Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Helmut- I followed Matsuno in his temporal analysis, which, I think, fits in very well with Peirce. Matsuno is both a world renowned scientist and philosopher. Edwina On Fri 06/03/20 4:14 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, Dan, Jon, List, Thank you, will do too (look at Koichiro Matsuno). I remember long ago there was a discussion about how to assign the tenses to the categories. You proposed the same like Matsuno does: Present, perfect, progressive, and I proposed the betweens of past-present, present-future, and past-future. Now I think, that both fits: It depends of whether you are the interpreting system (subjectivity), as you said "notion of time", or you are looking at (observing) an interpreting system (objectivity or wannabe-objectivity). What is happening in the primisense or the first perception, is present or presence for the subject, but an observer would say, that it has a reason. The altersense is a matter of perfect tense for the subject: memories have come into play, but for an outside observer these memories are entering the mind now and have an effect on the future. The medisense, the thoughts, are pointing into the future for the subject, and for the observer they have a reason in the past, and an effect on the future. Or something like that, Best! Helmut 06. März 2020 um 20:56 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut, Dan, list Koichiro Matsuno, a bioengineer, and Peircean scholar, has written extensively on the notion of time, which he refers to as present, perfect and progressive [comparable to 1ns,2nd, 3ns]… I suggest you google his name, and on for example, Researchgate.net, you'll find articles dealing with time in physico-chemical and biological semiosis. For example. 1]How does Time Flow in Living Systems: 2]Temporality Naturalized [ where "The Schrodinger equation for quantum mechanics, which is approachable in third-person description, takes for granted tenseless time that does not distinguish between different tenses such as past, present and future…. 3] Time from Semiosis: E-series Time for Living systems. " We develop a semiotic scheme of time, in which time precipates from the repeated succession of punctuating the progressive tense by the perfect tense. The underling principle is communication among local participants. Time can thus be seen as a meaning-making, semiotic system in which different time codes are delineated 4] The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information 5] Google: Koichiro Matsuno- AltExploit. 'Abstract Expressions of Time's Modalities He is a phenomenal scientist and scholar. Edwina On Fri 06/03/20 2:31 PM , "Daniel L. Everett" danleveret...@icloud.com sent: All very intriguing. It is fascinating in light of this to think of the many ways that languages choose to divide/classify time. English, for example, has no morphological future tense (thus one must say “will go”), though it has morphological past (went) and present tenses (go). Other languages have as many as five distinct past tenses, one present and one future (there are many variations, but so far as I know languages will have more past tenses than future tenses if they have multiples). Other languages choose not to mark time at all morphologically (e.g. on the verb) and also have very few words for precise times (e.g. yesterday, today, tomorrow).There are many attempts/theories of how natural language encodes time/temporal relations. Peirce’s concept of time has been underexploited (to put it mildly) in linguistics and clearly the connection of time theory to natural language tense theories could be quite a fecund area of exploration. Admitting the orthogonal nature of these remarks to the mainline of discussion, Dan On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:20 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Jon, List, I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the permanence of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ coupling. The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of thirdness into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the interpretant becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: Peirce´s Primisense- Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the thinking, re-enters the Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a picture of our thoughts.I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only system, and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and "before" in quotat
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Edwina, Dan, Jon, List, Thank you, will do too (look at Koichiro Matsuno). I remember long ago there was a discussion about how to assign the tenses to the categories. You proposed the same like Matsuno does: Present, perfect, progressive, and I proposed the betweens of past-present, present-future, and past-future. Now I think, that both fits: It depends of whether you are the interpreting system (subjectivity), as you said "notion of time", or you are looking at (observing) an interpreting system (objectivity or wannabe-objectivity). What is happening in the primisense or the first perception, is present or presence for the subject, but an observer would say, that it has a reason. The altersense is a matter of perfect tense for the subject: memories have come into play, but for an outside observer these memories are entering the mind now and have an effect on the future. The medisense, the thoughts, are pointing into the future for the subject, and for the observer they have a reason in the past, and an effect on the future. Or something like that, Best! Helmut 06. März 2020 um 20:56 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut, Dan, list Koichiro Matsuno, a bioengineer, and Peircean scholar, has written extensively on the notion of time, which he refers to as present, perfect and progressive [comparable to 1ns,2nd, 3ns]… I suggest you google his name, and on for example, Researchgate.net, you'll find articles dealing with time in physico-chemical and biological semiosis. For example. 