[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Re: Frederik Stjernfelt At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13886 Frederik, Yes, the orthogonality or independence of descriptive and normative sciences is noted by McCulloch in his opening lines. The thing that struck me like a lightning synapse when I first read that passage, long time passing, was the fact that he set the logical arrow opposite to the causal arrow, invoking the shade of Duns Scotus and bound causes, which I looked up once or twice but didn't exactly get clear about, but anyway it sets the mind to thinking that there is nothing terribly automatic or straightforward about the relation of logical consequence and temporal sequence. Realizing that possibility opens up a much wider field, and I dare say a more realistic field of investigation. Et sic deinceps ... Jon Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: Dear Jon, list Thanks for a great McCulloch quote. You are right that many of these issues have been discussed before, but this is no reason to be tired or resigned like you sound in your intro to that quote. It is a human condition that most important issues have been discussed before. This should not prevent us from carrying on. McCulloch recapitulates how Peirce's theory of propositions prompted him early on to make a theory of how those propositions are processed by psychological states -- giving him the idea that neuronal interactions correspond to propositional events. This is a nice theory, fitting Peirce's idea that all in semiotics and logic should be conceived of as the ongoing analyses of the basic phenomenon which is the chain of reasoning. Charting how brains or psyches implement aspects of that chain, however important this is, does not change the importance of P's insistence that logic in the broad sense should be studied independently of how it may be realized in any particular physical medium, be it in minds, machines or elsewhere. Best F Gary, This knee-jerk view of logic and thought is one of many places where Peirce makes interesting suggestions worth pursuing but where the pursuit almost immediately runs into a host of problems. These issues have been discussed, here and elsewhere, many times before, and I cannot begin to sum it all up at this time, but here is one hint from a modern fore-runner with a deep knowledge of Peirce's work and its potential applications to AI, cognitive science, and neuroscience: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/11/15/what-weve-got-here-is-a-failure-to-communicate-6/ Excerpt from Warren S. McCulloch, “What Is a Number, that a Man May Know It, and a Man, that He May Know a Number?” (1960) quote Please remember that we are not now concerned with the physics and chemistry, the anatomy and physiology, of man. They are my daily business. They do not contribute to the logic of our problem. Despite Ramon Lull’s combinatorial analysis of logic and all of his followers, including Leibniz with his universal characteristic and his persistent effort to build logical computing machines, from the death of William of Ockham logic decayed. There were, of course, teachers of logic. The forms of the syllogism and the logic of classes were taught, and we shall use some of their devices, but there was a general recognition of their inadequacy to the problems in hand. […] The difficulty is that they had no knowledge of the logic of relations, and almost none of the logic of propositions. These logics really began in the latter part of the last century with Charles Peirce as their great pioneer. As with most pioneers, many of the trails he blazed were not followed for a score of years. For example, he discovered the amphecks — that is, “not both … and …” and “neither … nor …”, which Sheffer rediscovered and are called by his name for them, “stroke functions”. It was Peirce who broke the ice with his logic of relatives, from which springs the pitiful beginnings of our logic of relations of two and more than two arguments. So completely had the traditional Aristotelian logic been lost that Peirce remarks that when he wrote the Century Dictionary he was so confused concerning abduction, or apagoge, and induction that he wrote nonsense. Thus Aristotelian logic, like the skeleton of Tom Paine, was lost to us from the world it had engendered. Peirce had to go back to Duns Scotus to start again the realistic logic of science. Pragmatism took hold, despite its misinterpretation by William James. The world was ripe for it. Frege, Peano, Whitehead, Russell, Wittgenstein, followed by a host of lesser lights, but sparked by many a strange character like Schroeder, Sheffer, Gödel, and company, gave us a working logic of propositions. By the time I had sunk my teeth into these questions, the Polish school was well on its way to glory. In 1923 I gave up the attempt to write a logic of transitive verbs and began to see what I could do with the
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Does this mean the cows are home now? No more, please! gary f. -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 4-Sep-14 8:40 AM Re: Gary Fuhrman At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13894 Sorry, Dudes, I couldn't resist ... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMko5LelBdA More ... after coffee ... Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
