To Mohammed,
I have similar thoughts but rather than a system of Rules I thought of a system of interacting self preoccupied emotions. The agent has a roulette wheel of options with weights assigned randomly to make some choices more common than others, no fixed rules a priori. Let us assume the wheel starts out fair. But emotions add weights without public revelation. For instance if a choice requires effort it is less likely to be implemented. If a choice requires the sacrifice of resources then again less likely. If a choice requires some one else's effort such as an army it is more likely to be implemented. The agent explores emotions and options before making a decision. It seems that the wheel has numbers for public interest but something extraordinary must happen to unweight such options before an agent sacrifices something. Selfishness does appear to follow some rules but it is unclear how they are arranged. For instance in a panic situation women with babies are assumed to have a priority but unaccompanied children and women get trampled to death. So the act of sacrifice for children seems suspect. The assumption that women with children have priority suggests that society has such a preference but the way it is selectively implemented is curious. The scoundrel must be aware that others will make sacrifices that he or she is unwilling to make. Models have been built for simulating panic scenarios perhaps there lies a starting point. I see a programming difficulty where the outcome of some event must iterated through each agent to get a single outcome. Vladimyr Ivan Burachynsky PhD <mailto:vbur...@shaw.ca> vbur...@shaw.ca 120-1053 Beaverhill Blvd. Winnipeg,Manitoba, R2J3R2 Canada (204) 2548321 Land (204) 8016064 Cell From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Mohammed El-Beltagy Sent: May-08-11 5:56 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Modeling obfuscation (was - Terrorosity and it's Fruits) Eric, Thats an interesting way of looking at it. As complex game of information hiding. I was thinking along the line of of having a schema for rule creation. The schema here is like a constitution, and players can generate new rules based on that schema to promote their self interest. For rules to become "laws" they have to be the choice on the majority (or subject to some other social choice mechanism), this system allows for group formation and coalition building to get the new rules passed into laws. The interesting bit is how the drive for self interest amongst some of those groups and their coalitions can give rise to rules renders the original schema and/or the social choice mechanism ineffective. By "ineffective", I mean that they yield results and behavior that run counter to the purpose for which they were originally designed. What do you think? Cheers, Mohammed On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 2:44 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES <e...@psu.edu> wrote: I can't see that this posted, sorry if it is a duplicate -------- Mohammed, Being totally unqualified to help you with this problem... it seems interesting to me because most models I know of this sort (social systems models) are about information acquisition and deployment. That is, the modeled critters try to find out stuff, and then they do actions dependent upon what they find. If we are modeling active obfuscation, then we would be doing the opposite - we would be modeling an information-hiding game. Of course, there is lots of game theory work on information hiding in two critter encounters (I'm thinking evolutionary-game-theory-looking-at-deception). I haven't seen anything, though, looking at distributed information hiding. The idea that you could create a system full of autonomous agents in which information ends up hidden, but no particular individuals have done the hiding, is kind of cool. Seems like the type of thing encryption guys could get into (or already are into, or have already moved past). Eric On Fri, May 6, 2011 10:05 PM, Mohammed El-Beltagy <moham...@computer.org> wrote: I have a question I would like to pose to the group in that regard: Can we model/simulate how in a democracy that is inherently open (as stated in the constitution: for the people, by the people etc..) there emerges "decision masking structures" emerge that actively obfuscate the participatory nature of the democratic decision making for their ends? ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- http://perfectionatic.blogspot.com/ http://twitter.com/#!/perfectionatic
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