computer can only know things by description, but not by acquaintance. Forget the current man-made computer. We talk about a special sort of machine. There is nothing in the brain that a computer cannot imitate, at some fine grained level. So if you believe that brain can do something that acomputer can do, you will have to give a 3p description of the brain which is not Turing emulable. Then, first you are still stuck with a pre 3-things, so it will not help you for the mind-body problem, and second, well, nobody find in Nature (as opposed in math) non Turing emulable things in our neighborhood, except, importantly, for the souls of machines and humans, and for their detailed material reality. The soul of the machine, is not a machine, from the point of view of the machine. Machine's naturally believe that their are not machine, especially when growing ego. Only humans can know things by either route. Looks like a dogma. frankly, a very sad dogma. The Bp and Bp p arithmetical modalities already exemplifies why and how the machines (actually, not the universal computer, but the Löbian believer) is sensible to the two routes. Humans can be cute, and terrible, but for human and non human, it is always a sort of error of declaring oneself superior, especially in feeling and subjective matter. You don't know that. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. Not really, he claims that zombies do not exist and if an entity (human, computer, whatever) behaves as if it has a mind, then it does have a mind. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
Hi Stathis Papaioannou You say that if a person behaves as if he has a mind, then he does have a mind. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-21, 03:37:19 Subject: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. Not really, he claims that zombies do not exist and if an entity (human, computer, whatever) behaves as if it has a mind, then it does have a mind. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:51, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/20/2012 10:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. I agree with you on this. Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong. Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's dream statistics). This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence of consciousness and altered consciousness states. Bruno Dear Bruno, It seems, from this post that you do support some form of panprotopsychism! ? With comp to have a mind, you need a computer, or an universal number. Bruno http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rieo-BDTcko -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 14:30:47 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 19 Oct 2012, at 11:41, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish Not so. A zombie can't converse with you, a real person can. By definition a (philosophical) zombie can converse with you. A zombie is en entity assumed not having consciousness, nor any private subjective life, and which behaves *exactly* like a human being. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-18, 17:48:57 Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:58:29PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you. If not, not. If true, then you have demonstrated the non-existence of zombies (zombies, by definition, are indistinguishable from real people). However, somehow I remain unconvinced by this line of reasoning... -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. I agree with you on this. Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong. Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's dream statistics). This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence of consciousness and altered consciousness states. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 14:30:47 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 19 Oct 2012, at 11:41, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish Not so. A zombie can't converse with you, a real person can. By definition a (philosophical) zombie can converse with you. A zombie is en entity assumed not having consciousness, nor any private subjective life, and which behaves *exactly* like a human being. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-18, 17:48:57 Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:58:29PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you. If not, not. If true, then you have demonstrated the non-existence of zombies (zombies, by definition, are indistinguishable from real people). However, somehow I remain unconvinced by this line of reasoning... -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On 10/20/2012 10:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. I agree with you on this. Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong. Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's dream statistics). This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence of consciousness and altered consciousness states. Bruno Dear Bruno, It seems, from this post that you do support some form of panprotopsychism! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rieo-BDTcko -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