1]How does Time Flow in Living Systems: 2]Temporality Naturalized [ where "The Schrodinger equation for quantum mechanics, which is approachable in third-person description, takes for granted tenseless time that does not distinguish between different tenses such as past, present and future…. 3] Time from Semiosis: E-series Time for Living systems. " We develop a semiotic scheme of time, in which time precipates from the repeated succession of punctuating the progressive tense by the perfect tense. The underling principle is communication among local participants. Time can thus be seen as a meaning-making, semiotic system in which different time codes are delineated 4] The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information 5] Google: Koichiro Matsuno- AltExploit. 'Abstract Expressions of Time's Modalities He is a phenomenal scientist and scholar. Edwina On Fri 06/03/20 2:31 PM , "Daniel L. Everett" danleveret...@icloud.com sent: All very intriguing. It is fascinating in light of this to think of the many ways that languages choose to divide/classify time. English, for example, has no morphological future tense (thus one must say “will go”), though it has morphological past (went) and present tenses (go). Other languages have as many as five distinct past tenses, one present and one future (there are many variations, but so far as I know languages will have more past tenses than future tenses if they have multiples). Other languages choose not to mark time at all morphologically (e.g. on the verb) and also have very few words for precise times (e.g. yesterday, today, tomorrow). There are many attempts/theories of how natural language encodes time/temporal relations. Peirce’s concept of time has been underexploited (to put it mildly) in linguistics and clearly the connection of time theory to natural language tense theories could be quite a fecund area of exploration. Admitting the orthogonal nature of these remarks to the mainline of discussion, Dan On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:20 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Jon, List, I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the permanence of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ coupling. The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of thirdness into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the interpretant becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: Peirce´s Primisense- Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the thinking, re-enters the Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a picture of our thoughts. I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only system, and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and "before" in quotation marks, because without a preceding time, these words cannot really be applied. Best, Helmut 06. März 2020 um 18:32 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: Jeff, List: JD: At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries con
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Many thanks, Edwina. Will do. Dan > On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > > Helmut, Dan, list > > > Koichiro Matsuno, a bioengineer, and Peircean scholar, has written > extensively on the notion of time, which he refers to as present, perfect and > progressive [comparable to 1ns,2nd, 3ns]… > > I suggest you google his name, and on for example, Researchgate.net, you'll > find articles dealing with time in physico-chemical and biological semiosis. > > For example. > > 1]How does Time Flow in Living Systems: > > 2]Temporality Naturalized [ where "The Schrodinger equation for quantum > mechanics, which is approachable in third-person description, takes for > granted tenseless time that does not distinguish between different tenses > such as past, present and future…. > > 3] Time from Semiosis: E-series Time for Living systems. " We develop a > semiotic scheme of time, in which time precipates from the repeated > succession of punctuating the progressive tense by the perfect tense. The > underling principle is communication among local participants. Time can thus > be seen as a meaning-making, semiotic system in which different time codes > are delineated > > > 4] The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information > > 5] Google: Koichiro Matsuno- AltExploit. 'Abstract Expressions of Time's > Modalities > > He is a phenomenal scientist and scholar. > > Edwina > > On Fri 06/03/20 2:31 PM , "Daniel L. Everett" danleveret...@icloud.com sent: > > All very intriguing. It is fascinating in light of this to think of the many > ways that languages choose to divide/classify time. > > English, for example, has no morphological future tense (thus one must say > “will go”), though it has morphological past (went) and present tenses (go). > Other languages have as many as five distinct past tenses, one present and > one future (there are many variations, but so far as I know languages will > have more past tenses than future tenses if they have multiples). Other > languages choose not to mark time at all morphologically (e.g. on the verb) > and also have very few words for precise times (e.g. yesterday, today, > tomorrow). > > There are many attempts/theories of how natural language encodes > time/temporal relations. Peirce’s concept of time has been underexploited (to > put it mildly) in linguistics and clearly the connection of time theory to > natural language tense theories could be quite a fecund area of exploration. > > Admitting the orthogonal nature of these remarks to the mainline of > discussion, > > Dan > >> On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:20 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >> >> Jon, List, >> >> I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in >> which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the >> permanence of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ >> coupling. >> >> The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of >> thirdness into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the >> interpretant becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: >> Peirce´s Primisense- Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the >> thinking, re-enters the Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a >> picture of our thoughts. >> >> I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as >> such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then >> possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: >> Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe >> (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only >> system, and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and >> "before" in quotation marks, because without a preceding time, these words >> cannot really be applied. >> >> Best, >> Helmut >> 06. März 2020 um 18:32 Uhr >> "Jon Alan Schmidt" >> wrote: >> Jeff, List: >> >> JD: At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in >> "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries >> concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out >> the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. >> >> I agree that each involves different methods, and I have made several >> attempts (so far unsuccessful) to start writing a paper (or two) with the >> goal of teasing out those different threads. Peirce himself seems to think >> that we can "harmonize" them (his word) by recognizing the continuity of >> time; in fact, our direct perception of the continuous flow of time in >> phenomenology is what prompts our retroductive hypothesis of a true >> continuum in mathematics, which we then explicate deductively and evaluate >> inductively in other sciences. >> >> CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, >> to be tenable and to ha
[PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Helmut, Dan, list Koichiro Matsuno, a bioengineer, and Peircean scholar, has written extensively on the notion of time, which he refers to as present, perfect and progressive [comparable to 1ns,2nd, 3ns]… I suggest you google his name, and on for example, Researchgate.net, you'll find articles dealing with time in physico-chemical and biological semiosis. For example. 1]How does Time Flow in Living Systems: 2]Temporality Naturalized [ where "The Schrodinger equation for quantum mechanics, which is approachable in third-person description, takes for granted tenseless time that does not distinguish between different tenses such as past, present and future…. 3] Time from Semiosis: E-series Time for Living systems. " We develop a semiotic scheme of time, in which time precipates from the repeated succession of punctuating the progressive tense by the perfect tense. The underling principle is communication among local participants. Time can thus be seen as a meaning-making, semiotic system in which different time codes are delineated 4] The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information 5] Google: Koichiro Matsuno- AltExploit. 'Abstract Expressions of Time's Modalities He is a phenomenal scientist and scholar. Edwina On Fri 06/03/20 2:31 PM , "Daniel L. Everett" danleveret...@icloud.com sent: All very intriguing. It is fascinating in light of this to think of the many ways that languages choose to divide/classify time. English, for example, has no morphological future tense (thus one must say “will go”), though it has morphological past (went) and present tenses (go). Other languages have as many as five distinct past tenses, one present and one future (there are many variations, but so far as I know languages will have more past tenses than future tenses if they have multiples). Other languages choose not to mark time at all morphologically (e.g. on the verb) and also have very few words for precise times (e.g. yesterday, today, tomorrow). There are many attempts/theories of how natural language encodes time/temporal relations. Peirce’s concept of time has been underexploited (to put it mildly) in linguistics and clearly the connection of time theory to natural language tense theories could be quite a fecund area of exploration. Admitting the orthogonal nature of these remarks to the mainline of discussion, Dan On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:20 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Jon, List, I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the permanence of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ coupling. The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of thirdness into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the interpretant becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: Peirce´s Primisense- Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the thinking, re-enters the Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a picture of our thoughts.I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only system, and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and "before" in quotation marks, because without a preceding time, these words cannot really be applied. Best, Helmut 06. März 2020 um 18:32 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: Jeff, List:JD: At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.I agree that each involves different methods, and I have made several attempts (so far unsuccessful) to start writing a paper (or two) with the goal of teasing out those different threads. Peirce himself seems to think that we can "harmonize" them (his word) by recognizing the continuity of time; in fact, our direct perception of the continuous flow of time in phenomenology is what prompts our retroductive hypothesis of a true continuum in mathematics, which we then explicate deductively and evaluate inductively in other sciences.CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transfo
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
