Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-25 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Helmut, List:

What is described below is not the "tree structure" that Peirce outlined in
his Logic Notebook entry of November 1, 1909, but rather a variation of the
podium diagram that Robert Marty proposed in his recent paper.  The first
number indicates the correlate--sign (1), object (2), or interpretant
(3).  The second number indicates "immediate" as a possibility internal to
the sign (1), "dynamical" as an actuality external to the sign (2), or
"final" as a conditional necessity (3).  The third number indicates
correspondence to a monadic correlate (1), a dyadic relation (2), or a
triadic relation (3).

At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic
relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant
is the third correlate (3).  However, the second and third trichotomies of
Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and
interpretant *themselves*, but rather their *relations *with the sign (CP
2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary
R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent.  Arranging them
logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP
2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs.

At level 3, categorial analysis requires one sign (1.1) to have two objects
(immediate=2.1, dynamical=2.2) and three interpretants (immediate=3.1,
dynamical=3.2, final=3.3).  Dividing each of these six correlates (hexad)
into possible/existent/necessitant (Edwina's "categorial modes" of
1ns/2ns/3ns), arranging them logically in a linear order (again, Robert and
I only differ on which interpretants come fourth and sixth), and applying
the rule of determination results in 28 classes of signs.

At level 4, there are not three objects and six interpretants, but rather
the same two objects and three interpretants, plus three dyadic relations
(including the two from the 1903 taxonomy) and one triadic relation,
yielding Peirce's ten trichotomies--S (1.1.1), Oi (2.1.1), Od (2.2.1), Od-S
(2.2.2), Ii (3.1.1), Id (3.2.1), S-Id (3.2.2), If, (3.3.1), S-If (3.3.2),
and Od-S-If (3.3.3).  Dividing each of these into
possible/existent/necessitant, arranging them logically in a linear order,
and applying the rule of determination results in 66 classes of signs.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 1:09 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> List,
>
> I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to be
> applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three
> interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where
> you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and
> so on:
>
> level
> characters
> number of characters
>
> 1
> (3)
> 1
> 2
> (1);(2);(3)
>  3
> 3  (1.1); (2.1),(2.2);
> (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)
>6
> 4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2);
> (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3)10
>
> The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus
> the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at
> level 11 you have 66.
>
> Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign
> is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to
> Peirce also applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense),
> analysed by him up to the 3d level.
>
> This eternal tree-structure should be possible to apply to all things that
> underly the categories, otherwise the categories would not be categorical,
> and thus not categories, I think.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
John, List:

When have I ever declared that my "conclusion is what Peirce intended"?
When have I ever described my objective as "developing a definitive
reconstruction of Peirce's semeiotic"?  When have I ever maintained that my
"version [of semeiotic] is what Peirce intended"?  When have I ever
denied that my "conclusions are [my] own, not Peirce's"?  When have I ever
"construct[ed] a long thread of quotations ... and derive[d] some rigid
conclusion that [I] claim[] is what Peirce intended"?  Please provide *specific
*quotes from me to back up *each *of these serious allegations.  Otherwise,
I request a retraction and an apology.

On the contrary, I have explicitly acknowledged that my speculative grammar
is *not *identical to Peirce's, and I have even pointed out some
*specific *differences--such
as abandoning the 66-sign taxonomy based on a linear ordering of the ten
trichotomies, as well as associating the immediate object/interpretant with
a type, the dynamical object/interpretant with a token, and the final
interpretant with the sign itself.  I have recently stated plainly on
multiple occasions that all my posts are expressions of my personal
opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's writings, and that this
should go without saying.

On the other hand, I have read many books and papers in the secondary
literature that assert, "Peirce believed X" or "Peirce held Y" or
"According to Peirce, Z."  There is absolutely nothing wrong with such
statements--even when X, Y, and Z are paraphrases or summaries, rather than
verbatim quotations--as long as they can be adequately supported from
Peirce's actual writings.  John's slides linked below are a good example of
this, translating some of Peirce's ideas into the concepts and terminology
of modern logic.  Why is such an approach acceptable for him
in a conference presentation, but not for me in an e-mail list discussion?
Again, *why the double standard?*

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 8:51 AM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Gary,
>
> That sentence up to the comma is my primary objection to Jon's writings.
> As for the substance, my second objection is Jon's claim that his
> conclusion is what Peirce intended:
>
> GR> Your arguments *contra* Jon Alan Schmidt have been consistently
> methodological, not at all substantive.
>
> Jon has done useful work in highlighting some important quotations in
> Peirce's writings and stating his own opinions about how they are related.
> That's OK.  But I object to his claim of developing a definitive
> reconstruction of Peirce's semeiotic.  That is a task that Peirce attempted
> to do on several occasions.  But his ideas were constantly growing as he
> was writing.  He could never produce a single coherent version.  If Peirce
> himself could not produce a definitive version, nobody can claim that their
> version is what Peirce intended.
>
> GR> More to the point, there are those scholars who rather completely
> disagree with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of Jon's work.
>
> Please quote anybody who objected to what I said about Jon's work.  If you
> can't dig up some ancient quotations, please ask them to restate their
> objections.
>
> GR> Jon's work falls into a category of Peirce scholarship, *semeiotic
> grammar*, which you and Edwina seem to oppose almost in principle, but
> which is seen by many Peirce scholars -- and to this day -- as essential,
> even quintessential, in the understanding of what Peirce's philosophy
> involves, the changes in his  terminology often being expressions of the
> conceptual growth -- or fine turning -- of important, even crucial
> philosophical concepts; and not only in his logic as semeiotic, but also in
> his phenomenology and metaphysics.
>
> I believe that work is very important.  I have learned a lot from reading
> much of it -- certainly not all of it.  But the most reliable authors
> clearly state or imply that their conclusions are their own, not Peirce's.
> When they do make some claims about what Peirce meant, they add some hedge,
> such as "Peirce seems to say..." or "If I am right..."
>
> What I find most objectionable about Jon's method is the way he constructs
> a long thread of quotations, each taken out of context, and derives some
> rigid conclusion that he claims is what Peirce intended.  If anybody
> objects to that conclusion by citing other quotations, Jon find some excuse
> for rejecting them.
>
> GR> Your seeming rush to 'application' is, as I now see it, based on your
> hubristic (there's no more accurate term for it) estimation that you
> *already* grasp what's important in Peirce's philosophy...
>
> I am writing for  21st c audience.  I often quote Peirce's writings as a
> motivation for the work I'm doing, but I don't claim that my work is what
> he meant or intended.  Following is a 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, Gary R., John, List:

I agree with Edwina that she has *established *her own speculative grammar,
which she believes to be recognizably Peircean, and has sought to apply it
in the special sciences, most notably biology.  However, I understand Gary
R.'s point to be that she persistently rejects any suggestion of a
need for *reexamination
*of the conclusions that she reached long ago.  In other words, she comes
across as the one with the "rigid box," unwilling to give serious
consideration to any alternatives.  By the way, speculative grammar is the
study of *all *signs, not just symbols; and it concerns not only their
relations with their *interpretants*, but also their relations with their
*objects*.

