Sungchul, list,

First of all, I want to point out that in the post I am replying to, it
said "Franklin, lists", but it turns out the email was only sent to one
list, Peirce-L. At least, that's what I see. Just thought I'd point that
out.

Second of all, I think I should be perfectly frank with you, Sungchul. Your
reply to me seems to be on topic and just the sort of thing that I am
inclined to consider and respond to. But, I have seen many, many of your
posts, and almost always I simply move on as soon I see that it is from
you. I have noted from reading previous discussions you have had on the
list that you seem to have a couple of problems. One is that you haven't
really read much of Peirce, and don't seem inclined to correct this
problem. The other is that you have a funny way of constantly quoting
yourself, and have a habit of adding attachments to your posts. I don't
know if you have changed your ways and actually dug into some of Peirce's
texts; if you have, great, and you can disregard what I have said about
that. I just want to be perfectly clear and open here with you: If I sense
that what you have to say is the result of willful ignorance on your part
by choosing to not read Peirce, I will not reply. If you start adding
quotes from previous posts of yours from years ago, I will not reply (which
means, of course, if you do it again, I will not reply). If you start
adding attachments, I will not reply. I don't want to be rude, but I'm not
here to discuss the philosophy of Sungchul. I'm here to engage in
meaningful dialogue with others who have a sincere interest in Peirce's
philosophy. So long as I observe that to be in evidence, I will be more
than happy to discourse with you.

Moving on...

I don't really like these two lines:

Sinsign = "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which
> would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>


> Legisign = "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign
> if there were no interpretant."


My problem is that I am given to understand that Peirce wanted to use the
term 'interpretant' to cover the possibility that a sign might not be
interpreted. So the idea is that even if the sign were not actually being
interpreted at just this moment, it would still have an interpretant. I can
only guess that you got your quotes from Peirce, somewhere, somehow,
although you don't mention specifically where. All I can say is that
sometimes Peirce says things that I find upsetting, and this is one of
those cases. I maintain the view that the interpretant is there, regardless
of whether the sign is interpreted or not. There is no sign that does not
have an interpretant. In the case of a symbol needing to be interpreted, I
would say that so long as a symbol has been interpreted, it does not need
to be interpreted at just this moment in order to have an interpretant. It
is enough that the symbol has already been interpreted and has the real
possibility of being interpreted again.

I find your distinction between elementary and composite signs unfortunate
and undesirable. The nine 'elements', as you identify them, are not signs
in their own right. When we discuss a sign from the point of view of the
determination of a particular trichotomy, it is because it is not important
to consider other aspects of the sign class for the purpose of a given
analysis. If there were 'elementary' signs, it would probably have to be
those signs which other signs require in order to allow them to signify, as
when rhematic icons and rhematic indices are required by a dicentic symbol
(a proposition) in order to signify at all. This might be somewhat
misleading though, since as Stjernfelt points out in Natural Propositions
(p.77-78) with respect to terms, propositions, and arguments, a
'compositional' theory of signs is probably counter to what Peirce had in
mind.

Now as for the confining of the discussion, I disagree. So far as I see it,
the issue of the presentative aspect of the sign is not at issue. Would it
be possible to have a finer grained discussion if we discussed the ten
classes? Certainly. It would also be possible to have an even finer grained
discussion if we discussed the sixty-six classes. But what's the point? I
don't see it. If you think there is a point to discussing the matter in
such detail, then it is up to you to show the relevance of the finer points
introduced by considering the ten classes. If you can do that, I would
certainly be thankful. But I have only so much intellectual effort I can
expend, and I'd rather not waste my time and effort unless a consideration
is given that shows it is not a waste of time.

-- Franklin

--------------------------------------

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:15 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:

> Franklin, lists,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the
> collateral information--or common knowledge--that is required to accurately
> interpret the index. Otherwise, the index points, but we don't understand.
> If we were talking about a symbol, it would be different, because a symbol
> cannot be a symbol unless it is interpreted as such. But an index will be
> an index regardless of whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply
> requires some sort of physical connection with the object it denotes or
> points to."
>
> I wonder if the above statement is somehow related to the the following
> quotes I picked up somewhere and cited in the attachment to
> [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012:
>
> Sinsign = "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which
> would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> Legisign = "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign
> if there were no interpretant."
>
>
> Instead of confining our discussions to icons, indexes, symbols, rhemes,
> propositions, arguments (which I called 'elementary' signs in
> [biosemiotics:46] and 'monadic' in some sense), shouldn't we implicate
> qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns as well, so that we discuss the 10
> classes of signs (which I called 'composite signs' and are irreducibly
> triadic) ?
>
> There are 9 'elementary signs' (which are listed above) and 10 'composite
> signs':
>
> 1= rhematic iconic qualisign;
> 2= rhematic iconic sinsign;
> 3= rhematic iconic legisign;
> 4= rhematic indexical sinsign;
> 5= rhematic indexical legisign;
> 6=rhematic symbolic legisign;
> 7= dicent indiexcial sinsign;
> 8= dicent indexical legisign;
> 9= dicent symbolic legisign;
> 10= argument symbolic legisign
>
> Not distinguishing between 'elementary' and 'composite' signs may be akin
> to
>
> i) chemists not distinguishing between atoms and molecules;
> ii) linguists not distinguishing between words and sentences, and
> iii) logicians not distinguishing terms and propositions (?).
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
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