[obrolan-bandar] Re: penyakit yang bernama CDS
cds merambat ke indo? rasanya sih gak ada bank2 di indo yg jualan cds. cds itu kayak derivative lainnya, risiko paling gede ada di seller. ini kan bentuk asuransi. buyer cds dapat jaminan investasi di bond/loan kembali 100% kalau issuer/borrower default. kalau everything ok, buyer kehilangan biaya proteksi, sedangkan seller dapet premi yg di kondisi normal di bawah 1%. kalau issuer default si seller cds harus nanggung risiko besar karena harus nambahin dana ke buyer supaya bond/loan bisa kebayar 100%. contohnya kasus lehman bros. waktu lehman collapse kemudian bondnya cuma dihargai 8,625 cents per dollar. artinya seller cds harus bayar klaim 91,375 cents per dollar ke buyer cds supaya buyer/investor balik modal 100 cents per dollar. total nilai klaim yg harus dibayar sekitar $365 milyar. tapi seller cds katanya udah hedging eksposur mereka di cds. soal cds roi bond yg naik itu kan dampak fear di market. mungkin juga efek dari indover atau riset jp morgan. berapa sih hutang valas govt indo? $2-3 milyar maybe? itu kan bisa kebayar, cadangan devisa indo $55 milyar. cd itu mainannya spekulan. waktu jaman normal itu easy money buat investment bank, insurance company (aig). belum tentu juga seller cds ada kaitannya sama bondnya govt indo. ini ada artikel dari yahoo finance soal mortgage crisis n cds: Start around 1995. Groups involved with civil rights issues and activities for poor people began to complain that poor people and especially non-white poor people got mortgages much less often than white well to do people. Many economists, including me, explained that it was not at all surprising that poorer, less credit worthy people were often turned down for credit. That's how credit is supposed to work: you lend to people who will pay you back. But the advocates for poor and black people had immense political clout. Under President Bill Clinton, they passed legislation that called on banks to be required to lend to non credit worthy borrowers. The laws, including the Community Reinvestment Act, the CRA, required two large government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to buy those lower quality mortgages from the banks, guarantee them, and sell them to the public. These were bundled into immense pools of subprime mortgages as they were called, and sold all over the world. Soon, the private sector got into the act in a vast way. They also went to banks and bought their subprime loans, packaged them, and sold them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligations all over the world. Supposedly, the subprime collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) were sliced up in such a way that buyers could have a very high likelihood that they would be repaid even if many of the mortgages in the portfolio defaulted. This assumption was based on a misunderstanding of poor quality credit that had been popularized during the era of the junk bond investment powerhouse, Drexel Burnham Lambert. As it happened, these low quality mortgage bonds were recognized as highly likely to have real problems very soon after they started to be issued by private banks in the billions. The people who recognized the high likelihood of defaults were able to profit from that likelihood: First, they could sell the mortgage securities short, a straightforward wager that has long been available. Second, they could buy credit default swaps (CDS) from financial entities. These were essentially a side bet that anyone could make about a certain mortgage bond (or any other kind of security). It paid off fantastically if the bond went into default or was close to default. The people who sold these CDS were banks and insurers, especially Merrill Lynch and A.I.G., that believed the mortgage bonds would not default and therefore charged very little to the other side, the counterparty, to make the bet. Things went along well for everyone on the long side for several years as the housing market boomed. Even if borrowers could not repay their mortgages, they could refinance the mortgages for more money than was owed on the original mortgage, pay off the first mortgage and live happily in their new home. The mortgage in question in the bond would - again-- be paid off and the bond would continue happily in its owners hands. Then, the housing market started to stabilize and soon fall, as housing prices do. They move in cycles, although around a rising mean, as we economists say. Now, when the subprime mortgage holder could not pay off his mortgage, he could not refinance. Instead, he had to default. When a lot of these mortgages defaulted, the bonds into which they had been lumped declined in value. So far, I, your humble servant, followed the deal just fine. It was extremely similar to the collapse of the Drexel Burnham Lambert junk bond empire. This had caused barely a ripple in the national economy when it fell apart in the early 1990's. I assumed that the same would happen with junk mortgages. There would be some failed banks and insurers,
