Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-09 Thread glen e. p. ropella
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As with any MS project, one must start with the use cases.  If you
don't start with your use cases, then you'll end up wandering around,
mixing things up and forgetting what you're doing.  As they say if you
don't know where you're going, you'll never get there.

Hussein's story implies a use case, except it's got too many
mechanistic details.  You want the use case to be phenomenal, not
mechanistic.  So, the second (implied) story works better: How can we
undo it?  What would you _do_ with this model?  Can you perform any
experiments (in vitro upon a room full of participants - or in vivo
on an actual government) against which to validate?  If so, what would
those experiments look like and what data would they generate?

Those are the questions you have to ask first, before you get all
mechanical on each other. ;-)  Worst case, if you don't ask these
questions _first_, you'll inscribe your conclusions into the model.
You'll create a model that's nothing more than a justificationist
tautology.  You'll probably _still_ commit inscription error even if you
do start with the use cases, depending on the complicatedness of the
experiments or type of validation; but your inscription be easier to
spot and correct as you go along.


Hussein Abbass wrote circa 11-05-08 06:36 PM:
 Let me put this in a simple story. Prof. Clever is the dean of
 Faculty of Idiots. Prof Clever would like to be a dictator in a
 democratic society. He appoints 3 other Professors to form a strategy
 committee. He believes in separating strategy from execution, thanks
 to all the wonderful literature in management on that topic. Prof.
 Clever cancelled most Faculty public meetings and created many
 committees. These committees seek people opinion to have a truly
 democratic environment. He told the people we are a civilized
 society. We should not confront each other in public. Issues can be
 solved smoothly in a better environment and within a small group.
 Public meetings are now to simply give presentations that no
 controversial issue is discussed; their information content is 0 to
 anyone attending them. But they demonstrate democracy and support the
 members of the Faculty of Idiots’ right for dissemination of
 information. Prof. Clever promotes good values. Important values that
 Prof. Clever is promoting are trust and confidentiality. In meetings,
 people need to trust each other to facilitate exchange of
 information. But this requires confidentiality; otherwise problems
 will emerge. Obviously, meetings are called by management, members of
 the meetings are engineered by management, the whole social network
 is well-engineered such that different type of information do not get
 crossed from one sub-graph to another. The faculty of Idiots is the
 happiest faculty on earth. No public confrontation means no fights, a
 well-engineered civilized society. Small group meetings are dominated
 with Prof. Clever or simply take place to tick a box in a report.
 There is only one person in the Faculty of Idiots who knows
 everything, Prof. Clever. No one else knows more than anyone else to
 the extent that everyone simply knows nothing. But everyone is happy,
 everyone feels important because he/she is trusted and everyone feels
 they are well-informed of the task they are performing! Prof. Clever
 eliminated competition, no leader can emerge in this social system
 that he does not approve. Prof. Clever is the nice guy that everyone
 loves and respect. He listens, he is socially friendly, and after all
 is indeed Clever!
 
 [...]
 
 The harder question for me is, how can we undo it if it is engineered
 as above?


- -- 
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://tempusdictum.com

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Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-09 Thread Steve Smith
Looking all the way back to Mohammed's original question which was 
nicely concise:


   /Can we model/simulate how in a democracy that is inherently open (as/

   /stated in the constitution: for the people, by the people etc..) there/

   /emerges decision masking  structures emerge that actively obfuscate/

   /the participatory nature of the democratic decision making for their/

   /ends?/

I challenge us (at Glen's urging) to come up with /Use Case Scenarios/ 
that would help move us toward even the simplest of toy models.  So far, 
our brainstorming has yield some very interesting ideas/observations:


We've already begun discussing possible parts of a model:

1) Hussein has proposed at least part of a model, which I believe is an 
attempt to model specific agents who are actively seeking to cause 
Isolation and Localization for their own purposes.


2) Ivan has proposed ( I think?) that we consider modeling simple 
motivations (emotions) of (at least) two classes of Agents (Prof. 
Clevers and Gullibles)?  He also has proposed (I think?) building on top 
of models of unconscious narration generation and fitting (like 
overfitting a model to data?).


