Re: [liberationtech] Venezuelan Open Source Software Communities Condemn Media Manipulation
Although the article addresses a number of specific issues relating to access of information and censorship during the recent protests, it attempts to justify censorship using the argument that "the right to live trumps the right to free information". This argument is made in reference to the likely government-imposed censorship of Zello and Pastebin. The problem with this argument is that it is not Zello or Pastebin or any other communications medium that is responsible for the right-wing violence that has been occurring. Those groups that commit the violence, right-wing or not, state-sponsored or not, are responsible for their actions. Those groups, and the political ideologies that drive and justify the violence, are what should be condemned. It is not justifiable to censor entire communication mediums that are used by violent groups, since those mediums are used by the public for legitimate reasons. Zello and Pastebin are both popular services used by lots of people. It is not justifiable to block all of Zello because some groups use it to plan violent actions, just as it is not justifiable for the NSA to compromise and surveil all Skype communications for purportedly similar reasons. There is no justice in forbidding use of the printing press just because some have used it to print calls to arms, to use an analogy. There is certainly a disproportionate amount of uncritical and inaccurate reporting on the situation in Venezuela, no doubt, and much of it is used to misrepresent elite-backed right-wing extremists as deserving victims of a tyrannical regime. But this type of justification for censorship is without merit. I'd really love to hear more people's thoughts on this, especially those with experience in the country. -Dan On 03/03/2014 07:11 PM, Damian Fossi wrote: > Original text in spanish: http://www.aporrea.org/tecno/n246101.html > > Text in english: http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/10437 > > Best Regards, > -- http://disman.tl OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] 13 years in the making...
That's a very good point, we definitely do need to be more accurate and consistent in our external messaging, especially around the safety afforded by the software. We include a warning box on our downloads pages (e.g. [1]) in order to educate users before they deploy it, but perhaps we can make it more prominent as you suggest. Thanks for the feedback, we definitely take it very seriously. Dan [1] https://commotionwireless.net/download/routers On 01/02/2014 09:41 PM, S.Aliakbar Mousavi wrote: > Thanks Dan for sharing the warning label on your downloads pages, > describing what > Commotion cannot provide in terms of safety. However, it is very > different than what has quoted the media from Suscha as promises on his > interviews like below: > > http://www.radiofarda.com/content/f7_sascha_meinrath_answers_to_your_questions_over_internet_in_suitcase/24288845.html > > It has quoted that: > وی اضافه میکند که این سیستم به گونهای در حال طراحی است که امنیت > حداکثری و ناشناخته شدن حداکثری کاربران را در پی داشته باشد. > He adds that this system is designed in such a way that users can get > maximum security and anonymity > > > Anyhow, since the warning label is in internal pages and doesn't grab > user's attention I suggest you to mention it on another interview with > the same media and in the main page of project website inside a box to > decrease its risk for users in the countries like Iran, Syria, Sudan, > Cuba, North Korea, etc. because we are responsible about their security. > > > > > On 2 January 2014 12:14, Dan Staples <mailto:danstap...@opentechinstitute.org>> wrote: > > 'Safe' is a word that is thrown around a lot when it comes to > technology, and it really should be qualified; on its own it means very > little. We have a warning label on our downloads pages, describing what > Commotion cannot provide in terms of safety, which I would suggest > taking a look at: > https://commotionwireless.net/understanding-commotions-warning-label. On > that page are some suggestions for other tools you can use, depending on > your needs. > > However keep in mind that digital safety is never absolute and requires > much more than using the right tools; it requires an understanding of > the situation, the risks involved, *how* to use the tools your have, and > a lot more... > > As pointed out before, wireless is inherently a broadcast medium, which > makes transmitting devices locatable to some degree. Anonymity is really > difficult, and is not something Commotion provides. > > Dan > > > On 01/02/2014 10:32 AM, S.Aliakbar Mousavi wrote: > > So, how the commotion can be a safe tool for the users in > authoritarian > > states like Iran?Because, the government has become very sensitive on > > this project when Sacha announced it ,called: Internet in a Suitcase, > > then the Cyber Army in Iran can triangulate and arrest the user. > > > > Is there any way or tool to anonomize and hide the location? > > > > > > > > > > On Thursday, 2 January 2014, Petter Ericson wrote: > > > > Wireless communication is inherently about transmitting and > > receiving radio > > waves, and triangulating any omnidirectional radiation source is > > relatively > > easy. So the answer is "yes, assuming they have agents in > close enough > > proximity and using the correct tools". > > > > A big thanks to the Commotion team, your work has been very > useful to me > > personally in making localised meshes in my neighbourhood. > > > > Happy new year > > > > /P > > > > On 02 January, 2014 - S.Aliakbar Mousavi wrote: > > > > > Dear Sascha, > > > > > > Happy new year too. > > > Thanks for informing us. > > > > > > Before sending to the Iranian users I want to make sure > about its > > > security. You mentioned Commotion V1.0 is safe. *Can Iranian > > government > > > find the location of users by triangulating it or so?* > > > > > > Best, > > > Aliakbar > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 31 December 2013 15:02, Sascha Meinrath <mailto:sas...@ucimc.org> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Hi all, >
Re: [liberationtech] 13 years in the making...
