Many thanks, Edwina. Will do.

Dan

> On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> 
> 
> Helmut, Dan, list
> 
> 
> Koichiro Matsuno, a bioengineer, and Peircean scholar,  has written 
> extensively on the notion of time, which he refers to as present, perfect and 
> progressive [comparable to 1ns,2nd, 3ns]…
> 
> I suggest you google his name, and on for example,  Researchgate.net, you'll 
> find articles dealing with time in physico-chemical and biological semiosis.
> 
> For example.
> 
> 1]How does Time Flow in Living Systems:
> 
> 2]Temporality Naturalized [ where "The Schrodinger equation for quantum 
> mechanics, which is approachable in third-person description, takes for 
> granted tenseless time that does not distinguish between different tenses 
> such as past, present and future….
> 
> 3] Time from Semiosis: E-series Time for Living systems. " We develop a 
> semiotic scheme of time, in which time precipates from the repeated 
> succession of punctuating the progressive tense by the perfect tense. The 
> underling principle is communication among local participants. Time can thus 
> be seen as a meaning-making, semiotic system in which different time codes 
> are delineated....
>  
> 
> 4] The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information
> 
> 5] Google: Koichiro Matsuno- AltExploit. 'Abstract Expressions of Time's 
> Modalities
> 
> He is a phenomenal scientist and scholar.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> On Fri 06/03/20 2:31 PM , "Daniel L. Everett" danleveret...@icloud.com sent:
> 
> All very intriguing. It is fascinating in light of this to think of the many 
> ways that languages choose to divide/classify time.
> 
> English, for example, has no morphological future tense (thus one must say 
> “will go”), though it has morphological past (went) and present tenses (go). 
> Other languages have as many as five distinct past tenses, one present and 
> one future (there are many variations, but so far as I know languages will 
> have more past tenses than future tenses if they have multiples). Other 
> languages choose not to mark time at all morphologically (e.g. on the verb) 
> and also have very few words for precise times (e.g. yesterday, today, 
> tomorrow). 
> 
> There are many attempts/theories of how natural language encodes 
> time/temporal relations. Peirce’s concept of time has been underexploited (to 
> put it mildly) in linguistics and clearly the connection of time theory to 
> natural language tense theories could be quite a fecund area of exploration.
> 
> Admitting the orthogonal nature of these remarks to the mainline of 
> discussion,
> 
> Dan
> 
>> On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:20 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Jon, List,
>>  
>> I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in 
>> which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the 
>> permanence of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ 
>> coupling.
>>  
>> The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of 
>> thirdness into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the 
>> interpretant becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: 
>> Peirce´s Primisense- Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the 
>> thinking, re-enters the Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a 
>> picture of our thoughts.
>>  
>> I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as 
>> such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then 
>> possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: 
>> Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe 
>> (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only 
>> system, and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and 
>> "before" in quotation marks, because without a preceding time, these words 
>> cannot really be applied.
>>  
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>  06. März 2020 um 18:32 Uhr
>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>> wrote:
>> Jeff, List:
>>  
>> JD:  At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in 
>> "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries 
>> concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out 
>> the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.
>>  
>> I agree that each involves different methods, and I have made several 
>> attempts (so far unsuccessful) to start writing a paper (or two) with the 
>> goal of teasing out those different threads.  Peirce himself seems to think 
>> that we can "harmonize" them (his word) by recognizing the continuity of 
>> time; in fact, our direct perception of the continuous flow of time in 
>> phenomenology is what prompts our retroductive hypothesis  of a true 
>> continuum in mathematics, which we then explicate deductively and evaluate 
>> inductively in other sciences.
>>  
>> CSP:  One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, 
>> to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical 
>> conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly 
>> continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, 
>> while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the 
>> absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately 
>> given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. 
>> The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our 
>> having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n; c. 
>> 1902)
>>  
>> Logic then provides a plausible explanation for the so-called "arrow of 
>> time."  Peirce initially wrote the following in one of his notebooks.
>>  
>> CSP:  1.  A time is a determination of actuality independent of the identity 
>> of individuals, and related to other times as stated below. According to the 
>> present proposition we may speak of the state of different things at the 
>> same time as well as of the states of the same thing at different times and, 
>> of course, of different things at different times and of the same thing at 
>> the same time.
>> 2.  At different times a proposition concerning the same things may be true 
>> and false; just as a predicate may at any one time be true and false of 
>> different things. Time is therefore a determination of existents. (NEM 
>> 2:611; c. 1904-5)
>>  
>> A few years later, he offered a correction on the opposite page, which is 
>> otherwise blank.
>>  
>> CSP:  I can hardly now see how time can be called a determination of 
>> actuality. It is certainly a law. It is simply a unidimensional continuum of 
>> sorts of states of things and that these have an antitypy is shown by the 
>> fact that a sort of state of things and a different one cannot both be at 
>> the same time. And in consequence of this antitypy a state of things varies 
>> in one way and cannot turn round to vary the other way. Or to state it 
>> better a variation between state A and state B is limited to occurrence in 
>> one direction, just as the form of a body in space is limited to one or 
>> other of two perverse positions in space. (NEM 2:611; 1908 Aug 13)
>>  
>> Peirce here maintains the mathematical characterization of time as "a 
>> unidimensional continuum," but describes its parts as "sorts of states of 
>> things" and affirms the phenomenological fact that time flows in only one 
>> direction.  Turning to metaphysics, one thing that occurred to me just this 
>> week is that these different threads at least loosely correspond to the 
>> three main theories about time in the current philosophical literature.
>> Eternalism - past, present, and future all exist.
>> Presentism - only the present exists.
