Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Logic of Language: A Semiotic Introduction to the Study of Speech

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Michael, List:

Thank you for posting your provocative introduction.

The broad range of your interests are apparent and of deep interact to me. 
Many of my “quarrels” with the science-society interface emerge from the 
different understandings of words - as precision instruments of logic or as 
enraging explosions of emotions.

With that in mind, I struggled with the organization of the proposed “index” to 
the image of a coherent text.

So, I offer the following comments / suggestions from a scientific linguistics 
perspective (semantics, syntax, propositions, equations.)  

1. The “Seven Postulates” do not represent postulates as the term postulates is 
used in logic and mathematics.
None of the seven are independent units of thought.
   Grammatically, the indexed phrases are sort of a run-on sentence that is 
extraordinarily difficult to parse. 

As a potential reader of a book on Logic, I expect that exactly seven 
independent concepts will be presented, each crisply and unambiguously stated. 
1,2,3, and 4 contain two separate ideas such that the nature of the proposition 
is unclear.

5 and 6 can be read as statements of fact.  7 announces itself as a conclusion, 
apparently drawn from the first six! 

2. The assertion that the seven “postulates” are “juxtaposed” with two sets of 
three is radically unclear to this reader.

In examination of the proposed “juxtapositioning” I find that “postulates” 1,3, 
5 (and perhaps 6?) could be related to 
B. Modes of being of language. 

Thus, it makes more sense to me to switch the order of B and A “sets”.

Would the title of the proposed book be more representative of the content if 
the order of the two phrases of the title were switched?

After writing these comments, I ask myself: perhaps this is intended more as an 
outline than an introduction?

While I am keenly interested in the distancing between lexical fields and 
syntactical fields, and while this introduction includes potential useful 
material, I question the axiology of this proposed structure.

Please do not be offended by the sharpness of my comments.  I have taken the 
time to write this email in hopes of contributing to the success of your 
efforts.

Cheers

Jerry


 



> On Apr 16, 2020, at 7:17 AM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:
> 
> Dear List,
> 
> I posted something a couple of days ago which I fear didn't go through, so 
> I'm repeating it here.
> 
> For those of you who are interested in linguistics and semiotics, I'm 
> attaching the New Introduction to the book I'm working on, which will 
> amalgamate my two earlier Sense books published by Indiana UP in 1983 and 
> 1991. Your comments would be most welcome.
> 
> Best,
> M.
> 
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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Orin, List:

OH:  For all three words above he revamped the entries and in all cases
scaled back the theist assertions made in each.


It seems like the other way around to me, at least for "deist."

OH:  The *Imperial *definition of *deist *has the phrase "one who professes
no form of religion, but follows the light of nature and reason as his only
guides in doctrine and practice; a freethinker."

CSP:  1. One who believes in the existence of a personal God, but in few or
none of the more special doctrines of the Christian religion; one who holds
to some of the more general propositions of the Christian faith concerning
the Deity, but denies revelation and the authority of the church.

2. One who holds the opinion that there is a God, but no divine providence
governing the affairs of men; one who holds that God is not only distinct
from the world, but also separated from it.


The *Imperial Dictionary *definition apparently makes no mention of God at
all, while Peirce's two definitions in the *Century Dictionary* use that
word three times and Deity once.  How is that "scaling back the theist
assertions"?  What bearing do you see this as having on recent List
discussions?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 10:07 AM Orin Hargraves 
wrote:

> Among the words that Peirce defined for the *Century Dictionary *are:
> deism, deist, theosophy.
>
> In each case he had the option of adopting unchanged the definition that
> was in the *Imperial Dictionary of the English Language, *which served as
> a template for the *Century, *and he did this often with words whose
> standing definitions he found adequate. For all three words above he
> revamped the entries and in all cases scaled back the theist assertions
> made in each.
>
> The *Imperial *definition of *deist *has the phrase "one who professes no
> form of religion, but follows the light of nature and reason as his only
> guides in doctrine and practice; a freethinker."
>
> Peirce eliminates this from his definition and defines both Deist and
> Deism in relation to a belief in God, without comment on the basis for it.
>
> The *Imperial *says *theosophy *is "a general name given to those systems
> of philosophy which profess to attain to a knowledge of the Divine Being by
> spiritual ecstasy, direct intuition, or special individual relations."
>
> Peirce's main definition is simpler than this and he adds an encyclopedic
> note: "[theosophy] differs from most philosophical systems in that they
> start from phenomena and deduce therefrom certain conclusions concerning
> God, whereas theosophy starts with an assumed knowledge of God, directly
> obtained, through spiritual intercommunion, and proceeds thereform to a
> study and explanation of phenomena."
>
> The *Imperial Dictionary *is viewable online via the Hathi Trust; the *Century
> Dictionary *online is http://www.global-language.com/CENTURY/. Finally,
> Peirce's headword list is here:
> http://www.pragmaticism.net/peirce_cendict_wordlist.pdf
>
> Orin Hargraves
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  You state that Peirce maintains that there are exactly three
interpretants and your proof seems to be that you nowhere found more than
three *names* for interpretants in the same passage.


Indeed, I believe that if Peirce had held that there were more than three
interpretants, he would have said so somewhere explicitly.  Instead, he
experimented with various combinations of different names for *exactly
three* interpretants, the most consistent of which are
immediate/dynamical/final.  Emotional/energetic/logical only appear in the
drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907), and again, I see them as aligning directly
with the *divisions* according to the dynamical and final interpretants in
other late taxonomies as sympathetic/percussive/usual and
gratific/actuous/temperative, respectively.

The division according the mode of presentation of the immediate
interpretant as hypothetic/categorical/relative is admittedly not so
straightforward.  Peirce proposes it in a December 1908 draft letter to
Lady Welby "with great hesitation" (CP 8.369, EP 2:489), even though it
appears in his Logic Notebook as early as August 1906 (R
339:423-424[284r-285r]).  Of course, the adjectives themselves are commonly
used for three different kinds of *propositions* (CP 2.271, 1903), which
are distinguished in existential graphs (EGs) by how many lines of identity
each requires--zero, one, and two or more, respectively.

CSP:  Also note that by this system every proposition is either
hypothetical, categorical, or relative, according to the number of heavy
lines necessary to express its form. (R 481:10, LF 1:290, 1896).


However, an EG with no lines of identity can express a hypothetical
proposition only in the *alpha* system.  The *beta* system recognizes that
such a proposition is "expressed in precisely the same form" as a
categorical proposition (CP 3.445, 1896), while a spot with no lines of
identity attached is an *incomplete* proposition--i.e., a term or rheme,
whose number of pegs matches its valency (CP 4.560, 1906).  Therefore, the
division according to the immediate interpretant must come *before *the
division according to the nature of the influence of the sign; i.e., its
relation to the final interpretant.  This properly ensures that all
hypothetics are terms/semes, while all propositions/phemes are either
categoricals or relatives.

Moreover, the sheet of assertion in EGs is strictly a *logical* quasi-mind,
so it can only be determined by signs whose dynamical interpretants are
further signs; i.e., usuals.  Therefore, the division according to the mode
of presentation of the immediate interpretant must come *after* the
division according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, such
that a usual can be a hypothetic, a categorical, or a relative.  My
proposed *logical *order of determination for the three
interpretant trichotomies (If→Id→Ii) is consistent with this, while Robert
Marty's (Ii→Id→If) is not.