'Safe' is a word that is thrown around a lot when it comes to technology, and it really should be qualified; on its own it means very little. We have a warning label on our downloads pages, describing what Commotion cannot provide in terms of safety, which I would suggest taking a look at: https://commotionwireless.net/understanding-commotions-warning-label. On that page are some suggestions for other tools you can use, depending on your needs. However keep in mind that digital safety is never absolute and requires much more than using the right tools; it requires an understanding of the situation, the risks involved, *how* to use the tools your have, and a lot more... As pointed out before, wireless is inherently a broadcast medium, which makes transmitting devices locatable to some degree. Anonymity is really difficult, and is not something Commotion provides. Dan On 01/02/2014 10:32 AM, S.Aliakbar Mousavi wrote: > So, how the commotion can be a safe tool for the users in authoritarian > states like Iran?Because, the government has become very sensitive on > this project when Sacha announced it ,called: Internet in a Suitcase, > then the Cyber Army in Iran can triangulate and arrest the user. > > Is there any way or tool to anonomize and hide the location? > > > > > On Thursday, 2 January 2014, Petter Ericson wrote: > > Wireless communication is inherently about transmitting and > receiving radio > waves, and triangulating any omnidirectional radiation source is > relatively > easy. So the answer is "yes, assuming they have agents in close enough > proximity and using the correct tools". > > A big thanks to the Commotion team, your work has been very useful to me > personally in making localised meshes in my neighbourhood. > > Happy new year > > /P > > On 02 January, 2014 - S.Aliakbar Mousavi wrote: > > > Dear Sascha, > > > > Happy new year too. > > Thanks for informing us. > > > > Before sending to the Iranian users I want to make sure about its > > security. You mentioned Commotion V1.0 is safe. *Can Iranian > government > > find the location of users by triangulating it or so?* > > > > Best, > > Aliakbar > > > > > > > > > > On 31 December 2013 15:02, Sascha Meinrath > wrote: > > > > > Hi all, > > > > > > Commotion v1.0 is out! Helping spread safe, secure, ubiquitous > wireless > > > connectivity for all: http://www.newamerica.org/node/99668 > > > > > > We've come such a helluva long way from our humble Y2K > beginnings of a > > > group of > > > hackers meeting up in my living room... But, as Samuel Johnson > once said, > > > "Great > > > works are performed not by strength but by perseverance" (that > and an > > > incredibly > > > talented and dedicated team ;). > > > > > > Now we just need to spread the word to all our Internet > Freedom-loving > > > peeps. > > > > > > Happy New Year!!! > > > > > > --Sascha > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. > Violations > > > of list guidelines will get you moderated: > > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > > > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing > moderator at > > > compa...@stanford.edu . > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > S.Aliakbar Mousavi > > > -- > > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. > Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing > moderator at compa...@stanford.edu . > > > -- > Petter Ericson (pett...@acc.umu.se ) > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. > Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing > moderator at compa...@stanford.edu . > > > > -- > S.Aliakbar Mousavi > > > > > -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] Changing MAC addresses on mobile devices
Even more reason for randomizing your phone's MAC address: http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/you-are-a-rogue-device/Content?oid=18143845 You Are a Rogue Device -- A New Apparatus Capable of Spying on You Has Been Installed Throughout Downtown Seattle. Very Few Citizens Know What It Is, and Officials Don’t Want to Talk About It. by Matt Fikse-Verkerk and Brendan Kiley If you're walking around downtown Seattle, look up: You'll see off-white boxes, each one about a foot tall with vertical antennae, attached to utility poles. If you're walking around downtown while looking at a smartphone, you will probably see at least one—and more likely two or three—Wi-Fi networks named after intersections: "4th&Seneca," "4th&Union," "4th&University," and so on. That is how you can see the Seattle Police Department's new wireless mesh network, bought from a California-based company called Aruba Networks, whose clients include the Department of Defense, school districts in Canada, oil-mining interests in China, and telecommunications companies in Saudi Arabia. The question is: How well can this mesh network see you? How accurately can it geo-locate and track the movements of your phone, laptop, or any other wireless device by its MAC address (its "media access control