All very intriguing. It is fascinating in light of this to think of the many ways that languages choose to divide/classify time. English, for example, has no morphological future tense (thus one must say “will go”), though it has morphological past (went) and present tenses (go). Other languages have as many as five distinct past tenses, one present and one future (there are many variations, but so far as I know languages will have more past tenses than future tenses if they have multiples). Other languages choose not to mark time at all morphologically (e.g. on the verb) and also have very few words for precise times (e.g. yesterday, today, tomorrow). There are many attempts/theories of how natural language encodes time/temporal relations. Peirce’s concept of time has been underexploited (to put it mildly) in linguistics and clearly the connection of time theory to natural language tense theories could be quite a fecund area of exploration. Admitting the orthogonal nature of these remarks to the mainline of discussion, Dan > On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:20 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > > Jon, List, > > I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in > which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the permanence > of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ coupling. > > The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of thirdness > into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the interpretant > becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: Peirce´s Primisense- > Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the thinking, re-enters the > Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a picture of our thoughts. > > I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as > such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then > possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: > Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe > (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only system, > and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and "before" in > quotation marks, because without a preceding time, these words cannot really > be applied. > > Best, > Helmut > 06. März 2020 um 18:32 Uhr > "Jon Alan Schmidt" > wrote: > Jeff, List: > > JD: At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in > "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries > concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the > different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. > > I agree that each involves different methods, and I have made several > attempts (so far unsuccessful) to start writing a paper (or two) with the > goal of teasing out those different threads. Peirce himself seems to think > that we can "harmonize" them (his word) by recognizing the continuity of > time; in fact, our direct perception of the continuous flow of time in > phenomenology is what prompts our retroductive hypothesis of a true continuum > in mathematics, which we then explicate deductively and evaluate inductively > in other sciences. > > CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to > be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, > is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous > time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading > in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely > immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change > into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is > that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a > true continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n; c. 1902) > > Logic then provides a plausible explanation for the so-called "arrow of > time." Peirce initially wrote the following in one of his notebooks. > > CSP: 1. A time is a determination of actuality independent of the identity > of individuals, and related to other times as stated below. According to the > present proposition we may speak of the state of different things at the same > time as well as of the states of the same thing at different times and, of > course, of different things at different times and of the same thing at the > same time. > 2. At different times a proposition concerning the same things may be true > and false; just as a predicate may at any one time be true and false of > different things. Time is therefore a determination of existents. (NEM 2:611; > c. 1904-5) > > A few years later, he offered a correction on the opposite page, which is > otherwise blank. > > CSP: I can hardly now see how time can be called a determination of > actuality. It is certainly a l
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Jon, List, I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the permanence of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ coupling. The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of thirdness into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the interpretant becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: Peirce´s Primisense- Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the thinking, re-enters the Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a picture of our thoughts. I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only system, and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and "before" in quotation marks, because without a preceding time, these words cannot really be applied. Best, Helmut 06. März 2020 um 18:32 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: Jeff, List: JD: At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. I agree that each involves different methods, and I have made several attempts (so far unsuccessful) to start writing a paper (or two) with the goal of teasing out those different threads. Peirce himself seems to think that we can "harmonize" them (his word) by recognizing the continuity of time; in fact, our direct perception of the continuous flow of time in phenomenology is what prompts our retroductive hypothesis of a true continuum in mathematics, which we then explicate deductively and evaluate inductively in other sciences. CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n; c. 1902) Logic then provides a plausible explanation for the so-called "arrow of time." Peirce initially wrote the following in one of his notebooks. CSP: 1. A time is a determination of actuality independent of the identity of individuals, and