Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1
> On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > >> This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the >> move towards an externalist approach to mind in Heidegger is also made in >> Peirce. And it’s precisely within the proposition (or more expansively the >> dicisign) that Peirce makes this move. I suspect both of them are making >> this move due to influence from Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. >> (I think this is explicit for Heidegger although I’m not sure) Within the >> analytic tradition a lot of this is “solved” via judgments. This doesn’t >> quite work since we then have to ask what makes judgements possible. > > That is a good point. I think Peirce's analysis attempts to ground the basic > logic of Dicisigns in topology (co-localization being basically a topological > concept) - I think Husserl went in the same direction when attempting to > ground logic on geometry (in Erfahrung und Urtheil) … I should note that it’s precisely in Husserl’s grounding logic in geometry that Derrida makes his critique. Now this is one place where many Husserlians say Derrida misreads Husserl. However it’s also where Derrida breaks from Husserl and moves more into a Peircean direction. (I’d also add that it’s where Derrida tends to be clearer than usual) It’s been a very long time since I last read Derrida’s intro to Origin of Geometry. So I’m loath to say too much. Effectively though Derrida sees Husserl as introducing the relationship between ideal objects and signs. (He attributes to Husserl being the first philosopher to do so, but clearly that’s not the case) Where Derrida sees Husserl still tying meaning to subjectivity Derrida sees it in signs. (The play of difference is effectively Peirce’s later conception of sign with a distinction between dynamic and immediate objects) As I said one can dispute Derrida’s reading of Husserl rather easily. However effectively he’s critiquing a dyadic (topological) conception with a process based trichotomy sign. This becomes much more clear in the first half of On Grammatology where he says Peirce comes closest to what he’s arguing. (Although my sense is he hadn’t read much Peirce - certainly not the mature stuff like his letters to Lady Weby which anticipate much of what Derrida does later) >> Now a possible place we have a divide between Heidegger and Peirce is found >> within your quote from EP 2:311. There the copula joins not the two signs >> “Socrates” and “wise” but their replicas. For Heidegger the copula shows the >> objects of both. > > So, a collapse of sign and referent. Yes and no. This is a place that it really depends upon “which” Heidegger you read. There are quite a few quite different takes on Heidegger. I think some of Thomas Sheehan’s work has reduced that somewhat. At least we see a lot less of the “word mysticism” type of Heideggarianism. I favor a strong realist take on Heidegger where he just had a poor vocabulary to discuss what he was after. That is most of Heidegger’s work is just about meaning and its source. While not necessary to this take, I think a common view within this reading translated into Peirce’s taxonomies would be to see Heidegger as focused on the copula as index but moving to a general sign analysis. (Thus his concern with being within a painting which effectively is the same shift Peirce makes shifting to the dicisign) In this take Heidegger’s has a coherent focus even through his later work on the openness that allows objects to become meaningfully present to people. This is the index and it would be an index to both a representation and an other index. So effectively I read Heidegger as eventually reaching the dicisign although there may be subtle differences. (Certainly there are different focuses) Now there may be even here some differences. Heidegger moves from the focus on the copula (being) to der geoworfene Entwurf and then to Ereignis. That’s sometimes translated as the appropriation of existence to sustain the clearing. The clearing is the phenomenological clearing away of previous experiences of firstness to a new experience of firstness such that this reflects iconical, indexical and most significantly symbolical phenomenological experiences. That is there’s always a move so it is a process. One way to look at this is as the change in indices within us. But this is going farther afield from just a consideration of the dicisign which is a far more limited phenomena. Effectively Heidegger’s concern is what enables a dicisign to be a dicisign for us. Famously that includes an index to a set of practices each of which can’t be treated merely as a representation but also irreducibly indexes. (His “for the sake of which” and “in order to” logic is effectively just indices to other practices, objects and eventually to ourselves that allow objects to be meaningful. As his famous example of hammering shows, it
Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1