address"—nothing to do with Macintosh—which is analogous to a device's thumbprint)? Can the network send that information to a database, allowing the SPD to reconstruct who was where at any given time, on any given day, without a warrant? Can the network see you now? ... On 10/30/2013 06:17 PM, Timur Mehrvarz wrote: > On 27.10.2013 21:46, Julian Oliver wrote: >> ..on Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 03:15:12PM +0100, Timur Mehrvarz wrote: >>> On 24.10.2013 20:48, coderman wrote: this is not really the kernel itself, but rather the wifi chipset - a new kernel on the devices you're having trouble with won't fix this ioctl. unfortunately this problem is getting worse, not better. >>> >>> Hmm, I see. In this case it would be really good to have a >>> positive/negative list in regard to Wifi chipsets. >> >> Would be good to see a build of 'macchanger' for Android. > > coderman and I have created a wiki page, listing ten devices at the > moment. Of those, five allow the Wifi MAC address to be changed. The > other five do not. > > Please feel free to add more devices: > > http://www.openwiki.com/ow.asp?Changing+MAC+addresses+on+mobile+devices > -- http://disman.tl OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] Google Unveils Tools to Access Web From Repressive Countries | TIME.com
And keep in mind, the uProxy project doesn't seem to be trying to provide anonymity, only uncensored internet access. There are many challenges to anonymity that a simple browser plugin can't solve. Browsers are extremely easy to fingerprint, which is why Tor is now being packaged as an entire browser bundle. What I'm most curious about is how much information about the users of uProxy will be collected and analyzed by Google and shared with its partners. Dan On 10/21/2013 06:09 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote: > On 21-10-13 22:49, Nick wrote: >> Despite the provenence of the story, I'm still suprised there was no >> mention of Google's cooperation with repressive elements of its own >> government through PRISM and the like. Or (though this is probably >> far too optimistic) a mention of whether surveillance as overarching >> paradigm is compatible with the sort of self-representation they >> offer here. >> > google is a many headed dragon, like the US government, with one head > canceling out some actions of others. It is a shame that those heads are > not all the same size (like DoD vs State). Still I would encourage the > small heads to go on and do their work. > >> >> I also wonder how anonymous it is for the relay side - whether it's >> really just an interface to Tor bridge nodes, and therefore the >> relay can't see everything their "friend" is up to, or if it's a >> straight proxy. I would guess the latter as their emphasis seems to >> be completely about helping people hop out of their country's >> repressive internet policies. > > Seeing the description and the involvement of brave new software I > assume it is related to or a rename of Lantern, lantern is a proxy > software that uses the google social graph to find access. Maybe someone > from BNS could elaborate > > In terms of threat model it would be reasonable to trust the 'friend' in > this scenario, I would be more concerned with adversary externaly > observing the connections, seeing that a group of people from within > country X are connecting to the same ip in country Y , thus relating > those people in that group as sharing a node in a social graph, so to > eachother, while they might not have seen them as related before.. > > > Cheers, Sacha > > > -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] New Access report on fake domain attacks on civil society
Disclaimer: This is not a critique of Access or your report; it is a well-researched report with solid conclusions. In fact, you bring up the point I am about to make on page 11 of the report, which I appreciate. I bring this up because I think it could use discussion. While spoofing civil society groups using fake domains is certainly deceptive, and most often carried out with the intent of attacking supporters of human rights, I would caution against denouncing the use of fake domain attacks altogether. As a tactic, fake domain attacks (and more generally impersonating organizations or companies) have been used by activists to target both corporations and non-profits (i.e. civil society groups) as a media stunt to highlight these groups' harmful practices. Some examples of this in the US recently include the PINK Loves Consent campaign [1] targeting Victoria's Secret (full disclosure: I worked on this), pretty much anything by the Yes Men [2], and (sort of) Susan G. Komen For the Cure [3]. Tactics which have duplicitous aims always need to be considered within the context of the campaign to measure their appropriateness, but I certainly think fake domain attacks can be used legitimately against both civil society groups and corporations for furthering human rights goals. We also shouldn't make the mistake of assuming all civil society groups are necessarily good or supportive of human rights; it's an implicit assumption I often see in international development discourses. But that's a whole other discussion... -Dan [1] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/04/pink-loves-consent-underw_n_2239534.