Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Gary R, and Jon AS,

I agree with your points and with the quotations by Peirce.
The challenge is to find a systematic terminology that is
consistent with Peirce, with modern conventions in logic,
and with the following constraints:

 1. Logic allows a variable x in ∃x to refer to refer to anything
mathematical.  That implies that any x that refers to anything
in pure mathematics can be said to "exist" in some sense.

 2. But what sense is that?  Is it some "Platonic Heaven" for all
mathematical entities -- including the infinities of integers,
real numbers, and Cantor's hierarchies of infinity?

 3. Those people who deny that anything nonphysical can exist, claim
that mathematical things "depend" on physical things for their
existence.  Frege, for example, identified the number 5 with the
totality of all sets of five things in the universe.  But if the
universe is finite, there must be an upper bound on the integers
that can exist.  And that construction fails completely for real
numbers, functions, and higher orders of infinity.

 4. Some logicians (e.g., Lesniewski, Goodman, Quine...) tried to
eliminate sets because they are abstract, and they allow new
sets to be constructed from iterations of the empty set.  For
example:  {};  {{}};  {{},{{}}.{{{;  {{{}},}; ...
But Quine relented because he realized that sets or something
similar would be necessary to define all of mathematics.

 5. In his classification of the sciences, Peirce claimed that
pure mathematics is the only independent science.  Every other
science, including metaphysics, depends on mathematics.  That
rules out the option of claiming that mathematics has some
kind of dependency on what happens to exist in the universe.

 6. For his process ontology, Whitehead considered all physical
entities to be processes and physical objects to be slowly
moving processes.  He considered all processes to be
situated in a four-dimensional space time, and mathematical
entities to be "eternal objects" in the sense that they are
outside space and time.

 7. Interesting option:  John Wilkins (1668), the first secretary
of the British Royal Society, developed an ontology with the
help of other members of the society.  See the attached
Wilkins.png.  For a copy of his book, see 
https://archive.org/details/AnEssayTowardsARealCharacterAndAPhilosophicalLanguage


Wilkins' top-level distinction is Transcendental/Special.
He characterized the transcendental branch as "knowing" and the
special branch as "being".  Under Transcendental, he placed
language, logic, numbers, and metaphysics.

Suggestion:  Suppose we name the two branches at the top of
any ontology transcendental/physical:  Transcendental would
include all abstractions that are independent of space-time:
mathematical entities, sign types, and laws of nature.

Does anyone have any preferences for or against the pair
Transcendental/Physical instead of Mathematical/Physical?

John

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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary, list

I think that an abstract, such as a generality, does not,
itself-as-itself, 'exist' in a mode of 2ns, i.e., as actuality. These
generals, these laws, are real, but are operative as these laws, only
as the organizing habits of actual existence/matter.

That is, the formula of H2O is a law of organization of matter; it
does not exist as a separate 'thing' in itself in actuality. It is a
reality that functions as the laws of the organization of that
molecule.

I am puzzled why you keep asking me this - 

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18  6:15 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina wrote:
 Well this is certainly not how Peirce saw scientific inquiry. There
are many places and times in his life when he wrote something similar
to this. 
  1910 | Quest of Quest | MS [R] 655

… how shall we define a science? . . . a science, [is]  the total
principal industry of a social group, whose whole lives, or many
years of them, are consecrated to inquiries to which they are so
devoted as to be drawn to every person who is pursuing similar
inquiries, and these inquiries conducted according to the best
methods so far found out, to which they were trained and for the
prosecution of which every [one] of them possessed special
advantages, their different inquiries being so nearly of the same
nature that they thoroughly understood one another’s difficulties
and merits, and could after a brief preparation have generally each
one have taken up and carried on the other’s work, although
probably not with quite his success. So you are a generalist? It is
possible that I am, at least to some extent, as well. But I respect
this definition of discrete sciences which Peirce offers.
 You wrote: I agree with John that 'the entities of pure mathematics
do not exist in the universe of actuality'  
 But John also wrote:  The entities in the universe of necessity,
such as laws, are also outside the universe of actuality. 
 Do you agree with that as well? 
 Best,
 Gary
 On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 6:00 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary R, list

I don't divide up the world into separate realms of inquiry, so,
when you write:

"And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns,
which are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three
Universes, which are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something
which you at least seem to do when you write "the three
categories/universes." Obviously the Three Universes have a direct
connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is an error to
conflate or identify them. " 

...then, I'm not involved in such a separation of the terms in these
disciplines. The three universes, as you note, do have a direct
connection to the Categories - and that's my point. I agree with John
that 'the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of
actuality' - but I don't see how this is a problem. 

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18  5:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com [2]
sent:
 Edwina, John, Jon, list,
 Edwina wrote: So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've
provided.
 I have written enough today on this topic, yet I think that a close
reading of at least some of those quotations would refute your
denial. But for now let me just ask you, do you agree with the way
John Sowa distinguished the three universes in his recent post?  
 JS: I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities of
pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality. 
 The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws, are also
outside the universe of actuality. 
 For me the key phrase in the first passage above is "do not exist in
the universe of actuality," and in the second, "are also outside the
universe of actuality." I doubt that you'd agree with John that these
are "three disjoint universes" (I am assuming that by "disjoint" he
means here distinct/discrete.) 
 And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns,
which are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three
Universes, which are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something
which you at least seem to do when you write "the three
categories/universes." Obviously the Three Universes have a direct
connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is an error to
conflate or identify them.  
 In addition, as Jon just wrote:  "The constituents of Peirce's third
Universe--includ[e] not only Laws, but also Signs, Habits, and
continua (EP 2:435&479; 1908)-"  and, in my view, continua in
particular unequivocally distinguish the third universe from the
second. 
 Parenthetically, I'd add that in my view it is an error not to
differentiate the universal categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns from their
application within semeiotics, metaphysics, and elsewhere. These are
separate sciences with different goals, etc. So,  note that in
Peirce's classification (fol

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,

If a science, [is] the total principal industry of a social group, whose
whole lives, or many years of them, are consecrated to inquiries to which
they are so devoted as to be drawn to every person who is pursuing similar
inquiries, and these inquiries conducted according to the best methods so
far found out..

*But where, in all this, is the science?*

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina wrote:
>
> Well this is certainly not how Peirce saw scientific inquiry. There are
> many places and times in his life when he wrote something similar to this.
>
> 1910 | Quest of Quest | MS [R] 655
>
> … how shall we define a science? . . . a science, [is] the total
> principal industry of a social group, whose whole lives, or many years of
> them, are consecrated to inquiries to which they are so devoted as to be
> drawn to every person who is pursuing similar inquiries, and these
> inquiries conducted according to the best methods so far found out, to
> which they were trained and for the prosecution of which every [one] of
> them possessed special advantages, their different inquiries being so
> nearly of the same nature that they thoroughly understood one another’s
> difficulties and merits, and could after a brief preparation have generally
> each one have taken up and carried on the other’s work, although probably
> not with quite his success.
>
> So you are a generalist? It is possible that I am, at least to some
> extent, as well. But I respect this definition of discrete sciences which
> Peirce offers.
>
> You wrote: I agree with John that 'the entities of pure mathematics do
> not exist in the universe of actuality'
>
> But John also wrote:  The entities in the universe of necessity, such as
> laws,
> are also outside the universe of actuality.
>
> Do you agree with that as well?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 6:00 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> I don't divide up the world into separate realms of inquiry, so, when you
>> write:
>>
>> "And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns, which
>> are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three Universes, which
>> are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something which you at least seem to
>> do when you write "the three categories/universes." Obviously the Three
>> Universes have a direct connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is
>> an error to conflate or identify them. "
>>
>> ...then, I'm not involved in such a separation of the terms in
>> these disciplines. The three universes, as you note, do have a direct
>> connection to the Categories - and that's my point. I agree with John that
>> 'the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of
>> actuality' - but I don't see how this is a problem.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 22/08/18 5:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, John, Jon, list,
>>
>> Edwina wrote: So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.
>>
>> I have written enough today on this topic, yet I think that a close
>> reading of at least some of those quotations would refute your denial. But
>> for now let me just ask you, do you agree with the way John Sowa
>> distinguished the three universes in his recent post?
>>
>> JS: I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities
>> of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality.
>>
>> The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws,
>> are also outside the universe of actuality.
>>
>>
>> For me the key phrase in the first passage above is "do not exist in the
>> universe of actuality," and in the second, "are also outside the universe
>> of actuality." I doubt that you'd agree with John that these are "three
>> disjoint universes" (I am assuming that by "disjoint" he means here
>> distinct/discrete.)
>>
>> And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns, which
>> are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three Universes, which
>> are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something which you at least seem to
>> do when you write "the three categories/universes." Obviously the Three
>> Universes have a direct connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is
>> an error to conflate or identify them.
>>
>> In addition, as Jon just wrote:  "The constituents of Peirce's third
>> Universe--includ[e] not only Laws, but also Signs, Habits, and continua (EP
>> 2:435&479; 1908)-"  and, in my view, continua in particular
>> unequivocally distinguish the third universe from the second.
>>
>> Parenthetically, I'd add that in my view it is an error not to
>> differentiate the universal categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns from their
>> application within semeiotics, metaphysics, and elsewhere. These are
>> separate sciences with different goals, etc. So,  note that in Peirce's
>> classification (following Comte) a science lower in the classification
>> may depend on another 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina wrote:

Well this is certainly not how Peirce saw scientific inquiry. There are
many places and times in his life when he wrote something similar to this.