AvB:  I follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge of it, the
division according to interpretants in: *Logic Notebook entry dated 8 oct.
1905; Ms 339 p. 253r*


But Peirce again identifies *exactly three* interpretants on that
manuscript page
--immediate,
dynamic, and representative.  His trichotomies on this occasion are
clamatory/imperative/representative for the immediate interpretant and
feeling/conduct/thought for the dynamic interpretant, while he does not
assign any names for the representative interpretant.  The other three
listed divisions are for the interpretant *relations*--"Mode of Affecting
Dynamic Interp." (S-Id), which is "By Sympathy," "By Compulsion," or "By
Reason"; "Mode of being represented by Representative Interpretant" (S-If);
and "Mode of being represented to represent object by Repr. Interp."
(Od-S-If).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 6:14 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Jon Alan,
>
> This is a highly curious way of thinking of yours. You state that Peirce
> maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems
> to be that you nowhere found more than three *names* for interpretants in
> the same passage.
>
> It is nice to find that we agree upon at least one thing, i.e. we have
> Peirce's, your's and my take on the interpretants. I ragard them as three
> immediate objects that try to capture the process of semiosis as regarded
> the dynamical object.
>
> JAS: there is arguably a sense in which I posit *nine *different
> interpretants.  However, I strongly prefer *not *to characterize them
> that way
>
> If I understand the passage right you follow Shorts orthogonal
> arrangement, Zeman entertaning a more sober arrangement with only six
> interpretants. I follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Conception of God (was Categories at work within the signs)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  At what place does Peirce relegate religion to methphisics in his
writings on the architectonic of the sciences?


I am not suggesting that religion is part of metaphysics in Peirce's
classification of the sciences.  On the contrary, he places it under "the
Ethnology of Social Developments" along with "customs, laws, ... and
traditions," as well as under "History of Social Developments" along with
"law, slavery, manners, etc."  These are respectively the first branch of
"Ethnology," which is the third branch of "Classificatory psychics," and
the third branch of "History," which is the third branch of "Descriptive
psychics" (CP 1.200-201, 1902; cf. CP 1.264, 1902).  Of course, "The
Psychical Sciences" form the second branch of "Idioscopy" or the special
sciences (CP 1.187&189, 1902).

My point is rather that Peirce identifies the second branch of
"Metaphysics" as "Psychical, or Religious, Metaphysics, concerned chiefly
with the questions of 1. God, 2. Freedom, and 3. Immortality" (CP 1.192,
1902).  Elsewhere he characterizes "the question of a future life and
especially that of One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent in
but creating the universe" to be among "those metaphysical questions that
have such [human] interest" (CP 5.496, EP 2:420-421, 1907).  In other
words, ascertaining the reality and attributes of God falls firmly within
the domain of metaphysics, even though it obviously has bearing on religion.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 4:19 AM  wrote:

> Jon Alan,
>
>   JAS: Understood, although I consider the subject matter of my
> previous post to be metaphysics rather than religion.
>
> As I pointed out elsewhere our representative interpretants differ
> considerably. For me theology is the study dealing with God. It is one of
> the special sciences. Religious belief being a matter pertaining to man as
> an individual. And the remainer of interest to sociologists and
> psychologists.
>
> At what place does Peirce relegate religion to methphisics in his writings
> on the architectonic of the sciences?
>
> Auke
>
> Op 20 april 2020 om 3:05 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: Auke, List:
> AvB:  I will not respond to the content of your words since my aim was not
> to start a discussion about religion.
>
> Understood, although I consider the subject matter of my previous post to
> be metaphysics rather than religion.
> AvB:  By the way, I like this one most:
>
> I will simply point out that Peirce is not identifying those "immensely
> superior" beings with God, since they would still be *finite*; he is
> stating that the being of God would not rule out the possibility of such
> beings.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 4:39 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote:
>
> Jon Alan,
>
> Thanks for your response. I will not respond to the content of your words
> since my aim was not to start a discussion about religion. In general I
> skip mails on the list on that subject. But by our communication on
> semiotics being in a cul-de-sac kind of state I started wondering if the
> cause could reside here. With our respective views on the final
> interpretant I think it does.
>
> By the way, I like this one most:
>
> This statement excludes a finite god; although the Being of God would
> not, as far as I see, necessarily exclude that of a whole race of beings
> immensely superior to ourselves, such, for example, that the whole visible
> universe might be no more than a nucleolus in a single cell of the body of
> one of them.
>
> Best,
>
> Auke
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Ben Udell]

Orin, list,

You wrote:

   ... Peirce's headword list is here:
   http://www.pragmaticism.net/peirce_cendict_wordlist.pdf

Here's the Wayback Machine's image of the list of headwords for which 
the database contained documents at the Peirce-Wittgenstein Research 
Group at Université du Québec à Montréal with the Peirce Edition Project 
(PEP-UQÀM). I guess the documents are in Indianapolis now, but I don't know.

http://web.archive.org/web/20120209081908/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep

It's more recent than the PDF and a little easier to deal with than the PDF.

