Many thanks, Edwina. Will do. Dan
> On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > > Helmut, Dan, list > > > Koichiro Matsuno, a bioengineer, and Peircean scholar, has written > extensively on the notion of time, which he refers to as present, perfect and > progressive [comparable to 1ns,2nd, 3ns]… > > I suggest you google his name, and on for example, Researchgate.net, you'll > find articles dealing with time in physico-chemical and biological semiosis. > > For example. > > 1]How does Time Flow in Living Systems: > > 2]Temporality Naturalized [ where "The Schrodinger equation for quantum > mechanics, which is approachable in third-person description, takes for > granted tenseless time that does not distinguish between different tenses > such as past, present and future…. > > 3] Time from Semiosis: E-series Time for Living systems. " We develop a > semiotic scheme of time, in which time precipates from the repeated > succession of punctuating the progressive tense by the perfect tense. The > underling principle is communication among local participants. Time can thus > be seen as a meaning-making, semiotic system in which different time codes > are delineated.... > > > 4] The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information > > 5] Google: Koichiro Matsuno- AltExploit. 'Abstract Expressions of Time's > Modalities > > He is a phenomenal scientist and scholar. > > Edwina > > On Fri 06/03/20 2:31 PM , "Daniel L. Everett" danleveret...@icloud.com sent: > > All very intriguing. It is fascinating in light of this to think of the many > ways that languages choose to divide/classify time. > > English, for example, has no morphological future tense (thus one must say > “will go”), though it has morphological past (went) and present tenses (go). > Other languages have as many as five distinct past tenses, one present and > one future (there are many variations, but so far as I know languages will > have more past tenses than future tenses if they have multiples). Other > languages choose not to mark time at all morphologically (e.g. on the verb) > and also have very few words for precise times (e.g. yesterday, today, > tomorrow). > > There are many attempts/theories of how natural language encodes > time/temporal relations. Peirce’s concept of time has been underexploited (to > put it mildly) in linguistics and clearly the connection of time theory to > natural language tense theories could be quite a fecund area of exploration. > > Admitting the orthogonal nature of these remarks to the mainline of > discussion, > > Dan > >> On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:20 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >> >> Jon, List, >> >> I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in >> which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the >> permanence of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ >> coupling. >> >> The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of >> thirdness into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the >> interpretant becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: >> Peirce´s Primisense- Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the >> thinking, re-enters the Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a >> picture of our thoughts. >> >> I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as >> such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then >> possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: >> Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe >> (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only >> system, and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and >> "before" in quotation marks, because without a preceding time, these words >> cannot really be applied. >> >> Best, >> Helmut >> 06. März 2020 um 18:32 Uhr >> "Jon Alan Schmidt" >> wrote: >> Jeff, List: >> >> JD: At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in >> "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries >> concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out >> the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. >> >> I agree that each involves different methods, and I have made several >> attempts (so far unsuccessful) to start writing a paper (or two) with the >> goal of teasing out those different threads. Peirce himself seems to think >> that we can "harmonize" them (his word) by recognizing the continuity of >> time; in fact, our direct perception of the continuous flow of time in >> phenomenology is what prompts our retroductive hypothesis of a true >> continuum in mathematics, which we then explicate deductively and evaluate >> inductively in other sciences. >> >> CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, >> to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical >> conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly >> continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, >> while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the >> absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately >> given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. >> The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our >> having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n; c. >> 1902) >> >> Logic then provides a plausible explanation for the so-called "arrow of >> time." Peirce initially wrote the following in one of his notebooks. >> >> CSP: 1. A time is a determination of actuality independent of the identity >> of individuals, and related to other times as stated below. According to the >> present proposition we may speak of the state of different things at the >> same time as well as of the states of the same thing at different times and, >> of course, of different things at different times and of the same thing at >> the same time. >> 2. At different times a proposition concerning the same things may be true >> and false; just as a predicate may at any one time be true and false of >> different things. Time is therefore a determination of existents. (NEM >> 2:611; c. 1904-5) >> >> A few years later, he offered a correction on the opposite page, which is >> otherwise blank. >> >> CSP: I can hardly now see how time can be called a determination of >> actuality. It is certainly a law. It is simply a unidimensional continuum of >> sorts of states of things and that these have an antitypy is shown by the >> fact that a sort of state of things and a different one cannot both be at >> the same time. And in consequence of this antitypy a state of things varies >> in one way and cannot turn round to vary the other way. Or to state it >> better a variation between state A and state B is limited to occurrence in >> one direction, just as the form of a body in space is limited to one or >> other of two perverse positions in space. (NEM 2:611; 1908 Aug 13) >> >> Peirce here maintains the mathematical characterization of time as "a >> unidimensional continuum," but describes its parts as "sorts of states of >> things" and affirms the phenomenological fact that time flows in only one >> direction. Turning to metaphysics, one thing that occurred to me just this >> week is that these different threads at least loosely correspond to the >> three main theories about time in the current philosophical literature. >> Eternalism - past, present, and future all exist. >> Presentism - only the present exists. >> Growing Block - only the past and present exist. >> If we substitute reality for existence, these correspond respectively to >> Peirce's mathematical, phenomenological, and logical/semeiotic conceptions >> of