3) Eric has outlined an intuitive set of features for an Agent Model:

   You need 1) agents with different agendas, 2) the ability to assess
   and usurp rules created by other agents, 3) the ability to force
   other agents to adopt your rules. Note, also, that in this
   particular case, the corruption is accomplished by stacking
   contradictory rules on top of each other. Thus you need 4) an
   ability to implement contradictory rules, or at least choose between
   so-called rules.

4) Mohammed contributed (along with the original question) the idea that 
an intermediate mechanism of Information Hiding might be at play.


5) Jan Hauser (lost to the list but included in one of my missives) 
contributed the possibility that Ken Arrow's Impossibility Theorem may 
have a play here.  From Wikipedia:


   /In social choice theory
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_choice_theory, *Arrow’s
   impossibility theorem*, the *General Possibility Theorem*, or
   *Arrow’s paradox*, states that, when voters have three or more
   distinct alternatives (options), no voting system can convert the
   *ranked preferences* of individuals into a community-wide (complete
   and transitive) ranking while also meeting a certain set of
   criteria. These criteria are called //unrestricted domain
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unrestricted_domain,
   //non-dictatorship http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-dictatorship,
   //Pareto efficiency
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency, and //independence
   of irrelevant alternatives
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_irrelevant_alternatives./

I'm not sure it is responsive to Mohammed's original question as stated, 
but may be very important in a more general question implied.


I may have missed some other contributions in this discussion so far, 
but I hope this summary helps if some of us are interested in actually 
pulling a simple  model or partial answer together.


I'm all for idle speculation, I spend most of my waking hours (and some 
of my sleeping ones) in that state, but I heard here what felt like some 
momentum.


Glen seems the most formal of us in his approach to model building, 
perhaps he can continue to lead us out of the morass we often find 
ourselves in (I can only think of the mythical character of Sambo 
(apologies for the use of a possibly inappropriate racial slur from the 
late 19th century)  arranging for Tigers chasing eachother around a tree 
until they turn to butter).


Carry on!
 - Steve

Glen -

I think your point is well articulated.  And I think if we are trying 
to build (or even discover) such a model, your arguments for starting 
with use cases are valid.


But I think Hussein's Story contains his belief about the mechanisms 
of how a particular institutional dynamic works.  I believe Hussein 
already *has* a model of this phenomenon and he just (tried to?) 
explain it to us through the basic requirements: (Isolation and 
Localization) and an anecdotal explanation of mechanisms that could 
give rise to them.


Unfortunately, I don't hear us proposing to build a model we can use 
(much less verify) and therefore I don't see us building use cases 
anytime soon.  Who would use this model?


I suggest (without negative judgment) that this is why a lot of our 
(FRIAM) discussions fit this description to a tee:


/then you'll end up wandering around,
mixing things up and forgetting what you're doing.  As they say if you
don't know where you're going, you'll never get there./

Among those of us who have been roughly discussing this, I'd like to 
raise your challenge and ask the question... what do we want to do 
with such a model if we can build it (or discover it)?


   1. Provide it to powerful decision makers so they can make better
  decisions (or make 

Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-09 Thread Steve Smith
Vlad (what internal narrative of mine has me repeatedly saluting you as 
Ivan?) -


I understand your point about Narrative better now with this post.

As I understand your point, the obfuscation in a group is like the 
narrative in an individual.   Some collective set of actions occurs over 
time which we may or may not have complete knowledge of but which are 
presumably in the interest of one or two general sets of goals 
(political agendas, war on terror, etc.) which are themselves 
characterized as narratives.  These actions as observed (usually through 
reporting by others) taken as a whole yield some consonance and some 
dissonance.  The narrative-keepers (political parties, etc.) then craft 
a new narrative which matches the impedance of those observables with 
their own preferred (evolving) narratives.   This may include denying or 
treating as disinformation some of the observables (see Creationism v. 
Evolution).


Mohammed's original question assumes that decision masking structures 
emerge.  I think (as I mentioned once before) that this modeling problem 
is a meta-modeling problem.  We are, in fact, modeling how people model 
things intuitively and how those models play together in the context of 
a (more) formal model (system of rules or laws).


The rabbit hole gets deeper.   Once again, I appeal to those with more 
formal theories of modeling to keep us from falling down it too fast.


