date:20151116

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread Helmut Raulien

Franklin,

right! For example, the idea, that a common knowledge can be a dynamical object I had thought to have gotten from a letter to Lady Welby. My idea of self-refering sign, I think, comes from aspects of other theories, like autopoiesis, re-entry, and so on. And to find this aspect subsumed under the idea of the immediate object, whose function I have been understanding as another... well, not start again. See you later, and thank you very much for your friendly counseling!

Best,

Helmut

15. November 2015 um 23:55 Uhr
"Franklin Ransom" wrote:

Helmut,

You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you.

I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a word of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more complicated or 'higher-level' in understanding than those letters, and much of what is going on there is highly experimental for Peirce. I understand the sentiment to want to jump in right there (I did that myself some years ago), but it's not a good place to begin. The primary benefit of those letters (so it seems to me) is their suggestiveness of ideas. but that's not very helpful if one doesn't have a more basic understanding in place to test.

It's sort of like the common layman attempt to talk about abstract theoretical physics without knowing any of the basic ideas of physics, how they're defined, and how calculus applies to them. Many people can't help it, because everyone experiences time and space and such, and so each person thinks they have a sense of the subject matter and can kind of grasp what's being said (no matter how abstract the idea and the real need for understanding the mathematics that goes with it). But really, a layman's understanding is no understanding, and sometimes directly contradicts the truth. I would say it is similar with the semiotics discussed in the letters. We all think about signs and meaning, so we can't help wanting to understand it all right away; but if one isn't well-prepared, it won't be very helpful, and may actually prove harmful, for genuine understanding. Even those early papers I suggested can be challenging (especially "On a New List of Categories)", but at least they're not so experimental as the letters to Welby, and they will make clear certain elementary ideas in Peirce's semiotic, because that is the purpose of those papers.

Well, just a word of caution regarding the letters. If you think you can handle it, by all means, have at it. But if you start feeling the need for some rules of navigation to help you out on that open sea, I would just suggest the same papers I already have. If you would like to discuss any of them in a thread, I'll be happy to participate, with the exception of the letters to Welby; I learned the hard way to avoid those for now.

-- Franklin

On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Franklin,

thank you. Yes, it was very helpful, and a bit shocking for me to see, how many things I have been misunderstanding. My line of misunderstandings was based on not knowing, that the immediate object is about the sign itself too, as you have written. I will have to read more before taking part on this list. Beside the papers you have recommended, Letters to Lady Welby are good for me, I think, because there are many examples given.

Best,

Helmut

14. November 2015 um 23:52 Uhr
"Franklin Ransom"

Helmut,

I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP going around in an electronic version on the internet. I got a copy of that for under $3. It's not the best way, because images are lacking, which is very unfortunate for Vol.4 especially, and then also many symbols aren't portrayed well. Still, not bad for the price that I found it at. The commens is certainly helpful. The Guide for the Perplexed is secondary literature. I'm not familiar with Noth or Ort.

If you are inclined, I would suggest Essential Peirce, vol. 1 and 2 (there are only those two volumes). Also, it is a good idea to keep in mind that if you visit cspeirce.com, you will find at the top of the home page a link to writings by Peirce that have been made available online. I myself usually go there to reference the ULCE paper. If you have not had a chance to read the following papers yet, I highly recommend "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". "On a New List of Categories" is important for deeper understanding. Probably "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" would be good. I don't think these are writings that would typically be thrown in with semiotics (exc

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread gnox

Franklin, my responses inserted below.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 13-Nov-15 15:02
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

 

Gary F, list,

 

Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on Induction," 
I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of the 
discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.

 

I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" 
instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that Peirce 
was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. 

GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly defining two kinds of signs as 
parts of other signs: “If a sign, B, only signifies characters that are 
elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be 
a predicate (or essential part) of A. If a sign, A, only denotes real objects 
that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another sign, B, then A 
is said to be a subject (or substantial part) of B.” Do you not agree that 
these are definitions of predicate and subject?

 

Peirce then proceeds to define depth and breadth in terms of predicates and 
subjects:

“The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the 
characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical depth. … The 
totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of the real 
objects of a sign is called the logical breadth.” Now, when you say that 
“Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions”, are 
you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth? According to Peirce’s 
definition here, a sign can have depth only if it has predicates and signifies 
characters. Do all signs do that? Likewise, in order to have breadth, a sign 
must have subjects and real objects. Do all signs have those? If not, how can 
you claim that the referent of the term “a sign” in those definitions can be 
any sign at all? Peirce’s definitions specify that a sign that has depth and 
breadth (and thus can convey information) must have predicate(s) and 
subject(s). Does that apply to all kinds of sign?

