Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein
I would like to respond to Wittgenstein's idea that a mathematical proof should be called an invention rather than a discovery. When solving a Suduko puzzle, I often produce a logical deduction that the solution is unique. It seems clear to me that I discovered that there is only one solution. I don't see how to make any sense of the idea that I "invented" the fact that there is only one solution. "Wittgensteins technique was not to reinterpret certain particular proofs, but, rather, to redescribe the whole of mathematics in such a way that mathematical logic would appear as the philosophical aberration he believed it to be, and in a way that dissolved entirely the picture of mathematics as a science which discovers facts about mathematical objects . I shall try again and again, he said, to show that what is called a mathematical discovery had much better be called a mathematical invention. There was, on his view, nothing for the mathematician to discover. A proof in mathematics does not establish the truth of a conclusion; if fixes, rather, the meaning of certain signs. The inexorability of mathematics, therefore, does not consist in certain knowledge of mathematical truths, but in the fact that mathematical propositions are grammatical. To deny, for example, that two plus two equals four is not to disagree with a widely held view about a matter of fact; it is to show ignorance of the meanings of the terms involved. Wittgenstein presumably thought that if he could persuade Turing to see mathematics in this light, he could persuade anybody." Turing apparently gave up on W. a few lectures later. I have to admit the distinction that W. is making here does not move me particularly. It seems to me as much of a discovery to find out what is implied by the premises of a logical system as to find out how many electrons there are in an iron atom, and since logic is always at work behind empirical work, I cannot get very excited about the difference. Perhaps because I am dim witted. No response necessary. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein
Thus spake John F. Kennison circa 10/07/2008 10:01 AM: > I would like to respond to Wittgenstein's idea that a mathematical > proof should be called an invention rather than a discovery. When > solving a Suduko puzzle, I often produce a logical deduction that the > solution is unique. It seems clear to me that I discovered that there > is only one solution. I don't see how to make any sense of the idea > that I "invented" the fact that there is only one solution. As cryptic as all the jargon may sound, Wittgenstein's point is very intuitive. Mathematics is built upon a set of _definitions_. We define everything. Hence, all of math is an invention. It's true that you didn't invent the solution to the sudoku puzzle. But the formal system in which sudoku puzzles sit is a human invention. Hence, the solution to the puzzle is also a human invention. The person who invented the game invented the solution. You discovered what s/he invented. Did you discover it first? Unlikely. Can multiple people discover the same thing even after someone previously discovered that thing? Yes. The same would be true for, say, some occult part of an engine being explored by someone ignorant of engines. The novice starts unscrewing things one after another and comes upon a part she didn't know existed. She literally discovered the part. But that doesn't mean that engines aren't human inventions. Some human put it there. Another human discovered it there. Now, fancy pants filosofers will enter at this point and say things like: "but the engine builders designed and installed that engine part purposefully, whereas the solution to a logic puzzle can be an undesigned deductive consequence of the formal system and the way the puzzle was set up". That appeal to intention, purpose, or the magical, metaphysical homunculus in our brains is specious, though. So don't let it get in the way of rational thought. [grin] All mathematics is a human invention ... it's a set of definitions and grammatical manipulations of those definitions. The real questions come when we discuss why our invention mirrors reality so well ... Now _that's_ another issue entirely. The best argument is that we cognitive animals are inventions of reality and, hence, all the thoughts we have (including math) reflect some deep structure of reality. So, since we invented math and reality invented us, then math must be real ... perhaps even a filtered, essential, purified, form of reality. And that's what Wittgenstein was fighting against (or perhaps ultimately for? since he was a big fan of _thought_ in general but not math in particular) using his banal observation that math is a human invention just like Monopoly or Chess. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein
Okay, suppose someone else simply entered some numbers in a Suduko grid and said, "I wonder whether there is any solution that incorporates these numbers, and, if there is a solution, is it unique?" I concede that the person who did this invented the problem. But if I prove that there is a solution and that it is unique, I haven't invented that fact as that fact was implicit in the original question, but I have discovered that the fact was implicit, have I not? On 10/7/08 1:37 PM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Thus spake John F. Kennison circa 10/07/2008 10:01 AM: > I would like to respond to Wittgenstein's idea that a mathematical > proof should be called an invention rather than a discovery. When > solving a Suduko puzzle, I often produce a logical deduction that the > solution is unique. It seems clear to me that I discovered that there > is only one solution. I don't see how to make any sense of the idea > that I "invented" the fact that there is only one solution. As cryptic as all the jargon may sound, Wittgenstein's point is very intuitive. Mathematics is built upon a set of _definitions_. We define everything. Hence, all of math is an invention. It's true that you didn't invent the solution to the sudoku puzzle. But the formal system in which sudoku puzzles sit is a human invention. Hence, the solution to the puzzle is also a human invention. The person who invented the game invented the solution. You discovered what s/he invented. Did you discover it first? Unlikely. Can multiple people discover