Auke, List: AvB: You state that Peirce maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems to be that you nowhere found more than three *names* for interpretants in the same passage.
Indeed, I believe that if Peirce had held that there were more than three interpretants, he would have said so somewhere explicitly. Instead, he experimented with various combinations of different names for *exactly three* interpretants, the most consistent of which are immediate/dynamical/final. Emotional/energetic/logical only appear in the drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907), and again, I see them as aligning directly with the *divisions* according to the dynamical and final interpretants in other late taxonomies as sympathetic/percussive/usual and gratific/actuous/temperative, respectively. The division according the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant as hypothetic/categorical/relative is admittedly not so straightforward. Peirce proposes it in a December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby "with great hesitation" (CP 8.369, EP 2:489), even though it appears in his Logic Notebook as early as August 1906 (R 339:423-424[284r-285r]). Of course, the adjectives themselves are commonly used for three different kinds of *propositions* (CP 2.271, 1903), which are distinguished in existential graphs (EGs) by how many lines of identity each requires--zero, one, and two or more, respectively. CSP: Also note that by this system every proposition is either hypothetical, categorical, or relative, according to the number of heavy lines necessary to express its form. (R 481:10, LF 1:290, 1896). However, an EG with no lines of identity can express a hypothetical proposition only in the *alpha* system. The *beta* system recognizes that such a proposition is "expressed in precisely the same form" as a categorical proposition (CP 3.445, 1896), while a spot with no lines of identity attached is an *incomplete* proposition--i.e., a term or rheme, whose number of pegs matches its valency (CP 4.560, 1906). Therefore, the division according to the immediate interpretant must come *before *the division according to the nature of the influence of the sign; i.e., its relation to the final interpretant. This properly ensures that all hypothetics are terms/semes, while all propositions/phemes are either categoricals or relatives. Moreover, the sheet of assertion in EGs is strictly a *logical* quasi-mind, so it can only be determined by signs whose dynamical interpretants are further signs; i.e., usuals. Therefore, the division according to the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant must come *after* the division according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, such that a usual can be a hypothetic, a categorical, or a relative. My proposed *logical *order of determination for the three interpretant trichotomies (If→Id→Ii) is consistent with this, while Robert Marty's (Ii→Id→If) is not. AvB: I follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge of it, the division according to interpretants in: *Logic Notebook entry dated 8 oct. 1905; Ms 339 p. 253r* But Peirce again identifies *exactly three* interpretants on that manuscript page <https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search&ref=13283>--immediate, dynamic, and representative. His trichotomies on this occasion are clamatory/imperative/representative for the immediate interpretant and feeling/conduct/thought for the dynamic interpretant, while he does not assign any names for the representative interpretant. The other three listed divisions are for the interpretant *relations*--"Mode of Affecting Dynamic Interp." (S-Id), which is "By Sympathy," "By Compulsion," or "By Reason"; "Mode of being represented by Representative Interpretant" (S-If); and "Mode of being represented to represent object by Repr. Interp." (Od-S-If). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 6:14 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > Jon Alan, > > This is a highly curious way of thinking of yours. You state that Peirce > maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems > to be that you nowhere found more than three *names* for interpretants in > the same passage. > > It is nice to find that we agree upon at least one thing, i.e. we have > Peirce's, your's and my take on the interpretants. I ragard them as three > immediate objects that try to capture the process of semiosis as regarded > the dynamical object. > > JAS: there is arguably a sense in which I posit *nine *different > interpretants. However, I strongly prefer *not *to characterize them > that way > > If I understand the passage right you follow Shorts orthogonal > arrangement, Zeman entertaning a more sober arrangement with only six > interpretants. I follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge of it, > the division according to interpretants in: > > *Logic Notebook entry dated 8 oct. 1905; Ms 339 p. 253r* > > Best, > > Auke >
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