subject:"The consciousness singularity"



On 09 Dec 2011, at 23:50, benjayk wrote:



Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it.

I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism,


OK.



but I
still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you  
didn't

eliminate COMP+non-platonic-immaterialism.


In a classical (or intuitionist) proof, if you derived B from A,  
automatically you have derived B from A + any supplementary  
assumption.


Also, I don't know what you mean by non-platonic-immaterialism. Comp  
needs arithmetical realism (the belief that the third excluded middle  
principle is valid in first order arithmetic). It does not exclude  
wider form of realism, but it recovers them in the machine  
epistemologies.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity



On 09 Dec 2011, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net   
wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form  
of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in  
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would  
not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational  
universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of  
problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but  
I wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a  
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It  
basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some  
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't,  
or some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you  
suppose that everything happens and exists.  In the latter  
case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function  
is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

  Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into,  
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some  
stuff as existing and the rest not and everything happens  
and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The  
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem  
in that is has no way of sorting the Tom sees this and not  
that from the  from Dick sees this and not that and Jane  
sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only  
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not  
can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and  
Jane see and do not see.
  The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers  
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying  
medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I  
am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl  
had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4  
6-die and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6- 
die. ...
  The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes  
when we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that  
just as it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one  
set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish  
this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that  
computations exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of  
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the  
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

  I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg  
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories  
deal with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as  
I understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to  
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that  
everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem  
to be logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything  
that is well defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e.  
everything that is computable.  Within this plenuum there are  
various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will  
pick out what part we experience.  Computation includes an  
uncountable infinity of states and relations between states - so  
whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in  
the relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

   Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be  
cut to shreds by the razor itself. Postulating that everything  
exists without a means to even demostrate necessity is to postulate  
an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct  
contradiction to Occam's razor.


I think you have a mistaken conception of Occam's razor.  Although  
Occam may have had physical objects in mind when he enunciated his  
principle, no one uses that razor any more.  Occam's razor advises  
to make one's *theory* as simple as possible.  For example the  
atomic theory of matter entails an enormous number of objects - but  
it is a simple way to explain the existent of different materials,  
thermodynamics, fluid dynamics, bio-energetics,...


Even when we reduce this to a

Re: The consciousness singularity



On 09 Dec 2011, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote:


On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:



On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just  
there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take  
them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A  
creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it  
would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that  
natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and  
very plausibly,

there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).
You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.   
Physical laws are models we
make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they  
change when we get new
information.  Mathematical singularities are in the  
mathematics.  Nobody supposes they are

in the world.
Brent

Brent
You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and  
predict

the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?
Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are  
related by rules of
inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all  
kinds of things, both
real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where  
possible because then we
have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.   
Where our models are
not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear  
exactly what the model

predicts.

I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See  
William S. Coopers book

The Evolution of Reason.




In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
further divided?
The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite  
energy density and
curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a  
black hole and the Big
Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the  
model doesn't apply at
these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone,  
since it was already known
that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics  
and is expected to

breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.

Brent


 Brent

I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see
it.  I will restate an abbreviated opinion:

Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental
instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth… abstract
mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure
and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages
are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in
descriptions and predictions of the universe.


I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with  
truth.  Truth is an attribute of a proposition that expresses a  
fact.  Mathematics consists of relations of inference between  
propositions - which may or may not express anything at all beyond  
the relations.


Mathematics concerned usually mathematical truth. You confuse  
mathematics and the inner working of mathematical theories or  
machines. Logic, that is metamathematics, studies both aspect  
(syntactical proof, and the mathematical models of the theories).  
Everything interesting in logic depends on the relation between those  
two aspects. for example you have the notion of semantical entialment:  
A - B if all models satisfying A satisfy B, and syntactical  
entailment: you can derive B from A. logicians are happy when they  
have soundness and completeness theorems linking the two notions.  
Likewise, and simpler, you have the notion of tautology (true in all  
models of a theory) and proved proposition (syntactical notion).


Bruno






Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1)
representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as  
well

as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2)
computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic.


Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used  
to describe them.




Your statement: “I think the rules of inference are encoded in our
brains”, This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and
languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can,
*potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules
fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe.


I don't think laws/rules are fundamental.  They are compact models  
we make up to explain and predict facts.


Brent


The
role of human embodied consciousness in any “theory of everything” is
established by this fact.

Mathematics may be “a subset of language” as you state or language
could also be an

Re: The consciousness singularity



On 09 Dec 2011, at 17:55, Stephen P. King wrote:





[SPK]
I take Occam to say in any explanation do not multiply entities  
beyond necessity.


See Brent's answer.







Postulating that everything exists without a means to even  
demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown  
cardinality!) of entities, in direct contradiction to Occam's razor.


Occam razor asks for the minimal number of assumption in a theory.  
It does not care about the cardinal of the models of the theory.  
That is why the many worlds is a product of occam principle.


Sure, but the necessity of the plurality of actual worlds  
given that we can only observe one


Nobody can observe one universe. Physicists measure numbers and  
relates those numbers by inductive inference on quantitative relations  
among them.






requires additional evidence.


one physical universe requires as much evidences and explanations  
than 0, 2, 3, infinity, ... The everything idea is that all possible  
universes is conceptually simpler than one real universe among all  
the possible one.




Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in the  
two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does  
nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe that we do.


Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot understand  
that you are the one ending in Washington instead as the one ending in  
Moscow. It explains contingencies by consistent extensions.





It has its basis problem as your result has its measure problem.


I don't think there is any basis problem in the quantum MW, nor is  
there any initial theory problem in comp. And the mind-body problem  
is transformed into a body problem, itself becoming a measure problem,  
but that is what makes those theories interesting.






I suspect that these two problems are in the same family.






Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of entities,


Which is indeed the case for the comp ontology, but the  
epistemology can and will be bigger. It is a sort of Skolem  
phenomenon, that I have often described.




the need for necessitation remains unanswered. Why do numbers exist?


Nobody can answer that. We cannot prove the existence of the  
numbers in a theory which do not assume them at the start,  
implicitly or explicitly.


So it is OK to postulate that numbers exists


We need only to postulate that zero (or one if you prefer) is a  
number, and that the successor of a number is a number. This is less  
than postulating sets or categories, as you need for talking about  
Stone duality.




and from such argue that the physical world is unnecessary  
epiphenomena


It is a phenomenon. Why would it be an epiphenomenon? I have argue  
that this does not make sense.





and yet is required for your result to run.


The phenomenon is required. Not its primitivity.



All I ask is that you consider the world of numbers to not have an  
existence independent of the possibility of knowledge of it.


In which sense. With comp, the numbers (N, +, *) entails the existence  
of the knowledge of the numbers by some universal numbers. The Bp   
p concerns numbers relatively to universal numbers.





I separate existence from properties.


Me too. Existence is handled by the quantifier E, and properties are  
handled by arithmetical predicate.




The mere existence of an object does not necessitate any propeties  
whatsoever. Numbers have properties, they have relative value...  
Where do those properties derive?


From the (non trivial) additive and multiplicative properties, which  
are among the postulates (recursive laws of addition and  
multiplication).











Why numbers and not Nothing?


Because with Nothing in the ontology, you can't prove the existence  
of anything, not even illusion which needs some illusionned  
subject. That is why all fundamental theories assumes the numbers,  
(or equivalent) and with comp this can be shown to be enough.




I merely start with the assumption that existence exists and  
go from there.


We have discussed this. existence exists does not make sense for me.  
Existence of what? You are the one transforming existence into a  
property here.




To postulate one particular type of entity and not any other  
requires special explanations.


We assume simple principles and no more than what we need, and with  
comp we need only combinators, of lambda-terms, or natural numbers.





What makes numbers special over spaces?


They are conceptually far simpler.









At least with the Stone-type dualism we have a way to show the  
necessity of numbers via bisimulations between different instances  
of Boolean algebras and, dually, via causality between Stone  
spaces and thus do not violate Occam blindly.


Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more  
than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).


Are two Boolean

Re: The consciousness singularity



On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:57, Stephen P. King wrote:


Dear Bruno,

On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more  
than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).


Are two Boolean algebras that have different propositional  
content one and the same? If this is true then there is no  
variation is algorithms, it is to say that all algorithms are  
identical in every way.


Let me answer this differently. Does not the postulation of the  
primitive existence of numbers not equivalent to postulating an  
infinite set.


Not at all. As I said we need to postulate 0 and the successor rules  
(and the + and * laws). Every existing object (that is the object  
that you can prove to exist) are finite. The set N is not part of  
arithmetic.





Are not the Integers an (countable) infinite set?


Yes, but that is not part of the theory. But you can prove in the  
theory that there is no biggest numbers, or that for all numbers n you  
can find a bigger one. You can also prove the existence of numbers who  
believes in infinite sets, but you cannot prove the existence of an  
infinite set in arithmetic.


Arithmetic is the simplest (universal with respect to computations)  
theory. The one that Hillbert was hoping we could reduce all math to  
it, but since Gödel we know that we cannot even reduce arithmetical  
truth, or computer theoretical truth, to it.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread Pzomby



  Brent
  You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
  the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
  representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
  functions?
  Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by 
  rules of
  inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all kinds of 
  things, both
  real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where possible 
  because then we
  have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.  Where 
  our models are
  not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly 
  what the model
  predicts.