 

But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain the 
way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be somewhat 
unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where Peirce 
remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, and 
alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. Perhaps 
in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments may be 
regarded as propositions.

 

In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign cannot 
be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to form such 
an argument" (EP2, p.308).

 

In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear that 
terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" have 
informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is true 
that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no meaning by 
itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the information of a 
term is determined by the totality of synthetic propositions in which the term 
participates as either predicate or subject; its informed depth and breadth is 
due to the cases in which the term is not used alone, but with respect to other 
terms in propositions. In the case of being used as predicate, it increases in 
informed breadth; in the case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note 
that when the term appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is 
predicated of the term, and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has 
the subject of the proposition as its subject.

 

Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to 
supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth given as 
subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are 
such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that are 
men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very practical 
thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies what Peirce 
says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with respect to, not 
simply propositions, but signs in general.

 

That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be regarded as 
propositions. There are also some other points that are relevant to the claim 
that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. Although Peirce does 
admit that it is the proposition which is the main subject of the scholium as a 
whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple of times before the paragraph in 
question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to explain rhemas and arguments as wel

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread Franklin Ransom

Helmut,

To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The
idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of
collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of
the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had
some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what
the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through
experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge
itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information
we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or
the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to
determine the dynamical object being signified.

This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the
object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because
we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it
through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an
index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common
knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise,
the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a
symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless
it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of
whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of
physical connection with the object it denotes or points to.

So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human
body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't
know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal
at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the
symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to
something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later
through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous
experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes
the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this
collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a
disease, and now recognize the symptoms as pointing to it.

Another case is when we ask for directions to a place we have never been
before. In order to understand the dynamical object, i.e. the place
signified, we have to understand it indirectly through other places we have
been before. The giving of directions will typically refer to the kinds of
objects we have experienced before, like certain kinds of landmarks and
signs. So our collateral information, or common knowledge, gives us an
indirect experience of the place by its connection with other objects, like
certain kinds of landmarks and signs, that we have experienced before, and
when we come upon those landmarks and signs, we will understand their
physical connection to the place. And that understanding will begin with
the giving of directions, which references one's starting point as having
certain physical connections to follow to those landmarks and signs, that
will in turn lead to the place. Once we have visited the place, it will now
be a part of the real objects we have experienced; and when we learn new
information about the place, we will now have the direct collateral
experience or information to understand which object the new information is
about.

To put the point more generally, there are all manner of physical
connections in nature. But we are not in a position to understand each and
every one of those connections, because there are many things we have not
experienced. As we gain experience of more things, we become able to
interpret physical connections we were not able to before. And this is not
true of us simply as individual interpreters, but as a community of
inquiry, or scientific community.

-- Franklin

---

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Franklin,
> right! For example, the idea, that a common knowledge can be a dynamical
> object I had thought to have gotten from a letter to Lady Welby. My idea of
> self-refering sign, I think, comes from aspects of other theories, like
> autopoiesis, re-entry, and so on. And to find this aspect subsumed under
> the idea of the immediate object, whose function I have been understanding
> as another... well, not start again. See you later, and thank you very much
> for your friendly counseling!
> Best,
> Helmut
> 15. November 2015 um 23:55 Uhr
>  "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
>
> Helmut,
>
> You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you.
>
> I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a
> word of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more complicated or
> 'higher-level' in understanding than those letters, and much of what is
> going on there is highly exper

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread Helmut Raulien

Franklin,

I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course, this is neither a knowledge about unicorns, nor a belief in them, at least not nowadays, but a character in myths and fairytales, or something like that. Maybe we can call it an intension without an extension. But an intension of an existing extension may also be wrong, for example, people thought that all storks were white, before black ones were spotted in Australia. Or, that electrons circle around atom cores, before orbitals of the form of double-clubs were depicted. So it is hard to decide, I thought, whether the dynamical object is a character in a myth, or an affair in real nature. Or maybe, it is both? When a physicist, who is well-skilled about aerodynamics, hears the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly", maybe the dynamical object is rather the real affair in nature. But when a child who has just gotten able to speak, hears this argument, then for this child the dynamical object may either be a knowledge, grown-ups have (in this case, for the child, maybe it is not an argument, but a proposition? Does an argument, once it is understood or even just believed, become a proposition?-On-Topic!), or this is the immediate object, and the affair in nature the dynamic. But this topic is easily getting complicated: What, if a grown- up tells a child, that electrons circle around atom cores, that all storks are white, or that there is a father christmas? It is about collateral information. But at which level of source of collateral information does the definition of the dynamical object stop? If there was not a stop, it would not be the dynamical object, but the final interpretant, isnt it? Or the answer might be: The dynamical object is an affair in real nature, and if it is a character in a myth, then this character and this myth is the affair in real nature. I think, all this is very difficult, please donot feel obliged to answer all this, I think, it is my turn now, to try to understand it by reading some more papers. Lest you like this topic, and think, that it is good also for everybody else in this list.

