Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors and the logic of ingenuity

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary R., Jon S., list,

Thanks for the Wikipedia article remarks and the Tetrast link. I should 
add that I did not make the edits that have appeared in the last few 
years in the Wikipedia article on Peirce (or anywhere else on Wikipedia 
for that matter, except for updating a link or two somewhere, I forget).


I'm not supposed to edit the "Trikonic" Wikipedia article, since I'm 
connected with publications of trikonic (I produced two of the 
PowerPoint presentations and the others were based on those). Also, 
Wikipedia statements need to be sourced, preferably to published papers. 
So you need to write and get published a new paper on trikonic. I can 
offer comments and suggestions, etc., and produce a new PowerPoint 
presentation (although I've gotten a bit rusty), though I shouldn't be 
listed as a second or further author since I'm a four-ist and the most 
that I can say is that your vectors are something on which I _/would/_ 
definitely work if I _/were/_ a three-ist, likewise as traditional 
philosophy treats of the _/ordo essendi/_ and the _/ordo cognoscendi/_, 
and also insofar as Peirce's triads and trichotomies involve certain 
complexities regarding which your vectors offer the only systematic 
method of thematization, scrutiny, experimentation, etc., that I'm aware of.


Best, Ben

On 1/25/2016 3:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Jon, Ben, List,

I'm glad that this matter at least is cleared up. There are a few 
other papers written more recently than the Arisbe ones, for example, 
one I delivered in Pittsburgh at the SSA gathering a few years ago. 
But papers delivered there that year weren't published together, so I 
have only my draft and notes. I'll see if there's something in that 
and another unpublished piece which might be helpful to you and, if 
so, I'll send them to you directly.


In addition, I'm hoping to find time to put together a paper for a 
Peirce-centered conference in Waterloo, Canada, happening this Spring, 
one incorporating my most recent thinking on, especially, vector 
analysis. But I have a few other deadlines to meet--so we'll see. . .


Ben has over the years created some, in my opinion, /very/ good and 
useful articles on Peirce and Peircean thinking on Wikipedia. No doubt 
he could help me create a much better 'Trikonic' encyclopedia entry. 
However, he's a super-busy guy and, famously, perhaps especially on 
this list, a tetrast http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ and /not/ a 
triadist, so I don't know whether his heart could really be in it. 
Yet, should he ever suggest to me that he has the time and interest, 
you can be sure that I'd jump at the opportunity to work with him on 
totally reworking the Wikipedia 'Trikonic' entry as it very needs it. 
Indeed, I think we'd have to start from scratch.


Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 2:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:


Gary R., List:

Good to know, thanks.  I have no experience editing Wikipedia,
either; but Ben Udell certainly does, so maybe he can help you out
with fixing, updating, or removing that page.  Is there something
else about Trikonic online that is more recent than your Arisbe
papers and comprehensive enough to get me fully up to speed?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 1:36 PM, Gary Richmond
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote:


-
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SV: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear John, list -
I perfectly agree there are two quite different question here - the ideal, 
conceptual question of the synthesis of e.g. subject and predicate in 
propositions - and the actual, empirical question of how brains perform that 
synthesis. Both of them are crucially important questions. The solution of the 
former will set the frame for the latter; the solution of the latter will 
provide input to the former.
 In my book, I treat the linguist James Hurford's intriguing proposal that the 
ventral-dorsal split in perception forms a central part of the latter question.
Best
F

Fra: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 24. januar 2016 19:07
Til: Robert Eckert; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

OK, Robert. That puts a somewhat different light on it, since the issue is then 
an empirical one rather than the conceptual relations. I was mostly addressing 
the latter issue. (As was Frederik, I think.)

It is certainly possible that the same brain processes could be involved in 
more than one function, depending on how they are connected to other brain 
areas that might serve different functions, or to external factors that govern 
functions. My understanding is that syntactic and semantic functions interact, 
but are distinguished by different brain processes. That doesn’t mean that 
there might not be a common area that actually carries out the process of both 
coupling and merging, and then feeds them back to the relevant divergent 
functional regions for further processing. Chomsky and his colleagues in their 
recent work argue for the convergence of a number of different processes in 
syntax, but the most significant for its power is recursion, which underlies 
the merge function in particular. They argue that this function is especially 
general in humans, but not other animals, and there is a lot of experimental 
evidence for this (but based on behaviour, not brain studies). It might well be 
that the RAS plays an essential role here for recursion in general, whether 
semantic or syntactic (also tool use). I don’t know of any studies, though, 
that would make the RAS function in recursion show the right sort of activity 
and structure to explain the human capacity for recursion. One worry I have is 
that tool use also requires recursion, and some birds show this ability, even 
showing planning of tool use (in corvids in particular). This has led me to 
suspect that an old hypothesis that language capacity has an evolutionary 
origin in tool use might have something to it. However I know little about the 
equivalent of the RAS in corvids, if any. Their forebrains are quite different 
from ours and  our close relatives that also use tools.

Again, more to untangle here, but it seems to me that the conceptual issues and 
the brain structure and function issues are at least partially independent. 
Your hypothesis might be correct, but still not tell us very much about the 
functions involved and their relations to each other.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu]
Sent: Sunday, 24 January 2016 6:21 PM
To: John Collier; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

John, List,

What I am suggesting is that the same triadic neurophysiological synthesizing 
mechanism accounts for both semantic coupling and syntactic merging. The same 
neurophysiological structure, the "coupler", that Percy suggests accomplishes 
symbolization  makes the formation of both words and sentences possible.

The elements of grammar are themselves signs. Universal grammar restricts 
output and structure. The coupler synthesizes the relation between meaningful 
elements.

The results of this throwing together mechanism are different--semantics is not 
syntax, but the underlying merging/coupling mechanism can still be the same.

This hypothesis is a bit of a stretch

my guess--the coupler is the reticular formation, or reticualr activating 
system, as it controls the pryamidal system from its position at the 
decussation of pyramids (where the neurons of our "cross-wired" nervous system 
cross) in the brain stem. The system responsible for wakefulness and arousal is 
the same system that wakes us into the form of consciousness made possible by 
the use of symbol systems lie language. The recognized areas of the cortex like 
Wernicke's and Broca's areas are involved, but do not control, the elements of 
language which suffer when these areas are damaged. The neurophysiological 
activating mechanism for language is the reticular activating system.




=


On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 12:40 AM, John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Interesting questions, Robert. They certainly deserve further investigation.

One difference I see is that Cho

[PEIRCE-L] Fw: John Dewey Annual Meeting Program

[Gary Richmond]

List,

The tentative program for the John Dewey Society's Centennial Celebration
of *Democracy & Education* in Washington, DC this April has just been
announced. While I'm a member of the Society and am planning to attend the
events, one isn't required to join the organization to attend the
gathering. However, a space needs to be reserved in advance. Links are
provided to the Society's websites below.