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erica-cheung/pink-loves-consent-victorias-secret_b_2264289.html [2] http://yeslab.org/museum [3] a website hack rather than a fake domain attack, but the same goal of impersonation for political awareness purposes: http://jezebel.com/5881765/komens-page-hacked-to-read-help-us-run-over-poor-women-on-the-way-to-the-bank On 09/11/2013 01:40 PM, Michael Carbone wrote: > Hi libtech, > > Back in May I asked for examples of fake websites and social media > that impersonate civil society and news organizations to include in > a report that we at Access were working on. Thanks to all those > who provided feedback, we have now released the report: > > One of These Things is Not Like the Other: A Report on Fake Domain > Attacks https://www.accessnow.org/FakeDomainsReport [pdf] > > The report details how civil society organizations and news media > are the targets of a variety of sophisticated attacks to compromise > their websites and users, including the use of fake websites and > social media profiles. These fake domain attacks may be created > with the intention to draw readership from the original website and > display alternative content, create confusion amongst a targeted > community, or serve malware to compromise the target audience of > the original website. Attacks were seen in countries as diverse as > Belarus, Iran, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan. > > We have observed these attacks on the eves of elections and other > important political events, including during critical social and > political periods. Attacks in Iran and Belarus attempted to > minimize the spread of information and disrupt potential civil > unrest during political elections and anniversaries. > > Other attacks in Belarus and Kazakhstan utilized the privileged > position internet service providers (ISPs) have in a user’s > interaction with websites to redirect them away from targeted > websites to the fake websites. In addition, many fake domains took > advantage of procuring similarly-named URLs as the targeted website > in order to provide a sense of trust to the unwary user. > > As news organizations and citizen media increasingly rely on > digital means to present their work, state-level adversaries are > relying on novel ways of diminishing their impact and targeting > their readers. Our data provides a window into the methods and > effectiveness of these attacks and the type of government > environment that gives rise to them. > > In addition, our report provides a number of mitigation mechanisms > – technical, policy, and legal – against fake domains for both > users and targeted websites. By providing such frameworks for > mitigating these attacks, we hope this report will give human > rights defenders some of the tools and understanding needed to > better protect themselves and their work in a hostile digital > world. > > In conjunction with the report, we have released an online tool > “Fake Domain Detective” (fakedomains.accessnow.org) to help > organizations and individuals search for fake domains of civil > society and independent media websites. If you run across any > suspected fake domains or have feedback on the tool, please share > your findings with us at repo...@accessnow.org. > > Blogpost with overview of the report: > https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2013/08/01/one-of-th
Re: [liberationtech] Naive Question
Presumably, if this type of approach became widely adopted, it would be a useful service for an independent group to monitor the status of these notices and periodically publish a report of which companies had removed their notice. On 09/09/2013 12:52 PM, Scott Arciszewski wrote: > Forgot the URL: > http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/09/nsa-sabotage-dead-mans-switch > > > On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Scott Arciszewski > mailto:kobrasre...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Hello, > > I saw this article on The Guardian[1] and it mentioned a librarian > who posted a sign that looked like this: > http://www.librarian.net/pics/antipat4.gif and would remove it if > visited by the FBI. So a naive question comes to mind: If I operated > an internet service, and I posted a thing that says "We have not > received a request to spy on our users. Watch closely for the > removal of this text," what legal risk would be incurred? > > If the answer is "None" or "Very little", what's stopping people > from doing this? > > Thanks, > Scott > > > > -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] A community wireless mesh grows in Oakland, California.