No, it means that sometimes somebuddy's jes gotta go out and round up the cows ... Head 'em up, Move 'em out, Rawhide ... Jon Gary Fuhrman wrote: Does this mean the cows are home now? No more, please! gary f. -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 4-Sep-14 8:40 AM Re: Gary Fuhrman At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13894 Sorry, Dudes, I couldn't resist ... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMko5LelBdA More ... after coffee ... Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions
Dear Stan, list - My claim certainly does not entail that physics be entirely mechanistic. My observation is just that sign concepts are widespread in biology, not so in physics. This gives us the idea that biology studies real semiotic processes, while physics, including QM, does not. This observation, of course, only holds for the present state - as sciences evolve, it may be proved wrong by further developments in physics. You might also state my view by saying that biology constitutes the semiotic part of physics. Your pointing to the social role of industry and technology in the advancement of physics is quite important, still I take it to address the institutional part of the epistemology of physics, not the objects of physical research. But as my book addresses only the semiotics of propositions from biology and upwards, it becomes less important whether we agree as to the status of semiotics in physics. Best F Den 04/09/2014 kl. 15.58 skrev Stanley N Salthe ssal...@binghamton.edumailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu: Frederick -- Your view of physics, while quite standard, is contextualized, after about 1900, by the fact that its social role has been to support and advance industry and technology. If we regard semiotics as a possible new orientation within physics, some interesting things may develop that are not wholly mechanistic. I anticipate the rejoinder that QM is not mechanistic. To this I reply (a) QM phenomena exist wholly WITHIN machines, (b) its interpretation has been attempted only within mechanicism. I note also that Howard's role for nonholonomic constraints is also a mechanistic perspective in the way that they are deployed arbitrarily rather than 'organically'. STAN - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Dear Jon, list - I also remarked that in McCulloch. You're right about the less than straightforward relation between logical consequence and temporal sequence … If the two were identical, mental processes probably would be unable to address contents different from those processes … Best F Den 04/09/2014 kl. 16.10 skrev Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.netmailto:jawb...@att.net: Re: Frederik Stjernfelt At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13886 Frederik, Yes, the orthogonality or independence of descriptive and normative sciences is noted by McCulloch in his opening lines. The thing that struck me like a lightning synapse when I first read that passage, long time passing, was the fact that he set the logical arrow opposite to the causal arrow, invoking the shade of Duns Scotus and bound causes, which I looked up once or twice but didn't exactly get clear about, but anyway it sets the mind to thinking that there is nothing terribly automatic or straightforward about the relation of logical consequence and temporal sequence. Realizing that possibility opens up a much wider field, and I dare say a more realistic field of investigation. Et sic deinceps ... Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions
On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study cognition and communication processes - biology does. and On Sep 4, 2014, at 12:59 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: My claim certainly does not entail that physics be entirely mechanistic. My observation is just that sign concepts are widespread in biology, not so in physics. This gives us the idea that biology studies real semiotic processes, while physics, including QM, does not. This observation, of course, only holds for the present state - as sciences evolve, it may be proved wrong by further developments in physics. You might also state my view by saying that biology constitutes the semiotic part of physics. This is what I’m still not sure about. Certainly if one uses a Hamiltonian form then there’s less sign process. But it seems to me the Newtonian form of mechanics and the Feynman form of QM are inherently a sign process just as in biology. Further it is all about communication with forces being the interactions between particles. Likewise even classic EM seems to be a semiotic process, although certainly one can conceive of it as an equation that evolves. Not criticizing, just trying to figure out what you mean. Do you think that say a Feynman diagram isn’t a communication process? Perhaps not cognition in a normal sense, but in the Peircean sense (where he saw mind operative in chemical processes like crystal formation) it seems to be. However even if you are just requiring cognition or quasi-cognition (say with insects or microbiology) I’m not sure but what you don’t have virtual cognition in many forms QM takes. (I’m not saying the observer is a real cognition - I tend to see it as an accidental artifact - but it does seem to end up meaning QM takes a form similar to biology) Now I fully agree that the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian forms of mechanics and quantum mechanics aren’t really sign oriented. But I bet more people *think* and *talk* in terms of the more Newtonian conception (in terms of math/signs) even if the other forms of calculating are pretty common. Sorry, not trying to take things down a tangent, just very curious as to this point. I think Peirce tended to adopt more biological conceptions and apply them to physical ones whereas especially in the 19th century that was far less common. While it is a tangent, it seems to be a tangent with important implications for the main topic. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [biosemiotics:6635] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions
In reply to Howard- see my comments: At 04:47 PM 9/3/2014, Frederik wrote: Adding semiotic concepts to your description of physical events can be done, but it does not really add to our understanding of them - while in our understanding of biological events, semiotic concepts are always-already there. HP: I agree, but more so. Adding semiotic concepts to physical events cannot be done without violating several well-established scientific principles. EDWINA: I disagree with your certainty - which is a belief and not a fact. HP:(1) Parsimony. As you wrote, semiotics adds nothing to our understanding of physical laws. It is a gratuitous mythical addition. EDWINA: Again, this is your opinion and not a fact. Parsimony is not relevant here. HP: (2) Non-Falsifiability. That is, unless we figure out what themind of a photon could mean. EDWINA: There is no such thing as the 'mind of a photon' and semiosis does not require individual minds - which is a psychological concept and not a semiotic concept. HP: (3) Violates Indistinguishability. Atomic structure, and all matter, depend on the Pauli Exclusion Principle. The principled identity of fundamental particles is an essential symmetry. Any attribute of mind, even if imaginary, would violate this principle. EDWINA: Are you saying that asymmetry is a requirement of semiosis? I'm not aware of this principle. HP: (4) It begs or evades the question: What is mind? EDWINA: You are inserting psychological requirements into semiosis. False. The use of semiosis in analysis of the physico-chemical realm as well as the biological realm, including the simplest cells, does not require a separate agency within that cell, of 'mind'. FS: But I think deciding pro or con pansemiotics is no prerequisite for following the book's argument. HP: I agree. So, I apologize for continuing the issue. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6639] Re: Natural Propositions
I think this outline below by Frederik is excellent. But I'd like to add a few comments. Physics as a scientific endeavour does not study cognitive and communication processes, but, yes, physics in itself functions with the realities of semiosis. That is, my view is that semiosis - as an action of reasoning - does not begin with the biological realm - where it is increasingly obvious as a basic component of existence. Reason and therefore semiosis exists within the physico-chemical realm. The fact that reason and its 'chain of processes' in the physico-chemical realm are set, disinclined to adaptation and evolution - almost akin to that frozen end state that Peirce suggested of 'hidebound matter' doesn't mean that semiosis did not exist in that realm. Whether active semiosis exists in the most quantum states - we don't know, but my view is that Mind, or the process of reasoning, is basic to the universe and did not develop only with the biological realm. Edwina - Original Message - From: Frederik Stjernfelt To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce List Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 3:21 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6639] Re: Natural Propositions Dear Clark, list - I do not think physics pertains to secondness only. Physical laws safely belong to thirdness. And all empirical processes involve 1-2- as well as 3rdness. But that is another issue. Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study cognition and communication processes - biology does. (Of course physics is indispensable as an auxiliary science in the study of such processes in other sciences - all more basic sciences may be recruited by the sciences depending upon them). This discussion, however, is marginal to my purpose in the book. The main idea of the first chapter is the claim that one of the most important lessons to take from Peirce lies not in single parts of his semiotics, like some of the famous triads. Rather, it lies in the vast reorientation of the whole domain of sensation, perception, logic, reasoning, thought, language, images etc. which it entails. That reorientation takes the chain of reasoning as its primitive phenomenon. The claim is that it may be formally described, independently