1910 | Quest of Quest | MS [R] 655

… how shall we define a science? . . . a science, [is] the total principal
industry of a social group, whose whole lives, or many years of them, are
consecrated to inquiries to which they are so devoted as to be drawn to
every person who is pursuing similar inquiries, and these inquiries
conducted according to the best methods so far found out, to which they
were trained and for the prosecution of which every [one] of them possessed
special advantages, their different inquiries being so nearly of the same
nature that they thoroughly understood one another’s difficulties and
merits, and could after a brief preparation have generally each one have
taken up and carried on the other’s work, although probably not with quite
his success.

So you are a generalist? It is possible that I am, at least to some extent,
as well. But I respect this definition of discrete sciences which Peirce
offers.

You wrote: I agree with John that 'the entities of pure mathematics do not
exist in the universe of actuality'

But John also wrote:  The entities in the universe of necessity, such as
laws,
are also outside the universe of actuality.

Do you agree with that as well?

Best,

Gary




On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 6:00 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> I don't divide up the world into separate realms of inquiry, so, when you
> write:
>
> "And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns, which
> are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three Universes, which
> are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something which you at least seem to
> do when you write "the three categories/universes." Obviously the Three
> Universes have a direct connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is
> an error to conflate or identify them. "
>
> ...then, I'm not involved in such a separation of the terms in
> these disciplines. The three universes, as you note, do have a direct
> connection to the Categories - and that's my point. I agree with John that
> 'the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of
> actuality' - but I don't see how this is a problem.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 22/08/18 5:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, John, Jon, list,
>
> Edwina wrote: So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.
>
> I have written enough today on this topic, yet I think that a close
> reading of at least some of those quotations would refute your denial. But
> for now let me just ask you, do you agree with the way John Sowa
> distinguished the three universes in his recent post?
>
> JS: I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities
> of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality.
>
> The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws,
> are also outside the universe of actuality.
>
>
> For me the key phrase in the first passage above is "do not exist in the
> universe of actuality," and in the second, "are also outside the universe
> of actuality." I doubt that you'd agree with John that these are "three
> disjoint universes" (I am assuming that by "disjoint" he means here
> distinct/discrete.)
>
> And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns, which
> are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three Universes, which
> are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something which you at least seem to
> do when you write "the three categories/universes." Obviously the Three
> Universes have a direct connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is
> an error to conflate or identify them.
>
> In addition, as Jon just wrote:  "The constituents of Peirce's third
> Universe--includ[e] not only Laws, but also Signs, Habits, and continua (EP
> 2:435&479; 1908)-"  and, in my view, continua in particular unequivocally
> distinguish the third universe from the second.
>
> Parenthetically, I'd add that in my view it is an error not to
> differentiate the universal categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns from their
> application within semeiotics, metaphysics, and elsewhere. These are
> separate sciences with different goals, etc. So,  note that in Peirce's
> classification (following Comte) a science lower in the classification may
> depend on another higher in the classification for principles, but it does
> not furnish principles to those higher in the classification, although
> often enough, it provides examples to those sciences.
>
> Mathematics, as 'first science', furnishes principles to most all the
> sciences following it in the classification; and phenomenology, 2nd science
> (!) furnishes principles (notably, the universal categories) to certain
> sciences below it in the classification (such as semeiotics and
> metaphysics). (Note: as discussed here from time to time, a science being
> "lower" in the classification

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

I don't divide up the world into separate realms of inquiry, so,
when you write:

"And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns,
which are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three
Universes, which are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something
which you at least seem to do when you write "the three
categories/universes." Obviously the Three Universes have a direct
connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is an error to
conflate or identify them. "

...then, I'm not involved in such a separation of the terms in these
disciplines. The three universes, as you note, do have a direct
connection to the Categories - and that's my point. I agree with John
that 'the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of
actuality' - but I don't see how this is a problem. 

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18  5:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, John, Jon, list,
 Edwina wrote: So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've
provided.
 I have written enough today on this topic, yet I think that a close
reading of at least some of those quotations would refute your
denial. But for now let me just ask you, do you agree with the way
John Sowa distinguished the three universes in his recent post?  
 JS: I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities of
pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality. 
 The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws, are also
outside the universe of actuality. 
 For me the key phrase in the first passage above is "do not exist in
the universe of actuality," and in the second, "are also outside the
universe of actuality." I doubt that you'd agree with John that these
are "three disjoint universes" (I am assuming that by "disjoint" he
means here distinct/discrete.) 
 And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns,
which are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three
Universes, which are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something
which you at least seem to do when you write "the three
categories/universes." Obviously the Three Universes have a direct
connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is an error to
conflate or identify them.  
 In addition, as Jon just wrote:  "The constituents of Peirce's third
Universe--includ[e] not only Laws, but also Signs, Habits, and
continua (EP 2:435&479; 1908)-"  and, in my view, continua in
particular unequivocally distinguish the third universe from the
second. 
 Parenthetically, I'd add that in my view it is an error not to
differentiate the universal categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns from their
application within semeiotics, metaphysics, and elsewhere. These are
separate sciences with different goals, etc. So,  note that in
Peirce's classification (following Comte) a science lower in the
classification  may depend on another higher in the classification
for principles, but it does not furnish principles to those higher in
the classification, although often enough, it provides examples to
those sciences.
 Mathematics, as 'first science', furnishes principles to most all
the sciences following it in the classification; and phenomenology,
2nd science (!) furnishes principles (notably, the universal
categories) to certain sciences below it in the classification (such
as semeiotics and metaphysics). (Note: as discussed here from time to
time, a science being "lower" in the classification of science in no
way implies that that science is in any way less significant or
important.) 
 Best,
 Gary
 Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
 On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 4:14 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary R, list

No- I don't conflate or merge 3ns and 2ns. I've no idea how, after
all these years of my posts, you would come to such a conclusion
about my views of the three universes/categories. And I certainly
don't reduce the three categories/universes to two.

Just because I used the word 'embedded' doesn't mean merger or
conflation. My understanding of habits/3ns is that they, as laws,
organize matter. BUT, since they are generals, then, they are not, in
themselves, actuals; they are not existents in the mode of 2ns. To
'be' such a law, they must 'be' within matter, as the law that
organizes that matter. So, the law of organizing a bacterium isn't
'existential' [2ns] outside of that bacterium but is an integral
part, as organization [3ns] of that bacterium.  

So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18  3:51 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com [2]
sent:
 Edwina, John, list,
 Edwina wrote: The laws, per se, do not 'exist'  on their own because
they are laws/generals. 

I agree that most certainly laws do not 'exist' because they are
genera

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Schematic Representation of the Triad ?

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Cecile, Edwina, List:

CMC:  Since the representamen is the first correlate, isn't it more
consistent to talk about R-O-I ?


As is often the case, it depends on one's *purpose*.  R-O-I is indeed how
Peirce presented the three Correlates in certain passages, but O-R-I is the
well-established order of semeiotic determination; the Object determines
the Sign, which determines the Interpretant.  This *logical *(not temporal)
sequence is preserved even when we account for two Objects and three
Interpretants.