- Steve


The outline Steve has provided is very helpful. Much of Eric’s ideas 
governing a group of agents is what I imagine happens within a single 
agent. The Narrative then is constructed to eliminate the memory of 
discord. The winning subagent ( perhaps Hussein’s Dr.Clever) rewrites 
the experience to mollify other internals (maintaining his rank). I 
think this can be extended to explain Mohammed’s view of obfuscation.


If my view is correct what we see as atrocious  behaviour between 
people seems also  to occur within individuals. These crimes are 
simply exported to the real world. Threat and fear seem important for 
internal decisions and so it is natural to assume they would continue 
to be employed externally.


Gullibility is like an open window letting in Narratives  that can 
distort all the internal workings of the individual. So intelligent 
individuals always need to be unguard against gullibility.


Which seems always to appeal to particular emotions.

Pamela’s dismay with Chomsky suggests, that she assumes that his 
criticism of US policy should be reflected by a particular world view. 
I think Chomsky may be an honest observer but in his dispassionate 
honesty he is less than a good drinking partner. Honesty and 
collegiality are not necessarily linked.


Vlad,

*From:*friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] 
*On Behalf Of *Steve Smith

*Sent:* May-09-11 2:17 PM
*To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
*Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and 
it's Fruits)


Looking all the way back to Mohammed's original question which was 
nicely concise:


/Can we model/simulate how in a democracy that is inherently open (as/
/stated in the constitution: for the people, by the people etc..) there/
/emerges decision masking  structures emerge that actively obfuscate/
/the participatory nature of the democratic decision making for their/
/ends?/

I challenge us (at Glen's urging) to come up with /Use Case Scenarios/ 
that would help move us toward even the simplest of toy models.  So 
far, our brainstorming has yield some very interesting ideas/observations:


We've already begun discussing possible parts of a model:

1) Hussein has proposed at least part of a model, which I believe is 
an attempt to model specific agents who are actively seeking to cause 
Isolation and Localization for their own purposes.


2) Ivan has proposed ( I think?) that we consider modeling simple 
motivations (emotions) of (at least) two classes of Agents (Prof. 
Clevers and Gullibles)?  He also has proposed (I think?) building on 
top of models of unconscious narration generation and fitting (like 
overfitting a model to data?).


3) Eric has outlined an intuitive set of features for an Agent Model:

You need 1) agents with different agendas, 2) the ability to assess 
and usurp rules created by other agents, 3) the ability to force other 
agents to adopt your rules. Note, also, that in this particular case, 
the corruption is accomplished by stacking contradictory rules on top 
of each other. Thus you need 4) an ability to implement contradictory 
rules, or at least choose between so-called rules.


4) Mohammed contributed (along with the original question) the idea 
that an intermediate mechanism of Information Hiding might be at play.


5) Jan Hauser (lost to the list but included in one of my missives) 
contributed the possibility that Ken Arrow's Impossibility Theorem may 
have a play here.  From Wikipedia:


/In social choice theory 
http

Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-09 Thread glen e. p. ropella
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Steve Smith wrote circa 11-05-09 12:16 PM:
 I challenge us (at Glen's urging) to come up with /Use Case Scenarios/

I _hate_ that word: scenarios.  It's jargonal and off-putting to me,
which perhaps relates to the accusation that I have more formal methods
at hand. ;-)

I think it's best to focus on what/how we could measure what we care
about.  To model is very closely related to to measure ... and in my
formality, if you can't measure something, you can't model it.  So, the
real question goes back to those of us who were stimulated by Mohammed's
question.

We'll have to formulate some measures for openness, participation, and
obfuscation.  Now, before Vlad hits me again with his argument that
circumscription begets conclusion, I can mitigate it by saying that the
measures should be parallax.  There have to be _enough_ variation in the
measures so that the interested parties can champion at least one of
them as their own.  For example, when I brought up the initiative
process, that is a form of participation.  If we included that mechanism
in our democracy, I'd be forced to say that it is participatory, even if
Obama had inherited the throne, all the legislators were cronies, and
the court were kangaroo.  But the initiative process isn't the only
participatory mechanism.  And a measure that ... measures that type of
participation would be fundamentally different from a measure of
representativeness of, say, the electoral system, the parliamentary
system, etc.

Similarly, we should come up with a suite of measures for openness.
Obama's execution of bin Laden, interviews on 60 minutes, and keeping
the pictures secret is a good example.  We should pick measures that
evaluate Obama's disclosure as closed and some as open.