of the materials in which it may be implemented. Thus, language, images, perception etc. should be reconceptualized for the roles they may play in the chain of propositions of the reasoning process. This implies that propositions are not entities of language, nor do they presuppose any conscious propositional stance. Consciousness and language should rather be seen as scaffolding serving and increasing reasoning - and appearing and being selected for during evolution for that reason. In the book I call this the adaptation to reason hypothesis - P does not call it this but I think it may be safely abstracted from his writings. It has the corollary that truth and validity may not be reduced to epiphenomena of any other sciences - be it neuro(psychology) on the natural science side or history, anthropology, or sociology on the humantities-social science side. Another corollary is that many of the received dualisms in this area are of relative value only (language-images, perception-conception, mental-physical, animal-human, subject-object, etc.) and should not be taken as points of departure. I think this strong hypothesis has rarely been isolated in Peirce's work. It comes close to the surface, however, in his repeated insistence that logic should be unpsychological - this is why chapter 2 is devoted to that. Best F Den 04/09/2014 kl. 06.24 skrev Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com: On Sep 3, 2014, at 2:47 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on the observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in the description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science) while biology, on all levels, involves spontaneous semiotic concepts, from biochemistry to ecology and ethology you'll find genetic code, Information, signals, cues etc. which presumably form part of the subject matter of biology. Could you clarify what you mean with this distinction? I know physics is cast in various guises. Even in basic mechanics. But I just don’t see the distinction. (Undoubtedly a failing on my part) While physics is often thought through in terms of secondness, I’m not sure one can actually describe physics in that manner. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions: pansemiotics (no) vs semiosis beyond life (possibly)
In CP 5.488 Peirce makes a crucial distinction: all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. Only the latter idea - that the universe consists exclusively of signs - is properly termed pansemiotics. The former idea - that the universe is perfused with signs - implies Peirce's thesis that signs are not restricted to the living world in the sense that semiosis is (not the whole of but) at work already in the preliving development of the universe. IF that is the case, we need to distinguish between biosemiosis and physiosemiosis under the general notion of semiosis. Given the history of the modifier pan- in the history of philosophy, with its predominantly negative connotations or overtones, I think that it does a disservice to the development of semiotics to adopt (or try to adopt) positively the term pansemiotics. Actually, Frederik and I had an extensive discussion around this point in Let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ..., Cybernetics Human Knowing 13.3-4 (2006), 161-193, Let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ..., a rsponse to Stjernfelt's Let us not get too far ahead of the story ... in Cybernetics Human Knowing 13.1 (2006), 86-103. The universe is not composed exclusively of signs: that is what the name pansemiotics preconsciously, as it were, conveys. The extent to which the universe (of things objects) is perfused with signs is a different question. So, since semiotics is the knowledge acquired by studying the action of signs or semiosis, the extent of semiotic studies is as wide (or extensive) as is the process of semiosis. If semiosis is involved already in the evolution of the lifeless universe developing in the direction of life, then, just as biosemiotics studies semiosis as it is at work (or play!) in the world of living things, biosemiosis, so there will be a physiosemiotic dimension to semiotics (just as there is a biosemiotic dimension) as it is at work play in the physical universe prior to and (later) surrounding life, physiosemiosis. If there is any physiosemiosis, that is as much a part of semiotics as biosemiosis is. It is a question of the range or extent of the action of signs in the physical realm of things whether living or not. Per se, the question of physiosemiosis, thus, is the final frontier (to borrow an expression from StarTrek) of semiotic investigation. Per se, this final frontier question has NOTHING to do with so-called, or mis-called, pansemiotics. Semiosis may be a process present throughout the physical universe, living or not; but semiosis is NOT the only process thus present (which is what the name pansemiosis or pansemiotics implies). The question of physiosemiosis is a question of to what extent is the action of signs simply co-terminous with the realm of living things. (to perhaps put it in Frederik's framework: are there natural dicisigns beyond the frontiers of life?) The question properly phrased cannot be, as Frederik below suggests, properly rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics. From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2014 15:48 To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions Dear Gary, Edwina, list This is an recurrent discussion in P scholarship. It may be rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics, or it may be expressed as the claim that all true triadic relations are signs vs. the claim that signs only comprise a subset of triadic relations. Both tendencies are in Peirce so the isssue can not be resolved by Peirce scholarship. Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on the observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in the description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science) while biology, on all levels, involves spontaneous semiotic concepts, from biochemistry to ecology and ethology you'll find genetic code, Information, signals, cues etc. which presumably form part of the subject matter of biology. For that reason, I think pre-biological nature could be seen as a sort of semiotic zero-case. Adding semiotic concepts to your description of physical events can be done, but it does not really add to our understanding of them - while in our understanding of biological events, semiotic concepts are always-already there. I do not discuss this deeply in Natural Propositons but of course it forms the prerequisite to my discussing biological sign processes but not purely physical events conceived as semiotics. But I think deciding pro or con pansemiotics is no prerequisite for following the book's argument. Best F Den 03/09/2014 kl. 16.08 skrev Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.camailto:g...@gnusystems.ca: Jon, Edwina, lists, Yes, I read McCullough a few decades ago and learned a lot from him,
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions: pansemiotics (no) vs semiosis beyond life (possibly)
Dear John, list - We have discussed these issues at several occasions, as John writes. Now, our different positions are clearly expressed again - and, what is more, unchanged. So rather than taking yet another turn in that eternal circle, John, would'nt you like to take a shot at my first chapter? Best F Den 05/09/2014 kl. 00.32 skrev Deely, John N. jnde...@stthom.edumailto:jnde...@stthom.edu : In CP 5.488 Peirce makes a crucial distinction: “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs”. Only the latter idea – that the universe consists exclusively of signs – is properly termed “pansemiotics”. The former idea – that the universe is perfused with signs – implies Peirce’s thesis that signs are not restricted to the living world in the sense that semiosis is (not the whole of but) at work already in the preliving development of the universe. IF that is the case, we need to distinguish between biosemiosisand physiosemiosis under the general notion of “semiosis”. Given the history of the modifier “pan-“ in the history of philosophy, with its predominantly negative connotations or overtones, I think that it does a disservice to the development of semiotics to adopt (or try to adopt) positively the term “pansemiotics”. Actually, Frederik and I had an extensive discussion around this point in “Let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ...”, Cybernetics Human Knowing 13.3–4 (2006), 161–193, “Let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ...”, a rsponse to Stjernfelt’s “Let us not get too far ahead of the story ...” in Cybernetics Human Knowing 13.1 (2006), 86–103. The universe is not composed exclusively of signs: that is what the name “pansemiotics” preconsciously, as it were, conveys. The extent to which the universe (of things objects) is “perfused” with signs is a different question. So, since “semiotics” is the knowledge acquired by studying the action of signs or “semiosis”, the extent of semiotic studies is as wide (or “extensive”) as is the process of semiosis. If semiosis is involved already in the evolution of the lifeless universe developing in the direction of life, then, just as biosemiotics studies semiosis as it is at work (or play!) in the world of living things, “biosemiosis”, so there will be a “physiosemiotic dimension” to semiotics (just as there is a “biosemiotic dimension”) as it is at work play in the physical universe prior to and (later) surrounding life, “physiosemiosis”. If there is any physiosemiosis, that is as much a part of semiotics as biosemiosis is. It is a question of the range or extent of the action of signs in the physical realm of things whether living or not. Per se, the question of physiosemiosis, thus, is “the final frontier” (to borrow an expression from StarTrek) of semiotic investigation. Per se, this “final frontier” question has NOTHING to do with so-called, or mis-called, “pansemiotics”. Semiosis may be a process present throughout the physical universe, living or not; but semiosis is NOT the only process thus present (which is what the name “pansemiosis” or “pansemiotics” implies). The question of physiosemiosis is a question of to what extent is the action of signs simply co-terminous with the realm of living things. (to perhaps put it in Frederik’s framework: are there natural dicisigns beyond the frontiers of life?) The question properly phrased cannot be, as Frederik below suggests, properly “rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics”. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6644] Re: Natural Propositions: pansemiotics (no)