  I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See William S. 
  Coopers book
  The Evolution of Reason.

  In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
  further divided?
  The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy 
  density and
  curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole 
  and the Big
  Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model 
  doesn't apply at
  these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was 
  already known
  that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is 
  expected to
  breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.

  Brent

    Brent

  I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see
  it.  I will restate an abbreviated opinion:

  Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental
  instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth abstract
  mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure
  and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages
  are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in
  descriptions and predictions of the universe.

 I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with truth.  
 Truth is an
 attribute of a proposition that expresses a fact.  Mathematics consists of 
 relations of
 inference between propositions - which may or may not express anything at all 
 beyond the
 relations.



  Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1)
  representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well
  as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2)
  computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic.

 Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used to 
 describe them.


 Exactly, that is what I was attempting to state. You, and most other
contributors to this list are very knowledgeable but I believe that
some of the properties of numbers and mathematics may be overlooked as
to their relevance, but I may be wrong as I have only been observing
the “Everything” list for a short time.

Ordinal numbers are “descriptive adjectives” as to relational
position.  The relative position of an event in order being 1st, 2nd,
3rd etc. has describable meaning. The representational description of
mental events and external existent conditions are related as to their
position in the sequence of time. Time and place both exude conditions
that are describable and somewhat predictable. The representational
and descriptive conditional position of the earth to the sun, moon and
stars gives rise to conditions at a relational position in time.

The point is that numbers represent computation (counting and
arithmetic) and the ordinal attribute of numbers represent words that
communicate descriptive relational meaning. This appears to give dual
meaning to numbers that human brain/consciousness can distinguish,
represent, organize and compute.

An example: The mathematical “golden ratio” as observed in art and
nature appears to be pleasant in a geometrically way to the human
vision and brain/consciousness.



  Your statement: I think the rules of inference are encoded in our
  brains , This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and
  languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can,
  *potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules
  fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe.

 I don't think laws/rules are fundamental.  They are compact models we make up 
 to explain
 and predict facts.

 Brent



  The
  role of human embodied consciousness in any theory of everything is
  established by this fact.

  Mathematics may be a subset of language as you state or language
  could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal
  idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws).
  In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant
  mathematics or the language to understand what the mathematics
  represents or enumerates.

  It is my opinion that there is no singularity but a duality which
  roughly could be stated as both a state of being (quanta) and the

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-10 Thread meekerdb


On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some say that the interference of particles with themselves in the two-slit 
experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we observe 
the particular universe that we do.


Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot understand that you are the 
one ending in Washington instead as the one ending in Moscow. It explains contingencies 
by consistent extensions.


But then starting from Philadelphia instead of Brussels you should end up in Washington 
- since it is much more similar to Philadelphia.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 09 Dec 2011, at 00:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?



Hi Craig,

 Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of  
material
process occur for computations and would go even further in  
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not  
specify

which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.



True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism. To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?


Mechanism is usually used by materialist or dualist to put the mind- 
body problem under the rug, with the idea that we are just (material)  
machine, so that mind emerge from material activity. Then the whole  
point of UDA is that such an idea does not work. Weak materialism (and  
thus both monistic and dualist materialism) is incompatible with  
computationalism (in the sense of yes doctor). That is not yet very  
well appreciated. With one exception scientist usually see the point,  
but most seems not to be interested in the mind-body issues. They see  
this kind of stuff as religious and condemn it without realizing that  
the mind-body problem, even with mechanism is not yet solved, which is  
the main point of UDA.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net   
wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

 Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form  
of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in  
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would  
not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality  
without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I  
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a  
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically  
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are  
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff  
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that  
everything happens and exists.  In the latter case there's  
really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some  
stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

   Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into,  
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff  
as existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists  
do not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens  
and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way  
of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick  
sees this and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where  
as the stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as  
existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the union  
of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
   The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers  
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium  
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am  
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had  
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die  
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
   The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when  
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as  
it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of  
numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from  
that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist  
independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of  
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the  
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

   I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg  
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal  
with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I  
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to  
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything  
exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically  
coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well  
defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is  
computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states (numbers  
in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we  
experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states  
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in  
there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the  
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.






I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics  
implies that different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that  
it's true.


I agree, it is total non sense. Not only it would contradict Church  
thesis and the immunity of computability for diagonalization, but  
thanks to David Deutsch quantum computer, it does not even make sense  
with what we know currently believed in physics, and such a position  
is a sort of revisionist definition of what is a computation. That's  
is why I prefer to call Deutsch's Church Turing principle the  
Deutsch's thesis. And it is an open problem if such a thesis is  
compatible with Church's thesis.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

 Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of 
material
process occur for computations and would go even further in 
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not 
specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality 
without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I 
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a 
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically 
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are 
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff 
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that 
everything happens and exists.  In the latter case there's really 
no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

   Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, 
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists do 
not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens and 
exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of 
sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick 
sees this and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where 
as the stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the union 
of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
   The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers 
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium 
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am 
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three 
sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the 
third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
   The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when 
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as 
it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of 
numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from that 
itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist 
independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

   I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my 
question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal with 
this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I 
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse 
to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything 
exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically 
coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined 
and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is 
computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states (numbers in 
arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we 
experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states 
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in 
there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the 
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be 
cut to shreds by the razor itself. Postulating that everything exists 
without a means to even demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite 
(of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct contradiction to 
Occam's razor. Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of 
entities, the need for necessitation remains unanswered. Why do numbers 
exist? Why numbers and not Nothing? At least with the Stone-type dualism 
we have a way to show the necessity of numbers via bisimulations between 
different instances of Boolean algebras and, dually, via causality 
between Stone spaces and thus do not violate Occam blindly.
Comprehensability requires the co-existence of that which is 
comprehended with that which is doing the comprehension, that numbers 
can comprehend themselves without additional structure seem to me to be 
ruled out even by your

Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of 
material
process occur for computations and would go even further in 
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not 
specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality 
without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I 
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a 
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically 
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are 
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists 
and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything 
happens and exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for 
ur stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and 
the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, 
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists do 
not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens and 
exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of 
sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees 
this and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the 
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and 
the rest not can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, 
Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers 
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium 
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am reminded 
of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed 
jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third 
contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when 
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as it 
vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of numbers 
from another. If the ability to distinguish this from that itself 
vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist independent 
of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my 
question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal with 
this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I 
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse 
to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything exists.  
But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically coherent.  
So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined and still 
possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable.  Within 
this plenuum there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some 
principle will pick out what part we experience.  Computation includes 
an uncountable infinity of states and relations between states - so 
whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics 
implies that different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that 
it's true.


Brent

Hi Brent,

What is the basis of your doubt? Have you not looked at, for 
instance, the work of Tipler 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_J._Tipler#The_Omega_Point_cosmology 
that discusses how different physics alters the kinds of computations 
that can occur? The notion of Hypercomputation 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation is a good place to 
start. My agreement with Deutsch's assertion does not follow from just 
taking his words as authority. Consider a physical would in which the 
Plank constant was zero, Newton's universe for example; in such a world 
computations would be radically different if only because there do not 
exists any stable atoms. All computers would be sporadic and stochastic 
Boltzmann type computers. Would the same kind of universality that we 
have with our Turing thesis exist in such? The paper tape and read head 
would not have any physical support in the sense that its continuous 
existence over an arbitrary

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 09 Dec 2011, at 13:34, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net   
wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form  
of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in  
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would  
not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational  
universality without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I  
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a  
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It  
basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some  
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't,  
or some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you  
suppose that everything happens and exists.  In the latter  
case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function  
is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

  Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into,  
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff  
as existing and the rest not and everything happens and  
exists do not sleep together very well at all. The everything  
happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is  
has no way of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  
 from Dick sees this and not that and Jane sees this and  
not that, where as the stuff whose only function is to mark  
some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently  
defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not  
see.
  The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers  
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying  
medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I  
am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had  
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die  
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
  The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes  
when we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that  
just as it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one  
set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this  
from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that  
computations exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of  
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the  
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

  I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg  
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal  
with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I  
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to  
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that  
everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to  
be logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that  
is well defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything  
that is computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states  
(numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part  
we experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of  
states and relations between states - so whatever we experience  
must be in there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the  
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

   Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be  
cut to shreds by the razor itself.


?


Postulating that everything exists without a means to even  
demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown  
cardinality!) of entities, in direct contradiction to Occam's razor.


Occam razor asks for the minimal number of assumption in a theory. It  
does not care about the cardinal of the models of the theory. That is  
why the many worlds is a product of occam principle.





Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of entities,


Which is indeed the case for the comp ontology, but the epistemology  
can and will be bigger. It is a sort of Skolem phenomenon, that I have  
often described.




the need for necessitation remains unanswered. Why do numbers exist?


