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[Gary Richmond]

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8478] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Gary Richmond]

Frederik, lists,

You write, "But pain involves secondness." No doubt. I had already written
there is "certainly secondness involved" in my unexpected sudden eye pain
example.

But, unless one wants to deny the reality of 1ns, as apparently John would,
then one must admit that pain--and, as Peirce says, each unique instance of
pain--has its own distinct character, it's unique quality (firstness).

And are the three phenomenoloogical categories *ever* found apart from the
others in reality? Peirce says no (although one may predominate).

So to say that pain *involves *secondess doesn't deny firstness at all as I
see it.

Best,

Gary



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 4:50 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
wrote:

>  Dear Gary, lists -
> But pain involves secondness - it is not imagined pain - you refer to real
> pain which implies there's something actually acting in your eye - so it is
> not the pure quality, it is quality coupled with the insistence of
> secondness. Your blinking eye works in order to get rid of the existing
> particle, not only to address a quality of feeling. By the same token, pain
> involves thirdness - the complex of pain and blinking reflex has a purpose,
> that of cleaning your eye, and behind that is a biological habit acquired
> over millenia of selection. So the felt pain is only prescinded from this
> background ... that would be my version ...  Qualities without secondness are
> but possibilities ...
> Best
> F
>
>  Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.46 skrev Gary Richmond 
> :
>
>  John,
>
>  I experience qualities *as such* and often before I've labeled them x,
> y, or z. Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp dust particle hits
> my eye. Although there is certainly some secondness involved, I experience
> pain before I think 'pain'. Maybe other people do experience such things
> differently.
>
>  Best,
>
>  Gary
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8465] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Frederik, List:

>From the perspective of the chemical sciences, I find your strong conclusions 
>to be questionable.

More specifically, consider CSP's letter to Lady Welby, p. 7, Oct. 12, 1904. 
and his clear distinction between Firstness and Secondness. 

"Secondness is that mode of being of that which is such as it is, without 
respect to a second but regardless of any third."

In this sentence, the critical rhetoric terms are the words Secondness and the 
second.  The direct implication of this sentence is that the two-ness of 
Secondness is indicative of a difference - the difference that makes a 
difference in the terminology of Bateson.

As a sentential proposition, this sentence does NOT infer AN ORDER RELATIONSHIP 
 between Firstness and Secondness and hence seems to differ from your strong 
statements about compositionality w.r.t semiotics and metaphysics.  Indeed, CSP 
introduces the concept of thirdness as the third part of his categorization. 

As I read your interpretation, it seems that your image introduces a portion of 
thirdness into secondness.
>From my perspective, this mis-reading of the the basic logical meaning of 
>these categories is exceedingly common among philosophers who seek to 
>understand CSP.

In the context of this letter, Secondness is that which today is called an 
independent function in mathematics. Firstness is also defined, in mathematical 
language, as an independent function. 

Further, the practical, symbolic, and mathematical relations essential to 
describing a chemical reaction depend on a such a rhetorical representation of 
the relationships between precursors and products, predecessors and successors. 
Two necessarily separate and distinct objects (as sin-signs) with different 
indexes of quali-signs and different icons.  They are both diagrams.

For further insight on CSP's views on the nature of relations, see his papers 
on copulative logic.

Or, am I somehow mis-interpreting your diagrams and and extra-ordinarily strong 
conclusions you perceive?

Cheers

Jerry


 


On Apr 26, 2015, at 3:33 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:

> Dear Gary, John, lists 
> 
> It is correct that Firstness is no abstraction in the sense of Hypostatic 
> Abstraction (even if the term Firstness is such an abstraction). But 
> Firstness as such is an abstraction in the sense of "prescission" or 
> "prescissive abstraction" - It is often overlooked how P's categories, 
> already from their emergence in the 1860s, are tightly connected with the 
> epistemologic means of accessing them - namely, his three types of 
> distinction, dissociation,  prescission and discrimination, respectively. 
> In "Diagrammatology" ch. 11 (2007), I made this summary:  
> 
> (…)  the three categories are interrelated as follows (arrow here meaning 
> possibility of distinction; broken arrow impossibility):
>  
> 1. <--/--> 2.   2. <--/--> 3.
>  
> The categories may not be dissociated.
>  
> 1. <  2. 1. --/--> 2.
> 2. <  3. 2. --/--> 3.
> 1. <  3. 1. --/--> 3.
>  
> A lower category may be prescinded from a higher, not vice versa.
>  
> 1. <  2. 1. > 2.
> 2. <  3. 2. > 3.
> 1. <  3. 1. > 3.
>  
> All categories may be discriminated from the others.
> 
> So, 3. necessrily involves 2. and 1., and 2. involves 1. - so that 1. can be 
> reached by prescission from 3. and 2. Thus 1. is not "first" in any temporal 
> or phenomenological sense - it is not like we "begin" with firstness in order 
> to build up the higher categories - rather, we isolate, by prescission, the 
> lower from taking our point of departure in the higher. 
> In cognition, this corresponds to the idea that we are always-already within 
> the chain of inferences from one proposition to the next - but preconditions 
> of that chain in terms of simpler signs (e.g. tones, tokens, icons, indices, 
> rhemas) may be adressed by prescission (so that the whole semiotic theory 
> forms a sort of anatomy of the chain of arguments which is really, as a 
> whole, the starting point). This is why neither semiotics nor, correlatively, 
> metaphysics are compositional in Peirce.
> 
> Best
> F
> 
> 
> 
> Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.04 skrev Gary Richmond 
> :
> 
>> John, 
>> 
>> The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as 
>> saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a 
>> rhematic iconic qualisign.
>> 
>> Best,
>> 
>> Gary
> 
> 
> -
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8466] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