CSP:  ... the Dynamoid [Dynamic] Object determines the Immediate Object,
which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate [Final]
Interpretant, which determines the Effective [Dynamic] Interpretant, which
determines the Explicit [Immediate] Interpretant ... (EP 2:481; 1908)


Moreover, I agree that having the Sign/Representamen "in the middle"
properly emphasizes its mediating role, *between *the Object and
Interpretant.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 3:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Cecile, list
>
> Yes, I agree that we should all create and be responsible for our own
> interpretation of Peirce's work - particularly since both our expertise and
> focus are different.
>
> I am aware of Peirce's outline in 2.242, with the "Representamen is the
> First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed
> its Object, and the possible third Correlate being termed its Interpretant".
>
>  See also 1.274, "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in
> such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be
> capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same
> triadic relation to its Object in which its stands itself to the same
> Object". And note, that the terms of First, Second, Third do NOT refer to
> the modal categories, but to the order of semiosic actions. See also 2.92.
>
> In Peirce's ten classes of signs - see 2.254, he actually puts the
> Interpretant first, followed by the Object, and last - the Representamen!
>
> The reason I put the Representamen in the middle, is because its function
> is to be 'in the middle', i.e., to accept input data from an external
> source and then, mediate it, to result in an Interpretant.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 22/08/18 4:15 PM , Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela
> cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr sent:
>
> Edwina, Jon, Jeff, List,
>
> It seems logical that we should all create and be responsible for our own
> interpretation of Peirce's work and it is enriching to be able to discuss
> together our personal understanding as we keep on thinking it over, thereby
> complying with the semiosic law of our ever-expanding universe. I need some
> more time to get my ideas clear on the various interesting points that you
> have been raising. One little key thing that struck me as surprising is
> that the sign should be equated with O-R-I. Since the representamen is the
> first correlate, isn't it more consistent to talk about R-O-I ?
>
> Best regards to you all,
>
> Cécile
> Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela, Ph.D.
> Associate Professor of English
>
> [image: Logo Université de Pau et des pays de l'Adour]
> 
> Collège Sciences Sociales et Humanités
> Avenue du Doyen Poplawski
> BP 1160 - 64013 PAU
> FRANCE
> http://www.univ-pau.fr
>
> Le 8/22/2018 à 2:37 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :
>
> Cecile, List:
>
> For some reason, I did not receive the post below directly, only appended
> to the replies from others.
>
> As I explained to Helmut in another thread earlier today, according to
> Peirce, "Representamen" is either a generalization of "Sign" or synonymous
> with "Sign."  He initially treated "Sign" as having the more restrictive
> meaning--"a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273;
> 1903)--but ultimately decided that "Sign" was preferable to "this horrid
> long word" (SS 193; 1905).
>
> It is consistent with Peirce's usage to say that "a sign is not a triadic
> relation (after all), but only the first correlate of a triadic relation";
> and to represent that triadic relation, not the Sign itself, with the Y
> shape accordingly.  The Sign, Object, and Interpretant would then be at the
> ends of the three tails, and the node in the middle would be the relation
> of representing or (more generally) mediating.  However, the element of
> "directionality" (from Object through Sign to Interpretant) is missing.
>
> I typically use "semiosis" for the overall process, rather than an
> individual event of a Sign-Replica producing a Dynamic Interpretant,
> instead referring to the latter as an Instance of the Sign (cf. CP 4.537;
> 1906).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>> On Tue 21/08/18 5:40 PM , Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela
>> cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr sent:
>>
>> Thank you Edwina, Jon, and Auke for answering/d

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  To 'be' such a law, they must 'be' within matter, as the law that
organizes that matter.


Again, this is misleading.  In order to *exist*, a Law must indeed be
instantiated in at least one individual case; but its *Being *does not
amount to or depend on any such instantiation, or even the discrete
collection of *all *such instantiations.  3ns cannot be reduced to the
"organization" of 2ns.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 3:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> No- I don't conflate or merge 3ns and 2ns. I've no idea how, after all
> these years of my posts, you would come to such a conclusion about my views
> of the three universes/categories. And I certainly don't reduce the three
> categories/universes to two.
>
> Just because I used the word 'embedded' doesn't mean merger or
> conflation. My understanding of habits/3ns is that they, as laws, organize
> matter. BUT, since they are generals, then, they are not, in themselves,
> actuals; they are not existents in the mode of 2ns. To 'be' such a law,
> they must 'be' within matter, as the law that organizes that matter. So,
> the law of organizing a bacterium isn't 'existential' [2ns] outside of that
> bacterium but is an integral part, as organization [3ns] of that bacterium.
>
> So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.
>
> Edwina
>

-
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, John, Jon, list,

Edwina wrote: So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.

I have written enough today on this topic, yet I think that a close reading
of at least some of those quotations would refute your denial. But for now
let me just ask you, do you agree with the way John Sowa distinguished the
three universes in his recent post?

JS: I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities
of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality.

The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws,
are also outside the universe of actuality.


For me the key phrase in the first passage above is "do not exist in the
universe of actuality," and in the second, "are also outside the universe
of actuality." I doubt that you'd agree with John that these are "three
disjoint universes" (I am assuming that by "disjoint" he means here
distinct/discrete.)

And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns, which
are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three Universes, which
are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something which you at least seem to
do when you write "the three categories/universes." Obviously the Three
Universes have a direct connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is
an error to conflate or identify them.

In addition, as Jon just wrote:  "The constituents of Peirce's third
Universe--includ[e] not only Laws, but also Signs, Habits, and continua (EP
2:435&479; 1908)-"  and, in my view, continua in particular unequivocally
distinguish the third universe from the second.

Parenthetically, I'd add that in my view it is an error not to
differentiate the universal categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns from their
application within semeiotics, metaphysics, and elsewhere. These are
separate sciences with different goals, etc. So,  note that in Peirce's
classification (following Comte) a science lower in the classification *may*
depend on another higher in the classification for principles, but it does
*not* furnish principles to those higher in the classification, although
often enough, it provides examples to those sciences.

Mathematics, as 'first science', furnishes principles to most all the
sciences following it in the classification; and phenomenology, 2nd science
(!) furnishes principles (notably, the universal categories) to certain
sciences below it in the classification (such as semeiotics and
metaphysics). (Note: as discussed here from time to time, a science being
"lower" in the classification of science in no way implies that that
science is in any way less significant or important.)

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 4:14 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> No- I don't conflate or merge 3ns and 2ns. I've no idea how, after all
> these years of my posts, you would come to such a conclusion about my views
> of the three universes/categories. And I certainly don't reduce the three
> categories/universes to two.
>
> Just because I used the word 'embedded' doesn't mean merger or
> conflation. My understanding of habits/3ns is that they, as laws, organize
> matter. BUT, since they are generals, then, they are not, in themselves,
> actuals; they are not existents in the mode of 2ns. To 'be' such a law,
> they must 'be' within matter, as the law that organizes that matter. So,
> the law of organizing a bacterium isn't 'existential' [2ns] outside of that
> bacterium but is an integral part, as organization [3ns] of that bacterium.
>
> So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 22/08/18 3:51 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, John, list,
>
> Edwina wrote: The laws, per se, do not 'exist'  on their own because they
> are laws/generals.
>
> I agree that most certainly laws do not 'exist' because they are
> generals. But now you add:
>
> ET: They are only operable when they function as the habits/organization
> of actuality.So- they can certainly never be 'outside the universe of
> actually' [i.e., as Platonic Forms]; they are embedded within actuality
> [Aristotle].
>
> But saying, as you do, that laws can never be 'outside the universe of
> actuality' and are merely 'embedded within actuality' is to in effect
> conflate the 2nd and 3rd universes, to claim that there are not three
> distinct Universes but really (I use that word advisedly as reality is
> reduced to existence) only two. However, Peirce sees it differently:
>
> I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose
> matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every
> physical process can be reversed without violation of the law of mechanics,
> the law of habit forbids such a reversal. 1891-08-29  | Letters to
> Christine Ladd-Franklin | W 8:387 in Commens Dictionary
>
> And the generalizing law is "a universal te

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Schematic Representation of the Triad ?