Nobody can answer that. We cannot

Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 13:34, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  
wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form 
of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in 
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would 
not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality 
without

having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I 
wouldn't

call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a 
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It 
basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some 
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, 
or some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you 
suppose that everything happens and exists.  In the latter case 
there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to 
mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

  Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, 
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff 
as existing and the rest not and everything happens and 
exists do not sleep together very well at all. The everything 
happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has 
no way of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  
from Dick sees this and not that and Jane sees this and not 
that, where as the stuff whose only function is to mark some 
stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as 
the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
  The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers 
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium 
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am 
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had 
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die 
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
  The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when 
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as 
it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of 
numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from 
that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations 
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

  I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg 
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal 
with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I 
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to 
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that 
everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to 
be logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that 
is well defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything 
that is computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states 
(numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part 
we experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of 
states and relations between states - so whatever we experience 
must be in there somewhere.


Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the 
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.


Hi Bruno and Brent,

   Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be 
cut to shreds by the razor itself.


?


[SPK]
I take Occam http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor to say 
in any explanation do not multiply entities beyond necessity.





Postulating that everything exists without a means to even demostrate 
necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of 
entities, in direct contradiction to Occam's razor.


Occam razor asks for the minimal number of assumption in a theory. It 
does not care about the cardinal of the models of the theory. That is 
why the many worlds is a product of occam principle.


Sure, but the necessity of the plurality of actual worlds given 
that we can only observe one requires additional evidence. Some say that 
the interference of particles with themselves in the

Re: The consciousness singularity


Dear Bruno,

On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more than 
the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).


Are two Boolean algebras that have different propositional content 
one and the same? If this is true then there is no variation is 
algorithms, it is to say that all algorithms are identical in every way.


Let me answer this differently. Does not the postulation of the 
primitive existence of numbers not equivalent to postulating an infinite 
set. Are not the Integers an (countable) infinite set?


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.

You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to
some supernatural soul stuff. It basically boils down to whether you suppose
there are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or
some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything
happens and exists. In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose
only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.

Brent

Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and
everything happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way
of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the from Dick sees this and not
that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only function is
to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the
union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations
there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel
numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a
girl had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the
third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it
closely enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the
ability to distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to
distinguish this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!

Where did I claim that. I was just pointing out the genesis of everything
theories; you did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?

Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How
does immaterial based everything theories deal with this problem that I just outlined?

You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno. But as I understand it, the
ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that
we theorize that everything exists. But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be
logically coherent. So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined and
still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable. Within this plenuum
there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what
part we experience. Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states and
relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.

Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the relative way, by
the universal numbers themselves.

Hi Bruno and Brent,

Sorry, I do not accept that as a good answer since it would be cut to shreds by
the razor itself. Postulating that everything exists without a means to even demostrate
necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct
contradiction to Occam's razor.

I think you have a mistaken conception of Occam's razor. Although Occam may have had
physical objects in mind when he enunciated his principle, no one uses that razor any
more. Occam's razor advises to make one's *theory* as simple as possible. For example
the atomic theory of matter entails an enormous number of objects - but it is a simple way
to explain the existent of different materials, thermodynamics, fluid dynamics,
bio-energetics,...

Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of entities, the need for necessitation
remains unanswered. Why do numbers exist? Why numbers and not

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.

You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to
some supernatural soul stuff. It basically boils down to whether you suppose there
are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some
stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything
happens and exists. In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose
only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.

Brent

Hi Brent,

Where did I claim that. I was just pointing out the genesis of everything
theories; you did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?

Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How
does immaterial based everything theories deal with this problem that I just outlined?

You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno. But as I understand it, the
ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that we
theorize that everything exists. But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be
logically coherent. So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined and
still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable. Within this plenuum
there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what
part we experience. Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states and
relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.

I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics implies that
different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that it's true.

Brent

Hi Brent,

What is the basis of your doubt? Have you not looked at, for instance, the work of
Tipler http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_J._Tipler#The_Omega_Point_cosmology that
discusses how different physics alters the kinds of computations that can occur? The
notion of Hypercomputation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation is a good
place to start.

Yes I can understand that there are mathematical models in which computations different
from Turing's are possible. But I'm doubtful whether they are coherent. If you tried to
build a physics on them that model conscious beings would you run into contradictions?
That's one role the physical universe plays, it (supposedly) is free of contradictions.
So if we have a mathematical model of something physical and the model is found to have a
contradiction we generally say that it cannot be a correct model of the physical something.

My agreement with

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread Pzomby



On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:


  On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:
  On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

  Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
  any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
  granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is 
  just
  there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
  totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
  are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very 
  plausibly,
  there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).
  You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical 
  laws are models we
  make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we 
  get new
  information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody 
  supposes they are
  in the world.

  Brent
  Brent

  You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
  the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
  representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
  functions?

 Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by 
 rules of
 inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all kinds of 
 things, both
 real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where possible 
 because then we
 have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.  Where our 
 models are
 not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly 
 what the model
 predicts.

 I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See William S. 
 Coopers book
 The Evolution of Reason.



  In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
  further divided?

 The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy 
 density and
 curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and 
 the Big
 Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model 
 doesn't apply at
 these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was 
 already known
 that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is 
 expected to
 breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.

 Brent


 Brent

I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see
it.  I will restate an abbreviated opinion:

Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental
instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth… abstract
mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure
and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages
are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in
descriptions and predictions of the universe.

Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1)
representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well
as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2)
computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic.

Your statement: “I think the rules of inference are encoded in our
brains”, This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and
languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can,
*potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules
fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe.  The
role of human embodied consciousness in any “theory of everything” is
established by this fact.

Mathematics may be “a subset of language” as you state or language
could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal
idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws).
In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant…
mathematics or the language to understand what the mathematics
represents or enumerates.

It is my opinion that there is no singularity but a duality which
roughly could be stated as both “a state of being” (quanta) and the
“reason of being” (qualia) (access to abstract primitive laws/rules or
as you state “newer information”).

Perhaps monistic materialism and monistic idealism are semantically
created notions that lack “newer information”.

Thanks for your comments.




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Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote:


On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:



On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical laws 
are models we
make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we get 
new
information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody 
supposes they are
in the world.
Brent

Brent
You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?

Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by rules 
of
inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all kinds of 
things, both
real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where possible 
because then we
have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.  Where our 
models are
not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly what 
the model
predicts.

I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See William S. 
Coopers book
The Evolution of Reason.




In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
further divided?

The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy 
density and
curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and 
the Big
Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model 
doesn't apply at
these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was 
already known
that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is expected 
to
breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.

Brent


  Brent

I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see
it.  I will restate an abbreviated opinion:

Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental
instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth… abstract
mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure
and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages
are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in
descriptions and predictions of the universe.


I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with truth.  Truth is an 
attribute of a proposition that expresses a fact.  Mathematics consists of relations of 
inference between propositions - which may or may not express anything at all beyond the 
relations.




Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1)
representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well
as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2)
computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic.


Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used to 
describe them.



Your statement: “I think the rules of inference are encoded in our
brains”, This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and
languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can,
*potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules
fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe.


I don't think laws/rules are fundamental.  They are compact models we make up to explain 
and predict facts.


Brent


The
role of human embodied consciousness in any “theory of everything” is
established by this fact.

Mathematics may be “a subset of language” as you state or language
could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal
idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws).
In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant…
mathematics or the language to understand what the mathematics
represents or enumerates.

It is my opinion that there is no singularity but a duality which
roughly could be stated as both “a state of being” (quanta) and the
“reason of being” (qualia) (access to abstract primitive laws/rules or

as you state “newer information”).

Perhaps monistic materialism and monistic idealism are semantically
created notions that lack “newer information”.

Thanks for your comments.




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Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/9/2011 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a 
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically 
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are 
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff 
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that 
everything happens and exists.  In the latter case there's 
really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some 
stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, 
but ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff 
as existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists 
do not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens 
and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way 
of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick 
sees this and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where 
as the stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the union 
of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers 
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium 
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am 
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had 
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die 
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes 
when we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that 
just as it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one 
set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this 
from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations 
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg 
my question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal 
with this problem that I just outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I 
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to 
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything 
exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically 
coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well 
defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is 
computable.  Within this plenuum there are various states (numbers 
in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we 
experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states 
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in 
there somewhere.


I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics 
implies that different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that 
it's true.


Brent

Hi Brent,

What is the basis of your doubt? Have you not looked at, for 
instance, the work of Tipler 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_J._Tipler#The_Omega_Point_cosmology 
that discusses how different physics alters the kinds of computations 
that can occur? The notion of Hypercomputation 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation is a good place to 
start. 


Yes I can understand that there are mathematical models in which 
computations different from Turing's are possible.  But I'm doubtful 
whether they are coherent.  If you tried to build a physics on them 
that model conscious beings would you run into contradictions?  That's 
one role the physical universe plays, it (supposedly) is free of 
contradictions.  So if we have a mathematical model of something 
physical and the model is found to have a contradiction we generally 
say that it cannot be a correct model of the physical something.


[SPK]

  Hi Brent,

Again, what is the basis of your doubt and how would you confirm 
the truthfulness of that basis?