I agree with Edwina that publication of an article does not imply
endorsement of its conclusions, only the reasonableness of its methods and
arguments.  However, I understand Gary R.'s point to be exactly
that--John's *methodological *criticisms directed at me are misplaced,
because my approach is well within the mainstream of Peirce scholarship and
philosophical inquiry in general.  The real issue is that John (apparently)
disagrees with many of my *conclusions*, but as I have said multiple times
before, the proper course of action is then to *make a better
argument* for *different
*conclusions.  Again, I invite *persuasion*, rather than bare assertions
that I am guilty of "serious misinterpretations."

Edwina and John both seem to think that focusing (as I admittedly do) on
Peirce's words, including his terminology, detracts from what they deem to
be a more pressing and more important task--applying his ideas to today's
problems.  By contrast, I continue to maintain that getting his ideas
right *requires
*paying careful attention to his words and terminology, and getting his
ideas wrong obviously *precludes *applying them at all.  Instead, it
results in applying *one's own* ideas to today's problems, while creating
the mistaken impression that they are *Peirce's *ideas--precisely the
transgression of which I have been repeatedly (and falsely) accused.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 8:38 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> I'm going to reject your view that I 'oppose almost in principle' the
> research known as speculative grammar, which is research into the nature
> of a sign as symbol and the nature of symbols ..to their interpretants.
>
> I think that my published work in this area, focused on the relations and
> categories within the triad, rejects your opinion of such an opposition.
>
> Furthermore - I think that the discussion between Auke and JAS [in which I
> have participated] focuses on terminology and this 'speculative grammar'
> with the debate between how many interpretants are actually operative in
> the Peircean framework -. This is an important discussion, for my whole
> point about terminology is that it is not enough to simply define the
> terms. One has to examine their functionality in the 'real pragmatic
> world'. That's why, for example, this discussion between Auke and JAS is
> important - because the increased variety of Interpretants increases the
> capacity of the semiosic action to provide diversity and complexity. And
> that's why we keep asking for examples!
>
> On another point - it should be pointed out that a published article [my
> own included] does not mean that the content is 'the truth'! I'm very sure
> that you have - as have I - often been a reviewer for scholarly articles to
> be published in peer-reviewed journals. The normal criteria for publication
> is whether the article is coherent, well-written, and referenced - but
> that's all. I would never, and I'm very sure you would never as well -
> judge an article as to whether or not I personally agreed with the
> argument, with the content, with the approach or felt it was 'right' or
> 'the truth'. . Such decisions must be left up to the wider 'community of
> scholars' - and never to the reviewer.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 25/04/20 1:58 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> John, List,
>
> I so thoroughly disagree with you that at this point there's not much
> more to be said. Your arguments contra Jon Alan Schmidt have been
> consistently methodological, not at all substantive. And as far as I can
> see, you have conclusively shown yourself to have a double standard in that
> regard. It would indeed be easy to cite many, many examples of this
> hypocritical double standard and, indeed, many have been cited on this
> list. I would certainly not be loathe to rehearse some of them if need be.
>
> More to the point, there are those scholars who rather completely disagree
> with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of Jon's work. One need only
> look over the last couple of decades of articles published in Transactions
> of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Auke, List:

How many different interpretants does Peirce identify in the passage quoted
below (EP 2:478, 1906)?  Does he mention any additional interpretants in
that particular letter?  Are there any manuscripts whatsoever where Peirce
explicitly identifies more than three interpretants in the same analysis?
If not, why conclude that there are more than three, just because he uses
different names in different lists of exactly three?  How is this more
justified than viewing Peirce as experimenting over time with different
names for the same three interpretants?  Note that these are questions, not
assertions; I am inviting *persuasion* that Auke's approach is more
warranted than mine.  On the other hand, all the recent List discussions
were initially prompted by Robert Marty's paper introducing the podium
diagram, which (based on the three categories) implies that one sign
*must *have
exactly two objects and exactly three interpretants.  Where does such an
analysis supposedly go wrong?

Besides, limiting the interpretants to exactly three is by no means a novel
proposal.  As long ago as 1993, Jorgen Dines Johansen stated in his
book, *Dialogic
Semiosis:  An Essay on Signs and Meaning*, "The most important divisions of
the interpretant are the immediate, the dynamical, and the final" (p.
173).  He then aligned some of the alternative names accordingly--essential
and intended with immediate; communicational, rational, and ultimate
logical with final.  Five years later, the editors of Volume 2 of *The
Essential Peirce* similarly associated intentional, impressional, and
initial with immediate; effectual, factual, middle, and dynamic with
dynamical; and communicational, normal, habitual, and eventual with final
(p. 555 n. 2).  I disagree with a couple of these specific assignments, but
the point is that it is quite common in the secondary literature to
understand Peirce as having identified exactly three interpretants, while
varying considerably in what he called them.

Again, "the gamma part of semiotics" is an aspect of *Auke's *speculative
grammar, not Peirce's own; just as the immediate object/interpretant
pertaining to a type, the dynamical object/interpretant pertaining to a
token, and the final interpretant pertaining to the sign itself are aspects
of *my *speculative grammar, not Peirce's own.  Nevertheless, our different
speculative grammars are both recognizably *Peircean*.  As with Robert, I
sincerely appreciate Auke's scholarship--especially, as he mentions below,
our mutual dedication to studying Peirce's unpublished texts--even though
we have reached some different conclusions when it comes to the details.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 8:02 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Gary f., list,
>
> I understand to have hit on a great devide between groups of listers. As
> far as JAS is concerned, I already indicated my objections, and I already
> indicated that I value it highly that he took the trouble to seriously read
> the unpublished pages. I seldom meet a person that, as I did, took the
> trouble.
>
> I suggested already to look at this from a semiotical point of view:
>
> Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding
> possible?
>
> --
>
> Curiously enough this example fits in nicely with the discussion about the
> total number of interpretants Peirce distinguished.
>
> 1906|Letters to Lady Welby|EP 2:478
>
> There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the
> mind of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination
> of the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or
> say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which
> the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any
> communication should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It
> consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and
> interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should
> fulfill its function.
>
> ---
>
> Here we are in, what I call, the gamma part of semiotics. Demanding its
> own identification of differences between interpretants. This cannot simply
> be reduced to: immediate, normal and final interpretant.
>
> Auke
>

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Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-25 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Thanks for the paper, Gary - I'll have to print it out and read it
more thoroughly. 

But I'm not sure if it will change my mind! I don't, for example,
understand Firstness as comparable to the Platonic idea.

And I simply don't see that the mediative 'node', the
sign/representamen, can function in a mode of Firstness - other than
as a qualisign -  where all three nodes/relations are in the
categorical mode of Firstness. Of the ten classes, this is the only
one where the representamen/sign is in that mode of Firstness.

I don't see how the sign/representamen, which has an enormous 'Mind'
task to do in the semiosic process could 'add' information all on its
own, if it's just in that mode of Firstness….to produce and
Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness! That's adding a whole lot of
energy/information! Where does it get it from?