the same thing even after someone previously discovered that thing? Yes. The same would be true for, say, some occult part of an engine being explored by someone ignorant of engines. The novice starts unscrewing things one after another and comes upon a part she didn't know existed. She literally discovered the part. But that doesn't mean that engines aren't human inventions. Some human put it there. Another human discovered it there. Now, fancy pants filosofers will enter at this point and say things like: "but the engine builders designed and installed that engine part purposefully, whereas the solution to a logic puzzle can be an undesigned deductive consequence of the formal system and the way the puzzle was set up". That appeal to intention, purpose, or the magical, metaphysical homunculus in our brains is specious, though. So don't let it get in the way of rational thought. [grin] All mathematics is a human invention ... it's a set of definitions and grammatical manipulations of those definitions. The real questions come when we discuss why our invention mirrors reality so well ... Now _that's_ another issue entirely. The best argument is that we cognitive animals are inventions of reality and, hence, all the thoughts we have (including math) reflect some deep structure of reality. So, since we invented math and reality invented us, then math must be real ... perhaps even a filtered, essential, purified, form of reality. And that's what Wittgenstein was fighting against (or perhaps ultimately for? since he was a big fan of _thought_ in general but not math in particular) using his banal observation that math is a human invention just like Monopoly or Chess. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein
Thus spake John F. Kennison circa 10/07/2008 10:53 AM: > Okay, suppose someone else simply entered some numbers in a Suduko > grid and said, "I wonder whether there is any solution that > incorporates these numbers, and, if there is a solution, is it > unique?" I concede that the person who did this invented the problem. > But if I prove that there is a solution and that it is unique, I > haven't invented that fact as that fact was implicit in the original > question, but I have discovered that the fact was implicit, have I > not? Well, what you're saying depends on your usage of your words, particularly the words "fact", "implicit", and "discover". But to answer as directly as possible, all you did was transform something some other person invented. So, yes, you invented the first sentence (the solution to the puzzle). And you invented the second sentence (the statement that the solution is unique). And you invented the string of sentences that "proves" the two previous sentences. The puzzle creator did not explicitly invent those two sentences or the string of sentences that constructs the proof. It's just like folding a piece of paper. Someone hands you a piece of paper and you fold it into an origami swan. Did you _discover_ the swan? Or did you invent the swan? I don't intend to play around with the definitions of words. But playing around with words is a _great_ demonstration of Wittgenstein's beef with platonic mathematicians. All they're doing is playing around with symbols. It's not science. It's symbol manipulation. There is no discovery in the same sense that scientists mean. It is invention. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] Self-awareness
Russ, Oh, just that scientists appear to be one of the main violators of your self-awareness principle. Scientists tend to describe the physical world as if they are unaware that science constructs descriptive models of things far too complex to model, that might behave differently from any kind of model we know how to invent. That has us spending a disproportionate amount of time looking into our theories for the behavior of the world around us (under the streetlight for the keys lost in the alley) and letting our skills in watching physical systems atrophy. Do you see the connection?Is it partly accurate? Phil Henshaw From: Russ Abbott [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, October 06, 2008 4:04 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Self-awareness I'm sorry, Phil, I'm missing your point. How does your comment relate to my argument that self-awareness is a primary good and a possible way around the difficulty most people have with critical thinking? -- Russ On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 12:53 PM, Phil Henshaw <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Well Russ, what if a group of scientists were to acknowledge that science actually just seems to be descriptive after all..., and looking through the holes one seems able to actually see signs of a physical world after all! Than sort of 'emperor's new clothes' moment might be enough to turn everyone's attention to value of self-critical thinking wouldn't it?!;-) Phil From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott Sent: Sunday, October 05, 2008 10:06 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Willfull Ignorance - Satisfies NickCriteria E On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 12:39 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: So the first step is for each individual to accept their responsibility to think/speak critically at every opportunity. The next step is to package such critical thinking inside an infectious wrapper so that it spreads across all humanity. Yes, if it worked it would be wonderful. I'm cynical enough to doubt that it would succeed. (1) I doubt that we can find a wrapper infectious enough and (2) even if we did, I doubt that the population as a whole is capable of the level of critical thinking that we need. (That's elitism, isn't it.) Demagoguery almost always seems to succeed. Can anything be done about that? More discouraging is that advertising is cleaned up demagoguery. And advertising will always be with us. Just to be sure I knew what I was talking about (critical thinking?) I just looked up "demagoguery": "impassioned appeals to the prejudices and emotions of the populace." Prejudice and emotion will always be with us -- even the least prejudiced and least a prisoner of their emotions. Besides, without emotion, we can't even make decisions. (That's clearly another discussion, but it's worth noting.) So can we really complain about superficial prejudice and emotion when we are all subject to it at some level? Perhaps the need is for self-awareness -- and even more for having a high regard for self-awareness -- so that one can learn about one's prejudices and emotions and stand back from them when appropriate. Can we teach that? (It helps to have good role models. Obviously we have had exactly the opposite in our current president.) Actually, though, a high regard for self-awareness might be easier to teach than critical thinking. So perhaps there is hope. But the danger there is to fall prey to melodrama. It's not easy. I'll nominate Glen as a good role model, though. How can we make your persona more widely visible? -- Russ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] government hierarchy (was Re: Willful Ignorance)
