Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Soren,

EP 2: 463.

Best,
Jerry

On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Where can I find Peirce’s:  *An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in
> Security and Liberty*,  from 1913??
>
>
>
> Best
>
> Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 14. februar 2017 21:24
> *To:* Clark Goble
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
>
>
>
> Eric, list:
>
>
>
> Here is how I understand the nature of your thought:
>
>
>
> You consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings,
> you conceive the object of claiming about the nature of other people’s
> thoughts to have.  Then your conception of these effects, which makes you
> raise your eyebrow and get twitchy, is the whole of your conception of the
> object.
>
>
>
> And so, now what?  What does the Jamesian maxim and not Peircean
> recommend?
>
>
>
> For a Peircean would recognize that some “perversity of thought of whole
> generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation”.
>
> ~*What Pragmatism Is  *
>
>
>
> “Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential elements of
> demonstration are three: the subject, the attributes, and the basic
> premisses.
>
>
>
> I say ‘must believe’, because *all syllogism*, and therefore a fortiori
> demonstration, *is* *addressed* *not to the spoken word, but to the
> discourse within the soul*, and though we can always raise objections to
> the spoken word, to the inward discourse we cannot always object.
>
>
>
> That which is capable of proof but assumed by the teacher without proof
> is, if the pupil believes and accepts it, hypothesis, though only in a
> limited sense hypothesis-that is, relatively to the pupil; if the pupil has
> no opinion or a contrary opinion on the matter, the same assumption is an
> illegitimate postulate. Therein lies the distinction between hypothesis and
> illegitimate postulate: the latter is the contrary of the pupil’s opinion,
> demonstrable, but assumed and used without demonstration (*Post. An*.
> I-10).
>
>
>
> And therefore, “I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as
> long as it is practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much
> accuracy even indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any
> other person, while it is far from certain that we can do so (and
> accurately record what [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly)
> even in the case of what shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to
> define all mental characters as far as possible in terms of their outward
> manifestations.”
>
> *~An Essay toward Reasoning in Security and Uberty*
>
>
>
> That is,
>
> What is C?
>
> What is A?
>
> What is B?
>
>
>
> Hth,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 10:20 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Feb 14, 2017, at 8:41 AM, Eric Charles 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a
> separate thread... but how did we suddenly start making claims about the
> nature of other people's thoughts?
>
>
>
> "People think, not so much in words, but in images and diagrams..." They
> do? How many people's thoughts have we interrogated to determine that?
>
>
>
> "Consciousness is inherently linguistic." It is? How much have we studied
> altered states of consciousness, or even typical consciousness?
>
>
>
> Sorry, these parts of Peirce always make me a bit twitchy. I'm quite
> comfortable when he is talking about how scientists-qua-scientists think or
> act, but then he makes more general statements and I get worried.
>
>
>
> Are those two statements really controversial? Honestly asking. It seems
> much of our consciousness isn’t primarily linguistic. We are, admittedly,
> deciding this both upon introspection as well as reports of how other
> people experience it. This gets into the question of what we mean by
> thinking of course. Peirce was much more open to thinking not primarily
> being about what we’re conscious of. To the linguistic point I’m not sure
> that’s controversial either. The idea that our consciousness of objects has
> an “as” structure seems common. That is the idea that we don’t just see a
> blue sky as raw sense data we then consciously interpret. Instead we see
> the sky as blue with blue and sky having those linguistic aspects even if
> we don’t pay much attention to it.
>
>
>
> None of this is to deny that we can have non-linguistic experiences. But
> I’m just not seeing the problem. (Completely open to being wrong here of
> course)
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

--

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Stephen C. Rose]