Usually, within the triadic semiosic process - the output
[Interpretant] has the same of less data/information than the input
[Object]. 

Obviously, I am also understanding the modal categories within a
view as to how much data/information they provide; how it has been
transformed by the mediative process etc. 
I'll try to see how you come to your conclusion under Sign Relations
that, for example, the Sign is always a Firstness etc.  I simply don't
'see' it as you do.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  5:07 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Helmut, Edwina, List,
 Helmut asked: (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and
interpretant 3ns?)

And Edwina responded: 
I certainly don't agree that the sign/representamen is [always?] in
a categorical mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, the interpretant in
3ns.

Do you mean the order of the semiosic process? This has nothing to
do with the categories, for, as Peirce outlined in the ten classes,
the triadic 'nodes' can be in any of the modal categories.  How about
a Sign in 1-1-1, a rhematic iconic qualisgin, where all three nodes
are in a mode of 1ns?Edwina and I have disagreed on this matter
forever, it would seem. I see things very differently than she does.
Consider the chart below beginning by noting its three diagrams: Sign
Elements at the top left; 9-adic Sign Relations at the bottom left;
10-adic Classification of Signs being the entire right hand side of
the chart.

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm
[1]
 Each of these three involves, firstly, trikons arranged categorially
such that 1ns is represented at the top of each triangle, 2ns at the
bottom of each, and 3ns to the right. 
 SIGN ELEMENTS: 
 The trikon diagram at the top left of the chart abstracts only the
three 'elements' of a sign and can be read thusly: the sign itself is
a 1ns, the object is 2ns, the interpretant is 3ns. 
 [Here, I believe, lies the basis of Edwina's and my disagreement.
For when we consider the 10 Classes of Signs below, in  this
analysis, each and every one of them will involve a Sign as 1ns, an
Object as 2ns and an Interpretant as 3ns)].
 SIGN RELATIONS:
 SIGN: Now if one then looks at the trikon diagram on the bottom left
one sees that each of these just considered -- viz.,
sign/object/interpretant -- can be tricategorially analyzed such that
for the  Sign itself: qualsign = 1ns, sinsign = 2ns, legisign = 3ns.
So one observes that while the Sign itself is always a 1ns at this
level of abstract analysis, its categorial 'modes' can be in any of
the three.
 OBJECT: Moving to the bottom of the diagram, similarly, the Object
can famously be tricategorially analyzed: icon = 1ns, index = 2ns,
symbol =3ns; yet qua Object it is always 2ns .
 INTERPRETANT: So also for the Interpretant sign: rheme (term, or
better, propositional function) = 1ns, dicisign (proposition) = 2ns,
argument = 3ns; yet qua Interpretant it is always 3ns.
 CLASSIFICATION OF SIGNS: 
 Finally, turning to the right portion of the entire diagram, here
the famous Classification into 10 classes is trikonically
represented. Here one finds that  each of the 10 classes is also
tricategorially analyzed based on the division of 9 (3 x 3) just
given (bottom left of the chart). 
 In verbally presenting each of the 10 classes at CP 2.254 - 264, in
order to highlight the notion that the interpretant involves the
object* and the object involves the sign itself, so beginning at the
interpretant as Peirce does in the CP passages just noted, commencing
at the interpretent, one moves through the object, to the sign itself.
So, for simple example, the 4th sign of the 10 classes (bottom left in
that diagram) is called by Peirce a Dicent(ic) (2ns) Indexical (2ns)
Sinsign (2ns), and the example he gives is a weathercock (I trust
that I don't have to spell out its dicentic, indexical, sinsignific
characters: see, CP 2.257). *More accurately, one ought say that the
Interpretant involves both the Object and the 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-25 Thread robert marty
don't worry ... I need a little time to give you the clearest possible
answer (which assumes I have an answer) ...
Regards,
Robert Marty

Le sam. 25 avr. 2020 à 20:42, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Helmut, you wrote:
>
> (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?)
>
> I certainly don't agree that the sign/representamen is [always?] in a
> categorical mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns.
>
> Do you mean the order of the semiosic process? This has nothing to do with
> the categories, for, as Peirce outlined in the ten classes, the triadic
> 'nodes' can be in any of the modal categories. How about a Sign in 1-1-1, a
> rhematic iconic qualisgin, where all three nodes are in a mode of 1ns?
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat 25/04/20 2:11 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
>
>
>
> Supplement: Please click on "full view" or synonym, otherwise the table
> does not work.
>
> List,
>
> I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to be
> applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three
> interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where
> you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and
> so on:
>
> level
> characters
> number of characters
>
> 1
> (3)
> 1
> 2
> (1);(2);(3)
>  3
> 3  (1.1); (2.1),(2.2);
> (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)
>6
> 4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2);
> (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3)10
>
> The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus
> the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at
> level 11 you have 66.
>
> Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign
> is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to
> Peirce also applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense),
> analysed by him up to the 3d level.
>
> This eternal tree-structure should be possible to apply to all things that
> underly the categories, otherwise the categories would not be categorical,
> and thus not categories, I think.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>
> 25. April 2020 um 02:51 Uhr
> "Jon Alan Schmidt"
> wrote:
> Robert, List:
>
> To clarify, I agree with what you say below and did not mean to imply
> otherwise.  I sincerely appreciate your scholarship, even though we have
> reached some different conclusions when it comes to the details.   Also,
> the "moral injunction" with which I concluded was not based on anyone's
> authority, just Peirce's own words as quoted.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:49 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List :
>>
>>
>> Peirce asks himself questions and only questions to know which
>> trichotomies of which virtual or abstract thought objects (ie the Ai of
>> my protosigns) he could choose to place them in the 10 places. At this
>> moment they are trichotomies   independentes of any determination
>> between these objects. There are actually 59049. It's enough to impress
>> Lady Welby and William James!
>>
>> But once this choice is made we would obviously fall back on the usual 66
>> classes.
>>
>> This is not the first time he has evaluated his task:
>>
>> Peirce: CP 5.488 Cross-Ref:††  488. I here owe my patient reader a
>> confession. It is that when I said that those signs that have a logical
>> interpretant are either general or closely connected with generals, this
>> was not a scientific result, but only a strong impression due to a
>> life-long study of the nature of signs. My excuse for not answering the
>> question scientifically is that I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or
>> rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I
>> call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and
>> fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast,
>> the labor too great, for a first-comer. I am, accordingly, obliged to
>> confine myself to the most important questions. The questions of the same
>> particular type as the one I answer on the basis of an impression, which
>> are of about the same importance, exceed four hundred in number; and
>> they are all delicate and difficult, each requiring much search and much
>> caution. At the same time, they are very far from being among the most
>> important of the questions of semiotic. Even if my answer is not exactly
>> correct, it can lead to no great misconception as to the nature of the
>> logical interpretant. There is my apology, such as it may be deemed." (dated
>> v.1936)
>>
>> 400 is much less than 59049!
>>
>> However, anyone can declare themselves an explorer today, this is the
>> condition of any free search. As far as I am concerned, I constantly
>> control that my explorations stick to Peirce's fundamental 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-25 Thread Helmut Raulien
Edwina, List,

 

I meant the composition of a sign triad. I guess, the tree-structure applies to composition, not to classification. The 6, 10, 28, 66, or how many ever classes of signs are compositions of (possible) classes at a certain level of analysis. A sign 1-1-1 is of this class, but is composed of sign itself-relation (1), object relation (2), and interpretant relation (3). The object as a class is an icon, so 1ns, but is acting in the 2ns-relation (as object), or so I would say.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 Samstag, 25. April 2020 um 20:42 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut, you wrote:

(is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?)