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

I also think we should be able to acknowledge his work and adapt, change
and derive inspiration from it. I do not accept his notion of universes for
example and I am sure that my triadic notions are at variance with a
literal effort to exegete his various writings. I am sure that accounts in
part for my difficulties on this list. But there is really no other place.
I spare you most of my egregious musings.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 4:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Cecile, list
>
> Yes, I agree that we should all create and be responsible for our own
> interpretation of Peirce's work - particularly since both our expertise and
> focus are different.
>
> I am aware of Peirce's outline in 2.242, with the "Representamen is the
> First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed
> its Object, and the possible third Correlate being termed its Interpretant".
>
>  See also 1.274, "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in
> such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be
> capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same
> triadic relation to its Object in which its stands itself to the same
> Object". And note, that the terms of First, Second, Third do NOT refer to
> the modal categories, but to the order of semiosic actions. See also 2.92.
>
> In Peirce's ten classes of signs - see 2.254, he actually puts the
> Interpretant first, followed by the Object, and last - the Representamen!
>
> The reason I put the Representamen in the middle, is because its function
> is to be 'in the middle', i.e., to accept input data from an external
> source and then, mediate it, to result in an Interpretant.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 22/08/18 4:15 PM , Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela
> cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr sent:
>
> Edwina, Jon, Jeff, List,
>
> It seems logical that we should all create and be responsible for our own
> interpretation of Peirce's work and it is enriching to be able to discuss
> together our personal understanding as we keep on thinking it over, thereby
> complying with the semiosic law of our ever-expanding universe. I need some
> more time to get my ideas clear on the various interesting points that you
> have been raising. One little key thing that struck me as surprising is
> that the sign should be equated with O-R-I. Since the representamen is the
> first correlate, isn't it more consistent to talk about R-O-I ?
>
> Best regards to you all,
>
> Cécile
> Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela, Ph.D.
> Associate Professor of English
>
> [image: Logo Université de Pau et des pays de l'Adour]
> 
> Collège Sciences Sociales et Humanités
> Avenue du Doyen Poplawski
> BP 1160 - 64013 PAU
> FRANCE
> http://www.univ-pau.fr
>
> Le 8/22/2018 à 2:37 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :
>
> Cecile, List:
>
> For some reason, I did not receive the post below directly, only appended
> to the replies from others.
>
> As I explained to Helmut in another thread earlier today, according to
> Peirce, "Representamen" is either a generalization of "Sign" or synonymous
> with "Sign."  He initially treated "Sign" as having the more restrictive
> meaning--"a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273;
> 1903)--but ultimately decided that "Sign" was preferable to "this horrid
> long word" (SS 193; 1905).
>
> It is consistent with Peirce's usage to say that "a sign is not a triadic
> relation (after all), but only the first correlate of a triadic relation";
> and to represent that triadic relation, not the Sign itself, with the Y
> shape accordingly.  The Sign, Object, and Interpretant would then be at the
> ends of the three tails, and the node in the middle would be the relation
> of representing or (more generally) mediating.  However, the element of
> "directionality" (from Object through Sign to Interpretant) is missing.
>
> I typically use "semiosis" for the overall process, rather than an
> individual event of a Sign-Replica producing a Dynamic Interpretant,
> instead referring to the latter as an Instance of the Sign (cf. CP 4.537;
> 1906).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>> On Tue 21/08/18 5:40 PM , Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela
>> cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr sent:
>>
>> Thank you Edwina, Jon, and Auke for answering/discussing my question,
>> which logically leads on to more questioning.
>>
>> I would agree with Edwina that the Y shape is more appropriate to
>> represent a triadic relation than the triangle, which results from three
>> dyadic relations.
>>
>> I'm a bit surprised that the word representamen does not appear in the
>> various posts. Since "a representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic
>> relation" (CP 2.242, 1903), I take it that Jon, you use the word sign
>> meaning representamen, right? I would have said that 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Schematic Representation of the Triad ?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Cecile, list

Yes, I agree that we should all create and be responsible for our
own interpretation of Peirce's work - particularly since both our
expertise and focus are different. 

I am aware of Peirce's outline in 2.242, with the "Representamen is
the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being
termed its Object, and the possible third Correlate being termed its
Interpretant".

 See also 1.274, "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands
in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as
to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to
assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which its stands
itself to the same Object". And note, that the terms of First,
Second, Third do NOT refer to the modal categories, but to the order
of semiosic actions. See also 2.92. 

In Peirce's ten classes of signs - see 2.254, he actually puts the
Interpretant first, followed by the Object, and last - the
Representamen!

The reason I put the Representamen in the middle, is because its
function is to be 'in the middle', i.e., to accept input data from an
external source and then, mediate it, to result in an Interpretant. 

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18  4:15 PM , Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela
cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr sent:
Edwina, Jon, Jeff, List, 

It seems logical that we should all create and be responsible for   
   our own interpretation of Peirce's work and it is enriching to be  
able to discuss together our personal understanding as we keep on 
 thinking it over, thereby complying with the semiosic law of our 
 ever-expanding universe. I need some more time to get my ideas   
   clear on the various interesting points that you have been  
raising. One little key thing that struck me as surprising is that   
   the sign should be equated with O-R-I. Since the representamen is  
the first correlate, isn't it more consistent to talk about R-O-I 
 ? 

Best regards to you all, 

Cécile
   .signature a {color:#7b7c7e;} 
  Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela, Ph.D.
   Associate Professor of English
 [1]
  Collège Sciences Sociales et
Humanités
 Avenue du Doyen Poplawski
   BP 1160 - 64013 PAU
   FRANCE
 http://www.univ-pau.fr
Le 8/22/2018 à 2:37 AM, Jon Alan  
Schmidt a écrit :
Cecile, List: 
  For some reason, I did not receive the post below
directly,   only appended to the replies from others.

  As I explained to Helmut in another thread earlier
today,   according to Peirce, "Representamen" is either a
  generalization of "Sign" or synonymous with "Sign." 
He initially treated "Sign" as having   the more restrictive
meaning--"a Representamen with a mental   Interpretant" (CP
2.274, EP 2:273; 1903)--but ultimately   decided that "Sign"
was preferable to "this horrid long word"   (SS 193; 1905).  
  
  It is consistent with Peirce's usage to say that "a
sign is   not a triadic relation (after all), but only the
first   correlate of a triadic relation"; and to represent
that   triadic relation, not the Sign itself, with the Y
shape   accordingly.  The Sign, Object, and Interpretant
would then be   at the ends of the three tails, and the node
in the middle   would be the relation of representing or
(more generally)   mediating.  However, the element of
"directionality" (from   Object through Sign to Interpretant)
is missing. 
  I typically use "semiosis" for the overall process,
rather   than an individual event of a Sign-Replica producing
a Dynamic   Interpretant, instead referring to the latter as
an Instance   of the Sign (cf. CP 4.537; 1906). 
  Regards, 
 
  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA  
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, 
 Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2]   -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]   
  
   

On Tue 21/08/18 5:40 PM   , Cécile
Ménieu-Cosculluela cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr [4]   
   sent:
Thank you Edwina, Jon, and Auke for  
answering/discussing my question, which logically
  leads on to more questioning. 
I would agree with Edwina that the Y shape is   

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Schematic Representation of the Triad ?

[Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela]

Edwina, Jon, Jeff, List,

It seems logical that we should all create and be responsible for our 
own interpretation of Peirce's work and it is enriching to be able to 
discuss together our personal understanding as we keep on thinking it 
over, thereby complying with the semiosic law of our ever-expanding 
universe. I need some more time to get my ideas clear on the various 
interesting points that you have been raising. One little key thing that 
struck me as surprising is that the sign should be equated with O-R-I. 
Since the representamen is the first correlate, isn't it more consistent 
to talk about R-O-I ?


Best regards to you all,

Cécile

Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of English

Logo Université de Pau et des pays de l'Adour 

Collège Sciences Sociales et Humanités
Avenue du Doyen Poplawski
BP 1160 - 64013 PAU
FRANCE
http://www.univ-pau.fr 

Le 8/22/2018 à 2:37 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :

Cecile, List:

For some reason, I did not receive the post below directly, only 
appended to the replies from others.


As I explained to Helmut in another thread earlier today, according to 
Peirce, "Representamen" is either a generalization of "Sign" or 
synonymous with "Sign."  He initially treated "Sign" as having the 
more restrictive meaning--"a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" 
(CP 2.274, EP 2:273; 1903)--but ultimately decided that "Sign" was 
preferable to "this horrid long word" (SS 193; 1905).


It is consistent with Peirce's usage to say that "a sign is not a 
triadic relation (after all), but only the first correlate of a 
triadic relation"; and to represent that triadic relation, not the 
Sign itself, with the Y shape accordingly.  The Sign, Object, and 
Interpretant would then be at the ends of the three tails, and the 
node in the middle would be the relation of representing or (more 
generally) mediating.  However, the element of "directionality" (from 
Object through Sign to Interpretant) is missing.


I typically use "semiosis" for the overall process, rather than an 
individual event of a Sign-Replica producing a Dynamic Interpretant, 
instead referring to the latter as an Instance of the Sign (cf. CP 
4.537; 1906).