>> Growing Block - only the past and present exist.
>> If we substitute reality for existence, these correspond respectively to 
>> Peirce's mathematical, phenomenological, and logical/semeiotic conceptions 
>> of time--a one-dimensional continuous whole, isomorphic to a line figure 
>> (cf. CP 1.273; 1902); an indefinite moment that involves memory, 
>> confrontation, and anticipation (cf. CP 7.653; 1903); and an ongoing process 
>> by which the indeterminate becomes determinate (cf. CP 5.459, EP 2:357-358; 
>> 1905).  I have come to believe that #3 is closest to his overall view and 
>> can incorporate the insights of the other two.  It is unfortunate that there 
>> is not a more formal name for it; one recent dissertation suggests 
>> "accretivism," but I doubt that this will catch on.  My tentative name for 
>> Peirce's version of it is temporal synechism.  It seems noteworthy that the 
>> basic idea of the "growing block" is that reality itself is getting 
>> "larger," which is reminiscent of a passage in Kelly A. Parker's book, The 
>> Continuity of Peirce's Thought.
>>  
>> KAP:  The dynamical object in each successive representation in the process 
>> [of semeiosis] is necessarily different from that of its predecessor. The 
>> dynamical object of the first representation is the real universe at that 
>> time, and the immediate object is an abstraction consisting of some aspects 
>> of this reality. The next representation, however, cannot have exactly the 
>> same dynamical object. The real universe is at that point populated by at 
>> least one additional entity--the first representamen itself. Every 
>> successive representation in the semeiotic process thus has as its dynamical 
>> object not just the universe which the first representamen represented, but 
>> that universe plus the first representamen itself. (p. 148)
>>  
>> The object that determines the sign is different from the object that 
>> determines the interpretant, because the interpretant's object includes the 
>> sign itself.  Likewise, the past that determines the present is different 
>> from the past that determines the future, because the future's past includes 
>> the present itself.  Moreover, the object affects the sign and interpretant, 
>> but not vice-versa; and likewise, the past affects the present and future, 
>> but not vice-versa.  As ongoing and continuous processes, both semeiosis and 
>> time are irreversible because they conform to Gary R.'s vector of 
>> determination (2ns→1ns→3ns, object→sign→interpretant, past→present→future); 
>> and once the universe as a vast quasi-mind becomes more determinate, it 
>> cannot become less determinate again.  This leads us to the passage that you 
>> quoted in your second post.
>>  
>> CSP:  [1] I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has 
>> been to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world 
>> is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite 
>> past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. [2] The state 
>> of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which 
>> consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the 
>> infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete 
>> triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. [3] Between these, we have on 
>> our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity 
>> counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is 
>> constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit ... [4] As to the 
>> part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back from the 
>> infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries. 
>> (CP 8.317; 1891)
>>  
>> The cosmological basis for the "arrow of time" is Gary R.'s vector of 
>> process (1ns→3ns→2ns).  The universe is evolving from an absolutely 
>> indeterminate state of things at the hypothetical instant corresponding to 
>> "the commencement of all time" (NEM 3:1075; c. 1905), when everything would 
>> have been in the future, toward an absolutely determinate state of things at 
>> the hypothetical instant corresponding to "the  completion of all time" 
>> (ibid), when everything would be in the past.  As I said at the end of my 
>> initial post, what is always realized in the present is an indefinitely 
>> gradual state of change, and this terminology conveniently lends itself to 
>> another categorial analysis--the present is an indefinitely gradual state of 
>> change in its 1ns, an indefinitely gradual state of change in its 2ns, and 
>> an indefinitely  gradual (i.e., continuous) state of change in its 3ns.
>>  
>> Returning to mathematics, in a List post last September I proposed five 
>> properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for a true Peircean 
>> continuum.  (Incidentally, I am pleased to report that my essay based on 
>> that and several related List discussions, "Peirce's Topical Continuum:  A 
>> 'Thicker' Theory," has been accepted for publication in Transactions of the 
>> Charles S. Peirce Society .)  The first was regularity, which I now prefer 
>> to call rationality--every portion conforms to one general law or Idea, 
>> which is the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out 
>> its parts (cf. CP 7.535; 1899 and CP 7.535n6; 1908).  I now suggest that 
>> time is a real Peircean continuum, and that an indefinitely gradual state of 
>> change is the one general law or Idea to which every lapse of it conforms; 
>> i.e., every moment when it is present .
>>  
>> Since this has gotten quite lengthy, I will try to take up your specific 
>> questions in a later post.
>>  
>> Regards,
>>  
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>  
>> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
>> <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>> Jon, List,
>>> 
>>> Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a 
>>> letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate 
>>> and number the points he makes.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 1.   I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been 
>>> to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
>>> hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite 
>>> past, to a different state of things in the infinite future.
>>> 
>>> 2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the 
>>> nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state 
>>> of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which 
>>> consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.
>>> 
>>> 3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is 
>>> some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity 
>>> to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit.
>>> 
>>> 4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads 
>>> back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds 
>>> by contraries.  8.316
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the 
>>> contrast being made between our side of things, and the part of time that 
>>> is on the further side of eternity? 
>>> 
>>> A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What 
>>> kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the 
>>> infinite past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the 
>>> contrast between our side of things and the further side of eternity?
>>> 
>>> --Jeff
>>> 
>>> Jeffrey Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> Northern Arizona University
>>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>>> Hello Jon, List,
>>> 
>>> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in 
>>> "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries 
>>> concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out 
>>> the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.
>>> 
>>> --Jeff
>>> 
>>> Jeffrey Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> Northern Arizona University
>>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>>  
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