Edwina, John, Jon, list, Edwina wrote: So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.
I have written enough today on this topic, yet I think that a close reading of at least some of those quotations would refute your denial. But for now let me just ask you, do you agree with the way John Sowa distinguished the three universes in his recent post? JS: I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality. The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws, are also outside the universe of actuality. For me the key phrase in the first passage above is "do not exist in the universe of actuality," and in the second, "are also outside the universe of actuality." I doubt that you'd agree with John that these are "three disjoint universes" (I am assuming that by "disjoint" he means here distinct/discrete.) And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns, which are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three Universes, which are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something which you at least seem to do when you write "the three categories/universes." Obviously the Three Universes have a direct connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is an error to conflate or identify them. In addition, as Jon just wrote: "The constituents of Peirce's third Universe--includ[e] not only Laws, but also Signs, Habits, and continua (EP 2:435&479; 1908)-" and, in my view, continua in particular unequivocally distinguish the third universe from the second. Parenthetically, I'd add that in my view it is an error not to differentiate the universal categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns from their application within semeiotics, metaphysics, and elsewhere. These are separate sciences with different goals, etc. So, note that in Peirce's classification (following Comte) a science lower in the classification *may* depend on another higher in the classification for principles, but it does *not* furnish principles to those higher in the classification, although often enough, it provides examples to those sciences. Mathematics, as 'first science', furnishes principles to most all the sciences following it in the classification; and phenomenology, 2nd science (!) furnishes principles (notably, the universal categories) to certain sciences below it in the classification (such as semeiotics and metaphysics). (Note: as discussed here from time to time, a science being "lower" in the classification of science in no way implies that that science is in any way less significant or important.) Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 4:14 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, list > > No- I don't conflate or merge 3ns and 2ns. I've no idea how, after all > these years of my posts, you would come to such a conclusion about my views > of the three universes/categories. And I certainly don't reduce the three > categories/universes to two. > > Just because I used the word 'embedded' doesn't mean merger or > conflation. My understanding of habits/3ns is that they, as laws, organize > matter. BUT, since they are generals, then, they are not, in themselves, > actuals; they are not existents in the mode of 2ns. To 'be' such a law, > they must 'be' within matter, as the law that organizes that matter. So, > the law of organizing a bacterium isn't 'existential' [2ns] outside of that > bacterium but is an integral part, as organization [3ns] of that bacterium. > > So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided. > > Edwina > > > > On Wed 22/08/18 3:51 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, John, list, > > Edwina wrote: The laws, per se, do not 'exist' on their own because they > are laws/generals. > > I agree that most certainly laws do not 'exist' because they are > generals. But now you add: > > ET: They are only operable when they function as the habits/organization > of actuality.So- they can certainly never be 'outside the universe of > actually' [i.e., as Platonic Forms]; they are embedded within actuality > [Aristotle]. > > But saying, as you do, that laws can never be 'outside the universe of > actuality' and are merely 'embedded within actuality' is to in effect > conflate the 2nd and 3rd universes, to claim that there are not three > distinct Universes but really (I use that word advisedly as reality is > reduced to existence) only two. However, Peirce sees it differently: > > I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose > matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every > physical process can be reversed without violation of the law of mechanics, > the law of habit forbids such a reversal. 1891-08-29 | Letters to > Christine Ladd-Franklin | W 8:387 in Commens Dictionary > > And the generalizing law is "a universal tendency": > > I was led to the hypothesis that the laws of the universe have been formed > under a universal tendency of all things toward generalization > and habit-taking. 1898 | Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic > of Things: Habit | RLT 241; CP 7.515 Commens (emphasis added) > > This "universal tendency. . .toward generalization" is, to my way of > thinking, the third universe. To seemingly reduce three Universes to two > (by conflating law, 3ns, and lawfulness, or law expressed in the > existential world, 2ns, is, to my way of thinking, not only to undermine > the reality of the third universe but the second existential universe as > well. (Note just below that Peirce writes "existence (not reality).") > > 1901 | Individual | CP 3.613 > > …whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and > individuality are essentially the same thing… > > Existence has its own unique character, is "a special mode of reality." > > 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349 > > Existence […] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other > characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate . > > Further, distinguishing the second and third universes, Peirce writes: > > 1905 | Letters to Mario Calderoni | MS [R] L67 > > That mode of being which we call existence, the reaction of everything in > the universe against every other. . . brutally insisting on a place is > Secundan. I say “brutally”, because no law, so far as we know, makes any > single object to exist. Law only determines in what way things shall > behave, once they do exist (emphasis added). > > The dynamic character (which you and JAS have argued at length about) is > for Peirce clearly a characteristic of existence (secundan) which he here > distinguishes from reality (tertian). > > 1905 [c.] | Pragmatism, Prag [R] | CP 5.503 > > …reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so is a > cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the > environment, and so is a dynamic character… > > So, as Peirce sees it, your view "abolishes objective necessity" (the > third university) in not fully accepting the independent reality of > would-be's. And he ties this to that which would be in futuro (while > existence is hic et nunc). > > 1905 | Issues of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 290:52 > > …Necessitarianism is the doctrine that there is no objective > indetermination of Modality; it abolishes objective necessity and > possibility together, and only conceives the future as that which will > have been. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > u > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 > > > > On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 2:46 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> John, list >> >> Agreed, the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of >> actuality. >> >> Now, with regard to the universe of necessity, i.e., Laws/Thirdness - >> which you say are outside of the universe of actuality - I'll quibble with >> the wording. >> >> The laws, per se, do not 'exist' on their own because they are >> laws/generals. They are only operable when they function as the >> habits/organization of actuality. >> >> So- they can certainly never be 'outside the universe of actually' [i.e., >> as Platonic Forms]; they are embedded within actuality [Aristotle]. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed 22/08/18 2:22 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent: >> >> On 8/22/2018 2:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: >> > "I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be >> > anywhere in the universe. Most of us know more about the past >> > and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is >> > irrelevant to its existence. " >> > >> > What's the difference, then, between your definition of actuality and >> > the definition of possibility? >> >> I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities >> of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality. >> >> The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws, >> are also outside the universe of actuality. >> >> John >> >> >> >> >
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