In the end, what we have is a opportunity for abduction.  We have at
least 3 predicates (open/closed, [non]participatory, and
transparent/opaque).  Ideally, we have several predicates in each category.

The number of solutions that satisfy those predicates should be infinite
and explorable.  We should then be able to come up with several
mechanisms, including the families implied by the stories outlined by
Eric, Mohammed, Hussein, and Vlad.  In the end, a model capable of
instantiating even _some_ of those satisficing mechanisms should help us
be more open-minded about how obfuscation arises in democracy.

- -- 
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://tempusdictum.com

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Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-09 Thread glen e. p. ropella
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glen e. p. ropella wrote circa 11-05-09 02:12 PM:
 Similarly, we should come up with a suite of measures for openness.
 Obama's execution of bin Laden, interviews on 60 minutes, and keeping
 the pictures secret is a good example.  We should pick measures that
 evaluate Obama's disclosure as closed and some as open.

I just had the thought that FOIA responses might be one measure of openness:

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a788007182
http://www.flickr.com/photos/xepera/5705434466/in/photostream

I'm sure others could be derived from places like the OECD:
http://www.oecd.org/

Of course, if we wanted to capture the co-evolution of obfuscation for
individual _privacy_ in response to intrusive devices like credit card
databases or traffic cameras, we'd have to examine something like the
rates of spoofed registration/login data or light scattering license
plate covers in relation to the rates of usage for the intrusive tech.

I'm sure the EFF and white hacker sites could help there:
http://www.eff.org/

- -- 
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://tempusdictum.com

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Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-08 Thread Mohammed El-Beltagy
Eric,

Thats an interesting way of looking at it. As complex game of information
hiding.

I was thinking along the line of of having a schema for rule creation.  The
schema here is like a constitution, and players can generate new rules based
on that schema to promote their self interest. For rules to become laws
they have to be the choice on the majority (or subject to some other social
choice mechanism), this system  allows  for group formation and coalition
building to get the new rules passed into laws. The interesting bit is how
the drive for self interest amongst some of those groups and
their coalitions can give rise to rules renders the original schema and/or
the social choice mechanism ineffective. By ineffective, I mean that they
yield results and behavior that run counter to the purpose for which they
were  originally designed.

What do you think?

Cheers,

Mohammed

On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 2:44 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES e...@psu.edu wrote:

 I can't see that this posted, sorry if it is a duplicate 


 Mohammed,
 Being totally unqualified to help you with this problem... it seems
 interesting to me because most models I know of this sort (social systems
 models) are about information acquisition and deployment. That is, the
 modeled critters try to find out stuff, and then they do actions dependent
 upon what they find. If we are modeling active obfuscation, then we would be
 doing the opposite - we would be modeling an information-hiding game. Of
 course, there is lots of game theory work on information hiding in two
 critter encounters (I'm thinking
 evolutionary-game-theory-looking-at-deception). I haven't seen anything,
 though, looking at distributed information hiding.

 The idea that you could create a system full of autonomous agents in which
 information ends up hidden, but no particular individuals have done the
 hiding, is kind of cool. Seems like the type of thing encryption guys could
 get into (or already are into, or have already moved past).

 Eric

 On Fri, May 6, 2011 10:05 PM, *Mohammed El-Beltagy moham...@computer.org
 * wrote:

 I have a question I would like to pose to the group in that regard:

 Can we model/simulate how in a democracy that is inherently open (as
 stated in the constitution: for the people, by the people etc..) there
 emerges decision masking  structures emerge that actively obfuscate
 the participatory nature of the democratic decision making for their
 ends?



 
 FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
 Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
 lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org




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http://twitter.com/#!/perfectionatic

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Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-08 Thread lrudolph
Eric, Mohammed, et al.:

Alex Poddiakov, in Moscow, has done work that seems to me like it 
*might* be related to this question; for instance, on what he calls 
Trojan horse learning.  I refer you to his website, where various 
manuscripts (some in Russian, some in Russglish) are available and 
others are at least pointed to. http://epee.hse.ru/Poddiakov

Lee Rudolph

 I can't see that this posted, sorry if it is a duplicate 
 
 Mohammed,
 Being totally unqualified to help you with this problem... it
 seems interesting to me because most models I know of this sort (social 
 systems
 models) are about information acquisition and deployment. That is, the modeled
 critters try to find out stuff, and then they do actions dependent upon what
 they find. If we are modeling active obfuscation, then we would be doing the
 opposite - we would be modeling an information-hiding game. Of course, there 
 is
 lots of game theory work on information hiding in two critter encounters (I'm
 thinking evolutionary-game-theory-looking-at-deception). I haven't seen
 anything, though, looking at distributed information hiding. 
 