Best regards,
Ben Udell

On 4/20/2020 11:07 AM, Orin Hargraves wrote:


Among the words that Peirce defined for the *Century Dictionary *are:
deism, deist, theosophy.

In each case he had the option of adopting unchanged the definition that
was in the *Imperial Dictionary of the English Language, *which served as a
template for the *Century, *and he did this often with words whose standing
definitions he found adequate. For all three words above he revamped the
entries and in all cases scaled back the theist assertions made in each.

The *Imperial *definition of *deist *has the phrase "one who professes no
form of religion, but follows the light of nature and reason as his only
guides in doctrine and practice; a freethinker."

Peirce eliminates this from his definition and defines both Deist and Deism
in relation to a belief in God, without comment on the basis for it.

The *Imperial *says *theosophy *is "a general name given to those systems
of philosophy which profess to attain to a knowledge of the Divine Being by
spiritual ecstasy, direct intuition, or special individual relations."

Peirce's main definition is simpler than this and he adds an encyclopedic
note: "[theosophy] differs from most philosophical systems in that they
start from phenomena and deduce therefrom certain conclusions concerning
God, whereas theosophy starts with an assumed knowledge of God, directly
obtained, through spiritual intercommunion, and proceeds thereform to a
study and explanation of phenomena."

The *Imperial Dictionary *is viewable online via the Hathi Trust; the *Century
Dictionary *online is http://www.global-language.com/CENTURY/. Finally,
Peirce's headword list is here:
http://www.pragmaticism.net/peirce_cendict_wordlist.pdf

Orin Hargraves

On Sat, Apr 18, 2020 at 7:14 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Orin Hargraves]

Among the words that Peirce defined for the *Century Dictionary *are:
deism, deist, theosophy.

In each case he had the option of adopting unchanged the definition that
was in the *Imperial Dictionary of the English Language, *which served as a
template for the *Century, *and he did this often with words whose standing
definitions he found adequate. For all three words above he revamped the
entries and in all cases scaled back the theist assertions made in each.

The *Imperial *definition of *deist *has the phrase "one who professes no
form of religion, but follows the light of nature and reason as his only
guides in doctrine and practice; a freethinker."

Peirce eliminates this from his definition and defines both Deist and Deism
in relation to a belief in God, without comment on the basis for it.

The *Imperial *says *theosophy *is "a general name given to those systems
of philosophy which profess to attain to a knowledge of the Divine Being by
spiritual ecstasy, direct intuition, or special individual relations."

Peirce's main definition is simpler than this and he adds an encyclopedic
note: "[theosophy] differs from most philosophical systems in that they
start from phenomena and deduce therefrom certain conclusions concerning
God, whereas theosophy starts with an assumed knowledge of God, directly
obtained, through spiritual intercommunion, and proceeds thereform to a
study and explanation of phenomena."