I certainly don't agree that the sign/representamen is [always?] in a categorical mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns.

Do you mean the order of the semiosic process? This has nothing to do with the categories, for, as Peirce outlined in the ten classes, the triadic 'nodes' can be in any of the modal categories. How about a Sign in 1-1-1, a rhematic iconic qualisgin, where all three nodes are in a mode of 1ns?

Edwina



 

On Sat 25/04/20 2:11 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

 
 

Supplement: Please click on "full view" or synonym, otherwise the table does not work.

 

List,



 

I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to be applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and so on:

 

level  characters                                              number of characters

 

1   (3)                                                    1

2  (1);(2);(3)                                                  3

3  (1.1); (2.1),(2.2); (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)                                                  6

4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2); (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3)    10

 

The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at level 11 you have 66.

 

Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to Peirce also applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense), analysed by him up to the 3d level.

 

This eternal tree-structure should be possible to apply to all things that underly the categories, otherwise the categories would not be categorical, and thus not categories, I think.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

25. April 2020 um 02:51 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:



Robert, List:
 

To clarify, I agree with what you say below and did not mean to imply otherwise.  I sincerely appreciate your scholarship, even though we have reached some different conclusions when it comes to the details.   Also, the "moral injunction" with which I concluded was not based on anyone's authority, just Peirce's own words as quoted.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 


On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:49 AM robert marty  wrote:


Jon, List :
 



Peirce asks himself questions and only questions to know which trichotomies of which virtual or abstract thought objects (ie the Ai of my protosigns) he could choose to place them in the 10 places. At this moment they are trichotomies   independentes of any determination between these objects. There are actually 59049. It's enough to impress Lady Welby and William James! 

But once this choice is made we would obviously fall back on the usual 66 classes.

This is not the first time he has evaluated his task:

Peirce: CP 5.488 Cross-Ref:††  488. I here owe my patient reader a confession. It is that when I said that those signs that have a logical interpretant are either general or closely connected with generals, this was not a scientific result, but only a strong impression due to a life-long study of the nature of signs. My excuse for not answering the question scientifically is that I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a  backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer. I am, accordingly, obliged to confine myself to the most important questions. The questions of the same particular type as the one I answer on the basis of an impression, which are of about the same importance, exceed four hundred in number; and they are all delicate and difficult, each requiring much search and much caution. At 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-25 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Helmut, you wrote:

(is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant
3ns?)

I certainly don't agree that the sign/representamen is [always?] in
a categorical mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, the interpretant in
3ns.

Do you mean the order of the semiosic process? This has nothing to
do with the categories, for, as Peirce outlined in the ten classes,
the triadic 'nodes' can be in any of the modal categories. How about
a Sign in 1-1-1, a rhematic iconic qualisgin, where all three nodes
are in a mode of 1ns? 

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  2:11 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Supplement: Please click on "full view" or synonym, otherwise
the table does not work.   List, I still do not understand, why
the tree-structure should not be able to be applied to the sign
characters, meaning, there are more than three interpretants due to
the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where you have one
class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and so on:
  level  characters   
  number
of characters   1   (3)  
  
  1 2  (1);(2);(3)
  
  3 3  (1.1); (2.1),(2.2); (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)  
  
6 4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1);
(3.2.1).(3.2.2); (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3)10   The
number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus
the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and
at level 11 you have 66.   Apart from sign classes and sign
characters (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and
interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to Peirce also
applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense),
analysed by him up to the 3d level.   This eternal tree-structure
should be possible to apply to all things that underly the
categories, otherwise the categories would not be categorical, and
thus not categories, I think.   Best, Helmut  25. April 2020 um
02:51 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 wrote:   Robert, List:   To clarify, I agree with what you say below
and did not mean to imply otherwise.  I sincerely appreciate your
scholarship, even though we have reached some different conclusions
when it comes to the details.   Also, the "moral injunction" with
which I concluded was not based on anyone's authority, just Peirce's
own words as quoted.   Thanks,   Jon S. On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at
4:49 AM robert marty  wrote:  Jon, List : 

Peirce asks himself questions and only questions to know which
trichotomies of which virtual or abstract thought objects (ie the Ai
of my protosigns) he could choose to place them in the 10 places. At
this moment they are trichotomies   independentes of any
determination between these objects. There are actually 59049. It's
enough to impress Lady Welby and William James!  

But once this choice is made we would obviously fall back on the
usual 66 classes. 

This is not the first time he has evaluated his task: 

Peirce: CP 5.488 Cross-Ref:††  488. I here owe my patient reader
a confession. It is that when I said that those signs that have a
logical interpretant are either general or closely connected with
generals, this was not a scientific result, but only a strong
impression due to a life-long study of the nature of signs. My excuse
for not answering the question scientifically is that I am, as far as
I know, a pioneer, or rather a  backwoodsman, in the work of clearing
and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the
essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and
I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer. I
am, accordingly, obliged to confine myself to the most important
questions. The questions of the same particular type as the one I
answer on the basis of an impression, which are of about the same
importance, exceed four hundred in number; and they are all delicate
and difficult, each requiring much search and much caution. At the
same time, they are very far from being among the most important of
the questions of semiotic. Even if my answer is not exactly correct,
it can lead to no great misconception as to the nature of the logical
interpretant. There is my apology, such as it may be deemed."  (dated
v.1936) 

400 is much less than 59049! 

However, anyone can declare themselves an explorer today, this is
the condition of any free search. As far as I am concerned, I
constantly control that my explorations stick to Peirce's fundamental
writings, paragraph by 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-25 Thread Helmut Raulien
 

 
 

Supplement: Please click on "full view" or synonym, otherwise the table does not work.

 

List,



 

I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to be applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and so on:

 

level  characters                                              number of characters

 

1   (3)                                                    1

2  (1);(2);(3)                                                  3

3  (1.1); (2.1),(2.2); (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)                                                  6

4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2); (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3)    10

 

The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at level 11 you have 66.

 

Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to Peirce also applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense), analysed by him up to the 3d level.

 

This eternal tree-structure should be possible to apply to all things that underly the categories, otherwise the categories would not be categorical, and thus not categories, I think.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

25. April 2020 um 02:51 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Robert, List:
 

To clarify, I agree with what you say below and did not mean to imply otherwise.  I sincerely appreciate your scholarship, even though we have reached some different conclusions when it comes to the details.   Also, the "moral injunction" with which I concluded was not based on anyone's authority, just Peirce's own words as quoted.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 


On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:49 AM robert marty  wrote:


Jon, List :
 



Peirce asks himself questions and only questions to know which trichotomies of which virtual or abstract thought objects (ie the Ai of my protosigns) he could choose to place them in the 10 places. At this moment they are trichotomies  independentes of any determination between these objects. There are actually 59049. It's enough to impress Lady Welby and William James! 