 The idea
 that you could create a system full of autonomous agents in which information
 ends up hidden, but no particular individuals have done the hiding, is kind of
 cool. Seems like the type of thing encryption guys could get into (or already
 are into, or have already moved past).
 
 Eric
 
 On Fri, May  6, 2011
 10:05 PM, Mohammed El-Beltagy moham...@computer.org
 wrote:
 
 
 I have a question I would like to pose to the group in that regard:
 
 Can we model/simulate how in a democracy that is inherently open (as
 stated in the constitution: for the people, by the people etc..) there
 emerges decision masking  structures emerge that actively obfuscate
 the participatory nature of the democratic decision making for their
 ends?
 
 
 
 
 




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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-08 Thread Vladimyr Burachynsky
To Mohammed,

 

I have similar thoughts but rather than a system of Rules I thought of a
system of interacting  self preoccupied emotions. The agent has a roulette
wheel of options with weights assigned randomly to make some choices more
common than others, no fixed rules a priori. Let us assume the wheel starts
out fair. But emotions add weights without public revelation.

 

For instance if a choice requires effort it is less likely to be
implemented. If a choice requires the sacrifice of resources then again less
likely.

If a choice requires some  one else's effort such as an army it is more
likely to be implemented. The agent explores emotions and options before
making a decision.

 

It seems that the wheel has numbers for public interest  but something
extraordinary must happen to unweight such options before an agent
sacrifices something. Selfishness does appear to follow some rules but it is
unclear how they are arranged.

For instance in a panic situation women with babies are assumed to have a
priority but unaccompanied children and women  get trampled to death. So the
act of sacrifice for children seems suspect. The assumption that women with
children have priority suggests that society has such a preference but the
way it is selectively implemented is curious. The scoundrel must be aware
that others will make sacrifices that he or she is unwilling to make.

Models have been built for simulating panic scenarios perhaps there lies a
starting point.

I see a programming difficulty where the outcome of some event must iterated
through each agent to get a single outcome.

Vladimyr Ivan Burachynsky PhD

 

 

 mailto:vbur...@shaw.ca vbur...@shaw.ca

 

 

 

120-1053 Beaverhill Blvd.

Winnipeg,Manitoba, R2J3R2

Canada 

 (204) 2548321 Land

(204) 8016064  Cell

 

 

 

From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf
Of Mohammed El-Beltagy
Sent: May-08-11 5:56 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's
Fruits)

 

Eric, 

 

Thats an interesting way of looking at it. As complex game of information
hiding. 

 

I was thinking along the line of of having a schema for rule creation.  The
schema here is like a constitution, and players can generate new rules based
on that schema to promote their self interest. For rules to become laws
they have to be the choice on the majority (or subject to some other social
choice mechanism), this system  allows  for group formation and coalition
building to get the new rules passed into laws. The interesting bit is how
the drive for self interest amongst some of those groups and their
coalitions can give rise to rules renders the original schema and/or the
social choice mechanism ineffective. By ineffective, I mean that they
yield results and behavior that run counter to the purpose for which they
were  originally designed. 

 

What do you think?

 

Cheers, 

 

Mohammed 

 

On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 2:44 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES e...@psu.edu wrote:

I can't see that this posted, sorry if it is a duplicate 

 

Mohammed,
Being totally unqualified to help you with this problem... it seems
interesting to me because most models I know of this sort (social systems
models) are about information acquisition and deployment. That is, the
modeled critters try to find out stuff, and then they do actions dependent
upon what they find. If we are modeling active obfuscation, then we would be
doing the opposite - we would be modeling an information-hiding game. Of
course, there is lots of game theory work on information hiding in two
critter encounters (I'm thinking
evolutionary-game-theory-looking-at-deception). I haven't seen anything,
though, looking at distributed information hiding. 