Best,

Helmut

16. November 2015 um 17:34 Uhr
"Franklin Ransom" wrote:

Helmut,

To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to determine the dynamical object being signified.

This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise, the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of physical connection with the object it denotes or points to.

So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a disease, and now recognize the symptoms as pointing to it.

Another case is when we ask for directions to a place we have never been before. In order to understand the dynamical object, i.e. the place signified, we have to understand it indirectly through

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: Please dont care too much about my below text, I think I have confused the dynamical object with the final interpretant, besides many other things with each other.

Franklin,

Best,

Helmut

16. November 2015 um 17:34 Uhr
"Franklin Ransom" wrote:

Helmut,

Another case

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread Sungchul Ji

Franklin, lists,

You wrote:

"When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the
collateral information--or common knowledge--that is required to accurately
interpret the index. Otherwise, the index points, but we don't understand.
If we were talking about a symbol, it would be different, because a symbol
cannot be a symbol unless it is interpreted as such. But an index will be
an index regardless of whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply
requires some sort of physical connection with the object it denotes or
points to."

I wonder if the above statement is somehow related to the the following
quotes I picked up somewhere and cited in the attachment to
[biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012:

Sinsign = "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which
would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

Legisign = "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign
if there were no interpretant."


Instead of confining our discussions to icons, indexes, symbols, rhemes,
propositions, arguments (which I called 'elementary' signs in
[biosemiotics:46] and 'monadic' in some sense), shouldn't we implicate
qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns as well, so that we discuss the 10
classes of signs (which I called 'composite signs' and are irreducibly
triadic) ?

There are 9 'elementary signs' (which are listed above) and 10 'composite
signs':

1= rhematic iconic qualisign;
2= rhematic iconic sinsign;
3= rhematic iconic legisign;
4= rhematic indexical sinsign;
5= rhematic indexical legisign;
6=rhematic symbolic legisign;
7= dicent indiexcial sinsign;
8= dicent indexical legisign;
9= dicent symbolic legisign;
10= argument symbolic legisign

Not distinguishing between 'elementary' and 'composite' signs may be akin
to

i) chemists not distinguishing between atoms and molecules;
ii) linguists not distinguishing between words and sentences, and
iii) logicians not distinguishing terms and propositions (?).

All the best.

Sung











On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Helmut,
>
> To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The
> idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of
> collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of
> the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had
> some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what
> the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through
> experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge
> itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information
> we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or
> the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to
> determine the dynamical object being signified.
>
> This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the
> object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because
> we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it
> through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an
> index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common
> knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise,
> the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a
> symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless
> it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of
> whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of
> physical connection with the object it denotes or points to.
>
> So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human
> body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't
> know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal
> at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the
> symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to
> something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later
> through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous
> experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes
> the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this
> collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a
> disease, and now recognize the symptoms as pointing to it.
>
> Another case is when we ask for directions to a place we have never been
> before. In order to understand the dynamical object, i.e. the place
> signified, we have to understand it indirectly through other places we have
> been before. The giving of directions will typically refer to the kinds of
> objects we have experienced before, like certain kinds of landmarks and
> signs. So our colla

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Hello Franklin, List,

Thank you for taking the time to look at the two diagrams that were attached to 
the email.   The diagrams are, of course, quite incomplete.  There are a large 
number of divisions that need to be considered, and the labels on the diagrams 
I've offered only contain underdeveloped suggestions about how we might 
understand a relatively small number of the different classes of signs/.

My purpose in offering those diagrams (which are just working notes) was to ask 
how the relations between sign-object-interpretant at one level of cognition 
are related to those at another higher level of cognition.  As such, I asked 
how the relations between the percept, qualisign and immediate interpretant on 
the left part of the diagram fit with the relations between the sinsign, 
dynamical object and dynamical interpretant in the middle, and I then ask the 
same kind of question about the relations between legisign, dynamical object 
and final interpretant on the right. 

In doing so, was trying to ask the following question:  When an interpretant at 
a lower level is made the sign for the next higher level, is it only the 
interpretant that is functioning as the sign, or is it the whole complex of 
sign-object-interpretant that is serving the function of the sign?  One reason 
I have for thinking that it can be the latter is that the interpretant itself 
involves the triadic relation between its object and the sign it is 
interpreting.  As such, if only the interpretant is serving as the sign at the 
next higher level, then we are leaving out of the picture an essential part of 
what makes the interpretant the kind of thing it is.