My agreement with Deutsch's assertion does not follow from just 
taking his words as authority. Consider a physical would in which the 
Plank constant was zero, Newton's universe for example; in such a 
world computations would be radically different if only because there 
do not exists any stable atoms. 


In Newton's universe there weren't any atoms to be unstable.  But 
Newton's universe was not Turing computable.

[SPK]
  OK, but that is illustrating Deutsch's point that proofs require a 
physical universe. See pages 190-191 in BoI. Without the 'thisness of 
the physical one does not

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-09 Thread benjayk


Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it.

I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism, but I
still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you didn't
eliminate COMP+non-platonic-immaterialism. 

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/9/2011 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast 
to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose 
there are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or 
some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that 
everything happens and exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for ur 
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically 
stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and 
everything happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The 
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no 
way of sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this 
and not that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only 
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently 
defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations 
there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel 
numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a 
girl had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the 
third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it 
closely enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the 
ability to distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to 
distinguish this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations 
exist independent of physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of everything 
theories; you did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How 
does immaterial based everything theories deal with this problem that I just 
outlined?


You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno.  But as I understand it, the 
ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that 
we theorize that everything exists.  But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to 
be logically coherent.  So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined 
and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable.  Within this 
plenuum there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick 
out what part we experience.  Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states 
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.


I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics implies that 
different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that it's true.


Brent

Hi Brent,

What is the basis of your doubt? Have you not looked at, for instance, the work of 
Tipler http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_J._Tipler#The_Omega_Point_cosmology that 
discusses how different physics alters the kinds of computations that can occur? The 
notion of Hypercomputation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation is a good 
place to start. 


Yes I can understand that there are mathematical models in which computations different 
from Turing's are possible.  But I'm doubtful whether they are coherent.  If you tried 
to build a physics on them that model conscious beings would you run into 
contradictions?  That's one role the physical universe plays, it (supposedly) is free 
of contradictions.  So if we have a mathematical model of something physical and the 
model is found to have a contradiction we generally say that it cannot be a correct 
model of the physical something.


[SPK]

  Hi Brent,

Again, what is the basis of your doubt and how would you confirm the truthfulness of 
that basis?


The latter is part of the problem.   How could one test the idea that the universe 
instantiates a hypercomputer.  It seems to me that our model of the universe must be 
Turing computable because that's the kind of computation we can do to make predictions.  
To say that there are other physics that allow a hypercomputer or some other kind of 
computation, is sort of like saying there are aspects of the universe that we cannot 
model.  It might be true, but it's almost irrelevant.






My agreement with Deutsch's assertion does not follow from just taking his

Re: The consciousness singularity



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 I can relate with many things you say.
 Indeed I can argue that the universal (Löbian) machine already relate  
 on this, too.
 
 But science get rid only on subjective judgement in publication  
 (ideally), making them universally communicable.
 
 But considering the subjective influence themselves, science prohibit  
 them only by bad habits, ignorance, since about theology has been  
 abandoned to or stolen by the politics (523 after C.). it is just a  
 form of (sad) prohibition. It is above all unscientific.
But that's necessary, in some way. If we try to make the very subjective
communicable, we run into the problem of making the uncommunicable
communicable. Either science fails there, or it isn't very good science
(reproducible and clearly presented) anymore. If we start to include
subjective influence, suddenly our research won't be very reproducible and
can't be very clearly presented in an objective way, which are standards for
good science.
I don't think that the scientific community excluded subjective influence
purely because of dogma, but because it is so hard to research that it is
virtually impossible to obtain good results, and so it quite justfiable to
exclude (as a first approximation of what consistutes valid science) such
research from science. It is at most fringe science, like parapsychology.
I think the mistake of many scientist is to act like fringe science (or not
quite science anymore) is not also a valid tool for gaining insight, just
like mysticism. That's just dogma, scientism.

You are right that we can publicate subjective things without subjective
judgement, but that's not science as commonly understood, as this requires
much more than that (also well designed experiments,
reproducibility,etc...), it is just a part of science.

In a way fringe science and non-suprestitious mysticism is the continuation
of science; it continues its tradition of skepticism and open-mindedness,
but transcends scientific limitation. It is just a more difficult realm, in
the sense that we have to be more clear and honest and non-dogmatic and
careful and skeptic than in science to really gain useful insights.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 And here, according to the machine's comp theory (AUDA) you might be  
 rather true, but cross what can be communicated without making some  
 non provable assumption clear. Or you should add something like I  
 hope that 
I have no clear assumption, and what I say are just thoughts, I am not
saying there are the truth. I think there are very interesting and possibly
useful thoughts, though.
I am not even hoping that, it is just what I think, and it happens to
include hopeful thoughts - but it is not rooted in hope. I am just not a
person rooted in hope (quite the opposite actually, I tend to be afraid and
depressed).
I don't really feel like what I say is what would come out of what one could
hope. It is much more promising than anything one could hope for (like
heaven), and is so big that it naturally comes to us to find it very
frightening.

You are right that unfortunately in our times it seems better to make clear
at the start that you are not dogmatic about what you say, since it is so
common to assume that you think what you write is true. I often don't do
that because I don't even believe in what I say myself. I really can't find
any thought that I don't doubt almost immediatly.

Ultimately every thought and every theory and every assumption is worthy to
be doubted, we just have to learn to not be dependent on our beliefs to
really do that. I don't even think a belief can be true, it can be useful,
that's all, and beliefs that you hold very firmly tend to be of little use.
I treat all these ideas of the conscious singularity as ideas, not as dearly
held beliefs. If it happens it is going to be infinitely unbelievable
anyway.

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

 don't like primitively mysterious
matter, but you can't derive that in a rational way.

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux

 point. The problem is that
 your principle it totally ad-hoc. Oh, that's not good, let's just
 eliminate
 that.
 As said, you let your favorite mystery surivive and eliminate the one you
 don't like. You keep the inherent primitive infinite mystery of numbers,
 but
 deny the *inherent/primitive* infinite mystery of matter or the *inherent*
 primitive infinite mystery of consciousness, even though you have no
 justification for that. You can say you don't like primitively mysterious
 matter, but you can't derive that in a rational way.

 benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity



meekerdb wrote:
 
 On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
 Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if
 we
 assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our
 artificial
 experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to
 remain
 coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see photosynthesis). So
 it
 seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.
 
 Photosynthesis doesn't require much coherence.
http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-12-evidence-quantum-photosynthesis.html

And wikipedia says Studies in the last few years have demonstrated the
existence of functional quantum coherence in photosynthetic protein. [...]
These systems use times to decoherence that are within the timescales
calculated for brain protein..


meekerdb wrote:
 
   Even aside from Tegmark's analysis, it's 
 easy to see that brains should be mostly classical.  There would be great
 evolutionary 
 disadvantage to have a brain that was in a coherent superposition when it
 needed to inform 
 actions in a mostly classical world using a mostly classical body.
What if the classical world is just an simplificated world as an
epistemological model that's helps us to survive well in the world of
infinite quantum possibility (which is extremely hard to survive in without
it)? It may be that quantum processes are of great importance everywhere in
nature, and it is precisely our capability of consciousness to make simple
models that makes it appear classical.
We have more and more evidence of that, as we discover quantum coherence in
plants and many phenomena that are virtually impossible to explain in terms
of classical physics (paranormal phenomena).

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:

 You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my  
 favorite
 mystery is acceptable).
 
 This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your  
 enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.
 
I am not insulting you, I am just stating what you did. You invoke an
occams razor, which actually has nothing to do with eliminating
complicated theories (since it is just mysterious is not complicated at
all), and is really your opinion of what alternatives are acceptable.
You elimimate the primary mystery of matter and/or consciousness, but
abitrarily keep the mystery of computations.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Quentin and Brent(*), and myself, have patiently debunked your  
 refutation. You might just ask for explanation if you still miss the  
 point.
Sorry, you are patiently avoiding my point and claim to have debunked it.
That's a bit unfair.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 .
 With Occam, we can't eliminate the mystery.
 
 Occam eliminates only the ad hoc hypothesis used for making a theory  
 wrong. Occam eliminates the collapse of the wave packet,  for example,  
 because the collapse is made only to make QM false when applied to the  
 observers. (To avoid many realities).
 
 Likewise Occam eliminates primitive matter if the appearance of matter  
 can be (or has to be) explained in a conceptual simpler theory. And my  
 point is double:
 
 1) if we assume comp then it has to be the case that arithmetic (or  
 combinator, ...) is the simpler theory. (UDA)
 
 2) This can be verified (making comp testable) by deriving physics  
 from a translation of UDA in the language of a universal number.  
 (AUDA). Then you can compare that physics with the observation  
 inferred physics.
You miss the most simple possibility that primitive matter/consciousness
don't work according to any theory, but to some more fundamental
untheoretical principle.
You can't eliminate that, and your theory can't derive that principle,
either. And no, that is not unreasonable, since the very axioms of math
don't work according to any theory, either.

benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/12/8 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
  On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
 
  You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
  favorite
  mystery is acceptable).
 
  This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
  enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.
 