On Tue 02 Jul 2013 03:34:32 PM EDT, R. Jason Cronk wrote: > Is anybody going to be attending the PETS conference next week who is > familiar with current work/research in the area of wireless mesh > networks? I'm very interested in getting together and learning more > about the current state of affairs. > > Jason > > > On 6/25/2013 6:11 PM, Yosem Companys wrote: >> From: Jenny Ryan >> >> The sudo room mesh networking group has gotten to the point where we >> are nearly ready to launch a free community wireless network in >> Oakland, California! >> >> We will be launching the first part of the network with 100+ wifi >> nodes, and we need your help to raise the money! Even a single dollar >> helps! >> >> https://www.wepay.com/donations/oakland-community-mesh-network >> >> Even if you can't contribute monetarily, please consider forwarding >> this to your friends / social network of choice. >> >> We will provide a free wireless network controlled and maintained by >> the local community. The network will be used to provide both local >> community services, post-disaster backup connectivity and free >> internet connectivity focusing on the less connected communities. >> >> If you're more interested in donating equipment directly, look at our >> wishlist: >> >> https://sudoroom.org/wiki/Mesh/Wishlist >> >> Check out our wiki to learn more about our process, add to our growing >> list of tips and resources, or join the conversation directly by >> signing up for our mailing list and stopping by to visit us on IRC >> (#510pen on Freenode)! >> >> Cheers, >> Jenny >> http://jennyryan.net >> http://thepyre.org >> http://thevirtualcampfire.org >> http://technomadic.tumblr.com >> >> `~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~` >> "Technology is the campfire around which we tell our stories." >> -Laurie Anderson >> >> "Storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it." >> -Hannah Arendt >> >> "To define is to kill. To suggest is to create." >> -Stéphane Mallarmé >> ~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~`~` >> -- >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > > *R. Jason Cronk, Esq., CIPP/US* > /Privacy Engineering Consultant/, *Enterprivacy Consulting Group* > > > * phone: (828) 4RJCESQ > * twitter: @privacymaverick.com > * blog: http://blog.privacymaverick.com > > > > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech I'm a developer on the Commotion wireless mesh project (https://commotionwireless.net), and I'll be attending PETS next week. Feel free to contact me off list, I'd be glad to chat. -Dan -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Internet blackout
@Richard: Alternative infrastructure-type projects like Commotion and other mesh networks can certainly be put in place proactively. In fact, that's a goal of Commotion: encouraging communities to build out their own mesh networks, so residents have more ownership and control over their local infrastructure. When alternative infrastructure is being developed and proactively built out, these communities are more resilient against shutdown of state-controlled networks and can still communicate locally in the case of internet outage. On Wed 12 Jun 2013 06:49:26 AM EDT, Mrs. Y wrote: > What about Project Byzantium? > > http://project-byzantium.org/ > > "The goal of Project Byzantium is to develop a communication system by > which users can connect to each other and share information in the > absence of convenient access to the Internet. This is done by setting > up an ad-hoc wireless mesh network that offers services which replace > popular websites often used for this purpose, such as Twitter and IRC. > > These services and web apps were selected because they are the ones most > often used by activists around the world to find one another, exchange > information, post media, and organize. They were also selected because > they stand the best chance of being easy to use by our intended > userbase, which are people using mobile devices like smartphones, MP3 > players, and tablet PCs." > > I interviewed some of the contributors for a podcast on Hacker/maker > spaces here: > > http://packetpushers.net/healthy-paranoia-2-where-no-nerd-has-gone-before/ > > Michele > > > On 6/11/13 5:44 PM, Richard Brooks wrote: >> Just finished interacting with people from a number >> of countries worried about Internet blackouts being >> used by their governments to help prevent reporting >> of unpleasant truths, such as vote-rigging. >> >> I discussed with them what Telecomics did for Egypt >> and other Arab countries and what Commotion and >> mesh-networking may provide. They were enthusiastic >> about these possibilities, but disappointed when >> I explained that this was not anything that could >> be put in place proactively for the moment. >> >> This lead me to start thinking about the possibility >> of deploying something like Fidonet as a tool for >> getting around Internet blackouts. Has anyone tried >> something like that? >> >> Was wondering if anyone was aware of other approaches >> for mitigating this type of DoS. >> >> -Richard >> -- >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Deadline extension: International Summit for Community Wireless Networks 2013