ps - Peirce's three distinctions are subtypes of partial consideration -

F

Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.37 skrev John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
:

Gary,

I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where 
abstraction is understood as Locke’s partial consideration. At least that is 
the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different.

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jeff, Lists:

Excellent post!  

To me, these distinctions reveal aspects of CSP's thought that are oft ignored 
and which probably arise from his training is chemistry as well as other 
disciplines.

Before I comment, however, it is important to note that at first blush, I 
presumed that the index was a quote from CSP 7. 604 as your wrote.

Upon seeking the exactness of the context in which I wrote, I note that:
1. it is not from 7.604.   see 7.619 - 7.622.
2. the psuedo-index appears to be a selective construct, omitting important 
aspects of text.

My comments are as follows:

1. CSP specifically refers to the terminology of psychology, "res percepta", 
and separates the concept of image (as icon) as SOMETHING intended to represent.

2. Consequently, this distinction separates your index from the CSP usage of 
index in the trichotomy of nine related logical terms for constructing an 
argument. 

3. If the language of propositional logic of the trichotomy was invoked (which 
was my immediate impulse) then the reference to a chair (not to my mind!)  
would be a sinsign.

4. The attributes of a chair would be the propositional predicates of the 
nominative case, that is, the name of the sinsign.

5. The listing of the index refers to one's sensory and down-stream responses 
to the situation at hand.  A blind man would not accept this index as 
meaningful.
  
6.  I do not have time to comment further, beyond the point that 7.598-7.602 
are predecessors of 7.619-7.622.  In modern terminology, this is CSP's 
anticipation of the current statistically-oriented rhetoric about "BLACK SWANS".

My opening sentences were written before I sought out the exact text. The 
context of a text makes a difference in the interpretation of the meaning of 
the text, at least to me. 

Cheers

Jerry



On Apr 26, 2015, at 12:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

> Gary R., John, Lists,
> 
> Here is what Peirce says in his essay on Telepathy (CP 7.604) as he tries to 
> clarify the division he is drawing between percept and perceptual judgment:
> 
> Analysis of the experience of the chair as it appears before me now.
> a.The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any kind.
> b.It essentially embodies no intentions of any kind.
> c.It does not stand for anything.
> d.It obtrudes itself upon my gaze, but not as a deputy of something else, 
> not as anything.  
> e.It is very insistent, for all its silence.
> f.It would be useless for me to say “I don’t believe in the chair.”
> g.It disturbs be, more less.
> h.I can’t dismiss is, as I would a fancy
> i.I can only get rid of it by an exertion of physical force.
> j.It is a forceful thing.  Yet it offers no reason, defence, or excuse 
> for its presence (in my experience, in its existence).
> k.It does not pretend to any right to be there.
> l.It silently forces itself upon me (no further brute cause of which this 
> seems to be the effect).
> m.Such is the precept.  
> 
> Key question:  now, what is its logical bearing upon knowledge and belief?  
> This can be summed up in three precepts:
> 1.  It contributes something positive (the chair has four legs, a back, a 
> yellow color, a green cushion.  Each of these things is a predicate of the 
> subject “this thing.”  To learn that the subject actually has these 
> predicates is a contribution to our belief and knowledge).
> 2.  It compels the perceiver to acknowledge it.
> 3.  It neither offers any reason for such acknowledgement nor makes any 
> pretension to reasonableness.  
> 
> Taking these points together, it appears to me that the first part consists 
> in an analysis of what appears to us when we see something like a pillow 
> sitting on a chair.  The analysis seems to be guided by the phenomenological 
> account of the elemental categories.  The second part, where he formulates 
> the three precepts, looks to me like a hypothesis about the nature of the 
> percept.  
> 
> Gary claims that the percept is a rhematic iconic qualisign, but Peirce 
> claims in (c) that percepts do not stand for anything else.  As such, they 
> are not representations.  Later in this essay, however, Peirce characterizes 
> the percipuum as an interpretation of the percept.  In order for the 
> percipuum to be an interpretation of the percept, doesn't the percept have to 
> function as some kind of representamen?
> 
> How can we reconcile the apparent tension between claims that Peirce is 
> making about the nature of the percept and its relation to the percipuum and 
> the perceptual judgment?
> 
> --Jeff
> 
> Jeff Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> NAU
> (o) 523-8354
> 
> From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
> Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:37 AM
> To: Gary Richmond; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
> Cc: Peirce-L
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,
> 
> Gary,
> 
> I would say it is an abstra