The example I was considering draws on the formation of perceptual judgments 
from percepts.  You cite a passage that is telling:  "Perhaps I might be 
permitted to invent the term percipuum to include both percept and perceptual 
judgment." (7.629)  In what sense does the percipuum include the other two?  My 
hunch is that the percipuum is taken to be a continuous process of 
interpretation--and that percept and perceptual judgments are taken to be parts 
of that process.  In order to spell out how that process might take shape, we 
would need to consider the relations between antecipuum, ponecipuum and 
percipuum.  Towards this end, let's consider what Peirce means by this 
technical term.  He tells us, in a footnote, that he formed each of these terms 
on the model of how Praecipuum was formed from Praecipio.

Here are the definitions of the Latin terms:
1.  Praecipio:  to advise, give counsel, give rules, instruct, teach
2.  Praecipuum  (Roman law):  a portion received from an inheritance before 
general distribution

What does this teach us about the relationships between the following 
definitions and the definition of the percipuum?

3.  Percipio:  to understand, to be aware of the meaning of, observe, take 
possession of

4.  Perceive:  1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of some 
object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience; to come 
to know by a real action of the object on the mind (commonly upon the senses); 
though the knowledge may be inferential

5.  Percept:  the immediate object in perception 

6.  Perception:  1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of the 
18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the operation 
or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or resulting 
construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue of a real 
action of an object upon the mind.

The last three definitions are given by Peirce in the Century Dictionary.  So, 
how should we understand Peirce's technical term "Percipuum?"


Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 1:55 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, list,

I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that any 
reply is made to what I have to say.

After looking at the two attachments more carefully, I have some comments. I 
would, however, like to emphasize that I have not been thinking much about this 
subject for awhile, and certainly am not as well acquainted with the subject 
matter as Jeff. I'm just offering my two cents here.

One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object is, in 
brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is identified in 
brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong to I. Relation of 
Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose the particular 
examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it is a little 
confusing that they are identified as such. After all, since we are talking 
about nested signs here, and the I-relation (if I may so call it) is shown as 
par

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread Franklin Ransom

Helmut,

The unicorn issue is one that I am uncertain about. There's not much more
to say about it at this point, as I don't recall what CSP had to say about
such things, and I haven't put much thought into it with respect to the
semiotic point of view. One thing I could mention is that Peirce
distinguished between natural classes and artificial classes, and I think
it is safe to say that unicorn is an artificial class. This leaves in doubt
whether there is any genuine information about it, or whether there is a
dynamical object. I don't really like the suggestion that there is no
dynamical object in this case, but I suppose it's something to consider. In
any case, it is possible to have logical quantity--intension and
extension--without it being informed logical quantity. To be candid with
you though, these are just some stray thoughts, and I don't have a
considered answer at this time. It's quite possible that Peirce gave a
considered answer, but I don't recall it at this time.

The argument becoming a proposition when understood or believed is an idea
that might be worth considering. I wouldn't exactly say that it becomes a
proposition. It has already been mentioned in recent discussions in the
recent discussion on the list that an argument can be considered as a
proposition, and how that would work. Whether there is some special
consideration with respect to the argument becoming understood or believed,
I remain hesitant to say.

I'm not sure what you meant about the "level of source of collateral
information" and how it relates to the definition of the dynamical object,
or the possible connection with the final interpretant.

-- Franklin

-

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement: Please dont care too much about my below text, I think I have
> confused the dynamical object with the final interpretant, besides many
> other things with each other.
> Franklin,
> I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a
> dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then
> Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the
> concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course,
> this is neither a knowledge about unicorns, nor a belief in them, at least
> not nowadays, but a character in myths and fairytales, or something like
> that. Maybe we can call it an intension without an extension. But an
> intension of an existing extension may also be wrong, for example, people
> thought that all storks were white, before black ones were spotted in
> Australia. Or, that electrons circle around atom cores, before orbitals of
> the form of double-clubs were depicted. So it is hard to decide, I thought,
> whether the dynamical object is a character in a myth, or an affair in real
> nature. Or maybe, it is both? When a physicist, who is well-skilled about
> aerodynamics, hears the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they
> cannot fly", maybe the dynamical object is rather the real affair in
> nature. But when a child who has just gotten able to speak, hears this
> argument, then for this child the dynamical object may either be a
> knowledge, grown-ups have (in this case, for the child, maybe it is not an
> argument, but a proposition? Does an argument, once it is understood or
> even just believed, become a proposition?-On-Topic!), or this is the
> immediate object, and the affair in nature the dynamic. But this topic is
> easily getting complicated: What, if a grown- up tells a child, that
> electrons circle around atom cores, that all storks are white, or that
> there is a father christmas? It is about collateral information. But at
> which level of source of collateral information does the definition of the
> dynamical object stop? If there was not a stop, it would not be the
> dynamical object, but the final interpretant, isnt it? Or the answer might
> be: The dynamical object is an affair in real nature, and if it is a
> character in a myth, then this character and this myth is the affair in
> real nature. I think, all this is very difficult, please donot feel obliged
> to answer all this, I think, it is my turn now, to try to understand it by
> reading some more papers. Lest you like this topic, and think, that it is
> good also for everybody else in this list.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

