RE: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,

 

I recognized your approach as similar to mine. I will respond short to two 
related issues:

1.  Your diagrammatic approach
2.  The issue of continuity and discrete points

 

André De Tienne suggested to mimic the EG’s in phenomenology, i.e. making 
diagrammatic representations which can be operated upon. I suggest to do the 
same with semiotics, using the semiotic terminology. It is from this 
perspective that I read your point, line, plane, spaces diagram. 

 

Let’s indeed assume the continuity of semiosis and relegate it to the space 
level. And, that we only isolate discrete instances for specific purposes.

This would mean that at the space level nothing is specified for a specific 
purpose yet. So, on the space level we look at the continuous process in very 
general terms, something like input – output. 

If we want to become specific we have to go to the plane on which the 
pheme’s/propositions can be specified, together with the specific purpose that 
guides our interest. At 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf p. 27 
Fig. 3 you will find the way I would organize the plane at the most general 
plane level. At the bottom we have the indication of mayor (state in semiotics) 
and minor (effect in semiotics). At the top we have the specific purpose 
vaguely indicated.

 

We become more specific if we go from the plane to the line and points, see 
Fig. 1 at page 26. In this figure we may relate the plane to the space by 
assuming a line of identity orthogonally running through the index position, 
signifying the continuous input – output relation. On the plane itself we 
measure and become specific. Since Peirce entertains a notion of involvement 
(lower sign types/aspects are involved in the higher) and we are aiming at 
diagramming the doleme, we may assume all sign aspects involved in any doleme. 
Of course only if the specific result is to be reached. If not, some aspects 
will be failing. A case in point would be the occurrence of a type that is not 
familiar to the interpreting state. In this case the process would fail on the 
legisign aspect. Etc.

 

Along these lines, we could build a diagrammatic system that can be of 
practical use and operated upon.

 

Best,

 

Auke

 

 

 

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: zondag 3 februari 2019 20:30
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

 

Auke, List:

 

AvB:  What we need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can 
we explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is 
captured in logic by the term argument?

 

I agree with this general approach, and have sought to offer some suggestions 
that I hope are gesturing more or less in the right direction; in particular, 
my proposed diagram of Semes/Subjects as continuous lines, Phemes/Propositions 
as continuous planes, Delomes/Arguments as continuous spaces, and Instances as 
discrete points that we mark where these all coincide.  I believe that this 
last aspect conveniently reflects the fundamental unity of connected Signs; 
perhaps it is a corollary of Peirce's "theorem of the science of semeiotics" 
that if any Instances are connected, no matter how, the resulting system 
constitutes one Instance.

 

Returning to my original post on "Continuity of Semiosis"--just as the motion 
of any individual body is truly continuous, and we only mark discrete positions 
for specific purposes, the thought of any individual Quasi-mind (i.e., 
semiosis) is truly continuous, and we only isolate discrete Instances for 
specific purposes.  That includes when we decompose a Delome/Argument into 
Phemes/Propositions connected by a Logical Leading Principle, and a 
Pheme/Proposition into Semes/Subjects connected by a Continuous Predicate.


Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

List,

Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language 
in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.

I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short 
is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with 
little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that 
prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may 
prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, 
which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes 
delome.

If Short is 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

 

In my opinion: Yours is a pretty good indication of what I would regard as the 
hard core of the research program, i.e. the three categories or a triadic 
approach.

 

Best,

 

Auke

 

Van: Jerry Rhee  
Verzonden: zondag 3 februari 2019 22:27
Aan: Auke van Breemen 
CC: John F Sowa ; Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

 

Auke, list,

 

I appreciate what you are doing.  

 As you say, you ignore D, E, F, G, H, I, J..  X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, etc..

 

.. these three kinds of consciousness are entirely unlike; 

.. that they are connected with the ideas of one, two, three which are the 
three elementary forms with which logical analysis has to deal.

 

One being the form of a simple idea, 

two that of an ordinary relative idea, and 

three the only simple form of combination of a direct union of more than two 
ideas..

 

I don't pretend that my argument that there are only three kinds of 
consciousness does more than raise a presumption by the precision with which I 
succeed in defining a great variety of terms without calling in any fourth 
element. 

 

It will remain for those who question the conclusion to find a term I cannot 
define with this apparatus.(~ CP 8.304)

 

one two three.. C A B.. already written.

 

Best,

Jerry R

 

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

List,

Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language 
in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.

I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short 
is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with 
little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that 
prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may 
prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, 
which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes 
delome.