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Tue 21/08/18 5:40 PM , Cécile Ménieu-Cosculluela
cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr
 sent:

Thank you Edwina, Jon, and Auke for answering/discussing my
question, which logically leads on to more questioning.

I would agree with Edwina that the Y shape is more appropriate
to represent a triadic relation than the triangle, which
results from three dyadic relations.

I'm a bit surprised that the word representamen does not
appear in the various posts. Since "a representamen is the
First Correlate of a triadic relation" (CP 2.242, 1903), I
take it that Jon, you use the word sign meaning representamen,
right? I would have said that this is a restrictive meaning,
and that the word "sign" also has a wider meaning in which it
can be defined as a triadic relation. Would you agree that
"sign" has these two meanings?

I've been re-reading the CP's and have only been able to find
excerpts that led me to conclude that only the first meaning
appears in Peirce's writings. So a sign is not a triadic
relation (after all), but only the first correlate of a
triadic relation? (C.P. 2.274, 1902: "A Sign, or
Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be
capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to
assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it
stands itself to the same Object.")

And consequently, the Y shape has been used by Peirce to refer
to triadic relations, not to represent signs, since signs are
only representamens, not triadic relations? (I'm kind of
repeating what you said, Jon, to make sure I'm getting it
right and because that's not what I had understood.)

Therefore, does that lead us to conclude that a triadic
relation is not a sign but a semiosis? So that the Y shape is
a symbol that represents a semiosis, not a sign?

If this is the case, then does the word "semiosis" have two
meanings: 1: triadic relation, and 2: (infinite) sequence of
triadic relations (representamen --> object --> interpretant
--> representamen --> object --> interpretant --> etc. ad
infinitum) ?

Best regards,

Cécile

Cécile Mén

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

No- I don't conflate or merge 3ns and 2ns. I've no idea how, after
all these years of my posts, you would come to such a conclusion
about my views of the three universes/categories. And I certainly
don't reduce the three categories/universes to two.

Just because I used the word 'embedded' doesn't mean merger or
conflation. My understanding of habits/3ns is that they, as laws,
organize matter. BUT, since they are generals, then, they are not, in
themselves, actuals; they are not existents in the mode of 2ns. To
'be' such a law, they must 'be' within matter, as the law that
organizes that matter. So, the law of organizing a bacterium isn't
'existential' [2ns] outside of that bacterium but is an integral
part, as organization [3ns] of that bacterium. 

So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18  3:51 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, John, list,
 Edwina wrote: The laws, per se, do not 'exist'  on their own because
they are laws/generals. 

I agree that most certainly laws do not 'exist' because they are
generals. But now you add: 
ET: They are only operable when they function as the
habits/organization of actuality.So- they can certainly never be
'outside the universe of actually' [i.e., as Platonic Forms]; they
are embedded within actuality [Aristotle].

 But saying, as you do, that laws can never be 'outside the universe
of actuality' and are merely 'embedded within actuality' is to in
effect conflate the 2nd and 3rd universes, to claim that there are
not three distinct Universes but really (I use that word advisedly as
reality is reduced to existence) only two. However, Peirce sees it
differently:  

I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I
suppose matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit.
While every physical process can be reversed without violation of the
law of mechanics, the law of habit forbids such a reversal. 1891-08-29
 | Letters to Christine Ladd-Franklin | W 8:387 in Commens Dictionary 
And the generalizing law is "a universal tendency":
 I was led to the hypothesis that the laws of the universe have been
formed under a universal tendency of all things toward generalization
and habit-taking.  1898 | Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the
Logic of Things: Habit | RLT 241; CP 7.515 Commens (emphasis added)

This "universal tendency. . .toward generalization" is, to my way of
thinking, the third universe. To seemingly reduce three Universes to
two (by conflating law, 3ns, and lawfulness, or law expressed in the
existential world, 2ns, is, to my way of thinking, not only to
undermine the reality of the third universe but the second
existential universe as well. (Note just below that Peirce writes
"existence (not reality).") 1901 | Individual  | CP 3.613

…whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and
individuality are essentially the same thing… 

Existence has its own unique character, is "a special mode of
reality."1902  | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP
6.349

Existence […] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely
determinate .

Further, distinguishing the second and third universes, Peirce
writes:1905  | Letters to Mario Calderoni | MS [R] L67

 That mode of being which we call existence, the reaction of
everything in the universe against every other. . . brutally
insisting on a place is Secundan. I say “brutally”, because no
law, so far as we know, makes any single object to exist. Law only
determines in what way things shall behave, once they do exist
(emphasis added).

The dynamic character (which you and JAS have argued at length
about) is for Peirce clearly a characteristic of existence (secundan)
which he here distinguishes from reality (tertian). 1905 [c.] |
Pragmatism, Prag [R] | CP 5.503 

…reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and
so is a cognitionary character, while  existence means reaction with
the environment, and so is a dynamic character…

So, as Peirce sees it, your view "abolishes objective necessity"
(the third university) in not fully accepting the independent reality
of would-be's. And he ties this to that which would be  in futuro
(while existence is hic et nunc).
1905  | Issues of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 290:52
…Necessitarianism is the doctrine that there is no objective
indetermination of Modality; it abolishes objective necessity and
possibility together, and only conceives the future as that which
will have been. 

Best,

Gary
 Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical ThinkinguLaGuardia College of the City
University of New York 718 482-5690
 On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 2:46 PM Edwina Taborsky 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., Edwina, List:

The constituents of Peirce's third Universe--including not only Laws, but
also Signs, Habits, and continua (EP 2:435&479; 1908)--certainly do not *exist
*outside the second Universe of actuality; *nothing *does, since existence
and actuality are coextensive.  However, they are *Real* "outside the
universe of actuality" in the sense that they *govern* Existents or
*mediate* between them.  They are "would-bes," so it is misleading to say
that "they are embedded within actuality," because "no agglomeration of
actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a 'would-be'"
(CP 5.467; 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 1:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list
>
> Agreed, the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of
> actuality.
>
> Now, with regard to the universe of necessity, i.e., Laws/Thirdness -
> which you say are outside of the universe of actuality - I'll quibble with
> the wording.
>
> The laws, per se, do not 'exist'  on their own because they are
> laws/generals. They are only operable when they function as the
> habits/organization of actuality.
>
> So- they can certainly never be 'outside the universe of actually' [i.e.,
> as Platonic Forms]; they are embedded within actuality [Aristotle].
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 22/08/18 2:22 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 8/22/2018 2:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> > "I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be
> > anywhere in the universe. Most of us know more about the past
> > and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is
> > irrelevant to its existence. "
> >
> > What's the difference, then, between your definition of actuality and
> > the definition of possibility?
>
> I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities
> of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality.
>
> The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws,
> are also outside the universe of actuality.
>
> John
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, John, list,

Edwina wrote: The laws, per se, do not 'exist'  on their own because they
are laws/generals.

I agree that most certainly laws do not 'exist' *because* they are
generals. But now you add:

ET: They are only operable when they function as the habits/organization of
actuality.So- they can certainly never be 'outside the universe of
actually' [i.e., as Platonic Forms]; they are embedded within actuality
[Aristotle].

But saying, as you do, that laws can never be 'outside the universe of
actuality' and are merely 'embedded within actuality' is to in effect
conflate the 2nd and 3rd universes, to claim that there are *not *three
distinct Universes but *really *(I use that word advisedly as reality is
reduced to existence) only two. However, Peirce sees it differently:

I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose
matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every
physical process can be reversed without violation of the law of mechanics,
the law of habit forbids such a reversal. 1891-08-29 | Letters to Christine
Ladd-Franklin | W 8:387 in Commens Dictionary

And the generalizing law is "a universal tendency":

I was led to the hypothesis that the laws of the universe have been formed
under *a universal tendency of all things toward generalization
and habit-taking.* 1898 | Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of
Things: Habit | RLT 241; CP 7.515 Commens (emphasis added)

This "universal tendency. . .toward generalization" is, to my way of
thinking, the third universe. To seemingly reduce three Universes to two
(by conflating law, 3ns, and lawfulness, or law expressed in the
existential world, 2ns, is, to my way of thinking, not only to undermine
the reality of the third universe but the second existential universe as
well. (Note just below that Peirce writes "existence (not reality).")

1901 | Individual | CP 3.613

…whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and
individuality are essentially the same thing…

Existence has its own unique character, is "a special mode of reality."

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349

Existence […] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate.