But once this choice is made we would obviously fall back on the usual 66 classes.

This is not the first time he has evaluated his task:

Peirce: CP 5.488 Cross-Ref:††  488. I here owe my patient reader a confession. It is that when I said that those signs that have a logical interpretant are either general or closely connected with generals, this was not a scientific result, but only a strong impression due to a life-long study of the nature of signs. My excuse for not answering the question scientifically is that I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer. I am, accordingly, obliged to confine myself to the most important questions. The questions of the same particular type as the one I answer on the basis of an impression, which are of about the same importance, exceed four hundred in number; and they are all delicate and difficult, each requiring much search and much caution. At the same time, they are very far from being among the most important of the questions of semiotic. Even if my answer is not exactly correct, it can lead to no great misconception as to the nature of the logical interpretant. There is my apology, such as it may be deemed." (dated v.1936)

400 is much less than 59049!

However, anyone can declare themselves an explorer today, this is the condition of any free search. As far as I am concerned, I constantly control that my explorations stick to Peirce's fundamental writings, paragraph by paragraph, word by word. 

You end with a moral injunction based on the authority of John Sowa:

"That is why I insist on faithfulness to Peirce's own writings when employing his terminology and seeking to apply his ideas today.  Otherwise, we do not actually "build on and extend his work," but rather create something new of our own invention and wrongly attribute it to him."

 

I wonder who it can apply to and I don't feel concerned. On the other hand, I fear that there is still much to clear in the forest and that there is not yet time to plant trees on the freed parts won.





Le ven. 24 avr. 2020 à 04:15, Jon Alan Schmidt 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-25 Thread Helmut Raulien
List,

 

I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to be applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and so on:

 

level  characters                                              number of characters

 

1   (3)                                                    1

2  (1);(2);(3)                                                  3

3  (1.1); (2.1),(2.2); (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)                                                  6

4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2); (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3)    10

 

The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at level 11 you have 66.

 

Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to Peirce also applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense), analysed by him up to the 3d level.

 

This eternal tree-structure should be possible to apply to all things that underly the categories, otherwise the categories would not be categorical, and thus not categories, I think.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

25. April 2020 um 02:51 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Robert, List:
 

To clarify, I agree with what you say below and did not mean to imply otherwise.  I sincerely appreciate your scholarship, even though we have reached some different conclusions when it comes to the details.   Also, the "moral injunction" with which I concluded was not based on anyone's authority, just Peirce's own words as quoted.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 


On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:49 AM robert marty  wrote:


Jon, List :
 



Peirce asks himself questions and only questions to know which trichotomies of which virtual or abstract thought objects (ie the Ai of my protosigns) he could choose to place them in the 10 places. At this moment they are trichotomies  independentes of any determination between these objects. There are actually 59049. It's enough to impress Lady Welby and William James! 

But once this choice is made we would obviously fall back on the usual 66 classes.

This is not the first time he has evaluated his task:

Peirce: CP 5.488 Cross-Ref:††  488. I here owe my patient reader a confession. It is that when I said that those signs that have a logical interpretant are either general or closely connected with generals, this was not a scientific result, but only a strong impression due to a life-long study of the nature of signs. My excuse for not answering the question scientifically is that I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer. I am, accordingly, obliged to confine myself to the most important questions. The questions of the same particular type as the one I answer on the basis of an impression, which are of about the same importance, exceed four hundred in number; and they are all delicate and difficult, each requiring much search and much caution. At the same time, they are very far from being among the most important of the questions of semiotic. Even if my answer is not exactly correct, it can lead to no great misconception as to the nature of the logical interpretant. There is my apology, such as it may be deemed." (dated v.1936)

400 is much less than 59049!

However, anyone can declare themselves an explorer today, this is the condition of any free search. As far as I am concerned, I constantly control that my explorations stick to Peirce's fundamental writings, paragraph by paragraph, word by word. 

You end with a moral injunction based on the authority of John Sowa:

"That is why I insist on faithfulness to Peirce's own writings when employing his terminology and seeking to apply his ideas today.  Otherwise, we do not actually "build on and extend his work," but rather create something new of our own invention and wrongly attribute it to him."

 

I wonder who it can apply to and I don't feel concerned. On the other hand, I fear that there is still much to clear in the forest and that there is not yet time to plant trees on the freed parts won.





Le ven. 24 avr. 2020 à 04:15, Jon Alan Schmidt  a écrit :



Robert, List:

 

I agree that pursuing a tree structure effectively abandons the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread John F. Sowa



Gary,
That sentence up to the comma is my primary objection to
Jon's writings.  As for the substance, my second objection is Jon's claim
that his conclusion is what Peirce intended:
GR> Your arguments
*contra* Jon Alan Schmidt have been consistently methodological, not at
all substantive.
Jon has done useful work in highlighting some
important quotations in Peirce's writings and stating his own opinions
about how they are related.  That's OK.  But I object to his claim of
developing a definitive reconstruction of Peirce's semeiotic.  That is a
task that Peirce attempted to do on several occasions.  But his ideas were
constantly growing as he was writing.  He could never produce a single
coherent version.  If Peirce himself could not produce a definitive
version, nobody can claim that their version is what Peirce
intended.
GR> More to the point, there are those scholars who
rather completely disagree with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of
Jon's work.
Please quote anybody who objected to what I said about
Jon's work.  If you can't dig up some ancient quotations, please ask them
to restate their objections.
GR> Jon's work falls into a category
of Peirce scholarship, *semeiotic grammar*, which you and Edwina seem to
oppose almost in principle, but which is seen by many Peirce scholars --
and to this day -- as essential, even quintessential, in the understanding
of what Peirce's philosophy involves, the changes in his  terminology
often being expressions of the conceptual growth -- or fine turning -- of
important, even crucial philosophical concepts; and not only in his logic
as semeiotic, but also in his phenomenology and metaphysics.
I
believe that work is very important.  I have learned a lot from reading
much of it -- certainly not all of it.  But the most reliable authors
clearly state or imply that their conclusions are their own, not
Peirce's.  When they do make some claims about what Peirce meant, they add
some hedge, such as "Peirce seems to say..." or "If I am
right..."
What I find most objectionable about Jon's method is
the way he constructs a long thread of quotations, each taken out of
context, and derives some rigid conclusion that he claims is what Peirce
intended.  If anybody objects to that conclusion by citing other
quotations, Jon find some excuse for rejecting them.
GR> Your
seeming rush to 'application' is, as I now see it,  based on your
hubristic (there's no more accurate term for it) estimation that you
*already* grasp what's important in Peirce's philosophy...
I am
writing for  21st c audience.  I often quote Peirce's writings as a
motivation for the work I'm doing, but I don't claim that my work is what
he meant or intended.  Following is a revised version of the slides I
presented at a Peirce session of an APA meeting in 2015: 
http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .
As a result of that work, Fernando
Zalamea invited me to participate in a workshop in Columbia on existential
graphs.  At that workshop, I presented another version of the ppe.pdf
slides.  As a result, I was invited to convert those slides to an article
for a special issue of the Journal of Applied Logics.   Slide 2 of ppe.pdf
has the URL of that article, which takes 72 printed pages.
Please
let me know what you find "rushed" or "hubristic".  I
have posted many other articles and slides on my web site.  If you like, I
can send you the URLs of others that rush to apply Peirce's writings to
what I'm working on.
John

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Gary F,  - heh-  that's a neat comment!!. I wasn't even discussing
whether or not your suggestion that my posts 'block the road of
inquiry' were successful or not. I can't imagine how they would be.
But you specifically asked that I be asked to 'stop blocking the path
of inquiry'. And so - I asked for examples. I gave some examples of
how I felt MY comments were 'blocked' - and note you have ignored
such examples. 