Best,

Gary R


Dear JDS friends,

Thank you for reserving your space at the John Dewey Society's Centennial
Celebration of *Democracy & Education*. Exact details about the program are
forthcoming soon!

As some of you might know, in addition to the Centennial Conference, the
Society will also host its usual slate of events for its annual meeting. In
effect, then, there is another, second conference that happens in the days
after the Centennial gathering!

This slate of events will also take place in Washington, DC, on April 8 and
April 9, 2016.  We have a very special program lined up, including a John
Dewey Symposium on Race, Violence and Education after Ferguson, a School
and Society Forum on Teaching for Racial Justice in Schools, and a John
Dewey Lecture on the Prison Crisis in the United States. We will also
feature our annual Dewey and Philosophy Panel and Dewey through the
Generations Panel.

Please see either the text below or the attached document for more details,
noting that these events will take place in the AERA hotel complex.

We hope to see as many of you as possible at both events.

Finally, if you haven't yet joined the John Dewey Society, it would be a
wonderful time to do so. Please visit our website
 to join today.

On behalf of Society President, Leonard Waks,

Kyle

Kyle Greenwalt, PhD
http://greenwalt.wiki.educ.msu.edu/
Associate Professor
Department of Teacher Education
Michigan State University
Treasurer and Secretary
John Dewey Society
www.johndeweysociety.org[2]

JOHN DEWEY SOCIETY

2016 ANNUAL MEETING, WASHINGTON D.C.

DAY ONE - APRIL 8, 2016

12:30 -2:00 JOHN DEWEY SYMPOSIUM: RACE, STATE VIOLENCE AND EDUCATION AFTER
FERGUSON

The primary mission of the John Dewey Society is to encourage critical
reflection on the pressing social, cultural and educational issues of our
time. In that spirit, the Society annually hosts a symposium on a selected
contemporary issue. This year’s issue is “Race, State Violence, and
Education after Ferguson.”

On August 9, 2014, Darren Wilson, a Ferguson Missouri police officer,
fatally shot Michael Brown, an 18 year old African-American man, sparking
mass protests as well as vigorous national debate about the relations
between African-Americans and the police. The subsequent deaths of other
young African Americans including Tamir Rice in Cleveland Ohio and Sandra
Bland in Waller County Texas have intensified that debate. The activist
movement Black Lives Matter, formed after the acquittal of George Zimmerman
in the fatal shooting of Trayvon Martin in Miami Shores, Florida, has
gained worldwide attention for its protests of police violence. /Between
the World and Me,/ a book of reflections on the racial climate after
Ferguson by prominent journalist Ta-Nehesi Coates, rose to the top of the
New York Times bestseller list, and won the 2015 National Book Award.

The John Dewey Society invites reflection on the current situation, and is
honored to welcome three prominent educators and thought leaders - Paul C.
Taylor, Denise James, and James Earl Davis - to address its pressing
issues.

PAUL C. TAYLOR is Dean of Undergraduate Studies at Penn State, where he
also serves as associate professor of philosophy and African American
studies.  Professor Taylor earned a BA in philosophy from Morehouse
College, a Ph.D. in philosophy from Rutgers University, and an MPA (master
in public administration) from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. HIs
books include "Race: A Philosophical Introduction" (Polity, 2013) and "The
Philosophy of Race" (Routledge, 2012). In 2015 he delivered two significant
invited lectures:  “The President as Racial Project,” Irving Thalberg
Lecture, University of Illinois-Chicago (March 2015), and “Facing
Ferguson,” The 2015 Capen Lectures, The University at Buffalo SUNY (October
2015).

DENISE JAMES is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Dayton. Dr. James' primary research interest is in American social and
political philosophy. She received her B.A. from Spelman College, and her
M.A. and Ph.D. from Emory University in Atlanta, GA. Her recent articles
include: "Black Feminist Pragmatism: Forethoughts on the Practice and
Purpose of Philosophy as Envisioned by Black Feminists and John Dewey."
/Journal of Speculative Philosophy/, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2009, pp. 92-99; "The
Hostile Gospel and Democratic Faith: Black Feminist Reflections on John
Dewey and Rap," /Contemporary Feminist Pragmatism/, Hamington and
Bardwell-Jones, Indiana University Press, 2012, pp. 42-56; and "Musing: A
Blac

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Gary, Ben and List,



I appreciate the idea of trikonic and have read about the bean example,
which I dislike.  Some authors flip Rule/Result/Case and Result/Rule/Case
for abduction.  Are they isomorphic?



If I said they’re asymmetric, that it ought to be Result/Rule/Case and not
the other, where should we look to achieve consensus opinion?


Best,

Jerry Rhee   :)

On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 12:06 AM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> At the conclusion of my most recent post in this thread I offered trikonic
> vectorial analyses of the inference patterns as exemplified by the famous
> "bean" example of Peirce. Upon reflection, I find that I am not at all
> pleased with my diagram in that post for abductive inference and, in fact,
> think I did a somewhat better job of diagramming it a few years ago when
> presenting an invited paper, "Interoperability as Desideratum, Problem, and
> Process"
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/InteropArisbe.pdf
> at an ICCS workshop on "interoperability" in Aalborg, DK.
>
> Ben Udell created an excellent slide show in ppt to illustrate some of the
> principal ideas of my paper, including slide 18 (reproduced below) of the
> three inference patterns (the slide show itself uses some pretty
> sophisticated animation and is well worth taking a look at for a number of
> reasons (e.g., from the design standpoint}. See:
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/interoparisbe.ppt
>
> For abduction, then, the handfull of beans that I find near the bag of
> white beans is indeed from that bag is a mere guess--it has *possible*
> validity only.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 11:30 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jeff, List,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> JD: The suggestion that, in Peirce's semiotic theory, determination and
>> representation present mirror images of one another is an interesting idea
>> that I would like to explore.
>>
>> -I'm glad you're resuscitating this topic of 'determination' mirroring
>> 'representation' in Peirce, as it seems to me both interesting and
>> important in potentially illuminating the categoral vectors in relation to
>> these essential ideas in semiotic, especially their connection to two of
>> the three patterns of inrference which follow the same categorial paths:
>>  inductive inference (cf. semiotic determination) and abductive inference
>> (cf. representation).
>>
>> JD: I'm finding it to be quite a challenge to get straight about the
>> relationship by which one thing determines another.  The basic suggestion
>> you are making, I take it, is this:  an object determines a sign; in turn
>> the sign determines an interpretant; the interpretant is
>> determined--mediately--to be in a relation to the same object that
>> initially determined the sign.  One can reverse the story replacing
>> "determines" with "represents", which show that one is the mirror of the
>> other.
>>
>> -I think this is correct, and a neat and succinct way of expressing the
>> situation (see also my diagrams at the bottom of this message). I also
>> think that you're quite right in suggesting that key to understanding this
>> mirroring relationship is to correctly understand the term 'determination'
>> (as Peirce intended it to be employed in semiotic). But, this is, as you've
>> suggested, not an easy matter. Yet, in the course of discussions on this
>> list and elsewhere, I have come to agree with Albert Atkins that:
>>
>> Peirce's notion of determination is by no means clear and it is open to
>> interpretation, but for our purposes, it is perhaps best understood as the 
>> *placing
>> of constraints* or conditions on succesful signification by the object,
>> rather than the object *causing* or *generating *the sign. The idea is
>> that the object imposes certain parameters that a sign must fall within if
>> it is to represent that object. However, only certain characteristics of an
>> object are relevant to this process of determination.
>>
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
>>
>>
>> --For *our* purposes, too, I think it is best to think of "determines"
>> in semiotic as meaning something like "placing constraints on."  As has
>> repeatedly been made clear on this list, it is assuredly *not*
>> determination in the physical sense. You continued, quoting Peirce on
>> "determination."
>>
>> JD: "An operation increasing the depth of a term, whether with or without
>> change of information, is known as a determination. The books generally
>> give abstraction as the contrary of determination; but this is
>> inadmissible. I would propose the word depletion." (CP 2.428)
>>
>> JD: This passage contains a number of interesting points.  First, he is
>> using the concept of determines to chara