If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program 
(Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.

I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John Sowa 
points in this direction:

JAS:
> I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to 
> accept our disagreement and move on.

John:
That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as a 
predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that 
definition.  There is nothing more to say.

(To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)

Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering his 
considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence at all 
it is because it is transformed into a promising research program and not 
because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a 
semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the 
semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the 
term argument? 

In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may find 
many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes as 
improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different terms 
introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both 
possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the 
experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an example 
of differences in perspective:

On the terminological level Peirce experimented

He suggested:
A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative 
trichotomy for 
B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also introduced
C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. 

In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a different 
angle
With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an 
interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our world, it 
opens up the sign structure perspective
With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a sign, 
how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the 
phaneroscopic endeavour.

A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The exchange 
Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking recourse to the 
type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right in his interpretation 
of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in 
tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be 
taken as the same. For instance 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jerry Rhee]

Auke, list,



I appreciate what you are doing.

 As you say, you ignore D, E, F, G, H, I, J..  X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, etc..



*.. these three kinds of consciousness are entirely unlike; *

*.. that they are connected with the ideas of one, two, three which are the
three elementary forms with which logical analysis has to deal.*



*One being the form of a simple idea, *

*two that of an ordinary relative idea, and *

*three the only simple form of combination of a direct union of more than
two ideas..*



*I don't pretend that my argument that there are only three kinds of
consciousness does more than raise a presumption by the precision with
which I succeed in defining a great variety of terms without calling in any
fourth element. *



*It will remain for those who question the conclusion to find a term I
cannot define with this apparatus.(~ *CP 8.304)



one two three.. C A B.. already written.



Best,

Jerry R

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:

> List,
>
> Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
> 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at
> large
> 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common
> language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.
>
> I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe
> Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping
> with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology,
> that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That
> terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the
> speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce,
> hence argument becomes delome.
>
> If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program
> (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.
>
> I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John
> Sowa points in this direction:
>
> JAS:
> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to
> > accept our disagreement and move on.
>
> John:
> That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as
> a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that
> definition.  There is nothing more to say.
>
> (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
>
> Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering
> his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence
> at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program
> and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we
> need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we
> explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is
> captured in logic by the term argument?
>
> In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may
> find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes
> as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different
> terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both
> possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the
> experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an
> example of differences in perspective:
>
> On the terminological level Peirce experimented
>
> He suggested:
> A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative
> trichotomy for
> B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also
> introduced
> C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type.
>
> In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
> different angle
> With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
> interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
> With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our
> world, it opens up the sign structure perspective
> With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a
> sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the
> phaneroscopic endeavour.
>
> A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The
> exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking
> recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right
> in his interpretation of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic
> considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion
> which allows different tokens to be taken as the same. For instance when we
> deal with the spoken and written forms. Familiarity may overcome
> differences in form by an established law; because two different forms
> raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Stephen R., Edwina, List:

SCR:  The result of his root premise is the inevitable suggestion that the
universe is information and that this is the stuff of the universe.


How exactly would you define "information" as invoked in this statement?
How (if at all) is this different from saying (as Peirce did) that the
Universe is a Sign composed of Signs, or (as I did) that it is a *semiosic
continuum*?

ET:  We used to as you say, be able to disagree with abandon on this list,
but that has changed into a situation where we either follow the mantra or
- we are 'unPeircean'. That is, disagreements in interpretation or analysis
are no longer accepted as such,  but are viewed as 'violations of the
truth-of-Peirce'.


Please identify where anyone participating in any of the current List
discussions has adopted such a militant stance.  For example, John Sowa and
I have disagreed sharply, but *not once* alleged that the other's position
is "unPeircean" or a "violation of the truth-of-Peirce," whatever that
would even mean.

SCR:  At least people include you in their replies.