Saying reality is all does not mean everything is real. A unicorn is real
only because of the role he or she plays in reality. Reality has no borders
-- it is everything. Without an everything to designate with a word we are
prey to binary or dualistic thinking which might be fine for some things
but not for reaching ethical judgments and particularly not for actions
that require years to develop and implement. A Trump lie is very real
though it may be merely air and false and have no real object.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 3:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Clark, List:
>
> Right, that ambiguity surfaces in the two sentences that I initially
> mentioned a few days ago.
>
>- A unicorn has one horn.
>- Unicorns are real.
>
> The object of "unicorn" in the first sentence is the *idea *of a unicorn,
> and that is what makes it true, along with the fact that a universal
> proposition does not assert the *existence *of anything.  The object of
> "unicorns" in the second sentence is the collection of *actual *animals
> that are unicorns, and that is what makes it false.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Feb 14, 2017, at 12:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that
>> calls up the *idea *of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really
>> *exists*, real *descriptions *of the unicorn are well known to the
>> speaker and his/her auditor.
>>
>>
>> This is why I said I thought things depend upon equivocation. When we say
>> “phoenix” it’s not clear if we’re intending to refer to the idea of the
>> phoenix (and thus a real general) or the phoenix in the world (which is
>> false and thus has no referent).
>>
>> The question is what type of object we’re referring to. Of course if I
>> refer to the existing object of say “trucks” I’m also referring to the idea
>> of them since that is partially how I refer. I refer by giving hints since
>> the indexical link can’t be directly shared. Instead I share replicants of
>> icons or indices or gesture to indicate indexically.
>>
>> I’m of the opinion much of this is an artifact of language simply because
>> our words are often ambiguous regarding the sense in which we intend them.
>> By simply making clear how we intend to use a word a lot of the problems
>> disappear. I wouldn’t go so far as to say all of them do of course. There’s
>> always that gap between dynamic and immediate object and immediate object
>> and interpretant. Not to mention ambiguity over how the sign-vehicle
>> functions.
>>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

Right, that ambiguity surfaces in the two sentences that I initially
mentioned a few days ago.

   - A unicorn has one horn.
   - Unicorns are real.

The object of "unicorn" in the first sentence is the *idea *of a unicorn,
and that is what makes it true, along with the fact that a universal
proposition does not assert the *existence *of anything.  The object of
"unicorns" in the second sentence is the collection of *actual *animals
that are unicorns, and that is what makes it false.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Feb 14, 2017, at 12:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that
> calls up the *idea *of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really
> *exists*, real *descriptions *of the unicorn are well known to the
> speaker and his/her auditor.
>
>
> This is why I said I thought things depend upon equivocation. When we say
> “phoenix” it’s not clear if we’re intending to refer to the idea of the
> phoenix (and thus a real general) or the phoenix in the world (which is
> false and thus has no referent).
>
> The question is what type of object we’re referring to. Of course if I
> refer to the existing object of say “trucks” I’m also referring to the idea
> of them since that is partially how I refer. I refer by giving hints since
> the indexical link can’t be directly shared. Instead I share replicants of
> icons or indices or gesture to indicate indexically.
>
> I’m of the opinion much of this is an artifact of language simply because
> our words are often ambiguous regarding the sense in which we intend them.
> By simply making clear how we intend to use a word a lot of the problems
> disappear. I wouldn’t go so far as to say all of them do of course. There’s
> always that gap between dynamic and immediate object and immediate object
> and interpretant. Not to mention ambiguity over how the sign-vehicle
> functions.
>

-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[Jerry Rhee]

Eric, list:



Here is how I understand the nature of your thought:



You consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings,
you conceive the object of claiming about the nature of other people’s
thoughts to have.  Then your conception of these effects, which makes you
raise your eyebrow and get twitchy, is the whole of your conception of the
object.



And so, now what?  What does the Jamesian maxim and not Peircean recommend?



For a Peircean would recognize that some “perversity of thought of whole
generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation”.

~*What Pragmatism Is  *



“Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential elements of
demonstration are three: the subject, the attributes, and the basic
premisses.



I say ‘must believe’, because *all syllogism*, and therefore a fortiori
demonstration, *is* *addressed* *not to the spoken word, but to the
discourse within the soul*, and though we can always raise objections to
the spoken word, to the inward discourse we cannot always object.



That which is capable of proof but assumed by the teacher without proof is,
if the pupil believes and accepts it, hypothesis, though only in a limited
sense hypothesis-that is, relatively to the pupil; if the pupil has no
opinion or a contrary opinion on the matter, the same assumption is an
illegitimate postulate. Therein lies the distinction between hypothesis and
illegitimate postulate: the latter is the contrary of the pupil’s opinion,
demonstrable, but assumed and used without demonstration (*Post. An*. I-10).


And therefore, “I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as
long as it is practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much
accuracy even indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any
other person, while it is far from certain that we can do so (and
accurately record what [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly)
even in the case of what shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to
define all mental characters as far as possible in terms of their outward
manifestations.”

*~An Essay toward Reasoning in Security and Uberty*


That is,

What is C?

What is A?

What is B?