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, list,

One approach which might help in understanding the bean example as I
believe Peirce imagined it is to think 'character' or 'quality' rather than
'result' since, as I've argued somewhere, 'result' literally really works
only for deduction.

*Deduction*:
3rd (1ns) *result*: all these beans will *necessarily* evidence the
*quality* *whiteness*.
|>1st (3ns) All the beans in this bag are white,
2nd, (2ns), this large sample of beans is drawn from this bag;

*Induction*:
2nd (1ns) all these sampled beans evidence the *quality* *whiteness*;
|> 3rd (3ns) all the beans in this bag are * probably* white,
1st, (2ns), This large sample of beans is drawn from this bag,

*Abduction*:
2nd (1ns) these beans I find on the table. say, nearest this bag, evidence
the *quality* *whiteness*;
|>1st (3ns) All the beans in this bag on this table are white,
3rd, (2ns), this sample of beans is *possibly* from this bag (but there may
be some other piles of beans a bit further away from the bag which include
some black beans, so it is in no way certain that these beans are actually
from this bag).


Just now I can't see how to 'flip' abduction in the order you suggested
that "some authors" do, namely 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns. As I've remarked on
several occasions, this seems to me to be the vectorial order, *not* of an
inference pattern, but of a complete inquiry involving all *3 inference
patterns*:


*A complete inquiry*:
1st (1ns) Abduction, in the sense of hypothesis formation; i.e., a
*possible* explanation,
|> 2nd (3ns) Deduction of what would *necessarily* follow from the
hypothesis *if *valid that might be used to devise a test of it;
3rd (2ns) the Inductive test of the hypothesis which has been devised to
suggest the *probability* of the hypothesis being valid.


So, it would be helpful if you could offer an example of the categorial
'flip' of abduction you referred to. At the moment, I just can't envision
it.

Best,

Gary R





[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 8:20 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Hi Gary, Ben and List,
>
>
>
> I appreciate the idea of trikonic and have read about the bean example,
> which I dislike.  Some authors flip Rule/Result/Case and Result/Rule/Case
> for abduction.  Are they isomorphic?
>
>
>
> If I said they’re asymmetric, that it ought to be Result/Rule/Case and not
> the other, where should we look to achieve consensus opinion?
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry Rhee   :)
>
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 12:06 AM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> At the conclusion of my most recent post in this thread I offered
>> trikonic vectorial analyses of the inference patterns as exemplified by the
>> famous "bean" example of Peirce. Upon reflection, I find that I am not at
>> all pleased with my diagram in that post for abductive inference and, in
>> fact, think I did a somewhat better job of diagramming it a few years ago
>> when presenting an invited paper, "Interoperability as Desideratum,
>> Problem, and Process"
>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/InteropArisbe.pdf
>> at an ICCS workshop on "interoperability" in Aalborg, DK.
>>
>> Ben Udell created an excellent slide show in ppt to illustrate some of
>> the principal ideas of my paper, including slide 18 (reproduced below) of
>> the three inference patterns (the slide show itself uses some pretty
>> sophisticated animation and is well worth taking a look at for a number of
>> reasons (e.g., from the design standpoint}. See:
>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/interoparisbe.ppt
>>
>> For abduction, then, the handfull of beans that I find near the bag of
>> white beans is indeed from that bag is a mere guess--it has *possible*
>> validity only.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 11:30 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jeff, List,
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> JD: The suggestion that, in Peirce's semiotic theory, determination and
>>> representation present mirror images of one another is an interesting idea
>>> that I would like to explore.
>>>
>>> -I'm glad you're resuscitating this topic of 'determination' mirroring
>>> 'representation' in Peirce, as it seems to me both interesting and
>>> important in potentially illuminating the categoral vectors in relation to
>>> these essential ideas in semiotic, especially their connection to two of
>>> the three patterns of inrference which follow the same categorial paths:
>>>  inductive inference (cf. semiotic determination) and abductive inference
>>> (cf. representation).
>>>
>>> JD: I'm finding it to be quite a challenge to get straight about the
>>> relationshi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Gary,



I'm not sure what you're saying exactly but in Anderson’s Evolution of
Peirce’s Concept of Abduction (p.148), he states:



Rule - All the beans from this bag are white.

Result  - These beans are white.

.'. Case – These beans are from this bag. (2.623)



This is also repeated in Aliseda and many others.

_



Yet, others have it Result, Rule, Case;



e.g., Reichertz:

“*Abduction* "proceeds," therefore, from a known quantity (= result) to
*two* unknowns (= rule and case).”



and

figure 1.3 of Eco’s Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language goes Result,
Rule, Case…



But a quick internet search for Result, Rule, Case will bring up other
examples.





My main query is why I should accept your explanation and not theirs.  This
is why I think the bean example is so bad as to be malicious.  A novice
doesn’t see a difference between one and the other because there’s no
consequential difference in whether you notice one before the other to make
an inference about the case. Am I missing something here?