FYI, the deadline for workshop and panel proposals at this year's Summit has been extended until July 1st. See below for more info. -- Are you passionate about using technology to improve your community? Do you want to help expand access to affordable Internet? Are you an advocate for open technology, ICT4D or community-owned infrastructure? If so, then we invite to you to participate in this year's International Summit for Community Wireless Networks (IS4CWN) <http://2013.wirelesssummit.org/>. The Summit will take place in Berlin on October 2-4, 2013. IS4CWN is a gathering of technology experts, policy analysts, on-the-ground specialists, and researchers working on state-of-the-art community broadband projects across the globe. Above all, IS4CWN is a community of communities, and the annual summit serves as an opportunity to share ideas and challenges, discuss policy issues, and coordinate research and development efforts. The 2013 Summit theme is community. In the past decade -- which included the founding of Freifunk <http://start.freifunk.net/>, the birth of the International Summit for Community Wireless Networks, and the genesis of major projects including Commotion <https://commotionwireless.net/> and CONFINE <http://confine-project.eu/> -- the community wireless movement has expanded substantially in both size and visibility. But where do we go from here? How can we take the movement to the next level in terms of technological advancement, community engagement, and diversity? We encourage our speakers, workshop leaders, and participants to think big this year and help us grow our community of communities. Interested? Head on over to www.WirelessSummit.org <http://www.wirelesssummit.org/>. Registration is open and forms to submit workshop proposals and request travel funding are available. Early registrants will receive a 50% discount. Potential topics include: using wireless for social justice, rural broadband frameworks, technical developments in mesh networking, spectrum policy, training communities in technical skills, case studies of networks, challenges of corporate monopolies, and much more. This year's Summit is committed to having a diversity of voices and experience, and we're looking to have a lot of new faces in the room. Community networks encompass a whole range of social, political and technical challenges, so technical knowledge is definitely not required. Access to technology and technical knowledge has been historically inequitable and remains so to this day. Recognizing this, the International Summit for Community Wireless Networks aspires to include participants and speakers from a broad range of backgrounds and experiences. We seek and welcome diversity in order to reflect the communities that wireless networks can and should serve, cultivating expertise, creativity, and innovation. Please join us in creating an environment of respect, equity, and accessibility at all levels of Summit involvement. -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Call for Proposals: International Summit for Community Wireless Networks 2013
Are you passionate about using technology to improve your community? Do you want to help expand access to affordable Internet? Are you an advocate for open technology, ICT4D or community-owned infrastructure? If so, then we invite to you to participate in this year's International Summit for Community Wireless Networks (IS4CWN) <http://2013.wirelesssummit.org/>. The Summit will take place in Berlin on October 2-4, 2013. IS4CWN is a gathering of technology experts, policy analysts, on-the-ground specialists, and researchers working on state-of-the-art community broadband projects across the globe. Above all, IS4CWN is a community of communities, and the annual summit serves as an opportunity to share ideas and challenges, discuss policy issues, and coordinate research and development efforts. The 2013 Summit theme is community. In the past decade -- which included the founding of Freifunk <http://start.freifunk.net/>, the birth of the International Summit for Community Wireless Networks, and the genesis of major projects including Commotion <https://commotionwireless.net/> and CONFINE <http://confine-project.eu/> -- the community wireless movement has expanded substantially in both size and visibility. But where do we go from here? How can we take the movement to the next level in terms of technological advancement, community engagement, and diversity? We encourage our speakers, workshop leaders, and participants to think big this year and help us grow our community of communities. Interested? Head on over to www.WirelessSummit.org <http://www.wirelesssummit.org/>. Registration is open and forms to submit workshop proposals and request travel funding are available. Early registrants will receive a 50% discount. Potential topics include: using wireless for social justice, rural broadband frameworks, technical developments in mesh networking, spectrum policy, training communities in technical skills, case studies of networks, challenges of corporate monopolies, and much more. This year's Summit is committed to having a diversity of voices and experience, and we're looking to have a lot of new faces in the room. Community networks encompass a whole range of social, political and technical challenges, so technical knowledge is definitely not required. Access to technology and technical knowledge has been historically inequitable and remains so to this day. Recognizing this, the International Summit for Community Wireless Networks aspires to include participants and speakers from a broad range of backgrounds and experiences. We seek and welcome diversity in order to reflect the communities that wireless networks can and should serve, cultivating expertise, creativity, and innovation. Please join us in creating an environment of respect, equity, and accessibility at all levels of Summit involvement. -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
