Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-08 Thread Martin Hepworth


Can SLA's be used to cover this sort of thing. (starts to dig out his 
own contracts).

Surely you should be able to bounce it to your upstream provider who 
should deal with it for you??

Just a thought.

--
Martin Hepworth
Senior Systems Administrator
Solid State Logic Ltd
tel: +44 (0)1865 842300


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Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-08 Thread Scott Stursa

On Tue, 7 Oct 2003, Brian Bruns wrote:

 So, now for the fun part.  Being offsite, I wasn't the one to place the
 calls, but my admin on site started with FSU's abuse desk.  No help
 whatsoever.  Claimed that because the abuse desk was gone, they had no
 authority to deal with the problem.  Frustrated, annoyed, and pissed off, he
 tried again, and got hung up on twice.  Nice people eh?

You were speaking with one of our 2nd shift operators. Unfortunately, our
2nd and 3rd operators are not hired on the basis of cluefulness, but for
their willingness to work these shifts and do so at minimal pay. They tend
to take things very literally, so despite the fact that we have network
admins on-call 7/24, unless it's reported as a network problem the
operators won't call.

This morning instructions have been issued (again) to treat security
incidents as network problem and act accordingly. Additionally, your
E-Mail has been  hardcopied and posted in the operator's area, along with
some not-for-public-consumption comments of my own.


 After hanging up with Qwest, we got a call back from FSU.  After a good 20
 minutes or so of talking with the net admin from FSU, things were finally
 set in motion.  After another good 10 minutes or so, connectivity was
 restored and everything was back to normal.  According to my guy,  they
 yanked the whole subnet at FSU.  Problem solved.

The computer's MAC was blocked at the switch.

Our apologies for this incident. We will continue trying to improve the
responsiveness of our 2nd and 3rd shift operations staff.

If all else fails, call me at home: 850-385-4725

- SLS


Scott L. Stursa 850/644-2591
Network Security Officer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Academic Computing and Network Services Florida State University

- No good deed goes unpunished -


Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-08 Thread Andrew D Kirch

On Wed, 08 Oct 2003 08:44:26 +0100
Martin Hepworth [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 
 
 Can SLA's be used to cover this sort of thing. (starts to dig out his 
 own contracts).
 
 Surely you should be able to bounce it to your upstream provider who 
 should deal with it for you??
 
 Just a thought.
 
 -- 
 Martin Hepworth
 Senior Systems Administrator
 Solid State Logic Ltd
 tel: +44 (0)1865 842300
 
 
 
 
 **
 This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and
 intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
 are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify
 the system manager.
 
 This footnote also confirms that this email message has been swept by
 MIMEsweeper for the presence of computer viruses.
 
 www.mimesweeper.com
 **
 
 

Due to the efficiency of our upstream provider's abuse department,
opening efficiently at 8 am and closing just as efficiently at 5 pm (because we all 
know network abuse only occurs between 8 and 5), the ISP wasn't going to be of much 
help with an attack that started at 6:30pm localtime.

Andrew D Kirch
Security Admin - Summit Open Source Development Group
http://www.sosdg.org





Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-08 Thread Alan Spicer


 Due to the efficiency of our upstream provider's abuse department,
 opening efficiently at 8 am and closing just as efficiently at 5 pm
(because we all know network abuse only occurs between 8 and 5), the ISP
wasn't going to be of much help with an attack that started at 6:30pm
localtime.

 Andrew D Kirch
 Security Admin - Summit Open Source Development Group
 http://www.sosdg.org


* A lot of Abuse Departments are going to close at around 5pm, because the
advanced staff that would know how to deal with such things goes home around
that time. But most of them should have an escalation procedure, which means
that there is someone(s) over the staff in the NOC or Call (Support) Center
which can be called if necessary. You should insist or demand the issue be
escalated if it warrants this. If they won't escalate it ask for the phone
number of the supervisor... If they escalate it and you don't get a call
back in 30-60 minutes ... call again (repeat until you get a call back). Be
prepared to justify why you have had your issue escalated complete with
emailable detailed information. Even if the guy that calls you back
(semi-technical manager type) doesn't have the proper clue, chances are he
has someone else on call that does.

If they don't have this escalation capability ... (IMHO) get a different
ISP.

---
Alan Spicer ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
http://aspicer.homelinux.net/
Systems and Network Administration,
and Telecommunications
(954) 977-5245

The wonderful thing about the Internet is that you're connected to everyone
else. The terrible thing about the Internet is that you're connected to
everyone else.  -- Vincent Cerf (Father of the Internet)

Customer: The Internet is running too slow. Could you reboot it please?