time--a one-dimensional continuous whole, isomorphic to a line figure >> (cf. CP 1.273; 1902); an indefinite moment that involves memory, >> confrontation, and anticipation (cf. CP 7.653; 1903); and an ongoing process >> by which the indeterminate becomes determinate (cf. CP 5.459, EP 2:357-358; >> 1905). I have come to believe that #3 is closest to his overall view and >> can incorporate the insights of the other two. It is unfortunate that there >> is not a more formal name for it; one recent dissertation suggests >> "accretivism," but I doubt that this will catch on. My tentative name for >> Peirce's version of it is temporal synechism. It seems noteworthy that the >> basic idea of the "growing block" is that reality itself is getting >> "larger," which is reminiscent of a passage in Kelly A. Parker's book, The >> Continuity of Peirce's Thought. >> >> KAP: The dynamical object in each successive representation in the process >> [of semeiosis] is necessarily different from that of its predecessor. The >> dynamical object of the first representation is the real universe at that >> time, and the immediate object is an abstraction consisting of some aspects >> of this reality. The next representation, however, cannot have exactly the >> same dynamical object. The real universe is at that point populated by at >> least one additional entity--the first representamen itself. Every >> successive representation in the semeiotic process thus has as its dynamical >> object not just the universe which the first representamen represented, but >> that universe plus the first representamen itself. (p. 148) >> >> The object that determines the sign is different from the object that >> determines the interpretant, because the interpretant's object includes the >> sign itself. Likewise, the past that determines the present is different >> from the past that determines the future, because the future's past includes >> the present itself. Moreover, the object affects the sign and interpretant, >> but not vice-versa; and likewise, the past affects the present and future, >> but not vice-versa. As ongoing and continuous processes, both semeiosis and >> time are irreversible because they conform to Gary R.'s vector of >> determination (2ns→1ns→3ns, object→sign→interpretant, past→present→future); >> and once the universe as a vast quasi-mind becomes more determinate, it >> cannot become less determinate again. This leads us to the passage that you >> quoted in your second post. >> >> CSP: [1] I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has >> been to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world >> is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite >> past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. [2] The state >> of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which >> consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the >> infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete >> triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. [3] Between these, we have on >> our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity >> counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is >> constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit ... [4] As to the >> part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back from the >> infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries. >> (CP 8.317; 1891) >> >> The cosmological basis for the "arrow of time" is Gary R.'s vector of >> process (1ns→3ns→2ns). The universe is evolving from an absolutely >> indeterminate state of things at the hypothetical instant corresponding to >> "the commencement of all time" (NEM 3:1075; c. 1905), when everything would >> have been in the future, toward an absolutely determinate state of things at >> the hypothetical instant corresponding to "the completion of all time" >> (ibid), when everything would be in the past. As I said at the end of my >> initial post, what is always realized in the present is an indefinitely >> gradual state of change, and this terminology conveniently lends itself to >> another categorial analysis--the present is an indefinitely gradual state of >> change in its 1ns, an indefinitely gradual state of change in its 2ns, and >> an indefinitely gradual (i.e., continuous) state of change in its 3ns. >> >> Returning to mathematics, in a List post last September I proposed five >> properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for a true Peircean >> continuum. (Incidentally, I am pleased to report that my essay based on >> that and several related List discussions, "Peirce's Topical Continuum: A >> 'Thicker' Theory," has been accepted for publication in Transactions of the >> Charles S. Peirce Society .) The first was regularity, which I now prefer >> to call rationality--every portion conforms to one general law or Idea, >> which is the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out >> its parts (cf. CP 7.535; 1899 and CP 7.535n6; 1908). I now suggest that >> time is a real Peircean continuum, and that an indefinitely gradual state of >> change is the one general law or Idea to which every lapse of it conforms; >> i.e., every moment when it is present . >> >> Since this has gotten quite lengthy, I will try to take up your specific >> questions in a later post. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard >> <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >>> Jon, List, >>> >>> Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a >>> letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate >>> and number the points he makes. >>> >>> >>> >>> 1. I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been >>> to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is >>> hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite >>> past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. >>> >>> 2. The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the >>> nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state >>> of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which >>> consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. >>> >>> 3. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is >>> some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity >>> to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit. >>> >>> 4. As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads >>> back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds >>> by contraries. 8.316 >>> >>> >>> >>> Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the >>> contrast being made between our side of things, and the part of time that >>> is on the further side of eternity? >>> >>> A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What >>> kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the >>> infinite past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the >>> contrast between our side of things and the further side of eternity? >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard >>> Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM >>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time >>> Hello Jon, List, >>> >>> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in >>> "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries >>> concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out >>> the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or >> "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go >> to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY >> of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >
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