All very intriguing. It is fascinating in light of this to think of the many ways that languages choose to divide/classify time.
English, for example, has no morphological future tense (thus one must say “will go”), though it has morphological past (went) and present tenses (go). Other languages have as many as five distinct past tenses, one present and one future (there are many variations, but so far as I know languages will have more past tenses than future tenses if they have multiples). Other languages choose not to mark time at all morphologically (e.g. on the verb) and also have very few words for precise times (e.g. yesterday, today, tomorrow). There are many attempts/theories of how natural language encodes time/temporal relations. Peirce’s concept of time has been underexploited (to put it mildly) in linguistics and clearly the connection of time theory to natural language tense theories could be quite a fecund area of exploration. Admitting the orthogonal nature of these remarks to the mainline of discussion, Dan > On Mar 6, 2020, at 2:20 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > > Jon, List, > > I think, the question is, whether time is a continuum, like an ether, in > which all events and entities sort of swim, or is a produce of the permanence > of systems, with its universality provided by the systems´ coupling. > > The permanence of a system, I think, is provided by the re-entry of thirdness > into firstness, like in a semiosis (a semiotic system) the interpretant > becomes the new representamen. Or like in consciousness: Peirce´s Primisense- > Altersense- Medisense model, where the Medisense, the thinking, re-enters the > Primisense, the first iconic perception: We have a picture of our thoughts. > > I guess it would be hard to assume, that this re-.entry and permanence as > such produce time, because a re-entry and a permanence are only then > possible, if a time already exists. But maybe it is a bilateral dependency: > Time and systems only exist together. In the beginning of the universe > (assuming there was a big bang), the "new" born universe was the only system, > and "before" the big bang there was no time. I put "new" and "before" in > quotation marks, because without a preceding time, these words cannot really > be applied. > > Best, > Helmut > 06. März 2020 um 18:32 Uhr > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > Jeff, List: > > JD: At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in > "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries > concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the > different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. > > I agree that each involves different methods, and I have made several > attempts (so far unsuccessful) to start writing a paper (or two) with the > goal of teasing out those different threads. Peirce himself seems to think > that we can "harmonize" them (his word) by recognizing the continuity of > time; in fact, our direct perception of the continuous flow of time in > phenomenology is what prompts our retroductive hypothesis of a true continuum > in mathematics, which we then explicate deductively and evaluate inductively > in other sciences. > > CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to > be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, > is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous > time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading > in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely > immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change > into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is > that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a > true continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n; c. 1902) > > Logic then provides a plausible explanation for the so-called "arrow of > time." Peirce initially wrote the following in one of his notebooks. > > CSP: 1. A time is a determination of actuality independent of the identity > of individuals, and related to other times as stated below. According to the > present proposition we may speak of the state of different things at the same > time as well as of the states of the same thing at different times and, of > course, of different things at different times and of the same thing at the > same time. > 2. At different times a proposition concerning the same things may be true > and false; just as a predicate may at any one time be true and false of > different things. Time is therefore a determination of existents. (NEM 2:611; > c. 1904-5) > > A few years later, he offered a correction on the opposite page, which is > otherwise blank. > > CSP: I can hardly now see how time can be called a determination of > actuality. It is certainly a law. It is simply a unidimensional continuum of > sorts of states of things and that these have an antitypy is shown by the > fact that a sort of state of things and a different one cannot both be at the > same time. And in consequence of this antitypy a state of things varies in > one way and cannot turn round to vary the other way. Or to state it better a > variation between state A and state B is limited to occurrence in one > direction, just as the form of a body in space is limited to one or other of > two perverse positions in space. (NEM 2:611; 1908 Aug 13) > > Peirce here maintains the mathematical characterization of time as "a > unidimensional continuum," but describes its parts as "sorts of states of > things" and affirms the phenomenological fact that time flows in only one > direction. Turning to metaphysics, one thing that occurred to me just this > week is that these different threads at least loosely correspond to the three > main theories about time in the current philosophical literature. > Eternalism - past, present, and future all exist. > Presentism - only the present exists. > Growing Block - only the past and present exist. > If we substitute reality for existence, these correspond respectively to > Peirce's mathematical, phenomenological, and logical/semeiotic conceptions of > time--a one-dimensional continuous whole, isomorphic to a line figure (cf. CP > 1.273; 1902); an indefinite moment that involves memory, confrontation, and > anticipation (cf. CP 7.653; 1903); and an ongoing process by which the > indeterminate becomes determinate (cf. CP 5.459, EP 2:357-358; 1905). I have > come to believe that #3 is closest to his overall view and can incorporate > the insights of the other two. It is unfortunate that there is not a more > formal name for it; one recent dissertation suggests "accretivism," but I > doubt that this will catch on. My tentative name for Peirce's version of