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8467] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Gary, lists -
But pain involves secondness - it is not imagined pain - you refer to real pain 
which implies there's something actually acting in your eye - so it is not the 
pure quality, it is quality coupled with the insistence of secondness. Your 
blinking eye works in order to get rid of the existing particle, not only to 
address a quality of feeling. By the same token, pain involves thirdness - the 
complex of pain and blinking reflex has a purpose, that of cleaning your eye, 
and behind that is a biological habit acquired over millenia of selection. So 
the felt pain is only prescinded from this background … that would be my 
version …  Qualities without secondness are but possibilities …
Best
F

Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.46 skrev Gary Richmond 
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>
:

John,

I experience qualities as such and often before I've labeled them x, y, or z. 
Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp dust particle hits my eye. 
Although there is certainly some secondness involved, I experience pain before 
I think 'pain'. Maybe other people do experience such things differently.

Best,

Gary


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8465] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Gary, John, lists

It is correct that Firstness is no abstraction in the sense of Hypostatic 
Abstraction (even if the term Firstness is such an abstraction). But Firstness 
as such is an abstraction in the sense of "prescission" or "prescissive 
abstraction" - It is often overlooked how P's categories, already from their 
emergence in the 1860s, are tightly connected with the epistemologic means of 
accessing them - namely, his three types of distinction, dissociation,  
prescission and discrimination, respectively.
In "Diagrammatology" ch. 11 (2007), I made this summary:

(…)  the three categories are interrelated as follows (arrow here meaning 
possibility of distinction; broken arrow impossibility):

1. <--/--> 2.   2. <--/--> 3.

The categories may not be dissociated.

1. <  2. 1. --/--> 2.
2. <  3. 2. --/--> 3.
1. <  3. 1. --/--> 3.

A lower category may be prescinded from a higher, not vice versa.

1. <  2. 1. > 2.
2. <  3. 2. > 3.
1. <  3. 1. > 3.

All categories may be discriminated from the others.

So, 3. necessrily involves 2. and 1., and 2. involves 1. - so that 1. can be 
reached by prescission from 3. and 2. Thus 1. is not "first" in any temporal or 
phenomenological sense - it is not like we "begin" with firstness in order to 
build up the higher categories - rather, we isolate, by prescission, the lower 
from taking our point of departure in the higher.
In cognition, this corresponds to the idea that we are always-already within 
the chain of inferences from one proposition to the next - but preconditions of 
that chain in terms of simpler signs (e.g. tones, tokens, icons, indices, 
rhemas) may be adressed by prescission (so that the whole semiotic theory forms 
a sort of anatomy of the chain of arguments which is really, as a whole, the 
starting point). This is why neither semiotics nor, correlatively, metaphysics 
are compositional in Peirce.

Best
F



Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.04 skrev Gary Richmond 
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>
:

John,

The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as 
saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a 
rhematic iconic qualisign.

Best,

Gary


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[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Lists,

The conversation about whether or not there are real general properties, 
natural kinds, habitual regularities an/or laws in nature--and where such 
things might or might not be at work governing actual things--continues to 
surface on both lists with remarkable regularity.  It would seem that there is 
something at work behind the scenes that forces the conversation back to these 
kinds of questions.  

Having said that, we should probably take note of the fact that, for Peirce, 
there is no way to settle these kinds of questions based upon empirical 
evidence and the methods of the special sciences alone.  On his account, the 
basic questions pose problems in the normative science of logic.  Any 
empirically grounded explanations that seem to involve convictions about the 
reality or lack thereof about some kind of general thing in one area of inquiry 
or another rests, ultimately, on claims about the nature of the validity of 
different kinds of reasonings and what is presupposed by those forms of 
reasoning.  

So, on Peirce's view, it is reasonable to suppose that the community of 
scientists who are working in the special sciences do tend make claims about 
the real nature of generals.  This does seem to fit what many physicists, 
chemists, biologists, economists (etc.) say in many cases.  They ask, for 
instance if the principles articulated in their theories adequately explain the 
regularities that are observed.  But philosophers and special scientists alike 
will be wasting their breath if they think this fact about the conviction of 
the special scientists settles the matter as to whether or not those claims are 
adequately justified.  Similarly, those who are skeptical about the truth of 
claims about the real nature of generals in one area of inquiry or another can 
point to difficulties we face when trying to show that abductive, deductive or 
inductive arguments are themselves well grounded.  But they, too, will be 
wasting their breath if they think that empirical evidence and the methods of 
the special sciences will settle these claims about the validity of the forms 
of reasoning and the related assumptions about the nature of the real.