Well, the reliance on competence is relative to the difficulty of the task. As our world explodes with new connections and complexity that's sort of in doubt, isn't it? Isn't Taleb's observation that when you have increasingly complex problems with increasingly 'fat tailed' distributions of correlation then you better not rely on analysis? Anyone who takes that job is probably running into 'black swans' aren't they? Phil > -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On > Behalf Of glen e. p. ropella > Sent: Monday, October 06, 2008 5:23 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] government hierarchy (was Re: Willful Ignorance) > > Thus spake Marcus G. Daniels circa 10/06/2008 01:49 PM: > > I expect capable, intelligent managers are a subset of the > population. > > If a local government represents too small of a region, there won't > be > > competent people available to run things. > > Good point. However, a complement is that if you have a small enough > region, only those within that region can _possibly_ be competent > enough > to run things. A great example is an individual human. If _you_ can't > manage your own mind/body, then nobody else has any hopes of doing it > either. > > >I've seen plenty of > > incompetence and outright corruption in local governments too. > > Allowing for some expensive mistakes (and expensive successes) may > > encourage people to pay attention and engage -- they have something > on > > the line. > > Yes. The beauty of local government is that it's easy to put someone > in > charge and it's easy to remove them, too. Sure, there's plenty of > corruption and incompetence at any level; but the degree of > accountability, installation, and removal scale, too. Likewise, the > stakes for success and failure scale. > > One reason for the "nasty" politics we see is this very scaling. If > you've got someone in an aggregated seat of power, then a) it was > difficult for them to get there and b) it will be difficult to get them > out of there. The trick is to find the critical spot in the hierarchy. > And that usually turns out to be illegal behavior (based on nefarious > and ridiculous nooks and crannies of the law) or _disgrace_. So, we > politick by calling people hypocrites, racists, or whatever epithet may > fit the bill because these control points trigger catastrophic > collapses > of the inertial systems built up in the government hierarchy. Of > course > politics for heavily inertial aggregated government positions will > hinge > on nasty cheap shots and sound bites. > > As much as I hate the idea, we _need_ things like President Bush's > immunity from prosecution for decisions he made while doing his job. > We > need it to preserve the stability of the office in correspondence with > the amount of effort it took to put him in that office. > > But what this leads one to (I think) is the conclusion that high office > should be pressed upon the unwilling rather than sought out by those > who > want to hold that office. Perhaps we should make it a requirement of > citizenship that you can be drafted into office when a "jury" of your > peers decides that you're the best person to fill that role? Of > course, > that would lead to an entirely different selection mechanism that would > encourage the occult jockeying for nomination, false modesty, etc. But > I wonder how different (or how much worse) it could be than what we > have > now? It may even result in a "brain drain" where all the people at > risk > for being drafted move to Canada or something to avoid being forced to > play President. ;-) > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com > > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein
Or. another angle. Proofs represent discoveries about the invented grammar they use, with the proviso of "so far as we can see"? The way we define grammars changes to suite our intentions occasionally, but we're generally trying to identify things inherent in nature, for grammars drawn as conclusively as we know how to make them. They might not show us about the aspects of nature that are inconclusive, of course, but we still would like to know if our constructs are at least pointing to something real. What I find interesting is that every proof seems to imply "and therefore I can't think of anything else" a conclusion based on a lack of imagination. That point to proof as an acceptance of adding a branch to a constructed tree, I think? If the 'tree' itself at least reflects something that exists in nature when the grammar surely didn't is the puzzle. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of John F. Kennison Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2008 1:01 PM To: friam@redfish.com Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein I would like to respond to Wittgenstein's idea that a mathematical proof should be called an invention rather than a discovery. When solving a Suduko puzzle, I often produce a logical deduction that the solution is unique. It seems clear to me that I discovered that there is only one solution. I don't see how to make any sense of the idea that I "invented" the fact that there is only one solution. "Wittgensteins technique was not to reinterpret certain particular proofs, but, rather, to redescribe the whole of mathematics in such a way that mathematical logic would appear as the philosophical aberration he believed it to be, and in a way that dissolved entirely the picture of mathematics as a science which discovers facts about mathematical objects . I shall try again and again, he said, to show that what is called a mathematical discovery had much better be called a