Customer: So that'll get me connected to the Internet, right?
Tech Support: Yeah.
Customer: And that's the latest version of the Internet, right?
Tech Support: Uhh...uh...uh...yeah.




Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-08 Thread Haesu

rant style=moaning and useless context=naive

I really don't give a ^H^H^H^H!H  *  !X  *!X  about what timeframe abuse departments 
operate. I just want more upstreams (or specifically my upstreams) to have a community 
that I can announce a /32 to null.

/rant

-hc

-- 
Haesu C.
TowardEX Technologies, Inc.
Consulting, colocation, web hosting, network design and implementation
http://www.towardex.com | [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cell: (978)394-2867 | Office: (978)263-3399 Ext. 170
Fax: (978)263-0033  | POC: HAESU-ARIN

On Wed, Oct 08, 2003 at 07:19:39PM -0400, Alan Spicer wrote:
 
 
  Due to the efficiency of our upstream provider's abuse department,
  opening efficiently at 8 am and closing just as efficiently at 5 pm
 (because we all know network abuse only occurs between 8 and 5), the ISP
 wasn't going to be of much help with an attack that started at 6:30pm
 localtime.
 
  Andrew D Kirch
  Security Admin - Summit Open Source Development Group
  http://www.sosdg.org
 
 
 * A lot of Abuse Departments are going to close at around 5pm, because the
 advanced staff that would know how to deal with such things goes home around
 that time. But most of them should have an escalation procedure, which means
 that there is someone(s) over the staff in the NOC or Call (Support) Center
 which can be called if necessary. You should insist or demand the issue be
 escalated if it warrants this. If they won't escalate it ask for the phone
 number of the supervisor... If they escalate it and you don't get a call
 back in 30-60 minutes ... call again (repeat until you get a call back). Be
 prepared to justify why you have had your issue escalated complete with
 emailable detailed information. Even if the guy that calls you back
 (semi-technical manager type) doesn't have the proper clue, chances are he
 has someone else on call that does.
 
 If they don't have this escalation capability ... (IMHO) get a different
 ISP.
 
 ---
 Alan Spicer ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
 http://aspicer.homelinux.net/
 Systems and Network Administration,
 and Telecommunications
 (954) 977-5245
 
 The wonderful thing about the Internet is that you're connected to everyone
 else. The terrible thing about the Internet is that you're connected to
 everyone else.  -- Vincent Cerf (Father of the Internet)
 
 Customer: The Internet is running too slow. Could you reboot it please?
 
 Customer: So that'll get me connected to the Internet, right?
 Tech Support: Yeah.
 Customer: And that's the latest version of the Internet, right?
 Tech Support: Uhh...uh...uh...yeah.
 



Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-08 Thread Laurence F. Sheldon, Jr.

Haesu wrote:
 
 rant style=moaning and useless context=naive
 
 I really don't give a ^H^H^H^H!H  *  !X  *!X  about what timeframe abuse departments 
 operate. I just want more upstreams (or specifically my upstreams) to have a 
 community that I can announce a /32 to null.
 
 /rant

Seems like they ought to be made to offer a 1/3-the-price offering if
the connectivity is only offered for 1/3 the time.

No, really, I'll be alright, just me sit down here a minute.


[nanog@Overkill.EnterZone.Net: Extensions to RFC1998 - WAS: Re: DoS Attacks]

2003-10-08 Thread Haesu

Forwarding to NANOG on behalf of Mr. Fraizer.
Please don't shoot the messenger for any arguable/discussions.

-hc

-- 
Haesu C.
TowardEX Technologies, Inc.
Consulting, colocation, web hosting, network design and implementation
http://www.towardex.com | [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cell: (978)394-2867 | Office: (978)263-3399 Ext. 170
Fax: (978)263-0033  | POC: HAESU-ARIN

- Forwarded message from John Fraizer [EMAIL PROTECTED] -

X-Original-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2003 21:58:26 -0400 (EDT)
From: John Fraizer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Haesu [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Extensions to RFC1998 - WAS: Re: DoS Attacks
In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-2.0 required=5.0
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  REPLY_WITH_QUOTES,USER_AGENT_PINE
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X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.55 (1.174.2.19-2003-05-19-exp)


On Wed, 8 Oct 2003, Haesu wrote:

 H? What did I miss? When did RFC1998 get updated to include Null
 community? Feel free to let me know if they updated RFC on that
 lately.. b/c I havent checked it in a while.
 
 As far as I know, my upstreams are fully RFC1998 compliant and I use them well.
 
 -hc
 

Note: please echo this to the list.  I don't have post
access.  Ahem... Sue...Ahem...