Notice that is not just Peirce, but Plato, Aristotle, Plontinus, Aquinas, 
Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Mill and Hegel as well, who all agree 
that when it comes to such questions about fundamental principles of reasoning 
and the underlying assumptions about such reasoning, that these kinds of 
questions can't be settled in the special sciences (e.g., in psychology, 
biology, sociology, or what have you).  As such, philosophers who want to model 
their inquiries on a scientific approach need to think hard about how they 
might use something like an experimental method to find the truth about these 
kinds of questions.

Having developed competing theories of logic, we can then see what kinds of 
metaphysical theories naturally follow from such competing accounts.  In turn, 
we can see if the competing theories of logic and metaphysics square with the 
ongoing practice and results of the different special sciences.  For what it is 
worth, I think it would be worth the effort needed to separate these different 
arguments for or against the reality of generals--at least insofar as we'd like 
to continue the debate in a manner that is respectful of the larger 
philosophical context in which Peirce was working.  We can, of course, follow 
the lead of others, such as Heidegger, who suggest that the entire tradition in 
logic and metaphysics rests on some deep confusions and mistakes.  If some are 
following such a track, or trying to forge their own path in this kind of 
direction, it would be good to lay their cards on the table so that we will 
have a better idea why they are saying the things they do.  

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:55 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L
Subject: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,

No, I definitely classify my sensations as I have them. I did have one weird 
experience where I did not classify a colour while I was on DMT, so I think I 
get the idea. People have noted how quick I am at picking things out – it 
happens automatically for me.

It is an empirical question how the sensory system works. First it 
distinguishes differences. People working on it haven’t got much further except 
for vision, which definitely classifies before things are conscious (Lettvin et 
al, Marr), so shapes come preclassified.

John

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 26, 2015 1:47 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:8467] Re: Natural Propositions,

John,

I experience qualities as such and often before I've labeled them x, y, or z. 
Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp du

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8464] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

[Sungchul Ji]

John, Edwina, Stan, and lists,

It seems to me that the debate you are having about the meaning of
"gravitation" may be resolved  based on the principles of Peircean
semiotics, especially the irreducibly triadic nature of the sign.  The
following is my way of applying the principles of Peircean semiotics to
your debate:

"Gravitation" is a word and, as such, is irreducibly triadic, a la Peirce.
That is, "Gravitation" is an irreducible triad of Object, Representamen,
and Interpretant.



  GRAVITATION is the whole triad and IRREDUCIBLE to any one or two elements
of the whole:

   f
  g
   Gravitation as Object >  Gravitation as a Representamen
---> Gravitation as Interpretant
(Firstness)
 (Secondness)  (Thirdness)
(Gravitation as IS) (Gravitation as
EXPERIENCED) (Gravitation as THEORIZED/MODELED)
|

  ^
|

   |

|___|

 h

Figure 1.  A diagrammatic representation of "Gravitation" as a Peircean
sign or a mathematical category.  The three mappings, f = sign generation,
g = sign interpretation, and h = correspondence, are thought to commute,
i.e., f x g = h.


In other words, the word "Gravitation" used in the human society is an
irreducible triad of its Object (i.e., a reality extant even long before
humans appeared on this planet), its Representamen (e.g., 'gravitiation' in
English, 'Joong Ryok' in Korean), and its Interpretant (e.g., the 'action
at a distance' for Newton, the 'curvature of spacetime' for Einstein).

My (fallible) impression is that Stan tends to focus on the interpretant
aspect of Gravitation, Edwina on the Firstness aspect of Gravitation, and
John seems to point out the importance of what I call Step h.  Please
correct me if I am mis-reading your thoughts.

All the best.

Sung






On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 10:58 AM, John Collier  wrote:

>  Stan, it’s what we call the cause of all those things, which everyone
> recognizes is a single thing, whatever their theory. No theory needed. No
> special discourse needed. Only the name might differ. Each of those things
> itself is subject to your same reductive argument, because they are all
> generalizations. I am calling you out for either egregious inconsistency
> (failure to treat all generalizations the same)or else pointless ad hockery
> (picking some things we name, but not others). Or both.
>
>
>
> Of course we need ideas to put things together (abductions), but that
> says nothing about what they refer to. We can be mistaken about the nature
> of the reference (as people were for a long time about gravity, and
> probably still are), but naming something does not make it exist. Nor does
> it affect its nature.
>
>
>
> I would admit that there is a consistent system that would agree with your
> claim here, but it is called anti-realism, not constructivism. All
> philosophers these days are constructivists (also called
> representationalism), at least since Locke, who put semioisis into the
> philosophical terminology. But this is not incompatible with realism. So
> many of your arguments simply do not make the point you intend, or else are
> entirely uncontroversial, or both.
>
>
>
> If gravity were a construction, if someone didn’t believe in it they could
> jump out of a 20th floor window and suffer no problems. The generality
> that this sort of thing is impossible is called gravity. You don’t need an
> accurate theory, or any theory beyond a generalization, which in this case
> fits the mind independent facts rather well. Peirce was quite right to use
> the example.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu]
> *Sent:* April 26, 2015 11:20 AM
> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8462] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.
>
>
>
> John, Edwina -- Falling down, difficulty in hill climbing, etc., do not
> need human discourse (although the ideas used to meliorate these problems
> will be discursive). But GRAVITATION IS human discourse.  How can anyone
> not see this?  Even naming these phenomena without a developed theory
> uniting them would still be  (rhythms, sounds).
>
>
>
> STAN
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> Stan, for heaven's sake, gravity doesn't need any human discourse in order
> to exist. The laws of organization of a cell, in the egg as it transforms
> into a bird, don't need any human discourse in order to function. The laws
> of organization of a chemical molecule don't need any human discourse to
> function. These normative patterns, these habits of organization common to
> a species, to matter, toare all examples of Thirdness.
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
>  - Original Message -
>
> *From:* Stanley N 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R., John, Lists,

Here is what Peirce says in his essay on Telepathy (CP 7.604) as he tries to 
clarify the division he is drawing between percept and perceptual judgment:

Analysis of the experience of the chair as it appears before me now.
a.  The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any kind.
b.  It essentially embodies no intentions of any kind.
c.  It does not stand for anything.
d.  It obtrudes itself upon my gaze, but not as a deputy of something else, 
not as anything.  
e.  It is very insistent, for all its silence.
f.  It would be useless for me to say “I don’t believe in the chair.”
g.  It disturbs be, more less.
h.  I can’t dismiss is, as I would a fancy
i.  I can only get rid of it by an exertion of physical force.
j.  It is a forceful thing.  Yet it offers no reason, defence, or excuse 
for its presence (in my experience, in its existence).
k.  It does not pretend to any right to be there.
l.  It silently forces itself upon me (no further brute cause of which this 
seems to be the effect).
m.  Such is the precept.  

Key question:  now, what is its logical bearing upon knowledge and belief?  
This can be summed up in three precepts:
1.  It contributes something positive (the chair has four legs, a back, a 
yellow color, a green cushion.  Each of these things is a predicate of the 
subject “this thing.”  To learn that the subject actually has these predicates 
is a contribution to our belief and knowledge).
2.  It compels the perceiver to acknowledge it.
3.  It neither offers any reason for such acknowledgement nor makes any 
pretension to reasonableness.  

Taking these points together, it appears to me that the first part consists in 
an analysis of what appears to us when we see something like a pillow sitting 
on a chair.  The analysis seems to be guided by the phenomenological account of 
the elemental categories.  The second part, where he formulates the three 
precepts, looks to me like a hypothesis about the nature of the percept.  

Gary claims that the percept is a rhematic iconic qualisign, but Peirce claims 
in (c) that percepts do not stand for anything else.  As such, they are not 
representations.  Later in this essay, however, Peirce characterizes the 
percipuum as an interpretation of the percept.  In order for the percipuum to 
be an interpretation of the percept, doesn't the percept have to function as 
some kind of representamen?

How can we reconcile the apparent tension between claims that Peirce is making 
about the nature of the percept and its relation to the percipuum and the 
perceptual judgment?

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:37 AM
To: Gary Richmond; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,

Gary,

I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where 
abstraction is understood as Locke’s partial consideration. At least that is 
the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different.

John

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 26, 2015 1:05 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,

John,

The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as 
saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a 
rhematic iconic qualisign.

Best,

Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I 
have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there 
is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and 
discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem 
with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments.

Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming 
first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires 
and abduction. We can’t do other kinds of reasoning without this first 
classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out).

John

From: Gary Richmond 
[mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM

To: Peirce-L
Cc: mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

Frederik, lists,

Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the 
recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's paper 
"The Scent of Truth" (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 -

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8467] Re: Natural Propositions,

[John Collier]

No, I definitely classify my sensations as I have them. I did have one weird 
experience where I did not classify a colour while I was on DMT, so I think I 
get the idea. People have noted how quick I am at picking things out - it 
happens automatically for me.

It is an empirical question how the sensory system works. First it 
distinguishes differences. People working on it haven't got much further except 
for vision, which definitely classifies before things are conscious (Lettvin et 
al, Marr), so shapes come preclassified.

John

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 26, 2015 1:47 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:8467] Re: Natural Propositions,

John,

I experience qualities as such and often before I've labeled them x, y, or z. 
Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp dust particle hits my eye. 
Although there is certainly some secondness involved, I experience pain before 
I think 'pain'. Maybe other people do experience such things differently.

Best,

Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 12:37 PM, John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Gary,

I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where 
abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is 
the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different.

