Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

For the record, I have consistently referred to *my* Semeiotic
Argumentation, and have never--*not once*--attributed it to Peirce.  What I
*have* said is that Peirce *affirmed *each of its *premisses*, and I have
provided ample evidence from his *explicit* statements to support that
claim.  Moreover, the only time that I used the word "proof" was in
response to *someone else *mentioning "logical proof of the reality of
God," and I put quotation marks around it accordingly.

JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
*deductive *argumentation--the
conclusion is only as strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is false,
then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of
*that *premiss; but anyone who affirms *all *of the premisses is *rationally
required* to affirm the conclusion, as well.


On the other hand, Peirce himself used the word "proof" *without *such
quotation marks in a passage that I have quoted a couple of times.

CSP:  ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict *what
will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we cannot
think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought, as it
were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 2:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary F,
>
> Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
> arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
>
> GF
> > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
> > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
> > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
> > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
> > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
> > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
> > subject is collateral experience of it.
>
> I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
> as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
> individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
> source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
>
> The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
> God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
> or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
> catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
>
> GF
> > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
> > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
> > or provisional we take it to be.
>
> Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
> and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
> same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
> the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a
> prerequisite.
>
> GF
> > I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the
> > semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go
> > any further into theology than I have here.
>
> I very strongly agree.  And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
> "Enough already."
>
> John
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, Edwina, List:

JD:  As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they are the
first correlate of a further triadic relation.


I think that *consist *is the wrong word here, because it implies that some
Signs are *nothing but* triadic relations.  However, I acknowledge that some
 Signs clearly *involve *relations, and some of those relations are
*triadic*.  For example, Symbols involve Indices and Icons that are
connected in some way, Propositions involve Semes married by continuous
predicates, and Arguments involve Propositions married by leading
principles; not to mention that the Universe as a Sign obviously involves
triadic (and other) relations.  However, the point of contention is whether
*any *Sign *is *a triadic relation--i.e., a triad--rather than *always *being
one correlate of a triadic relation.

ET:  ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants' ...


No, only Legisigns/Types are Necessitants; Qualisigns/Tones are Possibles,
and Sinsigns/Tokens are Existents.

ET:  Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.


No, the Object and Interpretant are *external* to the Sign, not *parts *of
the Sign.  The Sign, Object, and Interpretant are the three correlates of
the triadic relation of *representing *or *mediating*.

ET:  We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the triad as
a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of relations in
his outline of these ten classes. 2.254


No, there is nothing whatsoever in that entire passage (NDTR, CP 2.233-272,
EP 2:289-299; 1903) that "contradicts" my claim; on the contrary, it
explicitly *confirms *that a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant--the First Correlate of a triadic relation, not *itself *a
triad or triadic relation.

CSP:  A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant.
A *Sign *is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a
mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (CP
2.242, EP 2:290-291)


Peirce proceeded to use "Sign," rather than "Representamen," throughout the
entire remainder of the text.  I do not see how he could have been any
clearer, and I stand by my statement that he never--*not once*--used "Sign"
for a triad.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 7:31 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since
> the representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
> semiosic set of O-R-I.
>
> Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
> structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.
>
> We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
> contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the triad as
> a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of relations in
> his outline of these then classes. 2.254
>
> The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign
> cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral part
> of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert actuality
> into the mediative process of Mind.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 19/05/19 1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
> sent:
>
> Jon S, Edwina, List,
>
> I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a genuinely
> triadic relation with respect to its object and interpretant. Having said
> that, some signs have the character of necessitants. These include
> legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs that have these three
> characteristics, do they have the internal structure of a triadic relation
> connecting its parts? I think the answer is "yes". As such, some signs
> consist of triadic relations--even if they are the first correlate of a
> further triadic relation.
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt
> Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars
> (was Continuity...
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of
> these terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
> Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 

Re: Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

I said the two words you cite and they were repeated but I assume I am the
one addressed. I am deeply sorry where offense has been taken. I regard
every human being as beyond judgment and judging others as a futile and
uncalled for activity.