Perhaps I am misreading your post, John, but it seems to me an argument over semantics. You seem to reject the term 'pansemiosis' - and I'm not sure why- other than that you understand the term to mean that 'the universe is NOT composed exclusively of signs..and I don't understand how you come to that conclusion. Yes - a physiosemiosic dimension; a biosemiosic dimension... And I'm not sure what you mean by 'semiosis is not the only process thus present' in the physical universe. I can understand your objection to pansemiotics vs biosemiotics, IF the former is understood as so universal that it includes biosemiotics anyway. Edwina - Original Message - From: Deely, John N. To: Frederik Stjernfelt ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce List Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 6:32 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6644] Re: Natural Propositions: pansemiotics (no) In CP 5.488 Peirce makes a crucial distinction: all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. Only the latter idea - that the universe consists exclusively of signs - is properly termed pansemiotics. The former idea - that the universe is perfused with signs - implies Peirce's thesis that signs are not restricted to the living world in the sense that semiosis is (not the whole of but) at work already in the preliving development of the universe. IF that is the case, we need to distinguish between biosemiosis and physiosemiosis under the general notion of semiosis. Given the history of the modifier pan- in the history of philosophy, with its predominantly negative connotations or overtones, I think that it does a disservice to the development of semiotics to adopt (or try to adopt) positively the term pansemiotics. Actually, Frederik and I had an extensive discussion around this point in Let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ..., Cybernetics Human Knowing 13.3-4 (2006), 161-193, Let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ..., a rsponse to Stjernfelt's Let us not get too far ahead of the story ... in Cybernetics Human Knowing 13.1 (2006), 86-103. The universe is not composed exclusively of signs: that is what the name pansemiotics preconsciously, as it were, conveys. The extent to which the universe (of things objects) is perfused with signs is a different question. So, since semiotics is the knowledge acquired by studying the action of signs or semiosis, the extent of semiotic studies is as wide (or extensive) as is the process of semiosis. If semiosis is involved already in the evolution of the lifeless universe developing in the direction of life, then, just as biosemiotics studies semiosis as it is at work (or play!) in the world of living things, biosemiosis, so there will be a physiosemiotic dimension to semiotics (just as there is a biosemiotic dimension) as it is at work play in the physical universe prior to and (later) surrounding life, physiosemiosis. If there is any physiosemiosis, that is as much a part of semiotics as biosemiosis is. It is a question of the range or extent of the action of signs in the physical realm of things whether living or not. Per se, the question of physiosemiosis, thus, is the final frontier (to borrow an expression from StarTrek) of semiotic investigation. Per se, this final frontier question has NOTHING to do with so-called, or mis-called, pansemiotics. Semiosis may be a process present throughout the physical universe, living or not; but semiosis is NOT the only process thus present (which is what the name pansemiosis or pansemiotics implies). The question of physiosemiosis is a question of to what extent is the action of signs simply co-terminous with the realm of living things. (to perhaps put it in Frederik's framework: are there natural dicisigns beyond the frontiers of life?) The question properly phrased cannot be, as Frederik below suggests, properly rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics. From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2014 15:48 To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions Dear Gary, Edwina, list This is an recurrent discussion in P scholarship. It may be rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics, or it may be expressed as the claim that all true triadic relations are signs vs. the claim that signs only comprise a subset of triadic relations. Both tendencies are in Peirce so the isssue can not be resolved by Peirce scholarship. Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on the observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in the description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science) while biology, on all levels, involves spontaneous semiotic concepts, from biochemistry to
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions cognition