Hth,

Jerry R

On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 10:20 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Feb 14, 2017, at 8:41 AM, Eric Charles 
> wrote:
>
> Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a
> separate thread... but how did we suddenly start making claims about the
> nature of other people's thoughts?
>
> "People think, not so much in words, but in images and diagrams..." They
> do? How many people's thoughts have we interrogated to determine that?
>
> "Consciousness is inherently linguistic." It is? How much have we studied
> altered states of consciousness, or even typical consciousness?
>
> Sorry, these parts of Peirce always make me a bit twitchy. I'm quite
> comfortable when he is talking about how scientists-qua-scientists think or
> act, but then he makes more general statements and I get worried.
>
>
> Are those two statements really controversial? Honestly asking. It seems
> much of our consciousness isn’t primarily linguistic. We are, admittedly,
> deciding this both upon introspection as well as reports of how other
> people experience it. This gets into the question of what we mean by
> thinking of course. Peirce was much more open to thinking not primarily
> being about what we’re conscious of. To the linguistic point I’m not sure
> that’s controversial either. The idea that our consciousness of objects has
> an “as” structure seems common. That is the idea that we don’t just see a
> blue sky as raw sense data we then consciously interpret. Instead we see
> the sky as blue with blue and sky having those linguistic aspects even if
> we don’t pay much attention to it.
>
> None of this is to deny that we can have non-linguistic experiences. But
> I’m just not seeing the problem. (Completely open to being wrong here of
> course)
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Clark Goble]

> On Feb 14, 2017, at 12:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that 
> calls up the idea of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really exists, 
> real descriptions of the unicorn are well known to the speaker and his/her 
> auditor.

This is why I said I thought things depend upon equivocation. When we say 
“phoenix” it’s not clear if we’re intending to refer to the idea of the phoenix 
(and thus a real general) or the phoenix in the world (which is false and thus 
has no referent).

The question is what type of object we’re referring to. Of course if I refer to 
the existing object of say “trucks” I’m also referring to the idea of them 
since that is partially how I refer. I refer by giving hints since the 
indexical link can’t be directly shared. Instead I share replicants of icons or 
indices or gesture to indicate indexically. 

I’m of the opinion much of this is an artifact of language simply because our 
words are often ambiguous regarding the sense in which we intend them.  By 
simply making clear how we intend to use a word a lot of the problems 
disappear. I wouldn’t go so far as to say all of them do of course. There’s 
always that gap between dynamic and immediate object and immediate object and 
interpretant. Not to mention ambiguity over how the sign-vehicle functions.



-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Ben, Clark, List:

Peirce's comments about the phoenix do indeed seem relevant to the unicorn
example and the nature of labels in general.

CSP:  A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme is a sign connected with its
Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica
calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or
dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the
Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that
concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the
logicians call a General Term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is
necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign.
Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind,
in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in
that mind to give rise to a General Concept. In this it differs from other
Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns, including those which are Replicas of Rhematic
Indexical Legisigns. Thus, the demonstrative pronoun "that" is a Legisign,
being a general type; but it is not a Symbol, since it does not signify a
general concept. Its Replica draws attention to a single Object, and is a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of
camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes,
even if this one is not individually known to the auditor; and it is
through such real connection that the word "camel" calls up the idea of a
camel. The same thing is true of the word "phoenix." For although no
phoenix really exists, real descriptions of the phoenix are well known to
the speaker and his auditor; and thus the word is really affected by the
Object denoted. (CP 2.261; 1903)


A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that
calls up the *idea *of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really
*exists*, real *descriptions *of the unicorn are well known to the speaker
and his/her auditor.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 12:05 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Clark, list,
>
> I haven't read very much on the problem of reference and generality with
> respect to fictional characters, so I'm reluctant to say that it usually
> comes down to equivocation over terms. Also I have in mind Peirce's
> comment, I don't remember where, that the object determines the sign, even
> when the sign in some sense brings the object into being (as with fictional
> characters). There seems there something more in the problematics than a
> routine equivocation problem. So I'm feeling cautious on the subject.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 2/14/2017 12:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
> On Feb 14, 2017, at 10:28 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>>>
>>> You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think
>>> most of the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms."
>>>
>>> Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in the
>>> particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes tempting kind
>>> of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. (Diving is okay,
>>> sinking is not so good.)
>>>
>>> I was more thinking of the problem of reference & generality with
>> respect to fictional creatures. Or was that what you didn’t have an opinion
>> on? As I said I think pragmatic maxim offers the solution here. Although
>> that too has some oddities in how Peirce applied it. (Thinking here of his
>> example of the Phoenix)
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Benjamin Udell]

Clark, list,

I haven't read very much on the problem of reference and generality with 
respect to fictional characters, so I'm reluctant to say that it usually 
comes down to equivocation over terms. Also I have in mind Peirce's 
comment, I don't remember where, that the object determines the sign, 
even when the sign in some sense brings the object into being (as with 
fictional characters). There seems there something more in the 
problematics than a routine equivocation problem. So I'm feeling 
cautious on the subject.