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On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:53 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> Again I read, "Enough already."
>
> Indeed. Enough already of blocking the way of inquiry. If you disagree
> with someone's interpretation of something posted to this list, then say so
> and give your reasons. That ought to be sufficient.
>
> If you aren't interested in a threaded topic, don't read in that thread.
> No one's going to miss you.
>
> If you aren't at all interested in what some particular list member has
> to say, delete his or her posts before commenting on them, perhaps even
> before reading them. No one will know or care.
>
> The lack of tolerance that I as list moderator have recently seen here is
> simply not acceptable in this forum. In my view, such a lack of tolerance
> reflects badly on the character of the intolerant person and not at all on
> the person harshly treated.
>
> As Joe Ransdell, the founder of Peirce-L wrote in "How the Forum Works"
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM
>
> [Forum members expect] that those who are at odds with one another. . . be
> both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in
> their readiness to make verbal amends when excess is imputed to them. *When
> in doubt, apologize: you are never diminished by it *[emphasis in the
> original]*.*
>
>
> While I believe some apologies are in order, I don't really expect to see
> them. I do, however, believe that certain folk here should read over *their
> own *recent comments to see if, upon reflection, they think they might
> have shown  intolerance toward the views and/or scholarship of another
> forum member. If the answer is that they do* not* believe that they did,
> then that is that, and there is nothing more to be said. But if the answer
> is that they must admit *to themselves* that they indeed did express some
> intolerance, then that person at least ought to consider if they want to
> see that intolerance (or pique, or insults, etc.) published in perpetuity
> on the Internet as an expression of their character. If not, they should
> simply refrain from conducting themselves in such an inappropriate manner
> in the future. As Ben Udell wrote here over a decade ago, "Peirce-L is a
> salon, not a saloon."
>
> I sincerely hope that no one here will attempt to justify untoward conduct
> on the list, although I can imagine that a list member or so will claim
> that I'm "scolding" folk here. Nonsense. Scold yourself if the
> uncomfortable shoe fits. Everyone should feel safe and free to express any
> Peirce-related thoughts that they have in the Peirce e-forum. That is*
> all* I'm saying.
>
> So, in a word, enough of blocking the way of inquiry; enough of
> intolerance.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 3:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Gary F,
>>
>> Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
>> arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
>>
>> GF
>> > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
>> > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
>> > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
>> > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
>> > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
>> > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
>> > subject is collateral experience of it.
>>
>> I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
>> as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
>> individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
>> source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
>>
>> The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
>> God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
>> or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
>> catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
>>
>> GF
>> > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
>> > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
>> > or provisional we take it to be.
>>
>> Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
>> and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
>> same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
>> the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a
>> 

Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Again I read, "Enough already."

Indeed. Enough already of blocking the way of inquiry. If you disagree with
someone's interpretation of something posted to this list, then say so and
give your reasons. That ought to be sufficient.

If you aren't interested in a threaded topic, don't read in that thread. No
one's going to miss you.

If you aren't at all interested in what some particular list member has to
say, delete his or her posts before commenting on them, perhaps even before
reading them. No one will know or care.

The lack of tolerance that I as list moderator have recently seen here is
simply not acceptable in this forum. In my view, such a lack of tolerance
reflects badly on the character of the intolerant person and not at all on
the person harshly treated.

As Joe Ransdell, the founder of Peirce-L wrote in "How the Forum Works"
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM

[Forum members expect] that those who are at odds with one another. . . be
both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in
their readiness to make verbal amends when excess is imputed to them. *When
in doubt, apologize: you are never diminished by it *[emphasis in the
original]*.*


While I believe some apologies are in order, I don't really expect to see
them. I do, however, believe that certain folk here should read over *their
own *recent comments to see if, upon reflection, they think they might have
shown  intolerance toward the views and/or scholarship of another forum
member. If the answer is that they do* not* believe that they did, then
that is that, and there is nothing more to be said. But if the answer is
that they must admit *to themselves* that they indeed did express some
intolerance, then that person at least ought to consider if they want to
see that intolerance (or pique, or insults, etc.) published in perpetuity
on the Internet as an expression of their character. If not, they should
simply refrain from conducting themselves in such an inappropriate manner
in the future. As Ben Udell wrote here over a decade ago, "Peirce-L is a
salon, not a saloon."