 I am not insulting you, I am just stating what you did. You invoke an
 occams razor, which actually has nothing to do with eliminating
 complicated theories (since it is just mysterious is not complicated at
 all), and is really your opinion of what alternatives are acceptable.
 You elimimate the primary mystery of matter and/or consciousness, but
 abitrarily keep the mystery of computations.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  Quentin and Brent(*), and myself, have patiently debunked your
  refutation. You might just ask for explanation if you still miss the
  point.
 Sorry, you are patiently avoiding my point and claim to have debunked it.
 That's a bit unfair.


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
  .
  With Occam, we can't eliminate the mystery.
 
  Occam eliminates only the ad hoc hypothesis used for making a theory
  wrong. Occam eliminates the collapse of the wave packet,  for example,
  because the collapse is made only to make QM false when applied to the
  observers. (To avoid many realities).
 
  Likewise Occam eliminates primitive matter if the appearance of matter
  can be (or has to be) explained in a conceptual simpler theory. And my
  point is double:
 
  1) if we assume comp then it has to be the case that arithmetic (or
  combinator, ...) is the simpler theory. (UDA)
 
  2) This can be verified (making comp testable) by deriving physics
  from a translation of UDA in the language of a universal number.
  (AUDA). Then you can compare that physics with the observation
  inferred physics.
 You miss the most simple possibility that primitive matter/consciousness
 don't work according to any theory, but to some more fundamental
 untheoretical principle.


The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).

Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.


 You can't eliminate that, and your theory can't derive that principle,
 either. And no, that is not unreasonable, since the very axioms of math
 don't work according to any theory, either.

 benjayk
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Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
 argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
 is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
 your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
 world is of no use (if there is one).

 Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
 it is about considering it true and see the implications.

Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 7, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 I said to Stephen that, concerning the epiphenomena, consciousness and
 matter do not play a symmetrical role, but this does not mean that one
 of them is primitive.

 With comp, the basic ontology needed is just anything given by the
 logical specification of any universal system. I have chosen the
 natural numbers, structured by the laws of addition and multuplication
 (that's already universal for computability). Both consciousness and
 matter appearance are explained in the comp frame.

Couldn't anything be 'explained' in the comp frame though? Is there
something specific about arithmetic which lends itself to the
production of material appearances rather than disembodied numbers
flying around or universes of variations on the theme of odor? On what
basis do you choose the natural numbers as a basic ontology? As you
know, to my mind, enumeration is obviously a high order
anthropological logic rooted in a sensorimotive primitive which is
gestural and rhythmic, not a formal ontological system.


  Just as matter is a phenomenon but not
  primitive, consciousness too is a phenomenon but not *the* primitive
  phenomenon.

 Yes. comp leads to a neutral monism. The theory of everything can be
 just arithmetic. It will be up to *you* to listen or not to what the
 numbers can tell.

I don't think that the theory of everything can be just arithmetic,
because not everything makes sense arithmetically. Everything does
however make sense in some sense, that's why I think that a sense
based theory of everything is the only plausible option.


  Regardless of it's possibly 'illusory' status, matter
  still has to ultimately be made of the same primitive as consciousness
  (what else is there to make it out of?)

 Observable matter might be an illusion. The numbers do play infinite
 video games.

But what do they use to play games with? It can only be themselves or
some meta-arithmetic phenomenon. It doesn't mean anything to say it's
an 'illusion', illusions still have to be produced through some means.

 Numbers dreams still obeys to the consequence of the
 additive+multiplicative non trivial (even non axiomatizable) number
 structure(s).

 Matter, as it appears in dreams and games, does not have to be made of
 something. All what is needed are relatively persistent relations
 between some numbers, notably those having relatively (to some
 universal number(s)) self-referentially correct features.

I understand what you mean, you're saying that matter can be virtual,
like the Matrix. This would be supported by the success of simulation
logic in modeling matter as well as the philosophical idea that we
cannot tell the difference between a realistic dream and reality. As
long as the arithmetic that we are computes other arithmetic processes
as being a material body, then there is no way we would be able to
tell the difference. I think that is not exactly the case.

Given the example of learning not to wet the bed as we grow up, I am
inclined to think that just because some aspects of ourselves can be
convinced of an immaterial realism does not mean that all parts of
ourselves can be fooled indefinitely. We are vast and complex. One or
a group of senses can be fooled at a time but it is not clear that the
self can be virtualized entirely. It may not work that way. We are
rooted in a historical flow of causality which is anchored to specific
events in this universe. We are therefore unrepeatable and unique on
some level - not subject to simulation or digitization as a generic
pattern. Matter may not have to be made of something, but there must
be something that at least pretends to be made of matter, and that
thing, and it's capacity to pretend in that way can only be primitive.


  There is no getting around the
  tight connection that the matter of our brain has with our conscious
  experience.

 Of course, I stop to follow you here. With comp the tight connection
 is made with the organization of that matter, not an elusive primitive
 matter no one can observe.

How can you say that the organization of matter is causally
efficacious if you say matter is an illusion? How can matter be any
less of an illusion than consciousness? I can inject a general
anesthetic into the bloodstream of someone with the most robust mind
in history and they will go down instantly, helpless in the face of a
few milligrams of dissolved material 'illusion'. Bullets versus Ghost
Dance. Zyklon B vs Torah. What does it mean to disbelieve an illusion
that kills?


  On some level, it all has to be the same thing. To me that
  means that it is neither matter nor consciousness which is illusion,
  but the separation of the two.

 This seems to me identifying different things.

?


  The primitive is not empty
  consciousness in a vacuum - that has zero degrees of realism. Thought
  alone cannot conjure material outside of the body. The primitive is
  the relation between subject and

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 5:46 AM, benjayk wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if
we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our
artificial
experiments. But it seems natural systems have a better ability to
remain
coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see photosynthesis). So
it
seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.

Photosynthesis doesn't require much coherence.

http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-12-evidence-quantum-photosynthesis.html

And wikipedia says Studies in the last few years have demonstrated the
existence of functional quantum coherence in photosynthetic protein. [...]
These systems use times to decoherence that are within the timescales
calculated for brain protein..

But they only involve passing electrons through some molecules; nothing like a neuronal
signal.

meekerdb wrote:

Even aside from Tegmark's analysis, it's
easy to see that brains should be mostly classical. There would be great
evolutionary
disadvantage to have a brain that was in a coherent superposition when it
needed to inform
actions in a mostly classical world using a mostly classical body.

What if the classical world is just an simplificated world as an
epistemological model that's helps us to survive well in the world of
infinite quantum possibility (which is extremely hard to survive in without
it)? It may be that quantum processes are of great importance everywhere in
nature, and it is precisely our capability of consciousness to make simple
models that makes it appear classical.

That's my point. We see the world as classical because that's the important way to see it
for survival. So our brains evolved to be (mostly) classical. Of course quantum
processes are important everywhere: without them atoms and molecules couldn't even exist.

We have more and more evidence of that, as we discover quantum coherence in
plants and many phenomena that are virtually impossible to explain in terms
of classical physics (paranormal phenomena).

If the phenomena are explicable by quantum mechanics, they're normal. Sounds like you
been reading too much Depak Chopra.

Brent

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Dec 2011, at 14:25, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:




The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.


Explain this in detail. Please.

It just doesn't deal with non-platonic-immaterialism, that's all.


Why should it?





Bruno Marchal wrote:



The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for sufficiently magical
materialism or
non-platonic-immaterialism.


It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will
survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a
machine do the right corresponding computation.

But if your reaoning doesn't work for everything


The reasoning works from the assumption (comp) only.




then the conlusion doesn't
follow. I might doubt that I survive a substitution, but I don't  
have to if

I don't believe in what you refuted in your argument.


The points are that if you survive a material digital functional  
substitution, you get

- first person indeterminacy (OK?)
- the invariance of that indeterminacy for delays, real/virtual shift  
(OK?)
- an explanation where the physical laws come from, no more relying on  
the assumption of a physical primary universe, and a partial  
explanation of what consciousness is and why it has to seem  
mysterious. (OK?)
(and with occam razor we get a simple ontology, and a simple theory of  
everything (OK?))

And the proof is enough constructive to make already comp testable. OK?



So, you conclusion just follows if you believe only the alternatives  
you

find relevant can be true.


I don't think so. The conclusion follows from the mechanist  
assumption, and nothing else. I think you just miss the point, as you  
have only criticized step zero (the definition of comp) until now. You  
say it includes the conclusion, which it does not (the assumption  
makes sense a priori for materialists, not the conclusion). Of course  
the assumption includes the conclusion in the logical sense (if not  
the reasoning would not be a deductive reasoning, but a speculation).


I comment the other post here. I might repeat myself a little bit.


You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
favorite
mystery is acceptable).


This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.


I am not insulting you, I am just stating what you did. You invoke an
occams razor,


After step 8.




which actually has nothing to do with eliminating
complicated theories


?




(since it is just mysterious is not complicated at
all),


This is not eliminated. I would say it is even justify, at different  
levels.





and is really your opinion of what alternatives are acceptable.


No alternatives to comp are eliminated. What is eliminated  
(epistemologically, and ontologically with Occam) is the aristotelian  
idea that there is a primary physical universe TOGETHER with the comp  
supposition. If someone comes up with a serious evidence that some  
*primary* matter exist, that would automatically be a serious evidence  
that comp is false.