And yes - I do see the difference between 'inquiry' and 'personal
opinion' so I think that's another red herring. Examples would help.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  9:10 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, sorry, I didn’t mean to imply that your attempts to block
the road of inquiry (such as your “six principles”) have been
successful.

 However, if you don’t see the difference between inquiry and
expressing a personal opinion, it would be futile for me to try to
explain it here. Anyway I would only be paraphrasing what I (and
Peirce and Susan Haack) said at
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm#attend [1].

 Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky  
 Sent: 25-Apr-20 08:22
 To: 'Peirce-L' 

; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
Gary F - please tell me how I am 'blocking the way to inquiry'.

When I am critiqued by JAS when I use the phrase 'dynamic semiosis'
because Peirce used the term 'dynamic' in a textual reference to the
dyadic action of Secondness - that response is, in my view 'blocking
the way to inquiry'. 

When I am critiqued by JAS that when I refer to Peircean thought
WITHOUT using a textual reference - that such an analysis is just my
personal opinion - then that response is, in my view, blocking the
way to inquiry'. 

 After all - it is absurd to consider that most of us - who have
been studying Peirce for years - should not be allowed to discuss
Peircean theories unless every statement is supported by a specific
text!

When I refer to Peircean texts to support my interpretations [eg, of
cosmology] and am instead told by JAS that 'this is early Peirce' and
therefore not necessarily valid - I feel that this is 'blocking the
way to inquiry'.

 I think that providing the Peircean text does not also mean that
one understands that text in the full depth of Peircean thought. Such
a tactic can, in itself, 'block the way of inquiry' for it doesn't
allow the researcher to examine how the MEANING can be used to
examine realityand thus - can be moved into examining the
biological and societal worlds.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20 8:00 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [2]  sent:

Auke, list,

 Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an
excuse for yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a
responsibility to support what our moderator has said about these
attacks — and to ask Edwina and Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the
path of inquiry. 

John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the
list, but in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new,
turning instead to vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims
about what Peirce would “cringe” at. I think the motivation for
these attacks is laid bare in your own post (copied below): Jon’s
ongoing inquiry into the development of Peirce’s speculative
grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations from Peirce,
many of which have never been posted to the list before. Apparently
this is deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because
these Peirce texts are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived
notions of what Peirce was doing. It is those notions which constitute
a “rigid box” in which they would like to confine Peircean
scholarship — while forbidding other scholars such as Jon from
paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out connections between one
Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the hypocrisy of this,
you must have a girder in your own eye.  

As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s
inquiry, except where his discoveries urge me to reconsider what
I’ve previously written about Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon
doesn’t have a strong interest in my book, either. But it’s
obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is an exemplary
instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater part of
the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year
or two. The claim that he “  denies it to others to have their
interpretation of Peirce's thought” is frankly absurd. His real
crime, in the view of those others, is to build his systematic
interpretation of Peirce’s speculative grammar on a broad
foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, say so and
say why, but to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more or
less than an attempt to block the road of inquiry.  

Gary f.

} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

I'm going to reject your view that I 'oppose almost in principle'
the research known as speculative grammar, which is research into the
nature of a sign as symbol and the nature of symbols ..to their
interpretants. 

I think that my published work in this area, focused on the
relations and categories within the triad, rejects your opinion of
such an opposition. 

Furthermore - I think that the discussion between Auke and JAS [in
which I have participated] focuses on terminology and this
'speculative grammar'  with the debate between how many interpretants
are actually operative in the Peircean framework -. This is an
important discussion, for my whole point about terminology is that it
is not enough to simply define the terms. One has to examine their
functionality in the 'real pragmatic world'. That's why, for example,
this discussion between Auke and JAS is important - because the
increased variety of Interpretants increases the capacity of the
semiosic action to provide diversity and complexity. And that's why
we keep asking for examples! 

On another point - it should be pointed out that a published article
[my own included] does not mean that the content is 'the truth'! I'm
very sure that you have - as have I - often been a reviewer for
scholarly articles to be published in peer-reviewed journals. The
normal criteria for publication is whether the article is coherent,
well-written, and referenced - but that's all. I would never, and I'm
very sure you would never as well - judge an article as to whether or
not I personally agreed with the argument, with the content, with the
approach or felt it was 'right' or 'the truth'. . Such decisions must
be left up to the wider 'community of scholars' - and never to the
reviewer.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  1:58 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List,
 I so thoroughly disagree with you that at this point there's not
much more to be said. Your arguments contra Jon Alan Schmidt have
been consistently methodological, not at all substantive. And as far
as I can see, you have conclusively shown yourself to have a double
standard in that regard. It would indeed be easy to cite many, many
examples of this hypocritical double standard and, indeed, many have
been cited on this list. I would certainly not be loathe to rehearse
some of them if need be. 
 More to the point, there are those scholars who rather completely
disagree with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of Jon's work.
One need only look over the last couple of decades of articles
published in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society to see
that some (but hardly all, since his philosophical interests are
rather far-ranging) of Jon's work falls into a category of Peirce
scholarship,  semeiotic grammar, which you and Edwina seem to oppose
almost in principle, but which is seen by many Peirce scholars -- and
to this day -- as essential, even quintessential, in the understanding
of what Peirce's philosophy involves, the changes in his terminology
often being expressions of the conceptual growth -- or fine turning
-- of important, even crucial philosophical concepts; and not only in
his logic as semeiotic, but also in his phenomenology and metaphysics.
To ignore such conceptual development expressed in Peirce's develop of
terminological subtlety seems to me to smack of intellectual laziness.
If Jon can hold in memory many of Peirce's semeiotic grammatical
distinctions and their relations to each other (something which I
certainly struggle to do), well all the more power to him. And let us
not forget that semeiotic grammar is the first of the three branches
of logic as semeiotic which Peirce posits and develops. 
 Your seeming rush to 'application' is, as I now see it,  based on
your hubristic (there's no more accurate term for it) estimation that
you already grasp what's important in Peirce's philosophy, indeed,
that you have come to 'determine' what it *is*, something which you
accuse others of doing even while they -- Jon in this case -- much
more modestly pursue abductions which their research has brought them
to: no more. This is nothing short of hypocritical and, so, from the
standpoint of the ethics of science,  repugnant. 
 I might note as a sign of Jon's work being seen as of growing
interest and value to the Peirce community more generally than you
and Edwina see it, that a paper of his is scheduled to appear in an
upcoming edition of Transactions, the premiere journal of Peircean
scholarship. And it is my prediction that Jon's work in semeiotic and
metaphysics (to mention just two areas of his interest) will grow in
importance within the Peirce community at large. You may not
understand and/or value it, but I and others do: it's just that
simple. 
 This is not to suggest that on-list and off-list that Jon and I have
agreed on everything. Far from 

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread gnox
Edwina, sorry, I didn’t mean to imply that your attempts to block the road of 
inquiry (such as your “six principles”) have been successful.