I sincerely hope that no one here will attempt to justify untoward conduct
on the list, although I can imagine that a list member or so will claim
that I'm "scolding" folk here. Nonsense. Scold yourself if the
uncomfortable shoe fits. Everyone should feel safe and free to express any
Peirce-related thoughts that they have in the Peirce e-forum. That is* all*
I'm saying.

So, in a word, enough of blocking the way of inquiry; enough of
intolerance.

Sincerely,

Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 3:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary F,
>
> Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
> arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
>
> GF
> > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
> > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
> > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
> > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
> > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
> > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
> > subject is collateral experience of it.
>
> I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
> as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
> individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
> source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
>
> The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
> God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
> or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
> catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
>
> GF
> > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
> > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
> > or provisional we take it to be.
>
> Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
> and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
> same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
> the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a
> prerequisite.
>
> GF
> > I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the
> > semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go
> > any further into theology than I have here.
>
> I very strongly agree.  And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
> "Enough already."
>
> John
>

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Re: RE: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

There is a considerable and growing body of evidence that has been known
over the past four or five decades that definitely is in reference to God
even though most who claim to have witnessed or see this Light find it
impossible to describe in words. The actual changes in the lives of such
witnesses has been palpable and focused on reaching out to others in
service. These testimonies are ignored by materialists who do not credit
near death of other psy phenomena with any reality. This is crumpling and
will crumble. A gloss on this that has no necessary truth but which may
prove the case is that with the decline of creedal Abrahamic religions will
come a rise in individual spirituality.  Peirce had an experience on which
he remarked late in life which seems to be like many such experiences which
confirm a mystical sense that would suggest these documentable but not yet
credited experiences which are growing in number.

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On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 2:40 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, Jon, Gary, list,
>
> I think, if God is by definition the creator, and so has created us, and
> our ability to tell right from wrong, then he could not have created us in
> a way that we were only able to do right, because then we would not need
> the ability to tell between right and wrong. An ability that never is
> needed and used, cannot exist, because its need and use cannot be seen.
> Sin, I think, is to not live up to one´s means, that is to ignore one´s
> own knowledge about right and wrong by doing something wrong in spite of
> one´s consciousness. This sin cannot be excluded from the beginning, by
> creative design, but has to be unlearned by the creatures the hard way.
> This, I think, is a rule even God on first glance cannot skip or avoid,
> like He cannot create a rock that is so heavy that He cannot lift it. On
> second glance though, He maybe can (solve these two aspects of
> almightiness-paradoxon), as the Jesus-parable (only my guess, that it is a
> parable) suggests: By being impersonated as human, He can be weak, even get
> killed, and solve the sin-problem too: Taking away human sins, or guilt
> about them, may that mean to admit their unavoidability?
>
> Helmut
>
>
>  19. Mai 2019 um 18:55 Uhr
> *Von:* g...@gnusystems.ca
>
>
> Jon, Gary R,
>
> Jon, you wrote, “I am hoping that Gary F. will explain why he finds it
> problematic that our acquaintance with God is entirely mediated by Signs,
> even though that is just as true of our acquaintance with Peirce or just
> about anything else.”
>
> I will try to keep this concise, because it’s really nothing but an
> attempt to explain what “collateral experience” means in this context.
>
> The evidence for Peirce’s having lived in Lowell and Milford, published a
> number of papers in various journals, having written the hundreds of
> manuscript pages you and I have transcribed, etc., puts the fact of his
> existence (1839-1914) beyond any reasonable doubt; and this puts his
> *reality* beyond any reasonable doubt.
>
> The psychophysical universe which, by hypothesis, was and is being created
> by God, contains no evidence of God’s *existence*. “Since God, in His
> essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit,” any
> claim of acquaintance with Him must rest on a very different basis from our
> acquaintance with Peirce (or my acquaintance with you, for that matter).
> Moreover, any *knowledge* that any mind can have of God must consist of
> predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which name, says
> Peirce, is different from all other proper names because it is *definable*.
> Every other proper name is an *index* of an entity who, at some time in
> some universe of discourse, has existed in some embodied form, and the
> *prerequisite* for knowledge of that subject is collateral experience of
> it. A definable term, on the other hand, is necessarily a *symbol* (CP
> 4.544) which may have little or no indexical value or grounding in
> collateral experience.
>
> After defining his terms, Peirce begins his NA by saying “If God Really
> be, and be benign, then, in view of the generally conceded truth that
> religion, were it but proved, would be a good outweighing all others, we
> should naturally expect …” Peirce does not *assert* that God is benign,
> but he does make the value of his argument conditional on God’s
> benevolence. Now, what reason do we have for attributing benevolence to the
> Creator of the psychophysical Universe? Any predicate we attribute to
> *any* agency is generalized from our experience of that quality being
> operative in the observable universe. If God created it *all*, why should
> we cherry-pick some qualities of Creation and attribute them to God while
> ignoring other qualities? What evidence is there that the Creator is more
> benevolent than malevolent, or 

[PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[John F Sowa]

Gary F,

Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.

GF

any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
subject is collateral experience of it.


I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.

The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.

GF

If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
or provisional we take it to be.


Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a 
prerequisite.


GF
I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the 
semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go 
any further into theology than I have here.


I very strongly agree.  And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
"Enough already."

John

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Aw: RE: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, Jon, Gary, list,

 

I think, if God is by definition the creator, and so has created us, and our ability to tell right from wrong, then he could not have created us in a way that we were only able to do right, because then we would not need the ability to tell between right and wrong. An ability that never is needed and used, cannot exist, because its need and use cannot be seen.

Sin, I think, is to not live up to one´s means, that is to ignore one´s own knowledge about right and wrong by doing something wrong in spite of one´s consciousness. This sin cannot be excluded from the beginning, by creative design, but has to be unlearned by the creatures the hard way. This, I think, is a rule even God on first glance cannot skip or avoid, like He cannot create a rock that is so heavy that He cannot lift it. On second glance though, He maybe can (solve these two aspects of almightiness-paradoxon), as the Jesus-parable (only my guess, that it is a parable) suggests: By being impersonated as human, He can be weak, even get killed, and solve the sin-problem too: Taking away human sins, or guilt about them, may that mean to admit their unavoidability?

 

Helmut

 

 

 19. Mai 2019 um 18:55 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon, Gary R,

Jon, you wrote, “I am hoping that Gary F. will explain why he finds it problematic that our acquaintance with God is entirely mediated by Signs, even though that is just as true of our acquaintance with Peirce or just about anything else.”

I will try to keep this concise, because it’s really nothing but an attempt to explain what “collateral experience” means in this context.

The evidence for Peirce’s having lived in Lowell and Milford, published a number of papers in various journals, having written the hundreds of manuscript pages you and I have transcribed, etc., puts the fact of his existence (1839-1914) beyond any reasonable doubt; and this puts his reality beyond any reasonable doubt.

The psychophysical universe which, by hypothesis, was and is being created by God, contains no evidence of God’s existence. “Since God, in His essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit,” any claim of acquaintance with Him must rest on a very different basis from our acquaintance with Peirce (or my acquaintance with you, for that matter). Moreover, any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that subject is collateral experience of it. A definable term, on the other hand, is necessarily a symbol (CP 4.544) which may have little or no indexical value or grounding in collateral experience. 