Best,

J

On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jerry, list,
>
> One approach which might help in understanding the bean example as I
> believe Peirce imagined it is to think 'character' or 'quality' rather than
> 'result' since, as I've argued somewhere, 'result' literally really works
> only for deduction.
>
> *Deduction*:
> 3rd (1ns) *result*: all these beans will *necessarily* evidence the
> *quality* *whiteness*.
> |>1st (3ns) All the beans in this bag are white,
> 2nd, (2ns), this large sample of beans is drawn from this bag;
>
> *Induction*:
> 2nd (1ns) all these sampled beans evidence the *quality* *whiteness*;
> |> 3rd (3ns) all the beans in this bag are * probably* white,
> 1st, (2ns), This large sample of beans is drawn from this bag,
>
> *Abduction*:
> 2nd (1ns) these beans I find on the table. say, nearest this bag, evidence
> the *quality* *whiteness*;
> |>1st (3ns) All the beans in this bag on this table are white,
> 3rd, (2ns), this sample of beans is *possibly* from this bag (but there
> may be some other piles of beans a bit further away from the bag which
> include some black beans, so it is in no way certain that these beans are
> actually from this bag).
>
>
> Just now I can't see how to 'flip' abduction in the order you suggested
> that "some authors" do, namely 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns. As I've remarked on
> several occasions, this seems to me to be the vectorial order, *not* of
> an inference pattern, but of a complete inquiry involving all *3
> inference patterns*:
>
>
> *A complete inquiry*:
> 1st (1ns) Abduction, in the sense of hypothesis formation; i.e., a
> *possible* explanation,
> |> 2nd (3ns) Deduction of what would *necessarily* follow from the
> hypothesis *if *valid that might be used to devise a test of it;
> 3rd (2ns) the Inductive test of the hypothesis which has been devised to
> suggest the *probability* of the hypothesis being valid.
>
>
> So, it would be helpful if you could offer an example of the categorial
> 'flip' of abduction you referred to. At the moment, I just can't envision
> it.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 8:20 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Hi Gary, Ben and List,
>>
>>
>>
>> I appreciate the idea of trikonic and have read about the bean example,
>> which I dislike.  Some authors flip Rule/Result/Case and
>> Result/Rule/Case for abduction.  Are they isomorphic?
>>
>>
>>
>> If I said they’re asymmetric, that it ought to be Result/Rule/Case and
>> not the other, where should we look to achieve consensus opinion?
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry Rhee   :)
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 12:06 AM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> List,
>>>
>>> At the conclusion of my most recent post in this thread I offered
>>> trikonic vectorial analyses of the inference patterns as exemplified by the
>>> famous "bean" example of Peirce. Upon reflection, I find that I am not at
>>> all pleased with my diagram in that post for abductive inference and, in
>>> fact, think I did a somewhat better job of diagramming it a few years ago
>>> when presenting an invited paper, "Interoperability as Desideratum,
>>> Problem, and Process"
>>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/InteropArisbe.pdf
>>> at an ICCS workshop on "interoperability" in Aalborg, DK.
>>>
>>> Ben Udell created an excellent slide show in ppt to illustrate some of
>>> the principal ideas of my paper, including slide 18 (reproduced below) of
>>> the three inference patterns (the slide show itself uses some pretty
>>> sophisticated animation and is well worth taking a look at for a number of
>>> reasons (e.g., from the design standpoint}. See:
>>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/interoparisbe.pp

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jerry Rhee]

btw, in your response, would you mind commenting on whether
1ns, 2ns, 3ns follows Result (1ns), Rule (2ns), Case (3ns), please?

I think the above is correct and that the following is wrong:
 Rule (1ns), Result (2ns), Case (3ns).

I also want to be clear about avoiding semantic conflations.
I suspect this problem extends to preference about (object, sign,
interpretant) over (sign, object, interpretant).

Thanks,
J

On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Hi Gary,
>
>
>
> I'm not sure what you're saying exactly but in Anderson’s Evolution of
> Peirce’s Concept of Abduction (p.148), he states:
>
>
>
> Rule - All the beans from this bag are white.
>
> Result  - These beans are white.
>
> .'. Case – These beans are from this bag. (2.623)
>
>
>
> This is also repeated in Aliseda and many others.
>
> _
>
>
>
> Yet, others have it Result, Rule, Case;
>
>
>
> e.g., Reichertz:
>
> “*Abduction* "proceeds," therefore, from a known quantity (= result) to
> *two* unknowns (= rule and case).”
>
>
>
> and
>
> figure 1.3 of Eco’s Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language goes Result,
> Rule, Case…
>
>
>
> But a quick internet search for Result, Rule, Case will bring up other
> examples.
>
> 
>
>
>
> My main query is why I should accept your explanation and not theirs.  This
> is why I think the bean example is so bad as to be malicious.  A novice
> doesn’t see a difference between one and the other because there’s no
> consequential difference in whether you notice one before the other to make
> an inference about the case. Am I missing something here?
>
>
> Best,
>
> J
>
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry, list,
>>
>> One approach which might help in understanding the bean example as I
>> believe Peirce imagined it is to think 'character' or 'quality' rather than
>> 'result' since, as I've argued somewhere, 'result' literally really works
>> only for deduction.
>>
>> *Deduction*:
>> 3rd (1ns) *result*: all these beans will *necessarily* evidence the
>> *quality* *whiteness*.
>> |>1st (3ns) All the beans in this bag are white,
>> 2nd, (2ns), this large sample of beans is drawn from this bag;
>>
>> *Induction*:
>> 2nd (1ns) all these sampled beans evidence the *quality* *whiteness*;
>> |> 3rd (3ns) all the beans in this bag are * probably* white,
>> 1st, (2ns), This large sample of beans is drawn from this bag,
>>
>> *Abduction*:
>> 2nd (1ns) these beans I find on the table. say, nearest this bag,
>> evidence the *quality* *whiteness*;
>> |>1st (3ns) All the beans in this bag on this table are white,
>> 3rd, (2ns), this sample of beans is *possibly* from this bag (but there
>> may be some other piles of beans a bit further away from the bag which
>> include some black beans, so it is in no way certain that these beans are
>> actually from this bag).
>>
>>
>> Just now I can't see how to 'flip' abduction in the order you suggested
>> that "some authors" do, namely 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns. As I've remarked on
>> several occasions, this seems to me to be the vectorial order, *not* of
>> an inference pattern, but of a complete inquiry involving all *3
>> inference patterns*:
>>
>>
>> *A complete inquiry*:
>> 1st (1ns) Abduction, in the sense of hypothesis formation; i.e., a
>> *possible* explanation,
>> |> 2nd (3ns) Deduction of what would *necessarily* follow from the
>> hypothesis *if *valid that might be used to devise a test of it;
>> 3rd (2ns) the Inductive test of the hypothesis which has been devised to
>> suggest the *probability* of the hypothesis being valid.
>>
>>
>> So, it would be helpful if you could offer an example of the categorial
>> 'flip' of abduction you referred to. At the moment, I just can't envision
>> it.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 8:20 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Gary, Ben and List,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I appreciate the idea of trikonic and have read about the bean example,
>>> which I dislike.  Some authors flip Rule/Result/Case and
>>> Result/Rule/Case for abduction.  Are they isomorphic?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If I said they’re asymmetric, that it ought to be Result/Rule/Case and
>>> not the other, where should we look to achieve consensus opinion?
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Jerry Rhee   :)
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 12:06 AM, Gary Richmond >> > wrote:
>>>
 List,

 At the conclusion of my most recent post in this thread I offered
 trikonic vectorial analyses of the inference patterns as exemplified by the
 famous "bean" example of Peirce. Upon reflection, I find that I am not at
 all pleased with my diagram in that post for abductive inference and, in
 fact, think I did a somewhat better job of diagramming it a few years ago
 when presenting an invi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, List,

You concluded your first response (before the second brief message as
addendum) by writing:

JR: My main query is why I should accept your explanation and not
theirs.  This is why I think the bean example is so bad as to be
malicious.  A novice doesn’t see a difference between one and the other
because there’s no consequential difference in whether you notice one
before the other to make an inference about the case. Am I missing
something here?