I obviously cannot speak for anyone else, but in all honesty, I rarely
quote or otherwise respond to your posts simply because I often struggle to
see their relevance to the subject matter of the thread.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 1:03 PM Stephen Curtiss Rose 
wrote:

> At least people include you in their replies.
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 10:51 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Well, I think it's a serious issue. We used to as you say, be able to
>> disagree with abandon on this list, but that has changed into a situation
>> where we either follow the mantra or - we are 'unPeircean'. That is,
>> disagreements in interpretation or analysis are no longer accepted as
>> such,  but are viewed as 'violations of the truth-of-Peirce'.  And that
>> moves a list up against a wall.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Sun 03/02/19 10:40 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> I am laughing Edwina because we used to be able to disagree with abandon
>> but all we do now is agree that something has happened. I think it is
>> nothing that is here -- but something in the cosmosphere -- the point at
>> which the academy reached its limit and C. P. Snow smiled in Heaven. Life
>> goes on. As does continuity. And they are not exactly the same.
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 9:51 AM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I agree with Stephen's concerns. I think that the repeated focus on
>>> terminology, with the agenda of insisting that it's 'this term' and not
>>> 'that term' obscures and makes almost irrelevant the real point of Peircean
>>> semiosis which is, in my view, as Stephen points out, 'that the universe is
>>> information'.
>>>
>>> It is this 'fact' which is the basis of Peircean semiosis and I consider
>>> that this is the key area of analysis. Unfortunately, this list at this
>>> time, doesn't have that same focus.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> On Sun 03/02/19 8:44 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs. Pierce
>>> fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew of. This was
>>> known when this list began. It is lost now in the back and forth which
>>> continues despite its impossibility which you point out. The result of his
>>> root premise is the inevitable suggestion that the universe is information
>>> and that this is the stuff of the universe.
>>> https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  What we need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How
can we explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that
is captured in logic by the term argument?


I agree with this general approach, and have sought to offer some
suggestions that I hope are gesturing more or less in the right direction;
in particular, my proposed diagram of Semes/Subjects as continuous lines,
Phemes/Propositions as continuous planes, Delomes/Arguments as continuous
spaces, and Instances as discrete points that we mark where these all
coincide.  I believe that this last aspect conveniently reflects the
fundamental *unity *of connected Signs; perhaps it is a corollary of
Peirce's "theorem of the science of semeiotics" that if any *Instances *are
connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one *Instance*.

Returning to my original post on "Continuity of Semiosis"--just as the
motion of any individual body is truly continuous, and we only *mark *discrete
positions for specific purposes, the thought of any individual Quasi-mind
(i.e., semiosis) is truly continuous, and we only *isolate *discrete
Instances for specific purposes.  That includes when we decompose a
Delome/Argument into Phemes/Propositions connected by a Logical Leading
Principle, and a Pheme/Proposition into Semes/Subjects connected by a
Continuous Predicate.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:

> List,
>
> Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
> 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at
> large
> 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common
> language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.
>
> I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe
> Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping
> with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology,
> that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That
> terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the
> speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce,
> hence argument becomes delome.
>
> If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program
> (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.
>
> I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John
> Sowa points in this direction:
>
> JAS:
> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to
> > accept our disagreement and move on.
>
> John:
> That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as
> a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that
> definition.  There is nothing more to say.
>
> (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
>
> Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering
> his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence
> at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program
> and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we
> need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we
> explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is
> captured in logic by the term argument?
>
> In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may
> find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes
> as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different
> terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both
> possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the
> experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an
> example of differences in perspective:
>
> On the terminological level Peirce experimented
>
> He suggested:
> A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative
> trichotomy for
> B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also
> introduced
> C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type.
>
> In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
> different angle
> With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
> interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
> With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our
> world, it opens up the sign structure perspective
> With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a
> sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the
> phaneroscopic endeavour.
>
> A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The
> exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., LIst:

JFS:  Furthermore, he never wrote anything about semes after 1906, except
for one brief mention of the triad in a letter to Lady Welby in 1908.


Well, he never wrote anything *at all* about "quasi-predicates" after 1903;
in fact, as far as I can tell, it only appeared that one time (CP 2.320, EP
2:282).

JFS:  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as a predicate or
quasi-predicate.


Again, with sincere respect, it shows no such thing.  On the contrary, he
defined a Seme as a Subject--especially in accordance with his "proper" and
"ultimate" logical analysis of a Proposition, which throws *everything*
other than the Continuous Predicate into the Subject.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 11:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 2/2/2019 8:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > Peirce did not introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until
> > 1908, so anything that he wrote about Propositions prior to that
> > reflects a different analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern
> > predicate logic, which you continue to advocate.
>
> No.  Peirce's later extensions are built on his core semantics,
> which is the foundation for 20th c. logics.  See the short (5 page)
> history by Hilary Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> Furthermore, he never wrote anything about semes after 1906, except
> for one brief mention of the triad in a letter to Lady Welby in 1908.
> Therefore, nothing he wrote in 1908 or later could have any effect
> on what he wrote about semes in 1906.
>
> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have
> > to accept our disagreement and move on.
>
> That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined
> a seme as a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have
> any effect on that definition.  There is nothing more to say.
>
> John
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