However, if you don’t see the difference between inquiry and expressing a 
personal opinion, it would be futile for me to try to explain it here. Anyway I 
would only be paraphrasing what I (and Peirce and Susan Haack) said at 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm#attend.

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky  
Sent: 25-Apr-20 08:22
To: 'Peirce-L' ; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

 

Gary F - please tell me how I am 'blocking the way to inquiry'.

When I am critiqued by JAS when I use the phrase 'dynamic semiosis' because 
Peirce used the term 'dynamic' in a textual reference to the dyadic action of 
Secondness - that response is, in my view 'blocking the way to inquiry'. 

When I am critiqued by JAS that when I refer to Peircean thought WITHOUT using 
a textual reference - that such an analysis is just my personal opinion - then 
that response is, in my view, blocking the way to inquiry'.

 After all - it is absurd to consider that most of us - who have been studying 
Peirce for years - should not be allowed to discuss Peircean theories unless 
every statement is supported by a specific text!

When I refer to Peircean texts to support my interpretations [eg, of cosmology] 
and am instead told by JAS that 'this is early Peirce' and therefore not 
necessarily valid - I feel that this is 'blocking the way to inquiry'.

I think that providing the Peircean text does not also mean that one 
understands that text in the full depth of Peircean thought. Such a tactic can, 
in itself, 'block the way of inquiry' for it doesn't allow the researcher to 
examine how the MEANING can be used to examine realityand thus - can be 
moved into examining the biological and societal worlds.

Edwina



 

On Sat 25/04/20 8:00 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

Auke, list,

Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an excuse for 
yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a responsibility to 
support what our moderator has said about these attacks — and to ask Edwina and 
Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the path of inquiry. 

John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the list, but 
in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new, turning instead to 
vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims about what Peirce would 
“cringe” at. I think the motivation for these attacks is laid bare in your own 
post (copied below): Jon’s ongoing inquiry into the development of Peirce’s 
speculative grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations from Peirce, 
many of which have never been posted to the list before. Apparently this is 
deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because these Peirce texts 
are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived notions of what Peirce was 
doing. It is those notions which constitute a “rigid box” in which they would 
like to confine Peircean scholarship — while forbidding other scholars such as 
Jon from paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out connections between one 
Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the hypocrisy of this, you must have 
a girder in your own eye. 

As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s inquiry, except where 
his discoveries urge me to reconsider what I’ve previously written about 
Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon doesn’t have a strong interest in my book, 
either. But it’s obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is an 
exemplary instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater part of 
the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year or two. The 
claim that he “ denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's 
thought” is frankly absurd. His real crime, in the view of those others, is to 
build his systematic interpretation of Peirce’s speculative grammar on a broad 
foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, say so and say why, but 
to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more or less than an attempt to 
block the road of inquiry. 

Gary f.

} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the practice of 
leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ transition conversation

 

 

 

From: Auke van Breemen 
Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

 

Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 

 

It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to text 
exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a science). 

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this one) that 
they 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread Auke van Breemen
Gary f., list,

I understand to have hit on a great devide between groups of listers. As far as 
JAS is concerned, I already indicated my objections, and I already indicated 
that I value it highly that he took the trouble to seriously read the 
unpublished pages. I seldom meet a person that, as I did, took the trouble.


I suggested already to look at this from a semiotical point of view:

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

--

Curiously enough this example fits in nicely with the discussion about the 
total number of interpretants Peirce distinguished.  

1906|Letters to Lady Welby|EP 2:478

There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of 
the utterer; the EffectualInterpretant, which is a determination of the mind of 
the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the 
Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of 
utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should 
take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, 
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in 
order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.

---

Here we are in, what I call, the gamma part of semiotics. Demanding its own 
identification of differences between interpretants. This cannot simply be 
reduced to: immediate, normal and final interpretant.


Auke

> Op 25 april 2020 om 14:00 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, list,
> 
> Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an 
> excuse for yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a 
> responsibility to support what our moderator has said about these attacks — 
> and to ask Edwina and Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the path of inquiry.
> 
> John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the list, 
> but in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new, turning instead to 
> vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims about what Peirce would 
> “cringe” at. I think the motivation for these attacks is laid bare in your 
> own post (copied below): Jon’s ongoing inquiry into the development of 
> Peirce’s speculative grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations 
> from Peirce, many of which have never been posted to the list before. 
> Apparently this is deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because 
> these Peirce texts are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived notions 
> of what Peirce was doing. It is those notions which constitute a “rigid box” 
> in which they would like to confine Peircean scholarship — while forbidding 
> other scholars such as Jon from paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out 
> connections between one Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the 
> hypocrisy of this, you must have a girder in your own eye.
> 
> As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s inquiry, except 
> where his discoveries urge me to reconsider what I’ve previously written 
> about Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon doesn’t have a strong interest in my 
> book, either. But it’s obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is 
> an exemplary instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater 
> part of the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year or 
> two. The claim that he “denies it to others to have their interpretation of 
> Peirce's thought” is frankly absurd. His real crime, in the view of those 
> others, is to build his systematic interpretation of Peirce’s speculative 
> grammar on a broad foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, 
> say so and say why, but to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more 
> or less than an attempt to block the road of inquiry.
> 
> Gary f.
> 
> } Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the practice 
> of leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {
> 
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ transition 
> conversation
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Auke van Breemen 
> Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
> To: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
> 
>  
> 
> Gary, List,
> 
> Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
> possible?
> 
> For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 
> 
>  
> 
> It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to 
> text exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a 
> science).
> 
> And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 
> 
> Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this one) 
> that they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my interpretations 
> of his writings.
> 
> But denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's thought.
> 
>  
> 
> Auke
> 
> 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Gary F - please tell me how I am 'blocking the way to inquiry'.

When I am critiqued by JAS when I use the phrase 'dynamic semiosis'
because Peirce used the term 'dynamic' in a textual reference to the
dyadic action of Secondness - that response is, in my view 'blocking
the way to inquiry'. 

When I am critiqued by JAS that when I refer to Peircean thought
WITHOUT using a textual reference - that such an analysis is just my
personal opinion - then that response is, in my view, blocking the
way to inquiry'.

 After all - it is absurd to consider that most of us - who have
been studying Peirce for years - should not be allowed to discuss
Peircean theories unless every statement is supported by a specific
text!