After defining his terms, Peirce begins his NA by saying “If God Really be, and be benign, then, in view of the generally conceded truth that religion, were it but proved, would be a good outweighing all others, we should naturally expect …” Peirce does not assert that God is benign, but he does make the value of his argument conditional on God’s benevolence. Now, what reason do we have for attributing benevolence to the Creator of the psychophysical Universe? Any predicate we attribute to any agency is generalized from our experience of that quality being operative in the observable universe. If God created it all, why should we cherry-pick some qualities of Creation and attribute them to God while ignoring other qualities? What evidence is there that the Creator is more benevolent than malevolent, or indifferent? If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible or provisional we take it to be.

Based on my own observations of the observable, I think it most likely that God is an ens rationis whose reality consists of our willingness to live up the the ideal characteristics which we attribute to Him. As Peirce put it, the Argument for His reality “should present its conclusion, not as a proposition of metaphysical theology, but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth.” God is a Real Ideal to Whom a pragmatic monotheist attributes all good. But this attribution runs into logical problems as soon as it tries to elevate itself as a metaphysical theology. If the Creator is benevolent, what accounts for our collateral experience of malevolence and rampant suffering of the innocent in His Creation? Well, one explanation is to say that God is good by definition, and we simply don’t really understand His transcendent and ultimate goodness. Almighty God can do no wrong. The ethical principle behind this belief is essentially “Might makes Right,” which I don’t consider to be a principle “full of nutrition for man's highest 

RE: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[gnox]

Jon, Gary R,

Jon, you wrote, “I am hoping that Gary F. will explain why he finds it 
problematic that our acquaintance with God is entirely mediated by Signs, even 
though that is just as true of our acquaintance with Peirce or just about 
anything else.”

I will try to keep this concise, because it’s really nothing but an attempt to 
explain what “collateral experience” means in this context.

The evidence for Peirce’s having lived in Lowell and Milford, published a 
number of papers in various journals, having written the hundreds of manuscript 
pages you and I have transcribed, etc., puts the fact of his existence 
(1839-1914) beyond any reasonable doubt; and this puts his reality beyond any 
reasonable doubt.

The psychophysical universe which, by hypothesis, was and is being created by 
God, contains no evidence of God’s existence. “Since God, in His essential 
character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit,” any claim of 
acquaintance with Him must rest on a very different basis from our acquaintance 
with Peirce (or my acquaintance with you, for that matter). Moreover, any 
knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of predicates attributed 
to the real Subject we call “God” — which name, says Peirce, is different from 
all other proper names because it is definable. Every other proper name is an 
index of an entity who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed 
in some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that subject is 
collateral experience of it. A definable term, on the other hand, is 
necessarily a symbol (CP 4.544) which may have little or no indexical value or 
grounding in collateral experience. 

After defining his terms, Peirce begins his NA by saying “If God Really be, and 
be benign, then, in view of the generally conceded truth that religion, were it 
but proved, would be a good outweighing all others, we should naturally expect 
…” Peirce does not assert that God is benign, but he does make the value of his 
argument conditional on God’s benevolence. Now, what reason do we have for 
attributing benevolence to the Creator of the psychophysical Universe? Any 
predicate we attribute to any agency is generalized from our experience of that 
quality being operative in the observable universe. If God created it all, why 
should we cherry-pick some qualities of Creation and attribute them to God 
while ignoring other qualities? What evidence is there that the Creator is more 
benevolent than malevolent, or indifferent? If there is no evidence, no means 
of testing a hypothesis inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how 
fallible or provisional we take it to be.

Based on my own observations of the observable, I think it most likely that God 
is an ens rationis whose reality consists of our willingness to live up the the 
ideal characteristics which we attribute to Him. As Peirce put it, the Argument 
for His reality “should present its conclusion, not as a proposition of 
metaphysical theology, but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of 
life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth.” God is a Real Ideal to 
Whom a pragmatic monotheist attributes all good. But this attribution runs into 
logical problems as soon as it tries to elevate itself as a metaphysical 
theology. If the Creator is benevolent, what accounts for our collateral 
experience of malevolence and rampant suffering of the innocent in His 
Creation? Well, one explanation is to say that God is good by definition, and 
we simply don’t really understand His transcendent and ultimate goodness. 
Almighty God can do no wrong. The ethical principle behind this belief is 
essentially “Might makes Right,” which I don’t consider to be a principle “full 
of nutrition for man's highest growth.” 