John

From: Gary Richmond 
[mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 26, 2015 1:05 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,

John,

The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as 
saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a 
rhematic iconic qualisign.

Best,

Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I 
have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there 
is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and 
discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem 
with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments.

Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming 
first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires 
and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this first 
classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out).

John

From: Gary Richmond 
[mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM

To: Peirce-L
Cc: mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

Frederik, lists,

Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the 
recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's paper 
"The Scent of Truth" (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I recommended the 
paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. Nathan writes:

The importance of perception is that in what
Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of text,
at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an
intellectual component into consciousness.

We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptual
judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, 
and
we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . (CP 
7.643)

We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and secondness,
are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component
is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other'
that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception
adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces
the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness.

What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations
to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second
level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of the
word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the
starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A judgment
involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what
else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of
inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at this
primitive level of thought

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Gary Richmond]

John,

I experience qualities *as such* and often before I've labeled them x, y,
or z. Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp dust particle hits my
eye. Although there is certainly some secondness involved, I experience
pain before I think 'pain'. Maybe other people do experience such things
differently.

Best,

Gary

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 12:37 PM, John Collier  wrote:

>  Gary,
>
>
>
> I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where
> abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that
> is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* April 26, 2015 1:05 PM
> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,
>
>
>
> John,
>
>
>
> The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as
> saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a
> rhematic iconic qualisign.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
>
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>
> *Communication Studies*
>
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *C 745*
>
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier  wrote:
>
> I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that
> I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained
> there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages
> and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no
> problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are
> judgments.
>
>
>
> Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction
> coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which
> requires and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this
> first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out).
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* April 25, 2015 2:46 PM
>
>
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Cc:* 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural
> Propositions, Ch.
>
>
>
> Frederik, lists,
>
>
>
> Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the
> recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's
> paper "The Scent of Truth" (*Semiotica* 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I
> recommended the paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well.
> Nathan writes:
>
>
>
> The importance of perception is that in what
>
> Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of
> text,
>
> at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an
>
> intellectual component into consciousness.
>
>
>
> We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the
> perceptual
>
> judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it
> against us, and
>
> we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . .
> (CP 7.643)
>
>
>
> We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and
> secondness,
>
> are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component
>
> is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other'
>
> that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception
>
> adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces
>
> the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness.
>
>
>
> What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations
>
> to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second
>
> level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of
> the
>
> word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the
>
> starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A
> judgment
>
> involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what
>
> else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of
>
> inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at
> this
>
> primitive level of thought.
>
>
>
> Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result
>
> of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational,
>
> so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from
>
> sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called)
>
> by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive
> inference
>
> shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation
>
> between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,

[John Collier]

Gary,

I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where 
abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is 
the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different.

John

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 26, 2015 1:05 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,

John,

The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as 
saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a 
rhematic iconic qualisign.

Best,

Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I 
have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there 
is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and 
discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem 
with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments.

Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming 
first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires 
and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this first 
classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out).

John

From: Gary Richmond 
[mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM

To: Peirce-L
Cc: mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

Frederik, lists,

Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the 
recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's paper 
"The Scent of Truth" (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I recommended the 
paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. Nathan writes:

The importance of perception is that in what
Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of text,
at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an
intellectual component into consciousness.

We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptual
judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, 
and
we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . (CP 
7.643)

We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and secondness,
are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component
is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other'
that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception
adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces
the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness.

What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations
to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second
level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of the
word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the
starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A judgment
involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what
else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of
inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at this
primitive level of thought.

Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result
of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational,
so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from
sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called)
by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive inference
shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation
between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments,
are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences'
(CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce's commitment (somewhat reconceived)
to the maxim: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.'
(CP 5.181). (The scent of truth, 461-2)

These passages seem to support what you just wrote. Do you agree? Btw, Cathy 
Legg wrote that in the Q&A of a paper she presented at APA recently she was 
asked exactly what is a percept in the perceptual judgment. She thought it was 
"a good question." I think Nathan's parenthetical remark in the paragraph just 
above provides a neat answer: it is "the sensory component in perception").

Best,

Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:19 P

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Gary Richmond]

John,

The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as
saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a
rhematic iconic qualisign.