At least people include you in their replies.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 10:51 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Well, I think it's a serious issue. We used to as you say, be able to
> disagree with abandon on this list, but that has changed into a situation
> where we either follow the mantra or - we are 'unPeircean'. That is,
> disagreements in interpretation or analysis are no longer accepted as
> such,  but are viewed as 'violations of the truth-of-Peirce'.  And that
> moves a list up against a wall.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sun 03/02/19 10:40 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent:
>
> I am laughing Edwina because we used to be able to disagree with abandon
> but all we do now is agree that something has happened. I think it is
> nothing that is here -- but something in the cosmosphere -- the point at
> which the academy reached its limit and C. P. Snow smiled in Heaven. Life
> goes on. As does continuity. And they are not exactly the same.
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 9:51 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
>> I agree with Stephen's concerns. I think that the repeated focus on
>> terminology, with the agenda of insisting that it's 'this term' and not
>> 'that term' obscures and makes almost irrelevant the real point of Peircean
>> semiosis which is, in my view, as Stephen points out, 'that the universe is
>> information'.
>>
>> It is this 'fact' which is the basis of Peircean semiosis and I consider
>> that this is the key area of analysis. Unfortunately, this list at this
>> time, doesn't have that same focus.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun 03/02/19 8:44 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs. Pierce
>> fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew of. This was
>> known when this list began. It is lost now in the back and forth which
>> continues despite its impossibility which you point out. The result of his
>> root premise is the inevitable suggestion that the universe is information
>> and that this is the stuff of the universe.
>> https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:05 AM Auke van Breemen 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> List,
>>>
>>> Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
>>> 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at
>>> large
>>> 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common
>>> language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.
>>>
>>> I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe
>>> Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping
>>> with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology,
>>> that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That
>>> terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the
>>> speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce,
>>> hence argument becomes delome.
>>>
>>> If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research
>>> program (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic
>>> trade.
>>>
>>> I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John
>>> Sowa points in this direction:
>>>
>>> JAS:
>>> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to
>>> > accept our disagreement and move on.
>>>
>>> John:
>>> That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme
>>> as a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on
>>> that definition.  There is nothing more to say.
>>>
>>> (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
>>>
>>> Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering
>>> his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence
>>> at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program
>>> and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we
>>> need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we
>>> explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is
>>> captured in logic by the term argument?
>>>
>>> In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may
>>> find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes
>>> as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different
>>> terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both
>>> possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the
>>> experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an
>>> example of differences in perspective:
>>>
>>> On the terminological level Peirce experimented
>>>
>>> He suggested:
>>> A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an
>>> alternative 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Well, I think it's a serious issue. We used to as you say, be able
to disagree with abandon on this list, but that has changed into a
situation where we either follow the mantra or - we are 'unPeircean'.
That is, disagreements in interpretation or analysis are no longer
accepted as such,  but are viewed as 'violations of the
truth-of-Peirce'.  And that moves a list up against a wall.

Edwina
 On Sun 03/02/19 10:40 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com
sent:
 I am laughing Edwina because we used to be able to disagree with
abandon but all we do now is agree that something has happened. I
think it is nothing that is here -- but something in the cosmosphere
-- the point at which the academy reached its limit and C. P. Snow
smiled in Heaven. Life goes on. As does continuity. And they are not
exactly the same.
 amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
 On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 9:51 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
I agree with Stephen's concerns. I think that the repeated focus on
terminology, with the agenda of insisting that it's 'this term' and
not 'that term' obscures and makes almost irrelevant the real point
of Peircean semiosis which is, in my view, as Stephen points out,
'that the universe is information'. 

It is this 'fact' which is the basis of Peircean semiosis and I
consider that this is the key area of analysis. Unfortunately, this
list at this time, doesn't have that same focus. 