mathematical invention. There was, on his view, nothing for the mathematician to discover. A proof in mathematics does not establish the truth of a conclusion; if fixes, rather, the meaning of certain signs. The inexorability of mathematics, therefore, does not consist in certain knowledge of mathematical truths, but in the fact that mathematical propositions are grammatical. To deny, for example, that two plus two equals four is not to disagree with a widely held view about a matter of fact; it is to show ignorance of the meanings of the terms involved. Wittgenstein presumably thought that if he could persuade Turing to see mathematics in this light, he could persuade anybody." Turing apparently gave up on W. a few lectures later. I have to admit the distinction that W. is making here does not move me particularly. It seems to me as much of a discovery to find out what is implied by the premises of a logical system as to find out how many electrons there are in an iron atom, and since logic is always at work behind empirical work, I cannot get very excited about the difference. Perhaps because I am dim witted. No response necessary. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] government hierarchy (was Re: Willful Ignorance)
Thus spake Phil Henshaw circa 10/07/2008 12:15 PM: > Well, the reliance on competence is relative to the difficulty of the task. > As our world explodes with new connections and complexity that's sort of in > doubt, isn't it? Isn't Taleb's observation that when you have increasingly > complex problems with increasingly 'fat tailed' distributions of correlation > then you better not rely on analysis? Anyone who takes that job is > probably running into 'black swans' aren't they? Of course more complex processes mean more difficulty in handling them. But that's what "expertise" is all about. The more difficult the handling, the more one needs expertise. The simpler the processes, the more one can rely on yokels or algorithms. So, I think the opposite of your conclusion is justifiable: The more complex the processes, the more powerful the "skill set" sales pitch becomes because the customers are aggressively hunting for expertise. But even in a very complex domain, regular, somewhat predictable patterns of observation/manipulation can yield success, despite the occult possibility of unexpected wonky trajectories. And people who have those patterns of observation/manipulation down pat are also experts. They just run the risk of being wrong when/if the system does happen to take a wonky trajectory. There's no reason to avoid relying on historically successful patterns of control. You just have to accumulate enough momentum while successful to survive the black swans. The trick is that when experts sell themselves to you, they tend toward optimism (and underestimate the risks) because they don't eat their own dog food ... they won't really suffer the consequences the customer will suffer when their expertise fails. They _tend_ to promise what they really can't deliver ... or they're extremely vague about what they promise so they can hold up whatever they happen to deliver as a refined version of what they promised ... like politicians and outsource code shops. In contrast, if your "skin is in it", then you tend to be a bit more pessimistic (and conservative) with what you promise. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein
Glen, You have made some interesting points. I don't deny that forming a proof involves invention and symbol manipulation. I also agree that mathematical truth is different from scientific truth. I now think the core question is whether a proof, according to the usual rules of symbol manipulation, represents a strong argument for the truth of the statement that is claimed to have been proven. (While, before reading your comments, my objections to W's statements were more a matter of whether "discovery" or "invention" is the better choice of a word to describe what is happening.) In other words, I see your interpretation of Wittgenstein's statements as his way of saying that mathematical argument does not do a good or reliable job of establishing truth. Am I characterizing your position correctly? John From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of glen e. p. ropella [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2008 2:21 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein Thus spake John F. Kennison circa 10/07/2008 10:53 AM: > Okay, suppose someone else simply entered some numbers in a Suduko > grid and said, "I wonder whether there is any solution that > incorporates these numbers, and, if there is a solution, is it > unique?" I concede that the person who did this invented the problem. > But if I prove that there is a solution and that it is unique, I > haven't invented that fact as that fact was implicit in the original > question, but I have discovered that the fact was implicit, have I > not? Well, what you're saying depends on your usage of your words, particularly the words "fact", "implicit", and "discover". But to answer as directly as possible, all you did was transform something some other person invented. So, yes, you invented the first sentence (the solution to the puzzle). And you invented the second sentence (the statement that the solution is unique). And you invented the string of sentences that "proves" the two previous sentences. The puzzle creator did not explicitly invent those two sentences or the string of sentences that constructs the proof. It's just like folding a piece of paper. Someone hands you a piece of paper and you fold it into an origami swan. Did you _discover_ the swan? Or did you invent the swan? I don't intend to play around with the definitions of words. But playing around with words is a _great_ demonstration of Wittgenstein's beef with platonic mathematicians. All they're doing is playing around with symbols. It's not science. It's symbol manipulation. There is no discovery in the same sense that scientists mean. It is invention. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
[FRIAM] FW: sfx News: Three Tuesdays Tomorrow Night Instead
I am taking the liberty of forwarding this to the FRIAM group because I think
it is such a great opportunity. It is the kind of thing large numbers of
people pay big money to go here in some hotel ball room somewhere and it is
happening right here in Santa Fe.Please see below.