The idea that you could create a system full of autonomous agents in which
information ends up hidden, but no particular individuals have done the
hiding, is kind of cool. Seems like the type of thing encryption guys could
get into (or already are into, or have already moved past).

Eric

On Fri, May 6, 2011 10:05 PM, Mohammed El-Beltagy moham...@computer.org
wrote:

I have a question I would like to pose to the group in that regard:
 
Can we model/simulate how in a democracy that is inherently open (as
stated in the constitution: for the people, by the people etc..) there
emerges decision masking  structures emerge that actively obfuscate
the participatory nature of the democratic decision making for their
ends?
 
 



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org




-- 
http://perfectionatic.blogspot.com/
http://twitter.com/#!/perfectionatic


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures

Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-08 Thread Vladimyr Burachynsky
Eric and Mohammed,

 

I don’t think anyone can be Off base at this point in sketching out a scenario. 
 But you might be trying to tackle Goliath in the first round!

 

Firstly I assume human beings are not very bright, They seem to use extremely 
simple rules of self satisfaction, though the emotions might be more 
complicated.

It is not widely accepted but dogs can figure things out as quickly as humans 
on occasion and there is no wearisome Narrative. 

I look at it from the point of view that agents are simple  but Stupid . This 
gave me a headache until I realized that many human beings actually do not know 
why they did something in particular, then and only then do they invent the 
Narrative. They are not actually attempting to deceive anyone  but simply wish 
to convince me that they did something for a Good reason. They avoid 
acknowledging the fact that they did not think.They then drop into the socially 
acceptable lexicon to explain everything. Often I have remarked that the act of 
speaking out loud convinces others as well as most importantly  the speaker 
himself.. So the speaker is lying to himself first and then accepts this as his 
story and probably could pass a lie detector test afterwards.

 

The fact that narratives are spun is a red herring. They did not know how they 
made the decision. That frightened the hell out of me in complex engineering 
projects. I had no way to anticipate human error  of this sort. People actually 
can construct insane scenarios to motivate themselves and then totally forget 
them. This form of misperception is internal to the brain. I have watched 
audiences fall for magicians tricks so completely that I have been stunned into 
disbelief. Yet it is so repeatable. I have seen some references to hidden Blind 
spots in reason explored by neurologists. Generally I think Biology was too 
cheap and lazy to give us a completely functional brain. I will be the first to 
admit to having difficulty with my brain at times.

 

To cope we have a pervasive belief that we are intelligent in spite of many 
serious flaws. As a scientist I consider determining the extent of thinking 
important. I am forced by language to say what I Think for lack of an 
alternative. I repeat the phrase for more than half a century but still do not 
understand what it actually means, nor do the philosophers directly address the 
act. Seems they were more preoccupied by passion in contradiction.

 

We say Man  is a learning animal which implies it progresses somewhat. But I 
suspect culturally we have found many insidious means to prevent learning. Why 
? Is it unconscious. Somewhat like the vexed mother fed up answering questions 
about the color of the sky and butterflies and moths. Ignorant people are 
easier to control, suggests history but why?

 

Let’s build something Stupid (Whimsical and arrogant)rather than Intelligent. 
If we have no idea what one is how can we answer what the opposite actually 
entails. An agent should have more than one choice of action and some of those 
should be utterly insane.

 

Your institutional Review boards you describe sound  as nasty as a Byzantine 
Palace Intrigue. So let’s start much simpler. For the present the agent should 
not know what is in his best interest , that is only to be determined by which 
emotion dominates at any moment. He can make up stories afterwards. I often 
consider the role of Historians that of making reasonable explanations out of 
stupid events. The conspiracy theorist will hate this if it bears out.

 

As for the gains  first we waste time looking for reasons where there are none. 
Next we can find some way of warning individuals not to encourage group think. 
With near to 7 Billion on this planet maybe it is time to alert ourselves to 
the flaws in our own brains.; Fear,  Gullibility, Conformity, short sighted 
self interest emotional reasoning. In the early stages I would limit the agents 
to simply responding and not have them try to become operators of other agents, 
but that seems to be the goal. Jochen forwarded an interesting article to the 
group on the ecology of the mind, I have yet to study the material but it looks 
intriguing .