Further, distinguishing the second and third universes, Peirce writes:

1905 | Letters to Mario Calderoni | MS [R] L67

That mode of being which we call existence, the reaction of everything in
the universe against every other. . . brutally insisting on a place is
Secundan. I say “brutally”, because *no law, so far as we know, makes any
single object to exist. Law only determines in what way things shall
behave, once they do exist *(emphasis added).

The dynamic character (which you and JAS have argued at length about) is
for Peirce clearly a characteristic of existence (secundan) which he here
distinguishes from reality (tertian).

1905 [c.] | Pragmatism, Prag [R] | CP 5.503

…*reality *means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so is a
cognitionary character, while *existence *means reaction with the
environment, and so is a dynamic character…

So, as Peirce sees it, your view "abolishes objective necessity" (the third
university) in not fully accepting the independent reality of would-be's.
And he ties this to that which would be *in futuro* (while existence is hic
et nunc).

1905 | Issues of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 290:52

…Necessitarianism is the doctrine that there is no objective
indetermination of Modality; it abolishes objective necessity and
possibility together, and only conceives the future as that which *will*
 have been.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinkingu*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 2:46 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list
>
> Agreed, the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of
> actuality.
>
> Now, with regard to the universe of necessity, i.e., Laws/Thirdness -
> which you say are outside of the universe of actuality - I'll quibble with
> the wording.
>
> The laws, per se, do not 'exist'  on their own because they are
> laws/generals. They are only operable when they function as the
> habits/organization of actuality.
>
> So- they can certainly never be 'outside the universe of actually' [i.e.,
> as Platonic Forms]; they are embedded within actuality [Aristotle].
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed 22/08/18 2:22 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 8/22/2018 2:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> > "I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be
> > anywhere in the universe. Most of us know more about the past
> > and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is
> > irrelevant to its existence. "
> >
> > What's the difference, then, between your definition of actuality and
> > the definition of possibility?
>
> I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The ent

[PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

Agreed, the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the
universe of actuality.

Now, with regard to the universe of necessity, i.e., Laws/Thirdness
- which you say are outside of the universe of actuality - I'll
quibble with the wording.

The laws, per se, do not 'exist'  on their own because they are
laws/generals. They are only operable when they function as the
habits/organization of actuality.

So- they can certainly never be 'outside the universe of actually'
[i.e., as Platonic Forms]; they are embedded within actuality
[Aristotle].

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18  2:22 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 8/22/2018 2:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 > "I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be 
 > anywhere in the universe. Most of us know more about the past 
 > and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is 
 > irrelevant to its existence. " 
 >  
 > What's the difference, then, between your definition of actuality
and  
 > the definition of possibility? 
 I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes.  The entities 
 of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality. 
 The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws, 
 are also outside the universe of actuality. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[John F Sowa]

On 8/22/2018 2:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

"I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be
anywhere in the universe. Most of us know more about the past
and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is
irrelevant to its existence. "

What's the difference, then, between your definition of actuality and 
the definition of possibility?


I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes.  The entities
of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality.

The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws,
are also outside the universe of actuality.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[John F Sowa]

On 8/22/2018 10:55 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:

Reality is anything, all, totality, the sum of semiotic existence.
Thus if I say Mello Rolls (something from my long ago childhood) in
the year 2099, it is real, Reality does not depend on the faculties
of the body or mind.


That is one possible way of using the word 'reality'.  And it is
one of the main reasons why I did not use the word 'reality'.

For modal logic, Peirce adopted the words possibility,
actuality, and necessity and defined them as three distinct
universes.

I adopted his definitions and related them to a puzzle that has
plagued the philosophy of mathematics for centuries:  When
you say "there exists an x" about some x in a mathematical
theory, where does that x exist?

Since many mathematical structures, including the integers,
form an infinite set, They can't exist in a finite universe.
One could say that they exist in a Platonic heaven, but then
you have to explain how that heaven relates to our ordinary
universe.

My proposal is the one I stated in my previous note to Ontolog
Forum (copy below).  That universe of possibilities is big
enough to contain all semiotic types.  Any marks and tokens
of those types would exist in our physical universe.

John
__

From a previous note in this thread:

The definition I stated is absolutely precise.  To emphasize
the precision, I'll restate it in 4-D coordinates -- but it
remains just as precise when you translate it to 3-D plus time:

 1. Pure mathematics is the study of possibilities.  Every
possible structure or process can be described by some
theory of pure mathematics, but no structure or process
of pure mathematics exists in actuality.

 2. Everything in the universe that is actual is either a
4-dimensional region of space-time or it is wholly
contained within some 4-D region of space-time.

 3. Applied mathematics is the practice of selecting structures
specified by one or more theories of pure mathematics and
using them to describe something contained within some 4-D
region of space-time.  The descriptions of applied mathematics
are rarely, if ever, absolutely true.  But it's often possible
to estimate the expected errors in measurement or prediction.

The distinction between #1 and #2 is precise.  All the errors
and vague intermediate cases result from difficulties in #3.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

You wrote:

"I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be 
  anywhere in the universe.  Most of us know more about the past 
  and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is 
  irrelevant to its existence. "

What's the difference, then, between your definition of actuality
and the definition of possibility?

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18 10:25 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 David and James, 
 DP 
 > What about "the first cake that I bake in 2020".  Is it an actual 
 > entity? It is not (currently) observable. It might not even exist 
 > (because I might not bake a cake in 2020).  I would claim that it 
 > is of the same type as "the first cake I baked in 2018" (which did

 > exist until we ate it). 
 JHD 
 > But the truth value of "the first cake I baked in 2018 is
gluten-free" 
 > is determinate (I happen not to know it, but you presumably do).
The 
 > same is not true of 2020. 
 I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be 
 anywhere in the universe.  Most of us know more about the past 
 and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is 
 irrelevant to its existence. 
 In fact, all of us know a great deal about the near future and 
 most of us do a lot of planning for the longer term.  For example, 
 every time I drive a car, I predict that no cars in the opposite 
 lane will serve over and collide with mine. 
 So far, that prediction has been absolutely true, and I hope 
 that it will always be true in the future.  I'm sure that 
 most of us have the same knowledge and hopes, and that our 
 hopes will be true for the overwhelming majority of us. 
 DP 
 > I am not sure that the possible/actual distinction makes sense 
 > for examples like this [baking a cake in 2020] 
 Just note the examples by James and me.  For the gluten-free cake 
 in 2020, the knowledge is uncertain.  But most people who bake 
 cakes can make a very accurate prediction about the likelihood 
 that they will bake a gluten-free cake in 2020. 
 In fact, I'll make a prediction about people I have never met: 
 For anyone who frequently bakes a cake and has never previously 
 baked a gluten-free cake, the probability that they will not 
 bake a gluten-free cake in 2020 is greater than 50%. 
 DP 
 > (and it certainly isn't the mathematics/physics distinction). 
 The definition I stated is absolutely precise.  To emphasize 
 the precision, I'll restate it in 4-D coordinates -- but it 
 remains just as precise when you translate it to 3-D plus time: 
   1. Pure mathematics is the study of possibilities.  Every 
  possible structure or process can be described by some 
  theory of pure mathematics, but no structure or process 
  of pure mathematics exists in actuality. 
   2. Everything in the universe that is actual is either a 
  4-dimensional region of space-time or it is wholly 
  contained within some 4-D region of space-time. 
   3. Applied mathematics is the practice of selecting structures 
  specified by one or more theories of pure mathematics and 
  using them to describe something contained within some 4-D 
  region of space-time.  The descriptions of applied mathematics 
  are rarely, if ever, absolutely true.  But it's often possible 
  to estimate the expected errors in measurement or prediction. 
 The distinction between #1 and #2 is precise.  All the errors 
 and vague intermediate cases result from difficulties in #3. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Schematic Representation of the Triad ?

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

As quoted below, Peirce affirmed in CP 2.274 that a relation can be the *Object
*of a Sign, which is obvious since the Object of the word "relation" is a
relation.  But where did he ever straightforwardly endorse the notion that
a relation can be a Sign itself?  I certainly do not perceive him as
"explicitly saying" in CP 1.537 that "the interpreting thought has the
nature of a genuine triad that stands, itself, as the first correlate in a
triadic relation to the same object and a further interpretant."  He never
once *mentions *triad, correlate, triadic relation, object, or interpretant
in that passage; so I guess that I need it spelled out where the text
supposedly *implies *these concepts in accordance with the suggested
interpretation.