Sun and earth do communicate, but resulting directly dyadic rather than triadic relations, and with no involvement of cognition. The point can be generalized: communication is broader than cognition. From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 15:02 To: Frederik Stjernfelt; Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study cognition and communication processes - biology does. and On Sep 4, 2014, at 12:59 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: My claim certainly does not entail that physics be entirely mechanistic. My observation is just that sign concepts are widespread in biology, not so in physics. This gives us the idea that biology studies real semiotic processes, while physics, including QM, does not. This observation, of course, only holds for the present state - as sciences evolve, it may be proved wrong by further developments in physics. You might also state my view by saying that biology constitutes the semiotic part of physics. This is what I’m still not sure about. Certainly if one uses a Hamiltonian form then there’s less sign process. But it seems to me the Newtonian form of mechanics and the Feynman form of QM are inherently a sign process just as in biology. Further it is all about communication with forces being the interactions between particles. Likewise even classic EM seems to be a semiotic process, although certainly one can conceive of it as an equation that evolves. Not criticizing, just trying to figure out what you mean. Do you think that say a Feynman diagram isn’t a communication process? Perhaps not cognition in a normal sense, but in the Peircean sense (where he saw mind operative in chemical processes like crystal formation) it seems to be. However even if you are just requiring cognition or quasi-cognition (say with insects or microbiology) I’m not sure but what you don’t have virtual cognition in many forms QM takes. (I’m not saying the observer is a real cognition - I tend to see it as an accidental artifact - but it does seem to end up meaning QM takes a form similar to biology) Now I fully agree that the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian forms of mechanics and quantum mechanics aren’t really sign oriented. But I bet more people *think* and *talk* in terms of the more Newtonian conception (in terms of math/signs) even if the other forms of calculating are pretty common. Sorry, not trying to take things down a tangent, just very curious as to this point. I think Peirce tended to adopt more biological conceptions and apply them to physical ones whereas especially in the 19th century that was far less common. While it is a tangent, it seems to be a tangent with important implications for the main topic. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Relation Theory
Re: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Relation_theory The article on k-adic relations deals with a higher level of generality than we usually need for triadic relations and sign relations, but it does provide a theoretical context for discussing the latter special cases and it illustrates many of the concepts, constructions, and operations that are used in mathematics, logic, and computer science to work with relations. The article also distinguishes two type of definitions for relations that are commonly used and frequently confused. Mathematicians and programmers would likely recognize this as the difference between strongly typed and weakly typed definitions while linguists and logicians might refer to it as the difference between contextualized and decontextualized definitions. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions
Frederik: While I heartily agree with you that one of the principle objectives of Peircian logic is to chain together a sequence of natural propositions, but I am puzzled by this paragraph. On Sep 4, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: The main idea of the first chapter is the claim that one of the most important lessons to take from Peirce lies not in single parts of his semiotics, like some of the famous triads. Rather, it lies in the vast reorientation of the whole domain of sensation, perception, logic, reasoning, thought, language, images etc. which it entails. That reorientation takes the chain of reasoning as its primitive phenomenon. The claim is that it may be formally described, independently of the materials in which it may be implemented. My response is in the same general vain as Clark’s. Allow me to parse the paragraph. Rather, it lies in the vast reorientation of the whole domain of sensation, perception, logic, reasoning, thought, language, images etc. which it entails. This sentence appears to me as to a description of chemical / biochemical research in the sense of Schelling as spirit/nature relations with respect to the visible/invisible. That reorientation takes the chain of reasoning as its primitive phenomenon. Chemists believe in such a primitive relation between atoms and molecules. Indeed, another name for this primitive chain of reasoning is “proof of structure” which is an inductive form of reasoning which associates the names of atoms with the names of molecules by specifying the relations among atoms. The claim is that it may be formally described, independently of the materials in which it may be implemented. This assertion appears to negate the associative logic between the identities of atoms and the identities of molecules such as you give in your assertions in Diagramatology, p. 208, which appears to focus on specific identities of materials as “proof of structure”. The origin of this biological data is clear. I am uncertain about the meaning you seek to project in the paragraph with respect origin of data in the sense of the whole domain of sensation, perception, logic, reasoning, thought, language, images etc. which it entails. Would you like to re-phrase your position? Or, do you have another formal description of this diagram, perhaps in terms of mathematics, physics, thermodynamics, iconic diagrams, indexes, symbol systems, or whatever? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions
On Sep 4, 2014, at 2:18 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Interaction seems to me to be a far wider concept than communication. Any possible empirical event involves energy exchange, that is, interaction. To me, it dilutes the concept of communication almost to insignificance to identify it with interaction tout court. I suspect we’re talking semantics. I don’t care which words we use so long as we’re all clear on what we mean by them in this context. To me communication is broad, but perhaps that’s just from having worked on too much computer networking. My own linguistic use (which I’m not committed to it as I noted) is that interaction is secondness and communication is thirdness. To me communication involves communicating something through some medium. However since my background is physics I tend to see properties or states as being what’s communicated. This especially makes sense once you start talking about the physics of a black hole. Anyway while obviously secondness and thirdness are closely related, it seems fair to keep them separated. To me communication is mediated while interaction is the raw encountered without consideration of the mediation. Thanks for clarifying. As in so many of these things, getting clear our definitions makes things much easier to understand. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions cognition
Frederik: On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study cognition and communication processes - biology does. Perhaps you are seeking to express a more metaphysical argument about the relationships among the basic sciences? In Diagrammatology, p. 208, figure 29, entitled “Receptor-motor coupling, you index several nominal objects which are a consequence of chains of reasoning about natural objects. These objects can all be viewed as exact consequences of third-order cybernetical relations encoded by the E coli genome (DNA) and embodied in material codes. BTW, do you refer to these objects as signs? symbols? or icons? Do you consider these indexes given in Figure 29 to be parts of biological “communication processes”? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions cognition
On Sep 4, 2014, at 9:36 PM, Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com wrote: Edwina, Pansemiotics carries the connotation of panpsychism. Physiosemiosis has no such connotation. And the term “pansemiosis” carries just the opposite of what you attribute, namely, the idea that the universe IS composed exclusively of signs. While I tend to read Peirce in terms of pansemiotics, I’d also recognize that this borderline panpsychism is extremely controversial. It is well worth doing what we can to separate Peirce’s semiotics from his ontological commitments. However as I take you to be saying later, it’s hard to say the universe is just signs (thirdness) since Peirce in various places obviously sees firstness and secondness. That was very poorly written on my part. Apologies. I meant to say that while I tend to read Peirce as verging on panpsychism, it’s quite controversial. As I later noted in that paragraph Peirce can’t really be a pansemiotician since that neglects firstness and secondness. However I think that his ontology is such that the three categories are basic ontologically. That claim (which I think Kelly Parker argues is a basic neoplatonic stance as well) is no less controversial than true panpsychism. While I think it is fruitful to think of basic ontology in terms of the three categories as fundamental, I think it’s very important and helpful to separate Peirce’s consideration of general semiotics from his ontology. If only to avoid the huge negative connotations anything smacking of panpsychism has in most philosophy departments. That said I think any physical phenomena will always be analyzable in terms of the three categories at a natural level. At which point it’s probably better to talk about quasi-minds and virtuality rather than bringing in the more controversial terms of cognition from biology. I’m not sure insects really have cognition but it’s worth talking like they do in many cases. Exactly how to make sense of mind in biology is far from clear to me. And talk of observers in physics is often taken as an ontological scandal some interpreters were involved in. I think Peirce’s approach is fruitful in that it avoids the need to engage with such considerations. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