You elimimate the primary mystery of matter and/or consciousness, but
abitrarily keep the mystery of computations.


Well, the mystery of computation *is* the mystery of numbers (by  
Church, Turing, Post, Gödel, ...). This one can be shown non  
eliminable in *any* theory, and is used in virtually all existing  
theories. Anyway, it is part of the assumption. By definition  
assumptions are not provable.







Bruno Marchal wrote:




A car pushed by invisible discrete
kangaroos
is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by
some
mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been
believed
for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.


I agree.
This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown
that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can
realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate
ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of
theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give
references).
So we agree. But then you conlusion doesn't follow, since you failed  
to

eliminate the mystery beyond computations.


How is that relevant for the conclusion (that physics, actually both  
quanta and qualia, is, in the comp theory, a branch of number theory/ 
computer science)?





We are not only related to
infinity of computations, we are related to an infinite mystery (which
*also* includes an infinity of computation).


That might be. Even in the comp frame. But that is not relevant for  
the proof of the reversal point.







Bruno Marchal wrote:



Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious
things
at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to

Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an argument that shows 
computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) is not compatible with 
materialism. It shows that to be able to predict your next moment (if computationlism is 
true) then the primitive material world is of no use (if there is one).


I don't think so.  It is patently untrue that the material world model is of no use in 
predicting your next experience.  In fact it is essentially the only useful model for 
prediction.


Brent
I wonder if practitioners of alternative medicine would fly in airliners designed by 
alternative aerodynamics?

--- TG, Holistic Lawyer

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Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:


The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).

Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.

Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?


No.  Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material processes: 
there is no Platonia.  Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Pzomby

On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

  Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
  any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
  granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
  there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
  totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
  are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
  there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

 You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical laws 
 are models we
 make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we get 
 new
 information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody 
 supposes they are
 in the world.

 Brent

Brent

You state: “Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
the world.”  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?

In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
further divided?

Thanks

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Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote:

On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:


Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical laws 
are models we
make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we get 
new
information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody 
supposes they are
in the world.

Brent

Brent

You state: “Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict
the world.”  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both
representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain
functions?


Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by rules of 
inference that preserve truth.  We can use it to talk about all kinds of things, both 
real and fictional.  We try to create mathematical models where possible because then we 
have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise.  Where our models are 
not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly what the model 
predicts.


I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains.  See William S. Coopers book 
The Evolution of Reason.




In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be
further divided?


The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy density and 
curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and the Big 
Bang.  It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model doesn't apply at 
these extreme conditions.  This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was already known 
that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is expected to 
breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances.


Brent



Thanks



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Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/8/2011 8:58 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/12/8 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an 
argument
that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) is not
compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict your 
next
moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material world 
is of no
use (if there is one).


I don't think so.  It is patently untrue that the material world model is 
of no use
in predicting your next experience.  In fact it is essentially the only 
useful model
for prediction.


That's not what I said. I said that the primitive world if any is of no use if we are 
computation, because our next moment is part of the infinity of computations that goes 
through our current state and only that. So in that case you use the appearance world 
not a *primitive* world.


You seem to be making an argument that we are not computations.  If we were then 
materialism would be a useless model.  It's not a useless model, therefore 
computationalism is false.  I'd disagree with that because is might be that materialism 
provides a useful model of compuattions.


Or are you arguing that the notion of a primitive world is useless because we always use 
the world of appearance.  That I might agree with.


Brent



Quentin


Brent
I wonder if practitioners of alternative medicine would fly in airliners 
designed
by alternative aerodynamics?
   --- TG, Holistic Lawyer


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Re: The consciousness singularity



On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:

  The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
  argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
  is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
  your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
  world is of no use (if there is one).

  Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
  it is about considering it true and see the implications.
  Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
  by definition?

 No.  Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material 
 processes:
 there is no Platonia.  Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.

 Brent

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Stephen P. King


On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.comwrote:

The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).
Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.

Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?

No.  Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material 
processes:
there is no Platonia.  Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.

Brent

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Craig


Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material 
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting 
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify 
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without 
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The consciousness singularity


On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
 On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  To suppose computation requires a material process would be
  materialism, wouldn't it?

 Hi Craig,

      Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
 process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
 computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
 which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
 having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism. To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 1:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.comwrote:

The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).
Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.

Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?

No. Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material
processes:
there is no Platonia. Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.

Brent

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Sure, but you could still suppose that consciousness is the result of certain computations
and so say yes to the doctor.

Brent

Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to some 
supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some 
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and 
some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists.  In the 
latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff 
as existing and the rest not.


Brent


To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?

Craig



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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Stephen P. King


On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of 
material

process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in 
contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to 
whether you suppose there are some things that are real (e.g. some 
things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and some doesn't) 
and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists.  In 
the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only 
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but 
ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing 
and the rest not and everything happens and exists do not sleep 
together very well at all. The everything happens and exists 
hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of sorting the Tom 
sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not that 
and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only 
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can be 
coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do 
not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their 
operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts 
one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I 
watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed jars. One contained 
nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 
immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we 
look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as it 
vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of numbers from 
another. If the ability to distinguish this from that itself vanishes, 
how are we to claim that computations exist independent of physics? 
Seriously!?!


Onward!

Stephen



To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?

Craig





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Re: The consciousness singularity


On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to some 
supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some 
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and 
some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists.  In 
the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some 
stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically stuff 
whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and everything 
happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The everything happens and 
exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of sorting the Tom sees 
this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not that and Jane sees this and 
not that, where as the stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and 
the rest not can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and 
do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations there 
exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from 
another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed 
jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained 
1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it closely 
enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the ability to 
distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from 
that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist independent of 
physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of everything theories; you 
did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?


Brent



Onward!

Stephen



To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?

Craig







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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-08 Thread Stephen P. King


On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net  wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

  Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of 
material
process occur for computations and would go even further in 
prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not 
specify

which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.


True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.


You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, 
in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff.  It basically boils 
down to whether you suppose there are some things that are real 
(e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and 
some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens 
and exists.  In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff 
whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but 
ironically stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as 
existing and the rest not and everything happens and exists do not 
sleep together very well at all. The everything happens and exists 
hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of sorting the 
Tom sees this and not that from the  from Dick sees this and not 
that and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose 
only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not can 
be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and 
do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their 
operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts 
one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I 
watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed jars. One 
contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained 
1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we 
look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as it 
vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of numbers 
from another. If the ability to distinguish this from that itself 
vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist independent of 
physics? Seriously!?!


Where did I claim that.  I was just pointing out the genesis of 
everything theories; you did notice that this is called the 
everything-list didn't you?


Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my 
question? How does immaterial based everything theories deal with this 
problem that I just outlined?


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?

Hi Craig,

True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism.

You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to
some supernatural soul stuff. It basically boils down to whether you suppose there
are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and
exists. In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function
is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.

Brent

Hi Brent,

Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically stuff
whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not and
everything happens and exists do not sleep together very well at all. The
everything happens and exists hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of
sorting the Tom sees this and not that from the from Dick sees this and not that
and Jane sees this and not that, where as the stuff whose only function is to mark
some stuff as existing and the rest not can be coherently defined as the union of
what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations there
exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from
another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three
sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained
1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it
closely enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the ability
to distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this
from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist independent of
physics? Seriously!?!

Where did I claim that. I was just pointing out the genesis of everything theories;
you did notice that this is called the everything-list didn't you?

Brent

HI Brent,

I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How does
immaterial based everything theories deal with this problem that I just outlined?

You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno. But as I understand it, the
ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that we
theorize that everything exists. But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be
logically coherent. So Bruno backs off to an everything that is well defined and still
possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable. Within this plenuum there are
various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we
experience. Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states and relations between
states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.

I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics implies that different
things are computable, but I'm doubtful that it's true.

Brent

Onward!

Stephen

Re: The consciousness singularity



On 06 Dec 2011, at 21:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote:

Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
  run/simulated
  on a digital computer.
Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno,  
because it
doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that  
our body
can be substituted): A digital computer consists not only of the  
turing
emulable states it works with. It does way more than that, since it  
is a
physical object and has to have some parts that transfrom the  
states (which
work with analog means like voltage), and receive (analog) input  
and output.


It is essentially consciousness that is being reproduced.  If  
consciousness arises from the brain performing certain computations,  
then those computations could be performed to any desired degree of  
precision by a digital computer; and saying Yes to the doctor is  
betting that the instantiating those computations will necessarily  
instantiate consciousness (the naturalist hypothesis - there is no  
magic).


OK. And saying yes to a doctor asks only for Turing emulability at  
some level. It does not presuppose that such an emulation can be only  
arithmetical or immaterial. That necessity is handled by the Movie  
Graph Argument (MGA, step 8(*) of UDA).


Yes doctor is basically the naturalist hypothesis, at least for an a  
priori materialist, but then step 8 shows that nature and Matter are  
themselves necessarily machine's mental construct, so, to be neutral,  
I would probably prefer to call that the rationalist hypothesis.