Best,

Gary

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier  wrote:

>  I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues
> that I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I
> maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction).
> These passages and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that
> I have no problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions,
> are judgments.
>
>
>
> Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction
> coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which
> requires and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this
> first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out).
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* April 25, 2015 2:46 PM
>
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Cc:* 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural
> Propositions, Ch.
>
>
>
> Frederik, lists,
>
>
>
> Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the
> recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's
> paper "The Scent of Truth" (*Semiotica* 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I
> recommended the paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well.
> Nathan writes:
>
>
>
> The importance of perception is that in what
>
> Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of
> text,
>
> at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an
>
> intellectual component into consciousness.
>
>
>
> We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the
> perceptual
>
> judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it
> against us, and
>
> we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . .
> (CP 7.643)
>
>
>
> We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and
> secondness,
>
> are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component
>
> is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other'
>
> that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception
>
> adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces
>
> the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness.
>
>
>
> What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations
>
> to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second
>
> level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of
> the
>
> word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the
>
> starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A
> judgment
>
> involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what
>
> else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of
>
> inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at
> this
>
> primitive level of thought.
>
>
>
> Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result
>
> of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational,
>
> so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from
>
> sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called)
>
> by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive
> inference
>
> shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation
>
> between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments,
>
> are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences'
>
> (CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce's commitment (somewhat reconceived)
>
> to the maxim: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.'
>
> (CP 5.181). (The scent of truth, 461-2)
>
>
>
> These passages seem to support what you just wrote. Do you agree? Btw,
> Cathy Legg wrote that in the Q&A of a paper she presented at APA recently
> she was asked exactly what is a percept in the perceptual judgment. She
> thought it was "a good question." I think Nathan's parenthetical remark in
> the paragraph just above provides a neat answer: it is "the sensory
> component in perception").
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
>
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>
> *Communication Studies*
>
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *C 745*
>
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
> wrote:
>
> Dear Gary, lists
>
>
>
> In the discussion of this P quote
>
> :
>
> "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousnes

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8459] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stan, for heaven's sake, gravity doesn't need any human discourse in order to 
exist. The laws of organization of a cell, in the egg as it transforms into a 
bird, don't need any human discourse in order to function. The laws of 
organization of a chemical molecule don't need any human discourse to function. 
These normative patterns, these habits of organization common to a species, to 
matter, toare all examples of Thirdness.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stanley N Salthe 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee 
  Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:12 AM
  Subject: [biosemiotics:8459] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.


  Frederick -- Gravitation is a human discourse theory. Perhaps you mean 
instead  the feeling of being heavy, and of not being able to flu upstairs.


  STAN


  On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt  wrote:

Dear John, Stan -  
Thirdnesses in nature are kinds, patterns, laws, generalities - Peirce 
sometimes used gravitation as an example. 
Best
F


Den 26/04/2015 kl. 15.05 skrev Stanley N Salthe 
:


  John -- It would be useful to have an example of mediation/Thirdness in 
Nature that does not depend upon human discourse. 


  STAN


  On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 9:00 PM, John Collier  wrote:

Stan, list,



No, mediation, or thirdness does not depend on language. There are many 
cases of irreducible triads in nature other than in languages as the term is 
usually understood, and as Stan uses it below. You don’t have to be a 
pansemiotician to accept that.



It is one thing for us to have mediate consciousness of generality and 
for there to be a generality that is not reducible to its instances. The idea 
that we create such things through the power of our thought is, frankly, 
ridiculous.



Peirce once said: "The agility of the tongue is shown in its insisting 
that the world depends upon it." Charles Peirce CP 8.83 (1891). That sort of 
thing is best left to coffee shop philosophy.



The distinction made in the first paragraph above needs to be made, 
even for an antirealist, or they soon get tied in knots. I won’t proceed to tie 
the knots.



John



From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu] 
Sent: April 25, 2015 10:39 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:8441] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.



Gary -- Regarding:



That's right--rather than immediate consciousness of generality, we 
have mediate consciousness of same. 



S: Here again I see the necessity of social construction. Mediation 
generally arrives via language, and languages are many and differ among 
themselves. So Thirdness would differ from language group to language group and 
therefore is not 'real' in the realist sense.



STAN



On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond 
 wrote:

That's right--rather than immediate consciousness of generality, we 
have mediate consciousness of same. This is one of the principal reasons why I 
consider Peirce's idea of the tripartite/tricategorial minimum of time being 
the moment (cf. Bergson's duree) versus the (abstract) instant to be so 
important. 








Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690



On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 6:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
wrote:

Gary R - exactly. Thanks for providing the quote.



There is no 'immediate consciousness of generality' and 'no direct 
experience of the general'...and Thirdness is a factor of our perceptual 
judgments; that is, reasoning, which is to say, the act-of-Thirdness, (and I 
include physico-chemical and biological systems in this process) is grounded in 
the experience of perception.



Edwina

  - Original Message - 

  From: Gary Richmond 

  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee 

  Cc: peirce-l at list.iupui.edu 

  Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 5:33 PM

  Subject: [biosemiotics:8435] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.



  "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of 
generality, I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of 
the general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in 
our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on 
necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the 
perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150)








  Gary Richmond

  Philosophy and Critical Thinking

  Communication Studies

  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

  C 745

  718 482-5690



  On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara 
 wrote:

  Edwina

  If I can se

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8455] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear John, Stan -
Thirdnesses in nature are kinds, patterns, laws, generalities - Peirce 
sometimes used gravitation as an example.
Best
F

Den 26/04/2015 kl. 15.05 skrev Stanley N Salthe 
mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu>>
:

John -- It would be useful to have an example of mediation/Thirdness in Nature 
that does not depend upon human discourse.