Edwina
 On Sun 03/02/19  8:44 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com
[3] sent:
 Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs.
Pierce fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew
of. This was known when this list began. It is lost now in the back
and forth which continues despite its impossibility which you point
out. The result of his root premise is the inevitable suggestion that
the universe is information and that this is the stuff of the
universe. 
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
[4]
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [5]
  On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:05 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:
 List,
 Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the
world at large
 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use
common language in order to have it achieve the influence it
deserves.
 I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem.
Maybe Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as
much groping with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the
esoteric terminology, that prevents semiotics the get the influence
it ought to have. That terminology may prove to be technical language
needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, which is not confined
to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes delome.
 If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research
program (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the
semiotic trade.
 I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and
John Sowa points in this direction:
 JAS:
 > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have
to 
 > accept our disagreement and move on.
 John:
 That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a
seme as a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any
effect on that definition.  There is nothing more to say.
 (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
 Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth
considering his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the
have any influence at all it is because it is transformed into a
promising research program and not because of what Peirce did
contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a semiotic definition
of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the semiotic
terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the
term argument? 
 In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we
may find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at
the changes as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that
the different terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the
same object. Both possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's
writings. I think the experimentation with the first trichotomy of
sign aspects delivers an example of differences in perspective:
 On the terminological level Peirce experimented
 He suggested:
 A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an
alternative trichotomy for 
 B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also
introduced
 C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. 
 In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
different angle
 With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
interpreting system and a sign, it 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

I am laughing Edwina because we used to be able to disagree with abandon
but all we do now is agree that something has happened. I think it is
nothing that is here -- but something in the cosmosphere -- the point at
which the academy reached its limit and C. P. Snow smiled in Heaven. Life
goes on. As does continuity. And they are not exactly the same.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 9:51 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I agree with Stephen's concerns. I think that the repeated focus on
> terminology, with the agenda of insisting that it's 'this term' and not
> 'that term' obscures and makes almost irrelevant the real point of Peircean
> semiosis which is, in my view, as Stephen points out, 'that the universe is
> information'.
>
> It is this 'fact' which is the basis of Peircean semiosis and I consider
> that this is the key area of analysis. Unfortunately, this list at this
> time, doesn't have that same focus.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sun 03/02/19 8:44 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs. Pierce
> fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew of. This was
> known when this list began. It is lost now in the back and forth which
> continues despite its impossibility which you point out. The result of his
> root premise is the inevitable suggestion that the universe is information
> and that this is the stuff of the universe.
> https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:05 AM Auke van Breemen 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
>> 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at
>> large
>> 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common
>> language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.
>>
>> I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe
>> Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping
>> with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology,
>> that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That
>> terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the
>> speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce,
>> hence argument becomes delome.
>>
>> If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program
>> (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.
>>
>> I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John
>> Sowa points in this direction:
>>
>> JAS:
>> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to
>> > accept our disagreement and move on.
>>
>> John:
>> That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as
>> a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that
>> definition.  There is nothing more to say.
>>
>> (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
>>
>> Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering
>> his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence
>> at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program
>> and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we
>> need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we
>> explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is
>> captured in logic by the term argument?
>>
>> In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may
>> find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes
>> as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different
>> terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both
>> possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the
>> experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an
>> example of differences in perspective:
>>
>> On the terminological level Peirce experimented
>>
>> He suggested:
>> A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative
>> trichotomy for
>> B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also
>> introduced
>> C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type.
>>
>> In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
>> different angle
>> With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
>> interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
>> With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our
>> world, it opens up the sign structure perspective
>> With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a
>> sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the
>> phaneroscopic endeavour.
>>
>> A legisign needs not to be a 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
agree with Stephen's concerns. I think that the repeated focus on
terminology, with the agenda of insisting that it's 'this term' and
not 'that term' obscures and makes almost irrelevant the real point
of Peircean semiosis which is, in my view, as Stephen points out,
'that the universe is information'. 

It is this 'fact' which is the basis of Peircean semiosis and I
consider that this is the key area of analysis. Unfortunately, this
list at this time, doesn't have that same focus.