The RFC itself hasn't been updated to include a Null community but if you
think about it, providing a NULL community is fully within the concept of
allowing customers to influence routing policy with the use of community
strings.

For example:


!
router bgp 65534
 neighbor a.a.a.a remote-as 65530
 neighbor a.a.a.a description Customer AS65530
 neighbor a.a.a.a prefix-list AS-65530 in
 neighbor a.a.a.a route-map CUSTOMERS in
!
ip prefix-list AS-65530 seq 5 permit x.x.x.x/y le 32
!
ip community-list standard POISON permit 65534:666
!
route-map CUSTOMERS permit 10
 match community POISON
 set local-preference 500
 set ip next-hop [ip address of your sink-hole]
!


Of course, the rest of the route-map CUSTOMERS is going to need to do some
sanity checks on the announcements you accept from the customers OTHER
than blackhole requests.  In our case, we pass them through a prefix-list
match that includes:

ip prefix-list CUSTOMERS seq 10 deny 0.0.0.0/0 ge 25

As you can see, we're doing a prefix-list check against the announcements
that the customer sends us in the neighbor statement.  Each customer gets
their own prefix-list that covers the networks that we have LOA to accept
from that customer. (Keeps boneheads from blackholing OTHER people!)

The first stanza in the CUSTOMERS route-map checks for the POISON
community.  Any prefix that the customer sends us that includes this
community will be routed to our sink-hole.

The rest of the stanzas in the CUSTOMERS route-map look for other
communities from the customer.  One stanza looks to see if the customer is
requesting us to pass their announcements of our address space on as
de-aggregated announcements.  If we don't see that community, they're
aggregated.  Other stanzas in the route-map are pretty cut and dry
RFC1998.

Our customers can do the following:

Community   Action
-
13944:0 Don't announce to any peer
13944:1 Don't announce to PEERS
13944:2 Don't announce to TRANSIT
13944:3 Don't announce to CUSTOMERS

13944:20Announce specific from EnterZone aggregate
for customers who are running on our IPs.

13944:90Set preference to 90
13944:100   Set preference to 100
13944:110   Set preference to 110
13944:120   Set preference to 120

13944:666   Poison a Route

13944:NNN0  don't announce to Peer NNN
13944:NNN1  prepend once towards Peer NNN
13944:NNN2  prepend twice towards Peer NNN
13944:NNN3  prepend thrice towards Peer NNN



Any time I do any consulting on another network, I recommend that they at
MINIMUM implement the Poisoned Route ability.  It is not terribly
difficult to do as you can see above.

--
John Fraizer
EnterZone, Inc
(13944+$|13944+_14813+$|13944+_17266+$)
PGP Key = 6C5903C4
Fingerprint = 2AA6 6614 1B5E EDD2 38AD C417 3E61 F975 6C59 03C4


- End forwarded message -



Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-07 Thread Mark Radabaugh


 So here I am, asking if anyone here has any advice on dealing with these
 issues in the future?  Its painfully apparent noone takes these situations
 seriously enough.  What should we do when we are put in a position like
 this?  Just sit back and hope it goes away itself?

 Also, any ideas on how to deal with these attacks on lower bandwidth
 connections?  Right now, 2mbit.com / sosdg.org is sitting on a 1.5/256
 business DSL line.  I really can't afford to be buying T1s or T3s just to
 hold up to attacks like this.

 As always, thanks.
 --
 Brian Bruns
 The Summit Open Source Development Group

I think I would follow two avenues next time - the direct approach with FSU
(or wherever the traffic is coming from) as well as with your DSL provider.
Your upstream should be able to assist in at least keeping the traffic off
of your dedicated line.

Whether your DSL provider has the resources to sink the traffic may be
another matter  -- but they are at least in a position to help you and
(since you are paying them) have an interest in dealing with you.

Mark Radabaugh
Amplex
(419) 720-3635





Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-07 Thread Avleen Vig

On Tue, Oct 07, 2003 at 11:45:35PM -0400, Brian Bruns wrote:
 So here I am, asking if anyone here has any advice on dealing with these
 issues in the future?  Its painfully apparent noone takes these situations
 seriously enough.  What should we do when we are put in a position like
 this?  Just sit back and hope it goes away itself?

You were lucky to know where it was coming from.
What you depends on what you know.
You knew the sources are small and you knew where they were. You did the
right thing by contacting FSU, and then their upstream.
If either was unresponsive, they are being extremely neglegent.
I'm one of the few who still believes that immediate 24/7 response to
security problems should be a requirement for permanent internet
connectivity.