[obrolan-bandar] Re: penyakit yang bernama CDS
bank2 di indonesia ga boleh jual beli produk derivatif jadi aman dari produk2 CDS.. --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, Vic [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: cds merambat ke indo? rasanya sih gak ada bank2 di indo yg jualan cds. cds itu kayak derivative lainnya, risiko paling gede ada di seller. ini kan bentuk asuransi. buyer cds dapat jaminan investasi di bond/loan kembali 100% kalau issuer/borrower default. kalau everything ok, buyer kehilangan biaya proteksi, sedangkan seller dapet premi yg di kondisi normal di bawah 1%. kalau issuer default si seller cds harus nanggung risiko besar karena harus nambahin dana ke buyer supaya bond/loan bisa kebayar 100%. contohnya kasus lehman bros. waktu lehman collapse kemudian bondnya cuma dihargai 8,625 cents per dollar. artinya seller cds harus bayar klaim 91,375 cents per dollar ke buyer cds supaya buyer/investor balik modal 100 cents per dollar. total nilai klaim yg harus dibayar sekitar $365 milyar. tapi seller cds katanya udah hedging eksposur mereka di cds. soal cds roi bond yg naik itu kan dampak fear di market. mungkin juga efek dari indover atau riset jp morgan. berapa sih hutang valas govt indo? $2-3 milyar maybe? itu kan bisa kebayar, cadangan devisa indo $55 milyar. cd itu mainannya spekulan. waktu jaman normal itu easy money buat investment bank, insurance company (aig). belum tentu juga seller cds ada kaitannya sama bondnya govt indo. ini ada artikel dari yahoo finance soal mortgage crisis n cds: Start around 1995. Groups involved with civil rights issues and activities for poor people began to complain that poor people and especially non-white poor people got mortgages much less often than white well to do people. Many economists, including me, explained that it was not at all surprising that poorer, less credit worthy people were often turned down for credit. That's how credit is supposed to work: you lend to people who will pay you back. But the advocates for poor and black people had immense political clout. Under President Bill Clinton, they passed legislation that called on banks to be required to lend to non credit worthy borrowers. The laws, including the Community Reinvestment Act, the CRA, required two large government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to buy those lower quality mortgages from the banks, guarantee them, and sell them to the public. These were bundled into immense pools of subprime mortgages as they were called, and sold all over the world. Soon, the private sector got into the act in a vast way. They also went to banks and bought their subprime loans, packaged them, and sold them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligations all over the world. Supposedly, the subprime collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) were sliced up in such a way that buyers could have a very high likelihood that they would be repaid even if many of the mortgages in the portfolio defaulted. This assumption was based on a misunderstanding of poor quality credit that had been popularized during the era of the junk bond investment powerhouse, Drexel Burnham Lambert. As it happened, these low quality mortgage bonds were recognized as highly likely to have real problems very soon after they started to be issued by private banks in the billions. The people who recognized the high likelihood of defaults were able to profit from that likelihood: First, they could sell the mortgage securities short, a straightforward wager that has long been available. Second, they could buy credit default swaps (CDS) from financial entities. These were essentially a side bet that anyone could make about a certain mortgage bond (or any other kind of security). It paid off fantastically if the bond went into default or was close to default. The people who sold these CDS were banks and insurers, especially Merrill Lynch and A.I.G., that believed the mortgage bonds would not default and therefore charged very little to the other side, the counterparty, to make the bet. Things went along well for everyone on the long side for several years as the housing market boomed. Even if borrowers could not repay their mortgages, they could refinance the mortgages for more money than was owed on the original mortgage, pay off the first mortgage and live happily in their new home. The mortgage in question in the bond would - again-- be paid off and the bond would continue happily in its owners hands. Then, the housing market started to stabilize and soon fall, as housing prices do. They move in cycles, although around a rising mean, as we economists say. Now, when the subprime mortgage holder could not pay off his mortgage, he could not refinance. Instead, he had to default. When a lot of these mortgages defaulted, the bonds into which they had been lumped declined in value. So far, I, your humble servant, followed the deal just fine. It was extremely similar to the collapse of the