As for an Argument, my understanding is that "the principle of reason that
governs the inference" is not its Object; rather, it is analogous to the
"continuous predicate" of a Proposition or Rheme--the *logical *form that
remains when all of the *material *content is thrown into the premisses
(cf. CP 2.466; 1866).  As Francesco Bellucci put it in *Peirce's
Speculative Grammar*, the Object of an Argument is "the state of things in
which the premises are true" (p. 277); in fact, Peirce himself directly
aligned this with its Logical Breadth (CP 5.471; 1907).  The colligated
premisses indeed constitute a Sign per the semeiotic theorem that "if any
signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one
sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).  However, I do not see the warrant for
maintaining that this Sign "has the character of a genuine triadic
relation," rather than simply being one correlate of such a relation, like
any other Sign.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 11:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S., List,
>
> Let's take the point you've quoted, and then let's draw out the
> implications of the  assertion together with one of Peirce's paradigmatic
> definitions of a sign:
>
> 1)  Here as elsewhere, the "genuine triad" is the *relation *of "a sign
> ... mediating between an object and an interpreting thought."
>
> 2)  A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
> triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
> determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
> relation to its Object in which it stand itself to the same Object. The
> triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together
> by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic
> relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a
> mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to
> it as the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which
> the third stands be merely similar to that in which the First stands, for
> this would make the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate
> Secondness merely. The Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus
> be capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must
> have a second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the
> relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object,
> and must be capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this must be
> equally be true of the Third's Third and so on endlessly; and this, and
> more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign; and the term
> Representamen is here used, nothing more is implied. A Sign is a
> Representamen with a mental Interpretant. (CP, 2.274)
>
> So, when the interpreting thought functions as a sign in relation to some
> further interpretant, the sign itself has the nature of a third. In
> particular, I belive it follows that the interpreting thought has the
> nature of a genuine triad that stands, itself, as the first correlate in a
> triadic relation to the same object and a further interpretant. That, I
> believe is what Peirce is explicitly saying in the passage below.
>
> 3)  Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are
> all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one
> another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its
> capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere *mind *capable of thinking,
> or a mere vague idea. The *second *is thought playing the role of a
> Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the general nature of *experience
> *or *information. *The third is thought in its role as governing
> Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the
> idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or *cognition. *(CP, 1.
> 537*)*
>
> One of the things that seems puzzling to me about these passages is the
> quick movement back and forth between talking abo

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Helmut, List,

Jon wrote: "Only later [than the 1903 classification] did Peirce add
trichotomies according to the *nature *of each Object and
Interpretant--phaneroscopic (Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or
normative (Final)."

J
ust so.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*



On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 9:35 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., Helmut, List:
>
> One clarification--in the 1903 taxonomy, the second and third trichotomies
> are not divisions of the (Dynamic) Object and (Final) Interpretant
> *themselves*, but of their *relations *to the Sign.  For a Dicent
> Indexical Sinsign, the S-FI *relation*, the S-DO *relation*, and the Sign
> itself are in the Category of 2ns (Existents).  Only later did Peirce add
> trichotomies according to the *nature *of each Object and
> Interpretant--phaneroscopic (Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or
> normative (Final).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 1:04 AM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Helmut, List,
>>
>> Helmut wrote: "Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and
>> interpretant."
>>
>> And so, in one very limited sense, it does. You gave this quote
>>
>> *CSP: A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to
>> an interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second
>> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern
>> (*"1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R]
>> 31:2, emphasis added*). *[Btw: there is an apparent terminological
>> problem in this quotation as Peirce writes that 'meaning' concerns 1ns; but
>> since he has just stated that the sign's "reference to an interpretant" is
>> a matter of 3ns (typcially associated by him with meaning), this apparent
>> problem is, I think, easily overcome.]
>>
>> Continuing
>>
>> HR: I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and
>> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it
>> as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves
>> (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function).
>>
>> I think your comment represents a misunderstanding of 'involvement' in
>> this context, one which most certainly does *not* 'functionally contain'
>> a relation at all (see my comment below).
>>
>> HR: That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more
>> too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement
>> define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the
>> written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives.
>>
>> I agree that it is important to understand "to involve" in Peirce's
>> semeiotic. In his classification of signs *involution* is *tricategorial
>> involution* whereas the interpretant (3ns) involves the object (2ns)
>> which involves the sign itself (1ns).
>>
>> Each of these (i.e., interpretant, object, sign itself) has its own
>> tricategorial designation. So, for example, the object may be 'symbolic'
>> (3ns), indexical (2ns), or iconic (1ns). An analogous tricategorial
>> division applies to the interpretant and to the sign itself.
>>
>> But *this *notion of categorial involution is offered merely for the
>> purpose of the abstract analysis of each of the 10 sign classes. It is
>> taken up in theoretical grammar, the first of the three divisions of logic
>> as semeiotic. And it only indirectly and *very* abstractly relates to
>> semiosis itself.
>>
>> As you wrote: HR: "the written form of a sign class is that of a noun
>> with two adjectives," or as I would phrase it: *In the order of
>> involution a sign class is written with two adjective followed by a noun. 
>> *The
>> first adjective refers to the interpretant, the second adjective refers to
>> the object, and, finally, the noun is the sign itself (i.e., quali-, sin-,
>> or legisign).
>>
>> So, for famous example, sign class 4 (e.g., a weather vane) is written
>> dicentic indexical sinsign, the interpretant in category 2ns (adj.,
>> dicentic), the object also in category 2ns (adj., indexical), the sign
>> itself also in category 2ns (noun, sinsign).
>> That is all! There is no functionality whatsoever in categorial
>> involution as it concerns the sign classes.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690*
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 12:57 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>>> Gary, List,
>>>
>>> Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and interpretant:
>>>
>>> "1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture |
>>> MS [R] 462:74
>>>
>>> …a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the
>>> interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the
>>> relation bet

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Reality is anything, all, totality, the sum of semiotic existence. Thus if
I say Mello Rolls (something from my long ago childhood) in the yer 2099,
it is real, Reality does not depend on the faculties of the body or mind.
It is in all probability recorded like everything online is. Bits somewhere
here or beyond.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 10:25 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> David and James,
>
> DP
>
>> What about "the first cake that I bake in 2020".  Is it an actual
>> entity? It is not (currently) observable. It might not even exist
>> (because I might not bake a cake in 2020).  I would claim that it
>> is of the same type as "the first cake I baked in 2018" (which did
>> exist until we ate it).
>>
>
> JHD
>
>> But the truth value of "the first cake I baked in 2018 is gluten-free"
>> is determinate (I happen not to know it, but you presumably do). The
>> same is not true of 2020.
>>
>
> I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be
> anywhere in the universe.  Most of us know more about the past
> and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is
> irrelevant to its existence.
>
> In fact, all of us know a great deal about the near future and
> most of us do a lot of planning for the longer term.  For example,
> every time I drive a car, I predict that no cars in the opposite
> lane will serve over and collide with mine.
>
> So far, that prediction has been absolutely true, and I hope
> that it will always be true in the future.  I'm sure that
> most of us have the same knowledge and hopes, and that our
> hopes will be true for the overwhelming majority of us.
>
> DP
>
>> I am not sure that the possible/actual distinction makes sense
>> for examples like this [baking a cake in 2020]
>>
>
> Just note the examples by James and me.  For the gluten-free cake
> in 2020, the knowledge is uncertain.  But most people who bake
> cakes can make a very accurate prediction about the likelihood
> that they will bake a gluten-free cake in 2020.
>
> In fact, I'll make a prediction about people I have never met:
> For anyone who frequently bakes a cake and has never previously
> baked a gluten-free cake, the probability that they will not
> bake a gluten-free cake in 2020 is greater than 50%.
>
> DP
>
>> (and it certainly isn't the mathematics/physics distinction).
>>
>
> The definition I stated is absolutely precise.  To emphasize
> the precision, I'll restate it in 4-D coordinates -- but it
> remains just as precise when you translate it to 3-D plus time:
>
>  1. Pure mathematics is the study of possibilities.  Every
> possible structure or process can be described by some
> theory of pure mathematics, but no structure or process
> of pure mathematics exists in actuality.
>
>  2. Everything in the universe that is actual is either a
> 4-dimensional region of space-time or it is wholly
> contained within some 4-D region of space-time.
>
>  3. Applied mathematics is the practice of selecting structures
> specified by one or more theories of pure mathematics and
> using them to describe something contained within some 4-D
> region of space-time.  The descriptions of applied mathematics
> are rarely, if ever, absolutely true.  But it's often possible
> to estimate the expected errors in measurement or prediction.
>
> The distinction between #1 and #2 is precise.  All the errors
> and vague intermediate cases result from difficulties in #3.
>
> John
>
>
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[PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[John F Sowa]

David and James,

DP

What about "the first cake that I bake in 2020".  Is it an actual
entity? It is not (currently) observable. It might not even exist
(because I might not bake a cake in 2020).  I would claim that it
is of the same type as "the first cake I baked in 2018" (which did
exist until we ate it).