Edwina
 On Sun 03/02/19  8:44 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com
sent:
 Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs.
Pierce fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew
of. This was known when this list began. It is lost now in the back
and forth which continues despite its impossibility which you point
out. The result of his root premise is the inevitable suggestion that
the universe is information and that this is the stuff of the
universe. 
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
[1]
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [2]
  On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:05 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:
 List,
 Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the
world at large
 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use
common language in order to have it achieve the influence it
deserves.
 I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem.
Maybe Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as
much groping with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the
esoteric terminology, that prevents semiotics the get the influence
it ought to have. That terminology may prove to be technical language
needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, which is not confined
to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes delome.
 If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research
program (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the
semiotic trade.
 I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and
John Sowa points in this direction:
 JAS:
 > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have
to 
 > accept our disagreement and move on.
 John:
 That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a
seme as a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any
effect on that definition.  There is nothing more to say.
 (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
 Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth
considering his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the
have any influence at all it is because it is transformed into a
promising research program and not because of what Peirce did
contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a semiotic definition
of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the semiotic
terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the
term argument? 
 In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we
may find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at
the changes as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that
the different terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the
same object. Both possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's
writings. I think the experimentation with the first trichotomy of
sign aspects delivers an example of differences in perspective:
 On the terminological level Peirce experimented
 He suggested:
 A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an
alternative trichotomy for 
 B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also
introduced
 C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. 
 In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
different angle
 With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative
perspective,
 With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our
world, it opens up the sign structure perspective
 With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation
of a sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates
signs with the phaneroscopic endeavour.
 A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The
exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking
recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is
right in his interpretation of type, which is informed by
phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve
legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be taken as
the same. For instance when we deal with the spoken and written
forms. Familiarity may overcome differences in form by an established
law; because two different forms raise the same symbol habitually. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs. Pierce
fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew of. This was
known when this list began. It is lost now in the back and forth which
continues despite its impossibility which you point out. The result of his
root premise is the inevitable suggestion that the universe is information
and that this is the stuff of the universe.
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:05 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:

> List,
>
> Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
> 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at
> large
> 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common
> language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.
>
> I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe
> Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping
> with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology,
> that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That
> terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the
> speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce,
> hence argument becomes delome.
>
> If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program
> (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.
>
> I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John
> Sowa points in this direction:
>
> JAS:
> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to
> > accept our disagreement and move on.
>
> John:
> That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as
> a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that
> definition.  There is nothing more to say.
>
> (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
>
> Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering
> his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence
> at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program
> and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we
> need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we
> explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is
> captured in logic by the term argument?
>
> In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may
> find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes
> as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different
> terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both
> possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the
> experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an
> example of differences in perspective:
>
> On the terminological level Peirce experimented
>
> He suggested:
> A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative
> trichotomy for
> B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also
> introduced
> C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type.
>
> In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
> different angle
> With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
> interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
> With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our
> world, it opens up the sign structure perspective
> With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a
> sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the
> phaneroscopic endeavour.
>
> A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The
> exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking
> recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right
> in his interpretation of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic
> considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion
> which allows different tokens to be taken as the same. For instance when we
> deal with the spoken and written forms. Familiarity may overcome
> differences in form by an established law; because two different forms
> raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Auke van Breemen]

List,

Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language 
in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.

I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short 
is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with 
little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that 
prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may 
prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, 
which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes 
delome.

If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program 
(Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.

I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John Sowa 
points in this direction:

JAS:
> I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to 
> accept our disagreement and move on.

John:
That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as a 
predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that 
definition.  There is nothing more to say.

(To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)

Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering his 
considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence at all 
it is because it is transformed into a promising research program and not 
because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a 
semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the 
semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the 
term argument? 

In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may find 
many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes as 
improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different terms 
introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both 
possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the 
experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an example 
of differences in perspective:

On the terminological level Peirce experimented

He suggested:
A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative 
trichotomy for 
B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also introduced
C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. 

In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a different 
angle
With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an 
interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our world, it 
opens up the sign structure perspective
With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a sign, 
how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the 
phaneroscopic endeavour.

A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The exchange 
Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking recourse to the 
type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right in his interpretation 
of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in 
tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be 
taken as the same. For instance when we deal with the spoken and written forms. 
Familiarity may overcome differences in form by an established law; because two 
different forms raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign.



Best,

Auke van Breemen





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[John F Sowa]

On 2/2/2019 8:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Peirce did not introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 
1908, so anything that he wrote about Propositions prior to that 
reflects a different analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern 
predicate logic, which you continue to advocate.


No.  Peirce's later extensions are built on his core semantics,
which is the foundation for 20th c. logics.  See the short (5 page)
history by Hilary Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

Furthermore, he never wrote anything about semes after 1906, except
for one brief mention of the triad in a letter to Lady Welby in 1908.
Therefore, nothing he wrote in 1908 or later could have any effect
on what he wrote about semes in 1906.


I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have
to accept our disagreement and move on.


That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined
a seme as a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have
any effect on that definition.  There is nothing more to say.

John

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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary, list,



To my open mind and eyes, all that appears to be metaphysical rubbish.



Perhaps not so obvious, then..