Best, Ben

On 2/14/2017 12:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote:


On Feb 14, 2017, at 10:28 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think 
most of the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms."


Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in 
the particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes 
tempting kind of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. 
(Diving is okay, sinking is not so good.)


I was more thinking of the problem of reference & generality with 
respect to fictional creatures. Or was that what you didn’t have an 
opinion on? As I said I think pragmatic maxim offers the solution 
here. Although that too has some oddities in how Peirce applied it. 
(Thinking here of his example of the Phoenix)



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Clark Goble]

> On Feb 14, 2017, at 10:28 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think most of 
> the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms."
> 
> Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in the 
> particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes tempting kind 
> of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. (Diving is okay, 
> sinking is not so good.)
> 
I was more thinking of the problem of reference & generality with respect to 
fictional creatures. Or was that what you didn’t have an opinion on? As I said 
I think pragmatic maxim offers the solution here. Although that too has some 
oddities in how Peirce applied it. (Thinking here of his example of the Phoenix)



-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Benjamin Udell]

Clark, list,

Yes, the different kinds of universe of discourse is indeed a "tricky 
bit" as you put it. If the sign's object is ultimately the universe of 
which the special object is a member, or part, then is there any reason 
for the sign not to be the universe of signs of which the special sign 
is a member or part?


I guess that as a practical matter a given universe of signs would be a 
system of signs shared by utterer and interpreter. But how would it be 
picked out? A universe of objects is indicated, if not by an index in a 
proposition itself, still by an index in the environment, said Peirce. 
Then there is also the universe of marks a.k.a. characters. I guess 
various universes or systems of signs would be reduced versions of 
Peirce's third universe of experience. What about a univese of 
interpretants? Would this just be a universe of signs in a different 
relation? At least sometimes it could be a different system of signs. In 
"A Neglected Argument..." Peirce says, "The third Universe comprises 
everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections 
between different objects, especially between objects in different 
Universes."


You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think 
most of the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms."


Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in the 
particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes tempting 
kind of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. (Diving is 
okay, sinking is not so good.)


On 2/13/2017 6:54 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

On Feb 11, 2017, at 12:59 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:


On the sign's object as ultimately the universe of discourse of the 
(more explicit) object, I was discussing Peirce's view.


1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:492 
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-letters-william-james-6


A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined
(i.e., specialized, _/bestimmt/_) by something other than itself,
called its Object (or, in some cases, as if the Sign be the
sentence “Cain killled Abel,” in which Cain and Abel are equally
Partial Objects, it may be more convenient to say that that which
determines the Sign is the Complexus, or Totality, of Partial
Objects. And in every case the Object is accurately the Universe
of which the Special Object is member, or part), while, on the
other hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the
determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the
Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately
by the Object.
[End quote]

For example, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto, 
but not only about Pluto.


This gets at the importance of a kind of holism for Peirce that 
surprisingly doesn’t get remarked upon as much as Quine’s. (Even 
though people pointed out the parallel to Quine who then wrote a paper 
about his ignorance of Peirce)


The tricky bit is really the different types of universes of 
discourses. We talked about that just a few weeks ago so I’ll not 
bring it up again. But I completely agree with you that we can’t 
really separate out the type of generality and reality without talking 
about these universes. Like you I tend to think most of the debate on 
all this depends upon equivocation over terms. That’s why the 
pragmatic maxim comes in handy as it cuts confusion between say an 
unicorn of a novel’s fictional world from an unicorn in the regular 
world by asking how we’d measure it.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[Clark Goble]

> On Feb 14, 2017, at 8:41 AM, Eric Charles  
> wrote:
> 
> Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a 
> separate thread... but how did we suddenly start making claims about the 
> nature of other people's thoughts? 
> 
> "People think, not so much in words, but in images and diagrams..." They do? 
> How many people's thoughts have we interrogated to determine that?
> 
> "Consciousness is inherently linguistic." It is? How much have we studied 
> altered states of consciousness, or even typical consciousness? 
> 
> Sorry, these parts of Peirce always make me a bit twitchy. I'm quite 
> comfortable when he is talking about how scientists-qua-scientists think or 
> act, but then he makes more general statements and I get worried.

Are those two statements really controversial? Honestly asking. It seems much 
of our consciousness isn’t primarily linguistic. We are, admittedly, deciding 
this both upon introspection as well as reports of how other people experience 
it. This gets into the question of what we mean by thinking of course. Peirce 
was much more open to thinking not primarily being about what we’re conscious 
of. To the linguistic point I’m not sure that’s controversial either. The idea 
that our consciousness of objects has an “as” structure seems common. That is 
the idea that we don’t just see a blue sky as raw sense data we then 
consciously interpret. Instead we see the sky as blue with blue and sky having 
those linguistic aspects even if we don’t pay much attention to it.