(*) http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html




And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations  
are done

and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and  
output, but in
this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and  
output a

brain or body can't work.


Yes, that's why I think the level of substitution might be a whole  
universe.   Tegmark's argument that the brain is essentially  
classical only shows that you could replace a brain with a digital  
computer IF you still have the rest of the universe to interact with.


Hmm... In that case, the brain (the generalized brain) *is* the  
universe. If you can replace the brain (the biological one in the  
skull) and if I survive by the fact that such an artificial brain run  
(physically, say) the right computation, then the rest of the  
physical universe (whatever that is) is an average of some sort on  
all computations (physical or not by step 8) going through my actual  
brain state.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The consciousness singularity



On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/6/2011 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
 fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't  
matter.


It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer  
that

interact with the environment

This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with  
the simulated brain, you *must* run at the same level. That  
does not preclude that the simulated brain can be run on any  
level, only interaction with you require a specific level... your  
level.


A human being is not a closed system.  So the substitution level  
for Bruno's argument to go thru could include digital simulation  
of a large part of the universe - or maybe all of it.


Brent

Yes.

But if all the universe is needed, then computationalism is  
certainly false and that would prevent any conscious AI and even  
if the argument could still go through with the whole universe...  
it seems really like plain old solipsism in that case.


Also, the argument is not about feasibility of capturing the  
consciousness of a living person and puting it in a computer but  
about the concept and the compatibility with materialism.


Yes, an environment is needed for consciousness, but I doubt that  
to capture an existing consciousness (mind uploading) the level  
would be more than neuronal or maybe atomic and hence the  
environment needed could be feeded via input/output system without  
it being explicitely included (weither the real one or a virtual  
one) in the captured consciousness.




If we assume comp, and if the whole physical universe is needed for  
the 'generalized brain', then, by comp, all the universe's states  
have to be digitally accessible, and the UD will still access to  
those states infinitely often. So the whole reasoning still go  
through, even in the case of a concrete physical UD (step seven).


Empirically this is doubtful, though. If the quantum indeterminacy  
relies on the first person indeterminacies, then we can bet that we  
share the computational states of our matter constitution at, or  
above, the quantum state of our bodies. Our level is probably above  
the quantum level. This makes QM saving comp from solipsism, and is  
coherent with Tegmark's argument that the brain does not exploit  
quantum superpositions when handling our relevant mechanist  
computational states (Sorry, Stephen). We most plausibly do share  
deep dynamical histories. Beware the collision with Andromeda!


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



Hi Bruno,

Yes, I am still reading this LIst. :-) Tegmark is not even wrong  
but I do concede the point as it is not relevant to digital  
substitution but I, like Craig, caution against thinking that using  
classical theory to reason about consciousness is doomed from the  
start. Your result, for me, proves that material monism fails  
miserably as a T.O.E.


OK.




but so does ideal monism.


Why?




The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem  
of epiphenomena.



I don't follow you on this. We have discussed that before. Matter  
(primitive matter) simply does not exist. It can be an ideal  
(immaterial) appearance (by the reasoning). Matter can not be an  
epiphenomenon. It is just a phenomenon, and not a primitive one.
But with material monism, matter has to exist primitively (by  
definition) and consciousness has to be an epiphenomenon indeed.
The role of matter and consciousness is not symmetrical. Matter can be  
an illusion, but consciousness cannot. In all case consciousness has  
to be real, or eliminated (which makes no sense). And it t makes  
logical sense to eliminate primitive matter, not consciousness. Only  
material monism needs to use the notion of epiphenomenon, not  
immaterial (number like) monism.



The main difference is that matter (or physics) single out (or try  
to single out) one universal system, where comp explains that such  
a universal physical system has to be justified from a measure, on  
all computations, invariant for all universal machine points of  
view, which includes the working of an infinity of universal systems.
The other difference is that by extracting physics from a  
computational measure constrained by the logic of self-reference,  
we get a natural distinction between qualia and quanta (even if  
quanta appears as special case of qualia by the first person plural  
nature of physical histories).


[SPK]
But this measure simply does not exist! The set of all  
computable functions is of measure zero in the set of all functions.

What are you going to do about this fact?


The measure is on the computations (going through my actual state),  
not on all functions. The set of all functions plays some role,  
including an

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Dec 7, 6:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:


  but so does ideal monism.

 Why?

  The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem
  of epiphenomena.

 I don't follow you on this. We have discussed that before. Matter
 (primitive matter) simply does not exist. It can be an ideal
 (immaterial) appearance (by the reasoning). Matter can not be an
 epiphenomenon. It is just a phenomenon, and not a primitive one.
 But with material monism, matter has to exist primitively (by
 definition) and consciousness has to be an epiphenomenon indeed.
 The role of matter and consciousness is not symmetrical. Matter can be
 an illusion, but consciousness cannot. In all case consciousness has
 to be real, or eliminated (which makes no sense). And it t makes
 logical sense to eliminate primitive matter, not consciousness. Only
 material monism needs to use the notion of epiphenomenon, not
 immaterial (number like) monism.

Making consciousness 'real' does not mean that it has to be any more
primitive than matter though. Just as matter is a phenomenon but not
primitive, consciousness too is a phenomenon but not *the* primitive
phenomenon. Regardless of it's possibly 'illusory' status, matter
still has to ultimately be made of the same primitive as consciousness
(what else is there to make it out of?) There is no getting around the
tight connection that the matter of our brain has with our conscious
experience. On some level, it all has to be the same thing. To me that
means that it is neither matter nor consciousness which is illusion,
but the separation of the two. The primitive is not empty
consciousness in a vacuum - that has zero degrees of realism. Thought
alone cannot conjure material outside of the body. The primitive is
the relation between subject and object: Sense. How I think it works
is that objectness is just the rear end of subjectness. Everything is
a subject to itself and and object to everything else. The closer
things are to the subject, literally and figuratively, the more sense
can be made out of them and their familiarity acquires subjective
qualities. When they are extremely close/similar, they are identified
with the subject directly.

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread benjayk



meekerdb wrote:
 
 And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
 computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are
 done
 and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
 One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and output, but
 in
 this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and output
 a
 brain or body can't work.
 
 Yes, that's why I think the level of substitution might be a whole
 universe.
And there is no other to this universe, or something transcendent to it?
This seems to be incoherent with Brunos conclusion, because the conclusion
entails that not all of the universe can be digital. But if there is not
other (or something trascendent to it) that provides input or that output is
given to, the substituted universe could only consists of the computations.

[The following is not on this sub-discussion, but is more an extension of my
first post about the consciousness singularity:]

meekerdb wrote:
 
Tegmark's argument that the brain is essentially classical only shows
 that you could replace a brain with a digital computer IF you still have
 the rest of the universe to interact with.
Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our artificial
experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to remain
coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see photosynthesis). So it
seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.
For me, it seems pretty evident now that there is something special to life
after all in the way it relates to physical laws and in importance of the
universe. It is just not plausible at all why the universe would be capable
of self-accelerating evolution if there is no inherent drive in nature
towards intelligence (not human intelligence, universal intelligence,
capability of self-learning). Why would carbon be able to form all these
complex bounds, and DNA be able to encode information in such a way that it
is so extremely versatile and universal in its expression, and even more
amazingly, why would it be working in such a way that at some point very
small changes can have extremely large effects in terms of
learning-capability (look at humans vs other animals).
It is utterly and totally implausible that this is chance, or is a necessity
that just happens to be good for intellignent life (why would it?).
Granted, we can invoke the anthrophic principle, but then we are really
granting that ultimately subjectivity shapes the apparent cosmos, which most
scientist want to avoid desperately.

Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

I think it is much much much more convincing (not to mention wonderful),
that the universe is based on an inherent self-organizing, self-learning
consciousness, the I/Self.
It is the ultimate singularity (including the Big Bang singularity).

It is self-evident, and self-explaining (through the evolution of the
cosmos), and extremely simple (it is just Self) so it naturally needs no
further external explanation.
The only reason that this is not accepted is because the scientific
community is predominatly dogmatically materialistic and based on
scienticsm. It doesn't want something transcendent trans-scientifc,
trans-rational, trans-objective as its base.
But that it is just self-denial, because science always needs something
beyond science to justify even its most fundamental premises (the universe
is basically lawful for example) and to interpret results (eg QM).

Once we take this possibility seriously many many difficult questions become
much more answerable (even though of course there is always infinite
ignorance about fundamental questions).
Why is the universe so orderly? Because consciousness is, as everybody can
observe for themselves, self-ordering through self-seeing.
Why does its behaviour approximate laws, but is still not entirely
predictable? Because natural laws are useful for consciousness to navigate
the world and use it.
Why is there life and why is the universe suited for life? Because the
universe (multiverse) is already intelligent and uses life for further
development towards even more intelligence.
If the universe is intelligent, why does it appear so stupid and uncaring
and unconscious oftentimes? It is not humanly intelligent, consciousness is
not rational or moral or planning, it only sees its own order, which may be
stupid from the persepective of humans, but still has its own

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:

 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 I am just not arguing at all for what
 your argument(s) seeks to refute.