 

It is an old joke , but the more people in the room the dumber it gets.

 

 

Vladimyr Ivan Burachynsky PhD

 

 

 mailto:vbur...@shaw.ca vbur...@shaw.ca

 

 

 

120-1053 Beaverhill Blvd.

Winnipeg,Manitoba, R2J3R2

Canada 

 (204) 2548321 Land

(204) 8016064  Cell

 

 

 

From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of 
ERIC P. CHARLES
Sent: May-08-11 4:00 PM
To: Mohammed El-Beltagy
Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

 

I think I know what you are talking about, but I'm not sure what the best way 
to model it would be, or what we would gain from the modeling exercise. Are you 
talking about something like this?

Institutional review

Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-08 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, May 08, 2011 at 06:17:04PM -0500, Vladimyr Burachynsky wrote:
  
 
 It is an old joke , but the more people in the room the dumber it gets.
 

Having grown up on a sheep farm, I can say this definitely applies to
sheep. An individual sheep is quite difficult to control, and I have a
lot of respect for its intelligence. Sheep in mobs, on the other hand,
are gobsmackingly stupid, and it only requires a man and his dog to
control a mob of a hundred animals...

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-08 Thread ERIC P. CHARLES
Vladimyr,
I agree with you that my situation was too complex, that was
part of my point (i.e., that if that is what Mohammed is thinking about, it is
awfully complex). But he wants to model systems with rules, in which rules made
for purpose A can be corrupted so they do not serve A, and rather serve some
other agent's goal B. I'm not sure what the simplest simulation would be that
allow such phenomenon. Still seems like it would need to be oddly complicated.


Such ideas connect strongly with the notion of exaptation in
evolutionary biology, and with simulation work on the evolution of deceptive
signaling. Alas, I'm not sure they connect strongly to your notion of modeling
emotion, or my notion of modeling distributed information
hiding.

Eric

P.S. While I agree with you about the nature of most
people, I try to never to underestimate people's amazing ability to make very
simple situaitons into very complicated situations, especially when in groups.
Take the US tax code for example.

On Sun, May  8, 2011 08:35 PM, Vladimyr Burachynsky vbur...@shaw.ca wrote:

Perhaps Gullibility is an advantage in small societies but it strikes me as
very hard to explain  in one as large as ours.
Gulibility and conformity have been stumbling blocks with regards to
evolution at least for me.
I can understand that Human Beings directed sheep evolution for our benefit
but our own seems so alike

Vladimyr Ivan Burachynsky PhD


vbur...@shaw.ca


Sky Drive Site 
http://cid-14a5cdb09aee4237.photos.live.com/self.aspx/CSA/Braiding%20Simulat
ions/ExperStruct.wmv

120-1053 Beaverhill Blvd.
Winnipeg,Manitoba, R2J3R2
Canada 
 (204) 2548321 Land
(204) 8016064  Cell



-Original Message-
From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf
Of Russell Standish
Sent: May-08-11 7:26 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's
Fruits)

On Sun, May 08, 2011 at 06:17:04PM -0500, Vladimyr Burachynsky wrote:
  
 
 It is an old joke , but the more people in the room the dumber it gets.
 

Having grown up on a sheep farm, I can say this definitely applies to sheep.
An individual sheep is quite difficult to control, and I have a lot of
respect for its intelligence. Sheep in mobs, on the other hand, are
gobsmackingly stupid, and it only requires a man and his dog to control a
mob of a hundred animals...

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives,
unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org




Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-08 Thread ERIC P. CHARLES
 this in a simple story. Prof. Clever is the
dean of Faculty of Idiots. Prof Clever would like to be a dictator in a
democratic society. He appoints 3 other Professors to form a strategy
committee. He believes in separating strategy from execution, thanks to all the
wonderful literature in management on that topic. Prof. Clever cancelled most
Faculty public meetings and created many committees. These committees seek
people opinion to have a truly democratic environment. He told the people we
are a civilized society. We should not confront each other in public. Issues
can be solved smoothly in a better environment and within a small group. Public
meetings are now to simply give presentations that no controversial issue is
discussed; their information content is 0 to anyone attending them. But they
demonstrate democracy and support the members of the Faculty of Idiots’ right
for dissemination of information. Prof. Clever promotes good values. Important
values that Prof. Clever is promoting are trust and confidentiality. In
meetings, people need to trust each other to facilitate exchange of
information. But this requires confidentiality; otherwise problems will emerge.
Obviously, meetings are called by management, members of the meetings are
engineered
by management, the whole social network is well-engineered such that different
type of information do not get crossed from one sub-graph to another. The
faculty of Idiots is the happiest faculty on earth. No public confrontation
means no fights, a well-engineered civilized society. Small group meetings are
dominated with Prof. Clever or simply take place to tick a box in a report.
There is only one person in the Faculty of Idiots who knows everything, Prof.
Clever. No one else knows more than anyone else to the extent that everyone
simply knows nothing. But everyone is happy, everyone feels important because
he/she is trusted and everyone feels they are well-informed of the task they
are performing! Prof. Clever eliminated competition, no leader can emerge in
this social system that he does not approve. Prof. Clever is the nice guy that
everyone loves and respect. He listens, he is socially friendly, and after all
is indeed Clever!

















 









So! we can get obfuscation to emerge. There are so
many old political tools to do so; take political propaganda as a powerful one
among many others! There are many different variations to do it, not just the
above model.

















 









The harder question for me is, how can we undo it if it
is engineered as above?

















 









Why is it hard to break it? Because the two principles
representing the sufficient conditions for its emergence rely on social values!
Any attempt to break it, will be met with resistance in a part of the
population and will be called unethical, if not illegal! It is a robust
self-regulating strategy.

















 









Another hard question is how can we get the social
network to recognize obfuscation in the previous setup? If they can’t
recognise
it, they can’t do anything about it!

















 









Finally, notice what I defined above as obfuscation and
framed it as a bad thing is indeed a form of democracy!!

















 









Cheers













Hussein















 









 











From: friam-boun...@redfish.com
[mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Vladimyr Burachynsky
Sent: Monday, 9 May 2011 9:17 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

















 









Eric and Mohammed,











 







I don’t think anyone can be Off base at this point in sketching
out a scenario.  But you might be trying to tackle Goliath in the first
round!











 







Firstly I assume human beings are not very bright, They seem to
use extremely simple rules of self satisfaction, though the emotions might be
more complicated.









It is not widely accepted but dogs can figure things out as
quickly as humans on occasion and there is no wearisome Narrative. 









I look at it from the point of view that agents are simple
 but Stupid . This gave me a headache until I realized that many human
beings actually do not know why they did something in particular, then and only
then do they invent the Narrative. They are not actually attempting to deceive
anyone  but simply wish to convince me that they did something for a Good
reason. They avoid acknowledging the fact that they did not think.They then
drop into the socially acceptable lexicon to explain everything. Often I have
remarked that the act of speaking out loud convinces others as well as most
importantly  the speaker himself.. So the speaker is lying to himself
first and then accepts this as his story and probably could pass a lie detector
test afterwards.











 







The fact that narratives are spun is a red herring. They did not
know how

[FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits)

2011-05-07 Thread ERIC P. CHARLES
I can't see that this posted, sorry if it is a duplicate 

Mohammed,
Being totally unqualified to help you with this problem... it
seems interesting to me because most models I know of this sort (social systems
models) are about information acquisition and deployment. That is, the modeled
critters try to find out stuff, and then they do actions dependent upon what
they find. If we are modeling active obfuscation, then we would be doing the
opposite - we would be modeling an information-hiding game. Of course, there is
lots of game theory work on information hiding in two critter encounters (I'm
thinking evolutionary-game-theory-looking-at-deception). I haven't seen
anything, though, looking at distributed information hiding. 

The idea
that you could create a system full of autonomous agents in which information
ends up hidden, but no particular individuals have done the hiding, is kind of
cool. Seems like the type of thing encryption guys could get into (or already
are into, or have already moved past).

Eric

On Fri, May  6, 2011
10:05 PM, Mohammed El-Beltagy moham...@computer.org
wrote:


I have a question I would like to pose to the group in that regard:

Can we model/simulate how in a democracy that is inherently open (as
stated in the constitution: for the people, by the people etc..) there
emerges decision masking  structures emerge that actively obfuscate
the participatory nature of the democratic decision making for their
ends?





FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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