When I refer to Peircean texts to support my interpretations [eg, of
cosmology] and am instead told by JAS that 'this is early Peirce' and
therefore not necessarily valid - I feel that this is 'blocking the
way to inquiry'.

I think that providing the Peircean text does not also mean that one
understands that text in the full depth of Peircean thought. Such a
tactic can, in itself, 'block the way of inquiry' for it doesn't
allow the researcher to examine how the MEANING can be used to
examine realityand thus - can be moved into examining the
biological and societal worlds.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  8:00 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Auke, list,

Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an
excuse for yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a
responsibility to support what our moderator has said about these
attacks — and to ask Edwina and Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the
path of inquiry. 

John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the
list, but in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new,
turning instead to vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims
about what Peirce would “cringe” at. I think the motivation for
these attacks is laid bare in your own post (copied below): Jon’s
ongoing inquiry into the development of Peirce’s speculative
grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations from Peirce,
many of which have never been posted to the list before. Apparently
this is deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because
these Peirce texts are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived
notions of what Peirce was doing. It is those notions which constitute
a “rigid box” in which they would like to confine Peircean
scholarship — while forbidding other scholars such as Jon from
paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out connections between one
Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the hypocrisy of this,
you must have a girder in your own eye. 

As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s
inquiry, except where his discoveries urge me to reconsider what
I’ve previously written about Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon
doesn’t have a strong interest in my book, either. But it’s
obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is an exemplary
instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater part of
the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year
or two. The claim that he “ denies it to others to have their
interpretation of Peirce's thought” is frankly absurd. His real
crime, in the view of those others, is to build his systematic
interpretation of Peirce’s speculative grammar on a broad
foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, say so and
say why, but to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more or
less than an attempt to block the road of inquiry. 

Gary f.

} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the
practice of leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {

 http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ transition conversation
From: Auke van Breemen  
 Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject:  Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a
misunderstanding possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 
It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs
to text exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing
semiotics as a science). 

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this
one) that they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my
interpretations of his writings.

But denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's
thought.
Auke

 Op 25 april 2020 om 4:35 schreef Gary Richmond : 

Auke, List, 
 Auke wrote: I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
GR: Yes, seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was pretty
astonishing, and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out
before; I've done so myself 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread gnox
Auke, list,

Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an excuse for 
yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a responsibility to 
support what our moderator has said about these attacks — and to ask Edwina and 
Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the path of inquiry.

John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the list, but 
in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new, turning instead to 
vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims about what Peirce would 
“cringe” at. I think the motivation for these attacks is laid bare in your own 
post (copied below): Jon’s ongoing inquiry into the development of Peirce’s 
speculative grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations from Peirce, 
many of which have never been posted to the list before. Apparently this is 
deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because these Peirce texts 
are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived notions of what Peirce was 
doing. It is those notions which constitute a “rigid box” in which they would 
like to confine Peircean scholarship — while forbidding other scholars such as 
Jon from paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out connections between one 
Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the hypocrisy of this, you must have 
a girder in your own eye.

As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s inquiry, except where 
his discoveries urge me to reconsider what I’ve previously written about 
Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon doesn’t have a strong interest in my book, 
either. But it’s obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is an 
exemplary instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater part of 
the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year or two. The 
claim that he “denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's 
thought” is frankly absurd. His real crime, in the view of those others, is to 
build his systematic interpretation of Peirce’s speculative grammar on a broad 
foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, say so and say why, but 
to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more or less than an attempt to 
block the road of inquiry.

Gary f.

} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the practice of 
leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ transition conversation

 

 

 

From: Auke van Breemen  
Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

 

Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 

 

It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to text 
exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a science).

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this one) that 
they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of his 
writings.

But denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's thought.

 

Auke

Op 25 april 2020 om 4:35 schreef Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> >: 

Auke, List, 

 

Auke wrote: I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.

 

GR: Yes, seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was pretty astonishing, 
and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out before; I've done so 
myself on-list and off-list, apparently to no avail.

 

Auke: It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method in 
order to uphold one's own a priori principles. But only at the price of 
disregarding or disqualifying a lot of what has been written by the authority.

 

GR: Indeed, John has certainly demonstrated this the last couple of years. It 
always surprises -- nay, shocks -- me. The double standard is patent.

 

Auke: As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the other, 
but not the girder in ones own eye.

 

GR: My mother used to say this too. It was, of course, Jesus who first said it 
(see: Matthew 7:3-5; Luke 6:42). It's certainly apt here. Luke's version:

 

Either how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother, let me pull out the mote 
that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam that is in thine 
own eye? Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of thine own eye, and then 
shalt thou see clearly to pull out the mote that is in thy brother's eye. 

 

Auke: That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.

 

GR: I agree that such obvious hypocrisy is a nasty practice. As list moderator, 
I'm writing this to hopefully nip it in the bud. We've been through this sort 
thing here before and even rather recently (last year). This kind of 
double-standard is truly appalling and, as I've argued herel, completely 
counter to forum culture. 

 

Best,

 

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

2020-04-25 Thread Auke van Breemen
Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 


It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to text 
exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a science).

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this one) that 
they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of his 
writings.

But denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's thought.


Auke

> Op 25 april 2020 om 4:35 schreef Gary Richmond :
> 
> Auke, List,
> 
> Auke wrote: I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
> 
> GR: Yes, seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was pretty 
> astonishing, and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out before; 
> I've done so myself on-list and off-list, apparently to no avail.
> 
> Auke: It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method 
> in order to uphold one's own a priori principles. But only at the price of 
> disregarding or disqualifying a lot of what has been written by the authority.
> 
> GR: Indeed, John has certainly demonstrated this the last couple of 
> years. It always surprises -- nay, shocks -- me. The double standard is 
> patent.
> 
> Auke: As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the 
> other, but not the girder in ones own eye.
> 
> GR: My mother used to say this too. It was, of course, Jesus who first 
> said it (see: Matthew 7:3-5; Luke 6:42). It's certainly apt here. Luke's 
> version:
> 
> > > 
> > Either how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother, let me pull out 
> > the mote that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam 
> > that is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of 
> > thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to pull out the mote that is 
> > in thy brother's eye.
> > 
> > > 
> Auke: That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.
> 
> GR: I agree that such obvious hypocrisy is a nasty practice. As list 
> moderator, I'm writing this to hopefully nip it in the bud. We've been 
> through this sort thing here before and even rather recently (last year). 
> This kind of double-standard is truly appalling and, as I've argued herel, 
> completely counter to forum culture. 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
> 
> 
> 
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
> 
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail
> Virus-free. www.avg.com 
> http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail
> 
> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:53 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > 
> > List,
> > 
> > I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
> > 
> > 
> > It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method 
> > in order to uphold one's own a priori principles.
> > 
> > But only at the price of disregarding or disqualifying a lot of 
> > what has been written by the authority.
> > 
> > 
> > As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the 
> > other, but not the girder in ones own eye.
> > 
> > That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.
> > 
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > Auke 
> > 
> > > 
>  
> http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail
> Virus-free. www.avg.com 
> http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail
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