Re: [obrolan-bandar] Re: penyakit yang bernama CDS
Tapi kalau nawarin produk OFF SHORE boleh .. Kaya Citi Jual Produk Lehman :P 2008/10/27, datasahamku [EMAIL PROTECTED]: bank2 di indonesia ga boleh jual beli produk derivatif jadi aman dari produk2 CDS.. --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com obrolan-bandar%40yahoogroups.com, Vic [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: cds merambat ke indo? rasanya sih gak ada bank2 di indo yg jualan cds. cds itu kayak derivative lainnya, risiko paling gede ada di seller. ini kan bentuk asuransi. buyer cds dapat jaminan investasi di bond/loan kembali 100% kalau issuer/borrower default. kalau everything ok, buyer kehilangan biaya proteksi, sedangkan seller dapet premi yg di kondisi normal di bawah 1%. kalau issuer default si seller cds harus nanggung risiko besar karena harus nambahin dana ke buyer supaya bond/loan bisa kebayar 100%. contohnya kasus lehman bros. waktu lehman collapse kemudian bondnya cuma dihargai 8,625 cents per dollar. artinya seller cds harus bayar klaim 91,375 cents per dollar ke buyer cds supaya buyer/investor balik modal 100 cents per dollar. total nilai klaim yg harus dibayar sekitar $365 milyar. tapi seller cds katanya udah hedging eksposur mereka di cds. soal cds roi bond yg naik itu kan dampak fear di market. mungkin juga efek dari indover atau riset jp morgan. berapa sih hutang valas govt indo? $2-3 milyar maybe? itu kan bisa kebayar, cadangan devisa indo $55 milyar. cd itu mainannya spekulan. waktu jaman normal itu easy money buat investment bank, insurance company (aig). belum tentu juga seller cds ada kaitannya sama bondnya govt indo. ini ada artikel dari yahoo finance soal mortgage crisis n cds: Start around 1995. Groups involved with civil rights issues and activities for poor people began to complain that poor people and especially non-white poor people got mortgages much less often than white well to do people. Many economists, including me, explained that it was not at all surprising that poorer, less credit worthy people were often turned down for credit. That's how credit is supposed to work: you lend to people who will pay you back. But the advocates for poor and black people had immense political clout. Under President Bill Clinton, they passed legislation that called on banks to be required to lend to non credit worthy borrowers. The laws, including the Community Reinvestment Act, the CRA, required two large government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to buy those lower quality mortgages from the banks, guarantee them, and sell them to the public. These were bundled into immense pools of subprime mortgages as they were called, and sold all over the world. Soon, the private sector got into the act in a vast way. They also went to banks and bought their subprime loans, packaged them, and sold them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligations all over the world. Supposedly, the subprime collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) were sliced up in such a way that buyers could have a very high likelihood that they would be repaid even if many of the mortgages in the portfolio defaulted. This assumption was based on a misunderstanding of poor quality credit that had been popularized during the era of the junk bond investment powerhouse, Drexel Burnham Lambert. As it happened, these low quality mortgage bonds were recognized as highly likely to have real problems very soon after they started to be issued by private banks in the billions. The people who recognized the high likelihood of defaults were able to profit from that likelihood: First, they could sell the mortgage securities short, a straightforward wager that has long been available. Second, they could buy credit default swaps (CDS) from financial entities. These were essentially a side bet that anyone could make about a certain mortgage bond (or any other kind of security). It paid off fantastically if the bond went into default or was close to default. The people who sold these CDS were banks and insurers, especially Merrill Lynch and A.I.G., that believed the mortgage bonds would not default and therefore charged very little to the other side, the counterparty, to make the bet. Things went along well for everyone on the long side for several years as the housing market boomed. Even if borrowers could not repay their mortgages, they could refinance the mortgages for more money than was owed on the original mortgage, pay off the first mortgage and live happily in their new home. The mortgage in question in the bond would - again-- be paid off and the bond would continue happily in its owners hands. Then, the housing market started to stabilize and soon fall, as housing prices do. They move in cycles, although around a rising mean, as we economists say. Now, when the subprime mortgage holder could not pay off his mortgage, he could not refinance. Instead, he