None of this is to deny that we can have non-linguistic experiences. But I’m 
just not seeing the problem. (Completely open to being wrong here of course)
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[Eric Charles]

Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a
separate thread... but how did we suddenly start making claims about the
nature of other people's thoughts?

"People think, not so much in words, but in images and diagrams..." They
do? How many people's thoughts have we interrogated to determine that?

"Consciousness is inherently linguistic." It is? How much have we studied
altered states of consciousness, or even typical consciousness?

Sorry, these parts of Peirce always make me a bit twitchy. I'm quite
comfortable when he is talking about how scientists-qua-scientists think or
act, but then he makes more general statements and I get worried.

Best,
Eric


---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps


On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 4:48 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Ben, list:
>
>
>
> You said,
>
> “Peirce recognized various senses of the word "syllogism."  In a broader
> sense that he discussed, an abductive inference is a kind of syllogism. But
> usually by the unmodified term "syllogism" people have long meant a
> deductive categorical syllogism: major premiss, minor premiss, conclusion.”
>
>
>
> I know well from our previous discussions that you are cognizant that the
> usual meaning of the unmodified term “syllogism” can be inadequate.
>
>
>
> In dealing with syllogism in the Aristotelian sense, it is clear to me
> that Peirce was only doing what Aristotle recommended:
>
>
>
> “He may not indeed destroy the framework of the received legends-… but he
> ought to show of his own, and skillfully handle the traditional material.”
> ~Aristotle, *Poetics*
>
>
>
> In all our inquiry, what we seek is the middle term.
>
>
>
> In abduction (second figure), the middle term is C.
>
> In deduction (first figure), the middle term is A.
>
> In induction (third figure), the middle term is B.
>
>
>
> “It is a good enthymeme, not an enthymeme as such, which omits to
> formulate premises that the audience can supply for themselves...”
> ~Burnyeat, Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion
>
>
>
> Hth,
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 2:35 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
>> Jerry, we've been through this many times. The pragmatic maxim recommends
>> drawing a (pragmatically explicitative) consequent from an antecedent. The
>> CP 5.189 form of abductive inference portrays finding a (naturally simple)
>> antecedent ("A") for a consequent ("C"), going, thus, in the _*reverse*_
>> direction, hence Peirce for some time called it "retroduction."
>>
>> The pragmatic maxim says to look for conceivable practical implications.
>> Abductive inference involves looking for conceivable implicants, "impliers"
>> if you will, that one could also call practical I guess, anyway for example
>> ones that may conflict with each other as explanations, e.g., ideas of
>> various mechanisms, insofar as the ideas are new to the data and are not
>> already presented by the data. Conceivable practical antecedents, not
>> conceivable practical consequents. Then one looks to deduce, compute, etc.,
>> conceivable practical consequents _*of*_ the abduced conceivable
>> practical antecedent, towards possible tests of that antecedent (the
>> hypothetical explanation).
>>
>> Peirce recognized various senses of the word "syllogism."  In a broader
>> sense that he discussed, an abductive inference is a kind of syllogism. But
>> usually by the unmodified term "syllogism" people have long meant a
>> deductive categorical syllogism: major premiss, minor premiss, conclusion.
>>
>> Best, Ben
>>
>> On 2/12/2017 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>>
>> Jerry - I'm sure you are joking. The format of a syllogism is:
>>
>> Major Premise
>> Minor Premise
>> Conclusion
>> ...with the additional format rules about 'universal', distribution,
>> negatives, etc etc..' Nothing to do with words per se.
>>
>> Words are meaningful, in my view, only in specific contexts; they gain
>> their meaning within the context...and the context operates within a format.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jerry Rhee 
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
>> *Cc:* John Collier ; Benjamin Udell
>> ; Peirce-L 
>> *Sent:* Sunday, February 12, 2017 2:02 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
>>
>> Dear Edwina, list:
>> When you say it's not the words but the format that counts; is that like
>> saying, it's not the argumentation but the argument that counts?
>>
>> For example, do you mean that it's CP 5.189 that counts and not C A B?
>> But what is CP 5.189 without C A B?
>> And what is C, A, B, without
>> syllogism, CP 5.189, growth of concrete reasonableness?
>> pragmatic maxim, CP 5.189, growth of concrete reasonableness?
>>
>> That is, if I were only to take you literally, then I could ask,
>>
>> *Among all words, is there a word?*
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry Rhee
>> p>On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 12:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Sorry, Jerry, I don't agree. It's not the words; it's the format that
>>