I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the 
semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go any further into 
theology than I have here.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 18-May-19 18:14
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: 
Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

 

Gary R., List:

 

Just a few brief clarifications ...

 

GR:  I would say that there are those ... who see this Cosmic Christ as active 
in the Kosmos today and, indeed, always and forever, from the beginning to the 
end of time--and so, as some commentators have argued, even before the man, 
Jesus, appeared in the world. It seems to me that at least aspects of this idea 
find a place in certain schools of Christian theology as well.

 

Yes, I did not mean to imply that Christ had no role in the Universe prior to 
the Incarnation.  On the contrary, as the New Testament and traditional creeds 
repeatedly affirm, He is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father and the Holy 
Spirit, and all three have participated in creating and sustaining the Universe 
from the beginning.

 

GR:  It is in the second person 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

The point is, that the Peircean semiosic framework is generative;
that is, it doesn't simply tell us that 'this' means 'that' - which
is the Saussurian communicative framework. Instead, the Peircean
frame, by inserting the representamen/sign as mediation - which is
NOT the same as 'transmission' - but as mediation, creates a
generative framework.
Therefore, as an example,  the representamen located in a plant,  in
its function of mediative Mind, takes data from an external Object
[such as water, chemicals] and using the laws located in that
representamen, transforms that raw data into its own Interpretant,
the morphological form of leaves and flowers and seeds. 
This morphological form, the full triadic sign,  functions as an
Object to some other form. So, the leaves and flowers and seeds of
the plant become food [Interpretants] etc for some other
actuality...and so on. 
But at no time is the triad reducible; all three parts function
interactively [O-R-I]. 
Edwina
 On Sun 19/05/19  8:31 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since the
representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
semiosic set of O-R-I.

Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.
We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the
triad as a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of
relations in his outline of these then classes. 2.254
The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign
cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral
part of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert
actuality into the mediative process of Mind. 
Edwina
 On Sun 19/05/19  1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Jon S, Edwina, List, 
I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a
genuinely triadic relation with respect to its object and
interpretant. Having said that, some signs have the character of
necessitants. These include legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs
that  have these three characteristics, do they have the internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts? I think the
answer is "yes". As such, some signs consist of triadic
relations--even if they are the first correlate of a further triadic
relation. 
Yours, 
Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
 Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation
wars (was Continuity...  Edwina, List: 
  Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage
of these terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903),
or "Sign" and "Representamen" are  synonymous (SS 193; 1905).  He
never--not once--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a
relation, while a Sign is always a correlate.
  Regards, 
  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -  twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
 
  On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen.
I am talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate
between the two and even to acknowledge the vital  role of the full
semiosic triad. 

Edwina   


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[1]
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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since the
representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
semiosic set of O-R-I.

Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.
We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the
triad as a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of
relations in his outline of these then classes. 2.254
The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign
cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral
part of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert
actuality into the mediative process of Mind. 
Edwina
 On Sun 19/05/19  1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Jon S, Edwina, List, 
I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a
genuinely triadic relation with respect to its object and
interpretant. Having said that, some signs have the character of
necessitants. These include legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs
that  have these three characteristics, do they have the internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts? I think the
answer is "yes". As such, some signs consist of triadic
relations--even if they are the first correlate of a further triadic
relation. 
Yours, 
Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
 Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation
wars (was Continuity...  Edwina, List: 
  Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage
of these terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903),
or "Sign" and "Representamen" are  synonymous (SS 193; 1905).  He
never--not once--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a
relation, while a Sign is always a correlate.
  Regards, 
  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -  twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
 
  On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen.
I am talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate
between the two and even to acknowledge the vital  role of the full
semiosic triad. 

Edwina   


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[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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