The *Imperial Dictionary *is viewable online via the Hathi Trust; the *Century
Dictionary *online is http://www.global-language.com/CENTURY/. Finally,
Peirce's headword list is here:
http://www.pragmaticism.net/peirce_cendict_wordlist.pdf

Orin Hargraves

On Sat, Apr 18, 2020 at 7:14 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John - I agree - most of us don't want to rehash our earlier arguments
> about these topics but I don't want to clarify.
>
> I don't think that it's Peirce's work that is controversial, with some of
> us preferring to work only in the non-controversial areas. I think that
> it's our individual interpretations of his work that can be controversial.
>
> 1] For example - I don't agree with JAS's comment where he uses the
> phrase 'the whole universe is a sign'  to justify its perhaps singular
> dependence on his view of a singular external object 'God'.  I read Peirce
> as actually saying: "the entire universe- not merely the universe of
> existents, but all that wider universe which we are all accustomed to refer
> to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
> not composed exclusively of signs". 5.449ff
>
> I note that the above us of the term 'sign' is in the plural of 'signs' -
> which, to me, implies a vast semiosic process of transforming
> multiple objects-data into multiple interpretants-meaning. This image of a
> complex and diverse universe, self-organized in its semiosic actions - is a
> very different reading from that of JAS.
>
> 2] And '"the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities". 5.119.
>
> I understand the 'representamen' as a process of mediation, of
> transforming object-data to interpretant-meaning and therefore, I read this
> sentence of Peirce in a different way than does JAS, who reads it to mean
> that 'the entire universe is a sign' [singular] and he refers it to god as
> an external object.
>
> 3] And we also read the nature of the final interpretant in a different
> way. These has already been outlined in the past few days by Auke as well
> as myself.
>
> 
>
> My point is that I don't think that it is Peirce who is controversial. I
> think that our different interpretations of Peirce are controversial. And -
> I don't think that we have to all agree! There is nothing wrong with these
> differences - as long as we acknowledge that they are our interpretations -
> and not 'the Gospel-of-Peirce'!!
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 17/04/20 11:16 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> Jon,
>
> I have no desire to rehash our earlier debates about the following issue:
>
> JAS> Accordingly, what I *have *suggested previously is that semeiotic is
> sufficiently robust to prompt the plausible hypothesis of God as the real
> and independent object that determines the entire universe as a sign. I
> know that you disagree with this, but we have
> debated it sufficiently in the past and need not rehash those arguments.
>
> I admit that some readers may consider that analysis as "plausible".   But
> others would strongly disagree.  It's safe to conclude that the point is
> controversial.
>
> People like Dan, Michael, Edwina, and many other subscribers to Peirce-L
> find the noncontroversial aspects of Peirce's semeiotic to be valuable for
> their work. I usually agree with them.
>
> There is nothing wrong with discussing the controversial applications to
> theology.  But it's important to say that one can use Peirce's theories
> without accepting those 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alan,

This is a highly curious way of thinking of yours. You state that Peirce 
maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems to be 
that you nowhere found more than three names for interpretants in the same 
passage.

 

It is nice to find that we agree upon at least one thing, i.e. we have 
Peirce's, your's and my take on the interpretants. I ragard them as three 
immediate objects that try to capture the process of semiosis as regarded the 
dynamical object.


JAS: there is arguably a sense in which I posit nine different interpretants.  
However, I strongly prefer not to characterize them that way

If I understand the passage right you follow Shorts orthogonal arrangement, 
Zeman entertaning a more sober arrangement with only six interpretants. I 
follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge of it, the division according 
to interpretants in:

Logic Notebook entry dated 8 oct. 1905; Ms 339 p. 253r


Best,

Auke



> Op 20 april 2020 om 3:30 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > JAS:  Peirce consistently maintains that there are 
> exactly three interpretants.
> > 
> > > 
> > > AvB:  This sentence most certainly is not true.
> > 
> > > 
> Please provide a citation or quote where Peirce assigns specific names to 
> more than three interpretants in the same passage.  Unless you can do that, I 
> stand by my statement.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  In the alpha part of semiotics it may seem so, but 
> not in the beta part (see my other mail) where he deals with the 
> interprtetation of the sign.
> > 
> > > 
> Peirce did not designate "alpha" and "beta" parts of semeitoic, that is 
> your idea.  The same is true of your subsequent enumeration of six 
> interpretants, especially since you admit that "Peirce hemself did not 
> connect them directly."  In fact, everything that you outline below is in 
> accordance with your speculative grammar, not Peirce's, although it is 
> recognizably Peircean in spirit.  The same is true of my own approach, which 
> is different from both yours and his.  For example, since I understand the 
> immediate/dynamical/final and emotional/energetic/logical divisions to be 
> orthogonal to each other, there is arguably a sense in which I posit nine 
> different interpretants.  However, I strongly prefer not to characterize them 
> that way, just like I reject describing the 1903 taxonomy as having nine 
> different "sign aspects."
> 
> Instead, I maintain that there are exactly three interpretants--immediate 
> as whatever a type possibly could signify to someone with mere sign system 
> acquaintance (essential knowledge); dynamical as whatever a token with its 
> tones actually does signify to someone with relevant collateral 
> experience/observation (informed knowledge); and final as whatever the sign 
> itself necessarily would signify to someone in the ultimate opinion 
> (substantial knowledge).  I go on to add that the immediate interpretant 
> includes a range of possible feelings (emotional) for all signs, exertions 
> (energetic) for indexical and symbolic signs, and further signs (logical) for 
> symbolic signs; the dynamical interpretant is an actual feeling (emotional), 
> exertion (energetic), or further sign (logical); and the final interpretant 
> is a habit of feeling (emotional), action (energetic), or thought (logical).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 6:27 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Jon,
> > 
> > You wrote:
> > 
> > Peirce consistently maintains that there are exactly three 
> > interpretants.
> > 
> > -
> > 
> > This sentence most certainly is not true. In the alpha part of 
> > semiotics it may seem so, but not in the beta part  (see my other mail) 
> > where he deals with the interprtetation of the sign. lets do the count:
> > 
> > 1. emotional interpretant, the interpretive view on the qualisign 
> > aspect
> > 
> > Heading for a subdivision: energetic interpretant to be subdivided 
> > into
> > 
> > 2. mental interpretant (iconic signaspect) and
> > 
> > 3. effort interpretant (sinsign aspect)
> > 
> > heading for a subdivision: logical intepretant to be sub-divided 
> > into:
> > 
> > 4. immediate interpretant (rheme aspect)
> > 
> > 5. dynamical interpretant (dicent aspect)
> > 
> > 6. normal interpretant (the argument aspects in which all lower 
> > aspects are involved).
> > 
> > Peirce hemself did not connect them directly. Probably because as a 
> > logicean with an eye on the sheet of assertion he did not take the 
> > apprehension 

Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Conception of God (was Categories at work within the signs)

[a . breemen]

Jon Alan,


  JAS: Understood, although I consider the subject matter of my previous 
post to be metaphysics rather than  religion.

As I pointed out elsewhere our representative interpretants differ 
considerably. For me theology is the study dealing with God. It is one of the 
special sciences. Religious belief being a matter pertaining to man as an 
individual. And the remainer of interest to sociologists and psychologists. 

At what place does Peirce relegate religion to methphisics in his writings on 
the architectonic of the sciences? 

Auke


Op 20 april 2020 om 3:05 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt : 
Auke, List:


AvB:  I will not respond to the content of your words since my aim was not to 
start a discussion about religion.


Understood, although I consider the subject matter of my previous post to be 
metaphysics rather than religion.

AvB:  By the way, I like this one most:

I will simply point out that Peirce is not identifying those "immensely 
superior" beings with God, since they would still be finite; he is stating that 
the being of God would not rule out the possibility of such beings.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
-http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 4:39 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl 
mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:

Jon Alan,

Thanks for your response. I will not respond to the content of your words since 
my aim was not to start a discussion about religion. In general I skip mails on 
the list on that subject. But by our communication on semiotics being in a 
cul-de-sac kind of state I started wondering if the cause could reside here. 
With our respective views on the final interpretant I think it does. 

By the way, I like this one most:

This statement excludes a finite god; although the Being of God would not, as 
far as I see, necessarily exclude that of a whole race of beings immensely 
superior to ourselves, such, for example, that the whole visible universe might 
be no more than a nucleolus in a single cell of the body of one of them.

Best,

Auke


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