Best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 10:53 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, John, List,
>
> JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
> analysis of a proposition.
> JFS:  No.  Definitely not.
>
>
> Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain
> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).
> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried
> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908).
>
> It is clear for those with mind open and eyes to see that the evidence
> says that ""the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever
> there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the
> proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its
> interpreter is requisite," such that "*everything in a proposition that
> possibly can should be thrown into the subjects*, leaving the pure
> predicate a mere form of connection" that is "'*continuous*' or
> 'self-containing" (emphasis added).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 8:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> John S., List:
>>
>> With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we
>> will simply have to accept our disagreement and move on.  Peirce did not
>> introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything
>> that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different
>> analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which
>> you continue to advocate.
>>
>> JFS:  EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity
>> represent predicates.
>>
>>
>> No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate
>> represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which
>> corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity.,
>>
>> JFS:  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler
>> and clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both
>> predicates and quasi-predicates.
>>
>>
>> No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name
>> the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the
>> Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final
>> Interpretant.
>>
>> JFS:  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and
>> quasi-predicate.
>>
>>
>> No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose
>> as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
>> representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or
>> Object of a sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906).
>>
>> JFS:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be
>> replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate".
>>
>>
>> No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word
>> that means "Subject."
>>
>> JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
>> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
>> analysis of a proposition.
>> JFS:  No.  Definitely not.
>>
>>
>> Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain
>> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
>> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
>> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
>> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
>> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
>> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).
>> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried
>> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
>> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908).
>>
>>
>> JFS:  His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most
>> elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses.  In fact, they're
>> superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.
>>
>>
>> No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the
>> elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, John, List,

JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
analysis of a proposition.
JFS:  No.  Definitely not.


Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain that
"the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of
which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).  Likewise,
Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried analysis so far
as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate
elements" (SS 72; 1908).

It is clear for those with mind open and eyes to see that the evidence says
that ""the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
such that "*everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
into the subjects*, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing" (emphasis added).

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 8:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John S., List:
>
> With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we will
> simply have to accept our disagreement and move on.  Peirce did not
> introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything
> that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different
> analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which
> you continue to advocate.
>
> JFS:  EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity
> represent predicates.
>
>
> No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate
> represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which
> corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity.,
>
> JFS:  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler and
> clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both
> predicates and quasi-predicates.
>
>
> No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name
> the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the
> Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final
> Interpretant.
>
> JFS:  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and
> quasi-predicate.
>
>
> No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose
> as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
> representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or
> Object of a sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906).
>
> JFS:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be
> replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate".
>
>
> No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word
> that means "Subject."
>
> JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
> analysis of a proposition.
> JFS:  No.  Definitely not.
>
>
> Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain
> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).
> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried
> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908).
>
>
> JFS:  His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most
> elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses.  In fact, they're
> superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.
>
>
> No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the
> elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that they
> diagram.
>
> JFS:  This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical
> subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs ...
>
>
> On the contrary, it actually maps perfectly to them--each individual Seme
> is an Index of a Subject, and the continuous Lines of Identity constitute
> an Icon of the Continuous Predicate.
>
> JFS:  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we will
simply have to accept our disagreement and move on.  Peirce did not
introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything
that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different
analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which
you continue to advocate.

JFS:  EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity represent
predicates.


No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate
represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which
corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity.,

JFS:  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler and
clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both
predicates and quasi-predicates.


No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name
the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the
Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final
Interpretant.

JFS:  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and
quasi-predicate.


No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose as
a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative
or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or Object of a
sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906).

JFS:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be
replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate".


No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word
that means "Subject."

JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
analysis of a proposition.
JFS:  No.  Definitely not.


Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain that
"the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of
which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).  Likewise,
Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried analysis so far
as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate
elements" (SS 72; 1908).


JFS:  His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most
elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses.  In fact, they're
superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.


No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the
elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that they
diagram.

JFS:  This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical
subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs ...


On the contrary, it actually maps perfectly to them--each individual Seme
is an Index of a Subject, and the continuous Lines of Identity constitute
an Icon of the Continuous Predicate.

JFS:  The transformation that Peirce recommended would replace the verb
'breathes' in the sentence "Every mammal breathes oxygen" with the verb
'is' in "Every mammal is an oxygen-breathing animal."