.
We may be speaking past each other.  Perhaps others on the list can figure
out what one or the other of us is "missing" in this exchange. Meanwhile,
and whether one sees the bean example as 'bad' or 'malicious' or not (I
certainly don't see it as such), let's take a look at how Peirce originally
puts the bean example and see to whehter "my explanation" follows or
misconstrues his. Peirce writes:

 DEDUCTION.

*Rule*.–All the beans from this bag are white.
*Case*.–These beans are from this bag.
.·.*Result*.–These beans are white.

  INDUCTION.

*Case*.–These beans are from this bag.
*Result*.–These beans are white.
.·.*Rule*.–All the beans from this bag are white

  HYPOTHESIS.

*Rule*.–All the beans from this bag are white.
*Result*.–These beans are white.
.·.*Case*.–These beans are from this bag. (CP2.623)

OK, let's see what happens when I translate these formations into my
notation following this schema.

1ns, Result
|> 3ns. Rule
2ns, Case

But, before doing that, let me address the additional remarks you made in
you message immediately following since we are clearly in disagreement here
and I apparently haven't made my categorial associations clear to you. You
wrote:

JR: btw, in your response, would you mind commenting on whether
1ns, 2ns, 3ns follows Result (1ns), Rule (2ns), Case (3ns), please?

I think the above is correct and that the following is wrong:
 Rule (1ns), Result (2ns), Case (3ns).

GR: As I see it,  both of these are incorrect. Rather, Rule (3ns), Case
(2ns), Result (1ns)

1ns, Result, is, as already mentioned, can be associated with a character
or quality
|> 3ns. Rule, represents a law, or at least 'lawfulness'--habit
2ns, Case, is an existential occurence

So:

 DEDUCTION.

*Rule*.–All the beans from this bag are white.
*Case*.–These beans are from this bag.
.·.*Result*.–These beans are white.


3rd (1ns), Result, These beans are white.
|> 1st (3ns). Rule, All the beans from this bag are white,
2nd, 2ns, Case, These beans are from this bag;


INDUCTION.

*Case*.–These beans are from this bag.
*Result*.–These beans are white.
.·.*Rule*.–All the beans from this bag are white


2nd, (1ns), Result, These beans are white.
|> 3rd (3ns), Rule, All the beans from this bag are white.
1st (2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;


HYPOTHESIS.

*Rule*.–All the beans from this bag are white.
*Result*.–These beans are white.
.·.*Case*.–These beans are from this bag.


2nd, (1ns), Result, All the beans from this bag are white;
|> 1st, (3ns), Rule, These beans are white,
3rd, (2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;


Peirce's "Result" here (as he makes quite clear in the complete discussion,
i.e. CP 2.619-624. and elsewhere) might better be expressed as "All the
beans I find *lying near this bag* are white." However, at this point in
the analysis he only means to demonstrate the results of "inverting a
deductive syllogism."

As for your final comment:

JR: I also want to be clear about avoiding semantic conflations.
I suspect this problem extends to preference about (object, sign,
interpretant) over (sign, object, interpretant).

I don't at all undertstand what you may be suggesting here; that is, I have
no idea what you mean when you speak of a "preference" in this regard.since
all Peircean semioticians see o-> s -> i as the order of semiosis; s -> o
-> i, on the other hand, if it means anything at all (and I don't quite see
that it does) points, perhaps, to the Hegelian order in some way which I
personally can't fathom.

Finally, your second message makes me rather certain that we are talking
past each other. I certainly will have nothing more to say on the topic and
will let others sound in if they're interested.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 10:03 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Hi Gary,
>
>
>
> I'm not sure what you're saying exactly but in Anderson’s Evolution of
> Peirce’s Concept of Abduction (p.148), he states:
>
>
>
> Rule - All the beans from this bag are white.
>
> Result  - These beans are white.
>
> .'. Case – These beans are from this bag. (2.623)
>
>
>
> This is also repeated in Aliseda and many others.
>
> _
>
>
>
> Yet, others have it Result, Rule, Case;
>
>
>
> e.g., Reichertz:
>
> “*Abduction* "proceeds," therefore, from a known quantity (= result) to
> *two* unknowns (= rule and case).”
>
>
>
> 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jerry, Gary F., List,

As you note, Jerry, Doug Anderson is simply quoting from what Peirce says in 
the the section on Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis:  "This sort of 
inference is called making an hypothesis. It is the inference of a case from a 
rule and a result." (CP 2.623)  Do you see Peirce presenting any other pattern 
when he is analyzing and classifying acts of reasoning based on the canonical 
forms of the Aristotelian syllogism?  

It is worth noting that, in this section of the essay, Peirce is restricting 
his attention to transformations of the relations between premisses and 
conclusions of inference patterns having the mood of Barabara.  Do any of the 
suspicions that you harbor about Peirce's example have to do with the mood in 
which the inference is expressed?  A little further along in the same essay, 
Perice looks at transformations of other other moods including, especially, 
Baroco and Bocardo.  Do some of your worries dissipate when looking at 
inference patterns to hypotheses expressed in the mood of Baroco?

At this stage in the development of his account of synthetic reasoning, Peirce 
is well aware that analyzing things in terms of the canonical forms of the 
Aristotelian syllogism will be quite limiting. Inferences to hypotheses 
involving relational predicates, quantities ranging over continuous values, 
modal assertions, and the like, will require of us that we use a richer system 
of logical tools--or we will risk skewing the philosophical analyses and 
explanations that we develop.  As such, he forges ahead in refining the logical 
tools needed to gain better insight into the proper classification of abductive 
inference and the explanation of its leading principle.

A little further along in that essay, Peirce goes on to say:  

Deduction proceeds from Rule and Case to Result; it is the formula of Volition. 
Induction proceeds from Case and Result to Rule; it is the formula of the 
formation of a habit or general conception--a process which, psychologically as 
well as logically, depends on the repetition of instances or sensations. 
Hypothesis proceeds from Rule and Result to Case; it is the formula of the 
acquirement of secondary sensation--a process by which a confused concatenation 
of predicates is brought into order under a synthetizing predicate. (CP 2.712)

What should we make of this description of hypothesis?  Let me say a bit in 
response to Gary R.'s earlier remarks about inferences to hypotheses.  What is 
Peirce saying when he claims that it is "formula of the acquirement of 
secondary sensation"? My hunch is that he is stressing the quality of the 
feeling that is involved in the "process by which a confused concatenation of 
predicates is brought into order under a synthetizing predicate."  That 
feeling, I suspect, can be understood in terms of the kind of analysis that 
Kant provides for an aesthetic judgment of taste in the 3rd Critique.  That is, 
it is an awareness of a requirement--and a consequent feeling of satisfaction 
in having satisfied a cognitive requirement that the manifold of sense be 
brought into unity.  