it > is temporal synechism. It seems noteworthy that the basic idea of the > "growing block" is that reality itself is getting "larger," which is > reminiscent of a passage in Kelly A. Parker's book, The Continuity of > Peirce's Thought. > > KAP: The dynamical object in each successive representation in the process > [of semeiosis] is necessarily different from that of its predecessor. The > dynamical object of the first representation is the real universe at that > time, and the immediate object is an abstraction consisting of some aspects > of this reality. The next representation, however, cannot have exactly the > same dynamical object. The real universe is at that point populated by at > least one additional entity--the first representamen itself. Every successive > representation in the semeiotic process thus has as its dynamical object not > just the universe which the first representamen represented, but that > universe plus the first representamen itself. (p. 148) > > The object that determines the sign is different from the object that > determines the interpretant, because the interpretant's object includes the > sign itself. Likewise, the past that determines the present is different > from the past that determines the future, because the future's past includes > the present itself. Moreover, the object affects the sign and interpretant, > but not vice-versa; and likewise, the past affects the present and future, > but not vice-versa. As ongoing and continuous processes, both semeiosis and > time are irreversible because they conform to Gary R.'s vector of > determination (2ns→1ns→3ns, object→sign→interpretant, past→present→future); > and once the universe as a vast quasi-mind becomes more determinate, it > cannot become less determinate again. This leads us to the passage that you > quoted in your second post. > > CSP: [1] I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has > been to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world > is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite > past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. [2] The state of > things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which > consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the > infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete > triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. [3] Between these, we have on > our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity > counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly > on the increase owing to the growth of habit ... [4] As to the part of time > on the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite future to > the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries. (CP 8.317; 1891) > > The cosmological basis for the "arrow of time" is Gary R.'s vector of process > (1ns→3ns→2ns). The universe is evolving from an absolutely indeterminate > state of things at the hypothetical instant corresponding to "the > commencement of all time" (NEM 3:1075; c. 1905), when everything would have > been in the future, toward an absolutely determinate state of things at the > hypothetical instant corresponding to "the completion of all time" (ibid), > when everything would be in the past. As I said at the end of my initial > post, what is always realized in the present is an indefinitely gradual state > of change, and this terminology conveniently lends itself to another > categorial analysis--the present is an indefinitely gradual state of change > in its 1ns, an indefinitely gradual state of change in its 2ns, and an > indefinitely gradual (i.e., continuous) state of change in its 3ns. > > Returning to mathematics, in a List post last September I proposed five > properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for a true Peircean > continuum. (Incidentally, I am pleased to report that my essay based on that > and several related List discussions, "Peirce's Topical Continuum: A > 'Thicker' Theory," has been accepted for publication in Transactions of the > Charles S. Peirce Society.) The first was regularity, which I now prefer to > call rationality--every portion conforms to one general law or Idea, which is > the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out its parts > (cf. CP 7.535; 1899 and CP 7.535n6; 1908). I now suggest that time is a real > Peircean continuum, and that an indefinitely gradual state of change is the > one general law or Idea to which every lapse of it conforms; i.e., every > moment when it is present. > > Since this has gotten quite lengthy, I will try to take up your specific > questions in a later post. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard > <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> Jon, List, >> >> Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a >> letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate >> and number the points he makes. >> >> >> >> 1. I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been to >> develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is >> hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, >> to a different state of things in the infinite future. >> >> 2. The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the >> nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state >> of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists >> in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. >> >> 3. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is >> some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity >> to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit. >> >> 4. As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back >> from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by >> contraries. 8.316 >> >> >> >> Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the contrast >> being made between our side of things, and the part of time that is on the >> further side of eternity? >> >> A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What >> kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the >> infinite past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the >> contrast between our side of things and the further side of eternity? >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard >> Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM >> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time >> Hello Jon, List, >> >> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, >> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do >> you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? >> Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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