2015-11-16 Thread Franklin Ransom

Sungchul, list,

First of all, I want to point out that in the post I am replying to, it
said "Franklin, lists", but it turns out the email was only sent to one
list, Peirce-L. At least, that's what I see. Just thought I'd point that
out.

Second of all, I think I should be perfectly frank with you, Sungchul. Your
reply to me seems to be on topic and just the sort of thing that I am
inclined to consider and respond to. But, I have seen many, many of your
posts, and almost always I simply move on as soon I see that it is from
you. I have noted from reading previous discussions you have had on the
list that you seem to have a couple of problems. One is that you haven't
really read much of Peirce, and don't seem inclined to correct this
problem. The other is that you have a funny way of constantly quoting
yourself, and have a habit of adding attachments to your posts. I don't
know if you have changed your ways and actually dug into some of Peirce's
texts; if you have, great, and you can disregard what I have said about
that. I just want to be perfectly clear and open here with you: If I sense
that what you have to say is the result of willful ignorance on your part
by choosing to not read Peirce, I will not reply. If you start adding
quotes from previous posts of yours from years ago, I will not reply (which
means, of course, if you do it again, I will not reply). If you start
adding attachments, I will not reply. I don't want to be rude, but I'm not
here to discuss the philosophy of Sungchul. I'm here to engage in
meaningful dialogue with others who have a sincere interest in Peirce's
philosophy. So long as I observe that to be in evidence, I will be more
than happy to discourse with you.

Moving on...

I don't really like these two lines:

Sinsign = "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which
> would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>

> Legisign = "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign
> if there were no interpretant."

My problem is that I am given to understand that Peirce wanted to use the
term 'interpretant' to cover the possibility that a sign might not be
interpreted. So the idea is that even if the sign were not actually being
interpreted at just this moment, it would still have an interpretant. I can
only guess that you got your quotes from Peirce, somewhere, somehow,
although you don't mention specifically where. All I can say is that
sometimes Peirce says things that I find upsetting, and this is one of
those cases. I maintain the view that the interpretant is there, regardless
of whether the sign is interpreted or not. There is no sign that does not
have an interpretant. In the case of a symbol needing to be interpreted, I
would say that so long as a symbol has been interpreted, it does not need
to be interpreted at just this moment in order to have an interpretant. It
is enough that the symbol has already been interpreted and has the real
possibility of being interpreted again.

I find your distinction between elementary and composite signs unfortunate
and undesirable. The nine 'elements', as you identify them, are not signs
in their own right. When we discuss a sign from the point of view of the
determination of a particular trichotomy, it is because it is not important
to consider other aspects of the sign class for the purpose of a given
analysis. If there were 'elementary' signs, it would probably have to be
those signs which other signs require in order to allow them to signify, as
when rhematic icons and rhematic indices are required by a dicentic symbol
(a proposition) in order to signify at all. This might be somewhat
misleading though, since as Stjernfelt points out in Natural Propositions
(p.77-78) with respect to terms, propositions, and arguments, a
'compositional' theory of signs is probably counter to what Peirce had in
mind.

Now as for the confining of the discussion, I disagree. So far as I see it,
the issue of the presentative aspect of the sign is not at issue. Would it
be possible to have a finer grained discussion if we discussed the ten
classes? Certainly. It would also be possible to have an even finer grained
discussion if we discussed the sixty-six classes. But what's the point? I
don't see it. If you think there is a point to discussing the matter in
such detail, then it is up to you to show the relevance of the finer points
introduced by considering the ten classes. If you can do that, I would
certainly be thankful. But I have only so much intellectual effort I can
expend, and I'd rather not waste my time and effort unless a consideration
is given that shows it is not a waste of time.

-- Franklin

--

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:15 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Franklin, lists,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the
> collateral i

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

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