If you don't know the source, talking to your own upstream to see if
there is anything they can do is a good first move. Most decent places
will at least TRY and help you out.

But realise that sometimes you just need to ride it out.


Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-07 Thread Brian Bruns

- Original Message - 
From: Mark Radabaugh [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2003 11:56 PM
Subject: Re: DoS Attacks



 I think I would follow two avenues next time - the direct approach with
FSU
 (or wherever the traffic is coming from) as well as with your DSL
provider.
 Your upstream should be able to assist in at least keeping the traffic off
 of your dedicated line.

 Whether your DSL provider has the resources to sink the traffic may be
 another matter  -- but they are at least in a position to help you and
 (since you are paying them) have an interest in dealing with you.

I hate to say this, but Ameritech/SBC is utterly useless in matters like
this.  I mean, at one point their redback was being nailed, and they didn't
seem to care one bit.  After 5pm, everyone with a clue seems to leave, and
we are left with useless low level help desk techs.

Our DSL service isn't bad - in fact it rarely goes down.  The problem is
that when we need their help with something out of our league, they are
completely useless.  Anyone know of a contact number for SBC/Ameritech that
would be useful in a case like this?


--
Brian Bruns
The Summit Open Source Development Group
Open Solutions For A Closed World / Anti-Spam Resources
http://www.2mbit.com
ICQ: 8077511




Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-07 Thread Sean Donelan

On Tue, 7 Oct 2003, Avleen Vig wrote:
 You knew the sources are small and you knew where they were. You did the
 right thing by contacting FSU, and then their upstream.
 If either was unresponsive, they are being extremely neglegent.

Its generally a better idea to contact your own upstream provider first.
Your own upstream knows you, and is supposedly paid to help you.  Your
upstream should have contacts with its BGP peers and eventually the
source.

A problem with calling random NOCs is they don't know you from someone
trying to social engineer something.  So you end up delaying effective
response while they try to figure out who you are, and how your report
is related to them.

If you have a problem with your credit card, your own bank is in a
better position to help you than calling random other banks in the world
even if you did have their phone number.  Other banks may care about
security, but they still don't know who you are.

If your own upstream won't help you, you may have no choice but to
beg other NOCs to help you.



Re: DoS Attacks

2003-10-07 Thread Haesu

First of all, have your tools ready so that whenever DoS pounds on you, you can
immediately activate them and they will give you an overview of the DoS attack
such as size of the attack, source/dest (random or one/two or spoofed?), et al.

Then you need to contact your upstream first to hve them deal with it, and yes
I understand, most SDSL providers do not like to cooperate.

Considering it takes me 1 hour of buerocracy to get an ACL put up during a DoS 
to my current providers, getting an ACL activated by SDSL team is.psh
utterly hopeless unless you have people connections :( 

If you can't afford T1/T3 type of circuits where you can at least call up your
upstream (doesnt matter how long it takes them to put up the ACL, the point is,
will they?), then I hate to say... I don't think there is much you can do :-(

-hc

-- 
Haesu C.
TowardEX Technologies, Inc.
Consulting, colocation, web hosting, network design and implementation
http://www.towardex.com | [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cell: (978)394-2867 | Office: (978)263-3399 Ext. 170
Fax: (978)263-0033  | POC: HAESU-ARIN


On Wed, Oct 08, 2003 at 12:03:19AM -0400, Brian Bruns wrote:
 
 - Original Message - 
 From: Mark Radabaugh [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2003 11:56 PM
 Subject: Re: DoS Attacks
 
 
 
  I think I would follow two avenues next time - the direct approach with
 FSU
  (or wherever the traffic is coming from) as well as with your DSL
 provider.
  Your upstream should be able to assist in at least keeping the traffic off
  of your dedicated line.
 
  Whether your DSL provider has the resources to sink the traffic may be
  another matter  -- but they are at least in a position to help you and
  (since you are paying them) have an interest in dealing with you.
 
 I hate to say this, but Ameritech/SBC is utterly useless in matters like
 this.  I mean, at one point their redback was being nailed, and they didn't
 seem to care one bit.  After 5pm, everyone with a clue seems to leave, and
 we are left with useless low level help desk techs.
 
 Our DSL service isn't bad - in fact it rarely goes down.  The problem is
 that when we need their help with something out of our league, they are
 completely useless.  Anyone know of a contact number for SBC/Ameritech that
 would be useful in a case like this?
 
 
 --
 Brian Bruns
 The Summit Open Source Development Group
 Open Solutions For A Closed World / Anti-Spam Resources
 http://www.2mbit.com
 ICQ: 8077511