That is the suggestion that Richard Smyth makes in Reading Peirce Reading.  I 
believe this line of interpretation is quite fruitful in that if offers us a 
rich set of philosophical resources for understanding the arguments Peirce is 
making about the legitimacy of the claims to validity that we make in arguments 
to hypotheses.  This approach gives the lie to the idea that hypotheses are 
just inferences to possible explanations--and that they are nothing more than 
guesses.  There are wild guesses, and then there are reasonable 
conjectures--and we can tell the difference between the two.  The latter are 
responsive to our sense of what we ought to do in seeking ways to unify the 
manifold of sense.  Those are requirements of necessity--even if the demands 
are only an intersubjective requirement on our sense of what of reasonable.

If this is on the right track, then it helps to clarify what Peirce might mean 
when he says that hypothesis involves the acquirement of a secondary sensation. 
 He puts the point in the following way in another place:  "The quantity which 
we have called the degree of confidence was probably the secondary sensation of 
a difference between the primary sensations compared." (CP, 7.35)  The 
comparisons we make in an uncontrolled manner when noting small differences of 
sensation are not all that different from the comparisons we need to make in a 
more controlled manner when forming arguments to hypotheses--are they?

--Jeff

--Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jerry Rhee [jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 8:03 PM
To: Gary Richmond
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, 
was, The categorial "mirror ima

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R., Jerry, List,

Let us apply the claim that hypothesis "is the formula of the acquirement of 
secondary sensation--a process by which a confused concatenation of predicates 
is brought into order under a synthetizing predicate" to the analysis of 
hypothesis. (CP 2.712) 

Notice what he says about the nature of a deductive argument:  'The so-called 
major premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, All men are mortal. The 
other or minor premiss states a case under the rule; as, Enoch was a man. The 
conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the result: Enoch is mortal."

So, let's apply this explanation to the example of deduction that we have been 
considering:
1. The so-called major premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, All the 
beans in the bag are white.
2. The other or minor premiss states a case under the rule; as, These beans are 
from the bag
3. The conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the result: These 
beans are white.

Now, let's apply the same formula to hypothesis, and insert the explanation 
given above:
1. The minor premiss states the result; as, The pile of beans on the floor are 
white
2. The so-called major premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, All the 
beans in the bag are white.
3. The conclusion takes the confused concatenation of predicates that are 
expressed when we colligate the rule and the result.  It then brings them into 
order under a synthetizing predicate and arrives at a case that would be 
sufficient to explain the surprising phenomena, if it were true: These beans 
are from the bag.

One reason for retaining the language of "rule, case, result" when analyzing 
examples of induction and hypothesis is that we thereby retain a nice clear 
language that enables us to see how the three propositions have been rearranged 
in the transformations of the deductive case.  Setting that minor point to the 
side, does the application of the explanation given in (CP 2.712) to the 
conclusion of the synthetic inference shed any light on the character of this 
type of inference to a hypothesis?  I think it does--largely because it focuses 
our attention on what is necessary for a synthetizing predicate to bring the 
confused concatenation of predicates into unity. 

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 9:32 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, 
was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

Jerry, List,

You concluded your first response (before the second brief message as addendum) 
by writing:

JR: My main query is why I should accept your explanation and not theirs.  This 
is why I think the bean example is so bad as to be malicious.  A novice doesn’t 
see a difference between one and the other because there’s no consequential 
difference in whether you notice one before the other to make an inference 
about the case. Am I missing something here?
.
We may be speaking past each other.  Perhaps others on the list can figure out 
what one or the other of us is "missing" in this exchange. Meanwhile, and 
whether one sees the bean example as 'bad' or 'malicious' or not (I certainly 
don't see it as such), let's take a look at how Peirce originally puts the bean 
example and see to whehter "my explanation" follows or misconstrues his. Peirce 
writes:


 DEDUCTION.

Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
Case.–These beans are from this bag.
.·.Result.–These beans are white.

  INDUCTION.

Case.–These beans are from this bag.
Result.–These beans are white.
.·.Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white

  HYPOTHESIS.

Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
Result.–These beans are white.
.·.Case.–These beans are from this bag. (CP2.623)

OK, let's see what happens when I translate these formations into my notation 
following this schema.

1ns, Result
|> 3ns. Rule
2ns, Case

But, before doing that, let me address the additional remarks you made in you 
message immediately following since we are clearly in disagreement here and I 
apparently haven't made my categorial associations clear to you. You wrote:

JR: btw, in your response, would you mind commenting on whether
1ns, 2ns, 3ns follows Result (1ns), Rule (2ns), Case (3ns), please?

I think the above is correct and that the following is wrong:
 Rule (1ns), Result (2ns), Case (3ns).

GR: As I see it,  both of these are incorrect. Rather, Rule (3ns), Case (2ns), 
Result (1ns)

1ns, Result, is, as already mentioned, can be associated with a character or 
quality
|> 3ns. Rule, represents a law, or at least 'lawfulness'--habit
2ns, Case, is an existential occurence

So:


 DEDUCTION.

Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
Case.–These beans are from this bag.
.·.Result.–These beans are white.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary, Jeffrey and list:



I had no intention of upsetting anyone but I wanted to raise some issues.



Gary, you said:



(Thirdness, Firstness, Secondness…  three, one, two…)



|> (3ns), *Rule*, These beans are white,

 (1ns), Result, *All the beans from this bag are white*;

 (2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;



but the HYPOTHESIS states:

*Rule*.–
*All the beans from this bag are white. **Result*.–These beans are white.
.·.*Case*.–These beans are from this bag.



These two are not synonymous.  You attributed the Result from HYPOTHESIS
(These beans are white) to the Rule in your translation (in bold).  This is
what I alluded to as inconsequential.  It didn’t even affect your
interpretation, “Peirce's "Result" here (as he makes quite clear in the
complete discussion, i.e. CP 2.619-624. and elsewhere) might better be
expressed as "All the beans I find *lying near this bag* are white."



Moreover, , from Jeffrey’s post, “Peirce states, “Hypothesis proceeds from
Rule and Result to Case”.



>From this Peirce statement, there is no distinction between (Rule + Result)
=> Case or (Result + Rule) => Case



Moreover, I contend that Result is 1ns, Rule is 2ns and Case is 3ns….one,
two, three…



Again, others have argued that Result comes before Rule but you simply
ignored those claims.  There is no counterargument for why that should not
be the case.