Dear Clark, lists, Den 24/09/2014 kl. 22.17 skrev Clark Goble mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> : On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial interest and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the way that in the proposition "Socrates is wise," for example, that ". . .it is not the two signs 'Socrates' and 'wise' that are connected, but the replicas of them used in the sentence" (EP2:110, emphasis added). Peirce’s treatment of the copula as an index is rather important I think in the history of being within philosophy. Again, while I’m often critical of continental philosophy at least this is an issue they recognize. Within the analytic tradition it tends to just be glossed over and ignored beyond a quick appeal to Kant’s “existence is not a predicate.” I’ve only gone through chapter 3 in Frederik’s book and I want to reread that before moving on to 4. So I don’t know if Frederik delves into that issue beyond the brief discussion in chapter 3. I don’t have his book handy to refer to that section, but again this seems important. I do think this is important. I discuss it in relation to P's idea of a syntax for Dicisigns in general. Here, his argument is that the tokens of the Subject and Predicate, respectively, must be placed alongside each other - so as to mirror the co-localization of Subject and Predicate in the object (if the Dicisign is true, that is). If not the tokens of two sides of a Dicisign are co-localized, in some sense, they will fail to function as a Dicisign (the painting and its title must not be separated by a long distance in time or space if not otherwise brought together …) Actually, I think this is pretty deep - in the sense of when we discover something basic, hitherto unnoticed, right before our eyes. I elaborate a bit more on its possible consequences in ch. 4. In continental philosophy this ends up being discussed a lot due to the place Heidegger gives it contra Husserl. A common critique of Heidegger many make is that he confuses a logical or semantic issue as an ontological one. (i.e. apply Frege against Heidegger) In this tact the meaning of the copula is tied to the meaning of the two parts and exists purely as a kind of intent. By making the copula an index (in the robust sense he gives indices) Peirce goes well beyond the Frege inspired approaches. I honestly think Heidegger and Peirce are very similar in their approaches if not the same here. Heidegger famously talks about being not being a being, nor a property of beings, nor a concept etc. It mediates between concepts and beings but is itself not something mediated. While I think it fair to criticize the clarity of Heidegger’s language (although he is working within the Cartesian and Husserlian tradition) I think he really is speaking of the copula (being) as an index. Further it’s a robust index such that it is a sign and not merely a relation between two things. This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the move towards an externalist approach to mind in Heidegger is also made in Peirce. And it’s precisely within the proposition (or more expansively the dicisign) that Peirce makes this move. I suspect both of them are making this move due to influence from Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. (I think this is explicit for Heidegger although I’m not sure) Within the analytic tradition a lot of this is “solved” via judgments. This doesn’t quite work since we then have to ask what makes judgements possible. That is a good point. I think Peirce's analysis attempts to ground the basic logic of Dicisigns in topology (co-localization being basically a topological concept) - I think Husserl went in the same direction when attempting to ground logic on geometry (in Erfahrung und Urtheil) … (Heidegger gets at this in many places although I vaguely recall Peirce arguing along similar lines although I can’t find where) If there is a genuine index in the proposition then of course that explains why judgments are possible. I’d add that, while we aren’t discussing it, I think the iconic component of the dicisign for Peirce also pops up in various places in Heidegger. For instance his discussion of the lógos of the phenomena we have a icon/index pair such that objects show themselves. For Husserl we get an ideal meaning and for Kant we get a representation. While Peirce has a representational aspect, his icons are far more powerful than what Husserl or Kant supply. Especially when tied with the index. Further given the place of the index and his logic of vagueness Peirce is able to explain propositions that gesture towards the unknown. That becomes quite important within the Heideggarian tradition - especially where it’s pushed by Gadamer, Derrida and Ricouer. Now a possible place we have a divide between
RE: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1