Hope to see you there on Wednesday (and the following Tuesday).
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
- Original Message -
From: Don Begley
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: 10/7/2008 10:11:04 AM
Subject: sfx News: Three Tuesdays Tomorrow Night Instead
Presidential Debate Looms:
Three Tuesdays -- Unwinding the Rhetoric -- Postponed to October 8 at 6:30 pm
The second session of Tom Johnson's Three Tuesdays workshop (described below)
has been rescheduled for tomorrow night, October 8, to avoid conflict with
tonight's presidential debate. The time and location remain the same, 6:30 at
Santa Fe Complex.
Swimming Against the Flow
(October 8, 6:30 pm)
Presidential debates; vice presidents, too; ads, emails and web pages: claims
and counterclaims abound. Come to this second workshop at Santa Fe Complex to
learn how to look beyond the scripts and see what is really going on this this
fall's campaigns.
>From soap to soapboxes, ads, debaters and talking heads work overtime to
>control or influence the flow of information available to voters. Learn how to
>swim against the flow, by navigating upstream through the flood of information
>around us to find where the information comes from and investigating its
>accuracy in this second of the Three Tuesdays workshops before November's
>elections.
On Tuesday night, October 7, journalist Tom Johnson will show workshop
participants how to track data to their upstream sources. Web pages and their
data are not static events; learn how to find the "signs" of where they came
from, who owns the site(s) and sometimes who links to them. Johnson will
discuss how investigators can use these attributes to advantage and also take a
step back to consider the "architecture of sophisticated web searching."
The third and final workshop, on October 14, will explore the payoff for the
research done by the workshop's participants: following the money to see what
and who is supporting the campaign. This final workshop looks at web sites that
make it easier to follow the election money and focuses on how to get their
data into a spreadsheet. Then what? A short intro to slicing-and-dicing the
numbers. (Even if you are a spreadsheet maven, please come and act as a coach.)
These workshops will give participants an opportunity to do some hands-on
("On-line hands-on", that is) investigation of New Mexico politics.
Participants are also encouraged to bring a laptop if they can. After learning
to do the online research needed to understand what's happening in the fall
political campaign, participants will have the opportunity to do homework
assignments and contribute to the Three Tuesdays wiki so their discoveries will
be available to the general public.
Everyone is welcome but space will be limited. A suggested donation of $45
covers all three events or $20 will help produce each session. Click here to
sign up.
Tom Johnson's 30-year career path in journalism is one that regularly moved
from the classroom to the newsroom and back. He worked for TIME magazine in El
Salvador in the mid-80s, was the founding editor of MacWEEK, and a deputy
editor of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. His areas of interest are analytic
journalism, dynamic simulation models of publishing systems, complexity theory,
the application of Geographic Information Systems in journalism and the impact
of the digital revolution on journalism and journalism education. He is the
founder and co-director of the Institute for Analytic Journalism and a member
of the Advisory Board of Santa Fe Complex.
Santa Fe Complex is located in the Railyard Art District within walking
distance of the hotels, restaurants and shops at the plaza downtown. We're
housed in two facilities, the project space at 624 Agua Fria and the work space
at 632 Agua Fria.
The conference area contains meeting rooms and facilities for short-term use
associated with on-going sfComplex projects. The project space houses the great
room, where we hold events and offer Internet access, working facilities, a
coffee lounge and work carrels for laptop users.
While there is parking at 624 Agua Fria, the Romero Street parking lot is more
conveniently located for the 632 facility. Romero St. is an old-style Santa Fe
ox-cart road just east of the 624 driveway. Follow it until it opens up to two
lanes and turn hard right into the parking lot for 632.
Here's a map to our location. For more information, call Don Begley at
505/216.7562.
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