_



As for sign/object/interpretant, it isn’t a trivial issue.  For example,
from Brent:



“The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to every
subject [for example: *one, two, three; sign, object, interpretant*;
chance, law, habit-taking or continuity].

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brent/PURSUING.HTM


My query is really related to whether the sequence matters.  Note also how
he distinguishes law (2ns) from habit-taking (3ns).  That is, law and
lawfulness is NOT habit but can be construed that way.



The possibility of confusing terminology is recognized in the following
discussion regarding the multiple meanings for “sign”.  Note the sequence:



“*It is difficult to define a sign in general*. It is something which is in
such a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine,
another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a
definition it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is
meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. However, this
much is clear ; that a sign has essentially two correlates, its object and
its possible Interpretant sign. Of these three, *Sign, Object, Interpretant*,
the sign as being the very thing under consideration is Monadic, the object
is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic.”



Later, he clarifies:



“I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something,
called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be
borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object
and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or
communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a
Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there
should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in
consequence of the communication. The Form, (and the Form is the Object of
the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent
of the sign…”



http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM





Should not all these definitions and labels be in unity?  If we were to
relate to the bean example, which is the Form/Object?



I say the sequence in a complete inquiry is:

the Form/Object is Result (1ns),

the Sign is Rule (2ns) and

the Interpretant is the Case (3ns),

i.e., (o => s => i), as you say with which I agree.



I don’t have to be correct (e.g., I may have mislabeled Case and Result but
the sequence holds 1ns, 2ns, 3ns).  To me, being clear on this matter is an
important issue.  But again, where is consensus opinion to be sought?  In
beans and bags?  It only leads to people walking away.

___



To further elaborate on why beans and bags are such a bad example:



Jeffrey,



Thank you for your detailed response.



Relating it to the current query, where is feeling and sensation in beans
and bags?  There is no genuine doubt there.


Best,

J

On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 11:44 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R., Jerry, List,
>
> Let us apply the claim that hypothesis "is the formula of the acquirement
> of secondary sensation--a process by which a confused concatenation of
> predicates is brought into order under a synthetizing predicate" to the
> analysis of hypothesis. (CP 2.712)
>
> Notice what he says about the nature of a deductive argument:  'The
> so-called major premiss lays 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jerry, Gary R., List,

You say:  "Relating it to the current query, where is feeling and sensation in 
beans and bags?  There is no genuine doubt there."

Well, I grew up on a farm that had a big old white barn down in the field 
constructed from hand-hewn wooden beams with enormous lofts for hay.  When I 
was young, my dad would store a number of bushel bags of sweet corn seed back 
in the corner each winter.  Many of those bags, but not all, had corn seed that 
had been treated with rat poison, which was bright pink in color.  Every once 
in a while, as we used the bags in planting, and then purchased more the 
following year, we would see a pile of corn on the floor, and I would ask 
myself:  where did that pile of corn come from?  Did the pile come from the one 
of the bags that had been left there all winter?  Or, did it fall out of the 
planter when we backed it into the barn.  Or, did the crows pick those seeds up 
and leave them in the pile?  If they did, then they must be pretty smart not to 
have eaten the pinks ones . . . .

In my own case, it isn't hard to conceive of a state of information in which 
feeling surprise is genuine and searching for an explanation is a non-obvious 
task.  It is dependent on one's background experience, but it shouldn't be too 
difficult to imagine--even if one didn't grow up on a farm.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jerry Rhee [jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 11:19 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, 
was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

Gary, Jeffrey and list:

I had no intention of upsetting anyone but I wanted to raise some issues.

Gary, you said:

(Thirdness, Firstness, Secondness…  three, one, two…)

|> (3ns), Rule, These beans are white,
 (1ns), Result, All the beans from this bag are white;
 (2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;

but the HYPOTHESIS states:
Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
Result.–These beans are white.
.·.Case.–These beans are from this bag.

These two are not synonymous.  You attributed the Result from HYPOTHESIS (These 
beans are white) to the Rule in your translation (in bold).  This is what I 
alluded to as inconsequential.  It didn’t even affect your interpretation, 
“Peirce's "Result" here (as he makes quite clear in the complete discussion, 
i.e. CP 2.619-624. and elsewhere) might better be expressed as "All the beans I 
find lying near this bag are white."

Moreover, , from Jeffrey’s post, “Peirce states, “Hypothesis proceeds from Rule 
and Result to Case”.

>From this Peirce statement, there is no distinction between (Rule + Result) => 
>Case or (Result + Rule) => Case

Moreover, I contend that Result is 1ns, Rule is 2ns and Case is 3ns….one, two, 
three…

Again, others have argued that Result comes before Rule but you simply ignored 
those claims.  There is no counterargument for why that should not be the case.

_

As for sign/object/interpretant, it isn’t a trivial issue.  For example, from 
Brent:

“The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to every 
subject [for example: one, two, three; sign, object, interpretant; chance, law, 
habit-taking or continuity].
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brent/PURSUING.HTM

My query is really related to whether the sequence matters.  Note also how he 
distinguishes law (2ns) from habit-taking (3ns).  That is, law and lawfulness 
is NOT habit but can be construed that way.

The possibility of confusing terminology is recognized in the following 
discussion regarding the multiple meanings for “sign”.  Note the sequence:

“It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which is in such 
a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine, another sign of 
the same object. This is true but considered as a definition it would involve a 
vicious circle, since it does not say what is meant by the interpretant being a 
"sign" of the same object. However, this much is clear ; that a sign has 
essentially two correlates, its object and its possible Interpretant sign. Of 
these three, Sign, Object, Interpretant, the sign as being the very thing under 
consideration is Monadic, the object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is 
Triadic.”

Later, he clarifies:

“I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication 
or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by 
something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant 
or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order 
rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In 
order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it 
shoul

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jerry Rhee]

Jeffrey,

haha!!  :)  I stand corrected!