related to other times as stated below. According to the present proposition we may speak of the state of different things at the same time as well as of the states of the same thing at different times and, of course, of different things at different times and of the same thing at the same time. 2. At different times a proposition concerning the same things may be true and false; just as a predicate may at any one time be true and false of different things. Time is therefore a determination of existents. (NEM 2:611; c. 1904-5) A few years later, he offered a correction on the opposite page, which is otherwise blank. CSP: I can hardly now see how time can be called a determination of actuality. It is certainly a law. It is simply a unidimensional continuum of sorts of states of things and that these have an antitypy is shown by the fact that a sort of state of things and a different one cannot both be at the same time. And in consequence of this antitypy a state of things varies in one way and cannot turn round to vary the other way. Or to state it better a variation between state A and state B is limited to occurrence in one direction, just as the form of a body in space is limited to one or other of two perverse positions in space. (NEM 2:611; 1908 Aug 13) Peirce here maintains the mathematical characterization of time as "a unidimensional continuum," but describes its parts as "sorts of states of things" and affirms the phenomenological fact that time flows in only one direction. Turning to metaphysics, one thing that occurred to me just this week is that these different threads at least loosely correspond to the three main theories about time in the current philosophical literature. Eternalism - past, present, and future all exist. Presentism - only the present exists. Growing Block - only the past and present exist. If we substitute reality for existence, these correspond respectively to Peirce's mathematical, phenomenological, and log
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Jeff, List: JD: At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. I agree that each involves different methods, and I have made several attempts (so far unsuccessful) to start writing a paper (or two) with the goal of teasing out those different threads. Peirce himself seems to think that we can "harmonize" them (his word) by recognizing the *continuity *of time; in fact, our direct *perception* of the continuous flow of time in *phenomenology *is what prompts our retroductive *hypothesis *of a true continuum in *mathematics*, which we then explicate deductively and evaluate inductively in other sciences. CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n; c. 1902) Logic then provides a plausible explanation for the so-called "arrow of time." Peirce initially wrote the following in one of his notebooks. CSP: 1. A *time *is a determination of actuality independent of the identity of individuals, and related to other times as stated below. According to the present proposition we may speak of the state of different things at the same time as well as of the states of the same thing at different times and, of course, of different things at different times and of the same thing at the same time. 2. At different times a proposition concerning the same things may be true and false; just as a predicate may at any one time be true and false of different things. Time is therefore a determination of existents. (NEM 2:611; c. 1904-5) A few years later, he offered a correction on the opposite page, which is otherwise blank. CSP: I can hardly now see how time can be called a determination of *actuality*. It is certainly a law. It is simply a unidimensional continuum of sorts of states of things and that these have an antitypy is shown by the fact that a sort of state of things and a different one cannot both be *at the same time*. And in consequence of this antitypy a state of things varies in one way and cannot turn round to vary the other way. Or to state it better a variation between state A and state B is limited to occurrence in one direction, just as the form of a body in space is limited to one or other of two perverse positions in space. (NEM 2:611; 1908 Aug 13) Peirce here maintains the *mathematical *characterization of time as "a unidimensional continuum," but describes its parts as "sorts of states of things" and affirms the *phenomenological *fact that time flows in only one direction. Turning to *metaphysics*, one thing that occurred to me just this week is that these different threads at least loosely correspond to the three main theories about time in the current philosophical literature. 1. Eternalism - past, present, and future all exist. 2. Presentism - only the present exists. 3. Growing Block - only the past and present exist. If we substitute *reality *for *existence*, these correspond respectively to Peirce's mathematical, phenomenological, and logical/semeiotic conceptions of time--a one-dimensional continuous whole, isomorphic to a line figure (cf. CP 1.273; 1902); an indefinite moment that involves memory, confrontation, and anticipation (cf. CP 7.653; 1903); and an ongoing process by which the indeterminate becomes determinate (cf. CP 5.459, EP 2:357-358; 1905). I have come to believe that #3 is closest to his overall view and can incorporate the insights of the other two. It is unfortunate that there is not a more formal name for it; one recent dissertation suggests "accretivism," but I doubt that this will catch on. My tentative name for Peirce's version of it is *temporal synechism*. It seems noteworthy that the basic idea of the "growing block" is that reality itself is getting "larger," which is reminiscent of a passage in Kelly A. Parker's book, *The Continuity of Peirce's Thought*. KAP: The dynamical object in each successive representation in the process [of semeiosis] is necessarily different from that of its predecessor. The dynamical object of the first representation is the real universe at that time, and the immediate object is an abstraction consisting of some aspects of this reality. The next representation, however, cannot