 I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
 *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable  
 that
 those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you feel
 like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say so.
 The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
 I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from  
 comp,
 they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and  
 over
 again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you  
 don't
 make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can  
 matter) and
 then saying it is equivalent to COMP.
 
 Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
 Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain, and  
 skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a  
 priori.
 I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only after  
 the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that  
 idea.
The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying. The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for sufficiently magical materialism or
non-platonic-immaterialism.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes  
 nothing
 magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
 supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically  
 related).
 
 I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical  
 materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp  
 + sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why  
 after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away with  
 Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are  
 pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is rarely  
 scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to eliminate
too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
magical or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
It is not at all artificial. A car pushed by invisible discrete kangaroos
is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by some
mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been believed
for many centuries, and also is our actual experience. 
Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious things
at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the very basis
of your theory.

It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply eliminate all
possbilities that you don't like.
You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my favorite
mystery is acceptable).

benjayk

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Re: The consciousness singularity



On 07 Dec 2011, at 17:14, benjayk wrote:




meekerdb wrote:



And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the  
computations are

done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and  
output, but

in
this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and  
output

a
brain or body can't work.


Yes, that's why I think the level of substitution might be a whole
universe.
And there is no other to this universe, or something transcendent to  
it?
This seems to be incoherent with Brunos conclusion, because the  
conclusion
entails that not all of the universe can be digital. But if there is  
not
other (or something trascendent to it) that provides input or that  
output is
given to, the substituted universe could only consists of the  
computations.


[The following is not on this sub-discussion, but is more an  
extension of my

first post about the consciousness singularity:]

meekerdb wrote:


  Tegmark's argument that the brain is essentially classical only  
shows
that you could replace a brain with a digital computer IF you still  
have

the rest of the universe to interact with.
Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially  
classical if we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our  
artificial
experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to  
remain
coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see  
photosynthesis). So it

seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.
For me, it seems pretty evident now that there is something special  
to life
after all in the way it relates to physical laws and in importance  
of the
universe. It is just not plausible at all why the universe would be  
capable

of self-accelerating evolution if there is no inherent drive in nature
towards intelligence (not human intelligence, universal intelligence,
capability of self-learning). Why would carbon be able to form all  
these
complex bounds, and DNA be able to encode information in such a way  
that it
is so extremely versatile and universal in its expression, and even  
more
amazingly, why would it be working in such a way that at some point  
very

small changes can have extremely large effects in terms of
learning-capability (look at humans vs other animals).
It is utterly and totally implausible that this is chance, or is a  
necessity

that just happens to be good for intellignent life (why would it?).
Granted, we can invoke the anthrophic principle, but then we are  
really
granting that ultimately subjectivity shapes the apparent cosmos,  
which most

scientist want to avoid desperately.

Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there,  
without

any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God  
is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would  
be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural  
laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very  
plausibly,

there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).

I think it is much much much more convincing (not to mention  
wonderful),
that the universe is based on an inherent self-organizing, self- 
learning

consciousness, the I/Self.
It is the ultimate singularity (including the Big Bang singularity).

It is self-evident, and self-explaining (through the evolution of the
cosmos), and extremely simple (it is just Self) so it naturally  
needs no

further external explanation.
The only reason that this is not accepted is because the scientific
community is predominatly dogmatically materialistic and based on
scienticsm. It doesn't want something transcendent trans-scientifc,
trans-rational, trans-objective as its base.
But that it is just self-denial, because science always needs  
something
beyond science to justify even its most fundamental premises (the  
universe

is basically lawful for example) and to interpret results (eg QM).

Once we take this possibility seriously many many difficult  
questions become

much more answerable (even though of course there is always infinite
ignorance about fundamental questions).
Why is the universe so orderly? Because consciousness is, as  
everybody can

observe for themselves, self-ordering through self-seeing.
Why does its behaviour approximate laws, but is still not entirely
predictable? Because natural laws are useful for consciousness to  
navigate

the world and use it.
Why is there life and why is the universe suited for life? Because the
universe (multiverse) is already intelligent and uses life for further
development towards even more intelligence.
If the universe is intelligent, why does it appear so stupid and  
uncaring
and unconscious oftentimes? It is not humanly intelligent,  
consciousness is
not rational

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 07 Dec 2011, at 16:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 7, 6:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote:

but so does ideal monism.

Why?

The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem
of epiphenomena.

I don't follow you on this. We have discussed that before. Matter
(primitive matter) simply does not exist. It can be an ideal
(immaterial) appearance (by the reasoning). Matter can not be an
epiphenomenon. It is just a phenomenon, and not a primitive one.
But with material monism, matter has to exist primitively (by
definition) and consciousness has to be an epiphenomenon indeed.
The role of matter and consciousness is not symmetrical. Matter can
be

an illusion, but consciousness cannot. In all case consciousness has
to be real, or eliminated (which makes no sense). And it t makes
logical sense to eliminate primitive matter, not consciousness. Only
material monism needs to use the notion of epiphenomenon, not
immaterial (number like) monism.

Making consciousness 'real' does not mean that it has to be any more
primitive than matter though.

That is a point where I agree with you, but Benjayk would disagree.

I said to Stephen that, concerning the epiphenomena, consciousness and
matter do not play a symmetrical role, but this does not mean that one
of them is primitive.

With comp, the basic ontology needed is just anything given by the
logical specification of any universal system. I have chosen the
natural numbers, structured by the laws of addition and multuplication
(that's already universal for computability). Both consciousness and
matter appearance are explained in the comp frame.

Just as matter is a phenomenon but not
primitive, consciousness too is a phenomenon but not *the* primitive
phenomenon.

Yes. comp leads to a neutral monism. The theory of everything can be
just arithmetic. It will be up to *you* to listen or not to what the
numbers can tell.

Regardless of it's possibly 'illusory' status, matter
still has to ultimately be made of the same primitive as consciousness
(what else is there to make it out of?)

Observable matter might be an illusion. The numbers do play infinite
video games. Numbers dreams still obeys to the consequence of the
additive+multiplicative non trivial (even non axiomatizable) number
structure(s).

Matter, as it appears in dreams and games, does not have to be made of
something. All what is needed are relatively persistent relations
between some numbers, notably those having relatively (to some
universal number(s)) self-referentially correct features.

There is no getting around the
tight connection that the matter of our brain has with our conscious
experience.

Of course, I stop to follow you here. With comp the tight connection
is made with the organization of that matter, not an elusive primitive
matter no one can observe.

On some level, it all has to be the same thing. To me that
means that it is neither matter nor consciousness which is illusion,
but the separation of the two.

This seems to me identifying different things.

The primitive is not empty
consciousness in a vacuum - that has zero degrees of realism. Thought
alone cannot conjure material outside of the body. The primitive is
the relation between subject and object: Sense. How I think it works
is that objectness is just the rear end of subjectness.

Yes, that's a good intuition. Matter is the border of the universal
mind (with comp, the mind of the universal machine, this includes its
many possible dreams). But so you don't identify them. Good.

Everything is
a subject to itself and and object to everything else.

But not everything can be said to refer to itself. Universal numbers
can because they have the cognitive ability to do that.

Bruno

The closer
things are to the subject, literally and figuratively, the more sense
can be made out of them and their familiarity acquires subjective
qualities. When they are extremely close/similar, they are identified
with the subject directly.

Craig

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread meekerdb


On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if we
assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our artificial
experiments.  But it seems natural systems have a better ability to remain
coherent, when it would be impossible otherwise (see photosynthesis). So it
seems we can't rely on Tegmarks assumption.


Photosynthesis doesn't require much coherence.  Even aside from Tegmark's analysis, it's 
easy to see that brains should be mostly classical.  There would be great evolutionary 
disadvantage to have a brain that was in a coherent superposition when it needed to inform 
actions in a mostly classical world using a mostly classical body.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity

On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.

I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent
reason to

*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable
that
those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you
feel
like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say
so.

The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from
comp,
they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and
over
again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you
don't
make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can
matter) and
then saying it is equivalent to COMP.

Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain,
and

skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a
priori.
I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only
after

the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that
idea.

The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.

Explain this in detail. Please.

The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for sufficiently magical
materialism or

non-platonic-immaterialism.

It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will
survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a
machine do the right corresponding computation.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes
nothing
magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically
related).

I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical
materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp
+ sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why
after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away
with

Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are
pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is
rarely

scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to
eliminate

too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
magical or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
It is not at all artificial. A car pushed by invisible discrete
kangaroos
is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by
some
mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been
believed

for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.

I agree.
This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown
that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can
realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate
ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of
theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give
references).

Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious
things
at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the
very basis

of your theory.

It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply
eliminate all

possbilities that you don't like.

Proving eliminate possibilities by definition. In the frame of some
assumption.

Bruno

You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
favorite

mystery is acceptable).

benjayk

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Re: The consciousness singularity

2011-12-07 Thread meekerdb


On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without
any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for
granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying A creator God is just
there, we have to take him for granted. It makes no sense (it would be a
totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws
are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly,
there are none because it is a mathematical singularity).


You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to we.  Physical laws are models we 
make up to explain and predict the world.  That's why they change when we get new 
information.  Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics.  Nobody supposes they are 
in the world.


Brent

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Re: The consciousness singularity