No, it would classify "mammal," "breathing," and "oxygen" as Subjects; and
"_ is in the relation of _ to _" as the Continuous Predicate.
The first blank is Designative (quantified noun), while the other two
blanks are Descriptive (verb and common noun).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 5:12 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon AS, list
>
> I changed the subject line to emphasize the conclusion.
>
> To see the evolution of Peirce's ideas, look at the chronological
> developments.  In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way
> that is inconsistent with what he wrote in 1906:
>
> > An Index or Seme is a Representamen whose Representative character
> > consists in it's being an individual Second... (EP 2:274)
>
> But note what he had written in 1902 (CP 2.320):
>
> > A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a
> > proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although
> > the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. But the
> > proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that
> > this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index.
>
> A portrait plus an index asserts a proposition (dicisign).  In effect,
> the image is used as a kind of predicate.  In that same paragraph,
> he introduced the word 'quasi-predicate' for images used in this way:
>
> > A better example is a photograph. The mere print does 

[PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[John F Sowa]

Jon AS, list

I changed the subject line to emphasize the conclusion.

To see the evolution of Peirce's ideas, look at the chronological
developments.  In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way
that is inconsistent with what he wrote in 1906:


An Index or Seme is a Representamen whose Representative character
consists in it's being an individual Second... (EP 2:274)


But note what he had written in 1902 (CP 2.320):


A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a
proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although
the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. But the
proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that
this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index.


A portrait plus an index asserts a proposition (dicisign).  In effect,
the image is used as a kind of predicate.  In that same paragraph,
he introduced the word 'quasi-predicate' for images used in this way:


A better example is a photograph. The mere print does not, in  itself,
convey any information. But the fact, that it is virtually a section
of rays projected from an object otherwise known, renders it a Dicisign.
Every Dicisign, as the system of Existential Graphs fully recognizes,
is a further determination of an already known sign of the same object.
It is not, perhaps, sufficiently brought out in the present analysis.
It will be remarked that this connection of the print, which is the
quasi-predicate of the photograph, with the section of the rays,
which is the quasi-subject, is the Syntax of the Dicisign;


By referring to EGs, Peirce emphasizes the similarity between the
iconic structure of an EG and images of any kind.  EGs with pegs
that are not attached to any line of identity represent predicates.
The act of attachment is "a further determination" that converts
a predicate or a quasi-predicate into a dicisign (proposition).

Chronology:

1902:  An image is a quasi-predicate when it combines with an index
   or quasi-index to state a proposition (dicisign).

1903:  An index and a seme are synonymous.  That is very different
   from his definition of 1906.  That implies that (a) Peirce's
   terminology was unstable, and (b) the ethics of terminology
   does not apply to unstable terms.

1906:  A seme is a widening (generalization) of predicate to include
   percepts and other image-like signs when used as predicates.
   In effect, seme means "predicate or quasi-predicate".

Interpretation:  With the prefix 'quasi-', Peirce modified the word
'predicate' for images used as predicates.  In 1903, he introduced
the word 'seme' as a synonym for index.  But that made it redundant.

When he was writing the Monist article in 1906, he wanted a single
word for both predicates and quasi-predicates.  So he dusted off
the word 'seme'.  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because
it was simpler and clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad',
'triad'... for both predicates and quasi-predicates.

Summary:  Peirce used the word 'predicate' for examples in logic
and ordinary language.  He used 'quasi-predicate' for images used
as predicates.  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of
predicate and quasi-predicate.

Conclusion:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word
'seme' may be replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-
predicate".  Therefore, the word 'predicate' may be generalized
to include every use of 'quasi-predicate'.  That eliminates any
need for the word 'seme'.

See below for comments about the quotations from 1906 and 1908.

John
__

JAS

there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable detail
what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical analysis
of a proposition.  In his letter of December 5, 1908 to Jourdain...


No.  Definitely not.  His existential graphs and diagrammatic
reasoning are the most elegant and powerful basis for his logical
analyses.  In fact, they're superior to the systems by Frege,
Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.  See the slides for "Peirce,
Polya, and Euclid: Integrating logic, heuristics, and geometry":
http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

In the letter to Jourdain, Peirce was writing for a reader who
was familiar with Aristotelian syllogisms, as taught in textbooks
from the 13th c. to the early 20th c:


A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more
ways than one... The result is that everything in a proposition that
possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the pure
predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses (as a
character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation _ to _ ,' 'and'
= 'is at once _ and _ ,' etc. ... (NEM 3:885-886, 1908)


This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical
subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs or his 1885 notation for
predicate calculus.  For a