That was great,
J

On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 12:49 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jerry, Gary R., List,
>
> You say:  "Relating it to the current query, where is feeling and
> sensation in beans and bags?  There is no genuine doubt there."
>
> Well, I grew up on a farm that had a big old white barn down in the field
> constructed from hand-hewn wooden beams with enormous lofts for hay.  When
> I was young, my dad would store a number of bushel bags of sweet corn seed
> back in the corner each winter.  Many of those bags, but not all, had corn
> seed that had been treated with rat poison, which was bright pink in
> color.  Every once in a while, as we used the bags in planting, and then
> purchased more the following year, we would see a pile of corn on the
> floor, and I would ask myself:  where did that pile of corn come from?  Did
> the pile come from the one of the bags that had been left there all
> winter?  Or, did it fall out of the planter when we backed it into the
> barn.  Or, did the crows pick those seeds up and leave them in the pile?
> If they did, then they must be pretty smart not to have eaten the pinks
> ones . . . .
>
> In my own case, it isn't hard to conceive of a state of information in
> which feeling surprise is genuine and searching for an explanation is a
> non-obvious task.  It is dependent on one's background experience, but it
> shouldn't be too difficult to imagine--even if one didn't grow up on a farm.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> From: Jerry Rhee [jerryr...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 11:19 PM
> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
> Cc: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial
> mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and
> 'representation'.
>
> Gary, Jeffrey and list:
>
> I had no intention of upsetting anyone but I wanted to raise some issues.
>
> Gary, you said:
>
> (Thirdness, Firstness, Secondness…  three, one, two…)
>
> |> (3ns), Rule, These beans are white,
>  (1ns), Result, All the beans from this bag are white;
>  (2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;
>
> but the HYPOTHESIS states:
> Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
> Result.–These beans are white.
> .·.Case.–These beans are from this bag.
>
> These two are not synonymous.  You attributed the Result from HYPOTHESIS
> (These beans are white) to the Rule in your translation (in bold).  This is
> what I alluded to as inconsequential.  It didn’t even affect your
> interpretation, “Peirce's "Result" here (as he makes quite clear in the
> complete discussion, i.e. CP 2.619-624. and elsewhere) might better be
> expressed as "All the beans I find lying near this bag are white."
>
> Moreover, , from Jeffrey’s post, “Peirce states, “Hypothesis proceeds from
> Rule and Result to Case”.
>
> From this Peirce statement, there is no distinction between (Rule +
> Result) => Case or (Result + Rule) => Case
>
> Moreover, I contend that Result is 1ns, Rule is 2ns and Case is 3ns….one,
> two, three…
>
> Again, others have argued that Result comes before Rule but you simply
> ignored those claims.  There is no counterargument for why that should not
> be the case.
>
> _
>
> As for sign/object/interpretant, it isn’t a trivial issue.  For example,
> from Brent:
>
> “The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to every
> subject [for example: one, two, three; sign, object, interpretant; chance,
> law, habit-taking or continuity].
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brent/PURSUING.HTM
>
> My query is really related to whether the sequence matters.  Note also how
> he distinguishes law (2ns) from habit-taking (3ns).  That is, law and
> lawfulness is NOT habit but can be construed that way.
>
> The possibility of confusing terminology is recognized in the following
> discussion regarding the multiple meanings for “sign”.  Note the sequence:
>
> “It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which is in
> such a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine,
> another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a
> definition it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is
> meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. However, this
> much is clear ; that a sign has essentially two correlates, its object and
> its possible Interpretant sign. Of these three, Sign, Object, Interpretant,
> the sign as being the very thing under consideration is Monadic, the object
> is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic.”
>
> Later, he clarifies:
>
> “I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the
> communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is
> determined by something, ca

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

[Jerry Rhee]

Jeffrey and list:

So, to be clear, in your example, it was Result (we would see a pile of
corn), Rule (from bag left all winter, fall out, cows pick seeds- different
rules for different contexts/representamen/sign), Case (old bag of corn,
new bag of corn, cow pick of corn)...

So, how did you pick out the best inference?  What's the relevance relation
that convinced you?  Was it gnawed?

Thanks for your patience,
J

On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 12:50 AM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Jeffrey,
>
> haha!!  :)  I stand corrected!
>
> That was great,
> J
>
> On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 12:49 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jerry, Gary R., List,
>>
>> You say:  "Relating it to the current query, where is feeling and
>> sensation in beans and bags?  There is no genuine doubt there."
>>
>> Well, I grew up on a farm that had a big old white barn down in the field
>> constructed from hand-hewn wooden beams with enormous lofts for hay.  When
>> I was young, my dad would store a number of bushel bags of sweet corn seed
>> back in the corner each winter.  Many of those bags, but not all, had corn
>> seed that had been treated with rat poison, which was bright pink in
>> color.  Every once in a while, as we used the bags in planting, and then
>> purchased more the following year, we would see a pile of corn on the
>> floor, and I would ask myself:  where did that pile of corn come from?  Did
>> the pile come from the one of the bags that had been left there all
>> winter?  Or, did it fall out of the planter when we backed it into the
>> barn.  Or, did the crows pick those seeds up and leave them in the pile?
>> If they did, then they must be pretty smart not to have eaten the pinks
>> ones . . . .
>>
>> In my own case, it isn't hard to conceive of a state of information in
>> which feeling surprise is genuine and searching for an explanation is a
>> non-obvious task.  It is dependent on one's background experience, but it
>> shouldn't be too difficult to imagine--even if one didn't grow up on a farm.
>>
>> --Jeff
>>
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>> 
>> From: Jerry Rhee [jerryr...@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 11:19 PM
>> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
>> Cc: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial
>> mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and
>> 'representation'.
>>
>> Gary, Jeffrey and list:
>>
>> I had no intention of upsetting anyone but I wanted to raise some issues.
>>
>> Gary, you said:
>>
>> (Thirdness, Firstness, Secondness…  three, one, two…)
>>
>> |> (3ns), Rule, These beans are white,
>>  (1ns), Result, All the beans from this bag are white;
>>  (2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;
>>
>> but the HYPOTHESIS states:
>> Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
>> Result.–These beans are white.
>> .·.Case.–These beans are from this bag.
>>
>> These two are not synonymous.  You attributed the Result from HYPOTHESIS
>> (These beans are white) to the Rule in your translation (in bold).  This is
>> what I alluded to as inconsequential.  It didn’t even affect your
>> interpretation, “Peirce's "Result" here (as he makes quite clear in the
>> complete discussion, i.e. CP 2.619-624. and elsewhere) might better be
>> expressed as "All the beans I find lying near this bag are white."
>>
>> Moreover, , from Jeffrey’s post, “Peirce states, “Hypothesis proceeds
>> from Rule and Result to Case”.
>>
>> From this Peirce statement, there is no distinction between (Rule +
>> Result) => Case or (Result + Rule) => Case
>>
>> Moreover, I contend that Result is 1ns, Rule is 2ns and Case is 3ns….one,
>> two, three…
>>
>> Again, others have argued that Result comes before Rule but you simply
>> ignored those claims.  There is no counterargument for why that should not
>> be the case.
>>
>> _
>>
>> As for sign/object/interpretant, it isn’t a trivial issue.  For example,
>> from Brent:
>>
>> “The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to
>> every subject [for example: one, two, three; sign, object, interpretant;
>> chance, law, habit-taking or continuity].
>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brent/PURSUING.HTM
>>
>> My query is really related to whether the sequence matters.  Note also
>> how he distinguishes law (2ns) from habit-taking (3ns).  That is, law and
>> lawfulness is NOT habit but can be construed that way.
>>
>> The possibility of confusing terminology is recognized in the following
>> discussion regarding the multiple meanings for “sign”.  Note the sequence:
>>
>> “It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which is in
>> such a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine,
>> another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a
>> definition it would involve a vicious cir