STAN

On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 9:00 PM, John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Stan, list,

No, mediation, or thirdness does not depend on language. There are many cases 
of irreducible triads in nature other than in languages as the term is usually 
understood, and as Stan uses it below. You don’t have to be a pansemiotician to 
accept that.

It is one thing for us to have mediate consciousness of generality and for 
there to be a generality that is not reducible to its instances. The idea that 
we create such things through the power of our thought is, frankly, ridiculous.

Peirce once said: "The agility of the tongue is shown in its insisting that the 
world depends upon it." Charles Peirce CP 8.83 (1891). That sort of thing is 
best left to coffee shop philosophy.

The distinction made in the first paragraph above needs to be made, even for an 
antirealist, or they soon get tied in knots. I won’t proceed to tie the knots.

John

From: Stanley N Salthe 
[mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu]
Sent: April 25, 2015 10:39 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:8441] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

Gary -- Regarding:

That's right--rather than immediate consciousness of generality, we have 
mediate consciousness of same.

S: Here again I see the necessity of social construction. Mediation generally 
arrives via language, and languages are many and differ among themselves. So 
Thirdness would differ from language group to language group and therefore is 
not 'real' in the realist sense.

STAN

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
That's right--rather than immediate consciousness of generality, we have 
mediate consciousness of same. This is one of the principal reasons why I 
consider Peirce's idea of the tripartite/tricategorial minimum of time being 
the moment (cf. Bergson's duree) versus the (abstract) instant to be so 
important.

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 6:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary R - exactly. Thanks for providing the quote.

There is no 'immediate consciousness of generality' and 'no direct experience 
of the general'...and Thirdness is a factor of our perceptual judgments; that 
is, reasoning, which is to say, the act-of-Thirdness, (and I include 
physico-chemical and biological systems in this process) is grounded in the 
experience of perception.

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Richmond
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l at list.iupui.edu
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 5:33 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:8435] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

"If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, I 
grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the general, I 
grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in our very 
perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on necessary 
reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the perception of 
generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150)

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara  
wrote:
Edwina

If I can see right you are disagreeing with Peirce, then.
However, I have a suspicion that there is not much real disagreements, but you 
just use words differently as me (or Peirce). I can easily agree that "Generals 
(...) are not akin to discrete matter" or that "we don't directly experience 
them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a separate existentiality."

But your statement that "We extract/synthesize generals within our direct 
empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition" I do not think is the whole 
story when it comes to Peirce's logical theory of perception (in 1903). That is 
(approximately) what happens in abductive reasoning, but its limit case, the 
formation of perceptual judgment is not reasoned because there is no 
self-control, nor question about its validity - it is always valid about the 
percept.

Yours,

-tommi


Edwina wrote:
Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are Thirdness, are 
not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness. Peirce is following 
Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only through our direct 
experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of meaning is irreducible to 
those of quality and reaction' 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

[John Collier]

I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I 
have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there 
is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and 
discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem 
with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments.

Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming 
first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires 
and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this first 
classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out).

John

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

Frederik, lists,

Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the 
recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's paper 
"The Scent of Truth" (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I recommended the 
paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. Nathan writes:

The importance of perception is that in what
Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of text,
at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an
intellectual component into consciousness.

We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptual
judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, 
and
we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . (CP 
7.643)

We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and secondness,
are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component
is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other'
that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception
adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces
the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness.

What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations
to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second
level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of the
word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the
starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A judgment
involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what
else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of
inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at this
primitive level of thought.

Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result
of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational,
so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from
sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called)
by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive inference
shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation
between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments,
are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences'
(CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce's commitment (somewhat reconceived)
to the maxim: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.'
(CP 5.181). (The scent of truth, 461-2)

These passages seem to support what you just wrote. Do you agree? Btw, Cathy 
Legg wrote that in the Q&A of a paper she presented at APA recently she was 
asked exactly what is a percept in the perceptual judgment. She thought it was 
"a good question." I think Nathan's parenthetical remark in the paragraph just 
above provides a neat answer: it is "the sensory component in perception").

Best,

Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>> wrote:
Dear Gary, lists

In the discussion of this P quote
:
"If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, I 
grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the general, I 
grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in our very 
perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on necessary 
reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the perception of 
generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150)

it may be too easy to get the impression that as there is "no immediate 
consciousness of generality", there must be, instead, perception as immediate 
consciousness of First- and Secondness from which generatlity is then, later, 
construed by acts of inference, generalization etc. But that would be to 
conform Peirce to the schema of logical empiricism which seems to have grown 
in