JHD

But the truth value of "the first cake I baked in 2018 is gluten-free"
is determinate (I happen not to know it, but you presumably do). The
same is not true of 2020.


I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be
anywhere in the universe.  Most of us know more about the past
and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is
irrelevant to its existence.

In fact, all of us know a great deal about the near future and
most of us do a lot of planning for the longer term.  For example,
every time I drive a car, I predict that no cars in the opposite
lane will serve over and collide with mine.

So far, that prediction has been absolutely true, and I hope
that it will always be true in the future.  I'm sure that
most of us have the same knowledge and hopes, and that our
hopes will be true for the overwhelming majority of us.

DP

I am not sure that the possible/actual distinction makes sense
for examples like this [baking a cake in 2020]


Just note the examples by James and me.  For the gluten-free cake
in 2020, the knowledge is uncertain.  But most people who bake
cakes can make a very accurate prediction about the likelihood
that they will bake a gluten-free cake in 2020.

In fact, I'll make a prediction about people I have never met:
For anyone who frequently bakes a cake and has never previously
baked a gluten-free cake, the probability that they will not
bake a gluten-free cake in 2020 is greater than 50%.

DP

(and it certainly isn't the mathematics/physics distinction).


The definition I stated is absolutely precise.  To emphasize
the precision, I'll restate it in 4-D coordinates -- but it
remains just as precise when you translate it to 3-D plus time:

 1. Pure mathematics is the study of possibilities.  Every
possible structure or process can be described by some
theory of pure mathematics, but no structure or process
of pure mathematics exists in actuality.

 2. Everything in the universe that is actual is either a
4-dimensional region of space-time or it is wholly
contained within some 4-D region of space-time.

 3. Applied mathematics is the practice of selecting structures
specified by one or more theories of pure mathematics and
using them to describe something contained within some 4-D
region of space-time.  The descriptions of applied mathematics
are rarely, if ever, absolutely true.  But it's often possible
to estimate the expected errors in measurement or prediction.

The distinction between #1 and #2 is precise.  All the errors
and vague intermediate cases result from difficulties in #3.

John

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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Helmut, List:

One clarification--in the 1903 taxonomy, the second and third trichotomies
are not divisions of the (Dynamic) Object and (Final) Interpretant
*themselves*, but of their *relations *to the Sign.  For a Dicent Indexical
Sinsign, the S-FI *relation*, the S-DO *relation*, and the Sign itself are
in the Category of 2ns (Existents).  Only later did Peirce add trichotomies
according to the *nature *of each Object and Interpretant--phaneroscopic
(Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or normative (Final).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 1:04 AM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Helmut, List,
>
> Helmut wrote: "Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and
> interpretant."
>
> And so, in one very limited sense, it does. You gave this quote
>
> *CSP: A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an
> interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second
> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern
> (*"1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R]
> 31:2, emphasis added*). *[Btw: there is an apparent terminological
> problem in this quotation as Peirce writes that 'meaning' concerns 1ns; but
> since he has just stated that the sign's "reference to an interpretant" is
> a matter of 3ns (typcially associated by him with meaning), this apparent
> problem is, I think, easily overcome.]
>
> Continuing
>
> HR: I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and
> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it
> as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves
> (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function).
>
> I think your comment represents a misunderstanding of 'involvement' in
> this context, one which most certainly does *not* 'functionally contain'
> a relation at all (see my comment below).
>
> HR: That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more
> too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement
> define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the
> written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives.
>
> I agree that it is important to understand "to involve" in Peirce's
> semeiotic. In his classification of signs *involution* is *tricategorial
> involution* whereas the interpretant (3ns) involves the object (2ns)
> which involves the sign itself (1ns).
>
> Each of these (i.e., interpretant, object, sign itself) has its own
> tricategorial designation. So, for example, the object may be 'symbolic'
> (3ns), indexical (2ns), or iconic (1ns). An analogous tricategorial
> division applies to the interpretant and to the sign itself.
>
> But *this *notion of categorial involution is offered merely for the
> purpose of the abstract analysis of each of the 10 sign classes. It is
> taken up in theoretical grammar, the first of the three divisions of logic
> as semeiotic. And it only indirectly and *very* abstractly relates to
> semiosis itself.
>
> As you wrote: HR: "the written form of a sign class is that of a noun with
> two adjectives," or as I would phrase it: *In the order of involution a
> sign class is written with two adjective followed by a noun. *The first
> adjective refers to the interpretant, the second adjective refers to the
> object, and, finally, the noun is the sign itself (i.e., quali-, sin-, or
> legisign).
>
> So, for famous example, sign class 4 (e.g., a weather vane) is written
> dicentic indexical sinsign, the interpretant in category 2ns (adj.,
> dicentic), the object also in category 2ns (adj., indexical), the sign
> itself also in category 2ns (noun, sinsign).
> That is all! There is no functionality whatsoever in categorial involution
> as it concerns the sign classes.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 12:57 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Gary, List,
>>
>> Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and interpretant:
>>
>> "1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS
>> [R] 462:74
>>
>> …a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the
>> interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the
>> relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens
>> Dictionary "sign")
>> "1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R] 31:2
>>
>> A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an
>> interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second
>> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first
>> category concern." (same source)
>>
>> I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and
>> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it
>> as involving the triadic relati

[PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Helmut, list

I'd agree with you - that it's not enough to analytically take apart
the triadic Sign into its Relations [that between the R and the O;
that between the R and the I; and that of the R in itself]. You have
to consider how this whole set functions. Otherwise -  why does it
even exist? That is - what pragmatic effect is there from this
triadic interaction of information?

Edwina
 On Wed 22/08/18 12:57 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Gary, List,   Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object
and interpretant:"1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd
Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R] 462:74  

…a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the
interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the
relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens
Dictionary "sign")  "1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and
Multitude | MS [R] 31:2  

A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an
interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second
category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category
concern." (same source)   

I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate
and function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If
you see it as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a
function, which involves (functionally contains) the relation
(involvement as function). 

That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more
too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement
define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the
written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives. 

Best, 

Helmut22. August 2018 um 00:40 Uhr
  "Gary Richmond" 
 wrote: Jon, Helmut, List,   Jon wrote:JAS: [T]he Sign itself
is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a
triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant.  I
think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction. 
 I would strongly agree. One would think that in consideration of the
cenoscopic science of logic as semeiotics that "the Sign itself. . .
is one Correlate. . . of a triadic relation" would be seen as a
settled matter however differently it might (correctly or
incorrectly) be seen by some in, say, some idioscopic science. From
what I can tell from decades of reading the secondary literature on
this matter, with few exceptions amongst semioticians it is a settled
matter. In any event, Peirce is emphatic that "the Sign  itself is not
a triadic relation."  JAS: As I said earlier today in another
thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic
relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of
semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant.  
I agree. In fact, for the directionality of semiosis the triangle with
bent arrows works quite well.   In trichotomic, semiosis follows
the directionality of the vector of determination, namely from the
Object, 2ns (at the bottom vertex of the triangle) through the Sign,
1ns (at its top), to the Interpretant, 3ns (at the vertex on the
right).   Peirce uses both the turnstile, Y, and the triangle in
various triadic diagrams in his discussion of semeiotics--but for
different purposes. One is not 'right', the other 'wrong' as some
assert.   The triangle is also handy when considering trichotomic
relations in Phenomenology and Metaphysics. For example (as it is
analyzed categorially in "A Neglected Argument":   JAS:
"S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is
Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is
incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in
reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S"
(cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one
of Peirce's finest sign definitions." As I suggested above,
Mats Bergman is hardly alone in maintaining that the directionality
of semeiosis is essential in defining the Sign.   JAS: "S
represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the
Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the
interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the
utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).Exactly. In other words: The
Object is 'utterer' of the Sign; it mediates between the Object and
the Interpretant (the Sign representing the Object to the
'interpreter'). O -> S -> IJAS: 
However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S
represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.  
My understanding as well.   Best,   Gary Gary
Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690