Clark, yes, that's one reason I've been recommending "Kaina Stoicheia" as a supplementary text for this seminar, because it's mostly about propositions but also about the "New Elements" *of the logic of mathematics*. I'm certainly not a mathematician myself, but I don't think one can get a good grasp of Peirce's philosophy as a whole without getting at least a basic grip on his philosophy of mathematics. gary f. -Original Message- From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: 24-Sep-14 1:18 PM To: Peirce List Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1 One other brief thought. Something I’ve not seen discussed much in the literature is the relationship between mathematics and propositions. (This may just because admittedly I’ve not sought out such discussions) Propositions are usually taken as linguistic with fairly strict boundaries on what counts as language. Now clearly Peirce’s dicisigns can handle equations and other meanings written via highly symbolic notation or even graphs. Traditional philosophy would need at best these to be translated into language first I think. I’d think we also fall into the question of mathematical foundations as well. Those who see mathematics as pure syntactical manipulation probably are fine with there being no propositions for math. Those who see more meaning in math probably need to deal with this. (Whether platonists or otherwise) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1
> On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial interest > and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the way > that in the proposition "Socrates is wise," for example, that ". . .it is not > the two signs 'Socrates' and 'wise' that are connected, but the replicas of > them used in the sentence" (EP2:110, emphasis added). Peirce’s treatment of the copula as an index is rather important I think in the history of being within philosophy. Again, while I’m often critical of continental philosophy at least this is an issue they recognize. Within the analytic tradition it tends to just be glossed over and ignored beyond a quick appeal to Kant’s “existence is not a predicate.” I’ve only gone through chapter 3 in Frederik’s book and I want to reread that before moving on to 4. So I don’t know if Frederik delves into that issue beyond the brief discussion in chapter 3. I don’t have his book handy to refer to that section, but again this seems important. In continental philosophy this ends up being discussed a lot due to the place Heidegger gives it contra Husserl. A common critique of Heidegger many make is that he confuses a logical or semantic issue as an ontological one. (i.e. apply Frege against Heidegger) In this tact the meaning of the copula is tied to the meaning of the two parts and exists purely as a kind of intent. By making the copula an index (in the robust sense he gives indices) Peirce goes well beyond the Frege inspired approaches. I honestly think Heidegger and Peirce are very similar in their approaches if not the same here. Heidegger famously talks about being not being a being, nor a property of beings, nor a concept etc. It mediates between concepts and beings but is itself not something mediated. While I think it fair to criticize the clarity of Heidegger’s language (although he is working within the Cartesian and Husserlian tradition) I think he really is speaking of the copula (being) as an index. Further it’s a robust index such that it is a sign and not merely a relation between two things. This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the move towards an externalist approach to mind in Heidegger is also made in Peirce. And it’s precisely within the proposition (or more expansively the dicisign) that Peirce makes this move. I suspect both of them are making this move due to influence from Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. (I think this is explicit for Heidegger although I’m not sure) Within the analytic tradition a lot of this is “solved” via judgments. This doesn’t quite work since we then have to ask what makes judgements possible. (Heidegger gets at this in many places although I vaguely recall Peirce arguing along similar lines although I can’t find where) If there is a genuine index in the proposition then of course that explains why judgments are possible. I’d add that, while we aren’t discussing it, I think the iconic component of the dicisign for Peirce also pops up in various places in Heidegger. For instance his discussion of the lógos of the phenomena we have a icon/index pair such that objects show themselves. For Husserl we get an ideal meaning and for Kant we get a representation. While Peirce has a representational aspect, his icons are far more powerful than what Husserl or Kant supply. Especially when tied with the index. Further given the place of the index and his logic of vagueness Peirce is able to explain propositions that gesture towards the unknown. That becomes quite important within the Heideggarian tradition - especially where it’s pushed by Gadamer, Derrida and Ricouer. Now a possible place we have a divide between Heidegger and Peirce is found within your quote from EP 2:311. There the copula joins not the two signs “Socrates” and “wise” but their replicas. For Heidegger the copula shows the objects of both. So for Heidegger the copula brings the two elements as indices. Although Heidegger does distinguish between two senses. One he calls the existential-hermeneutical (or the hermeneutical “as”). This is the “for the sake of” relationship. The second is the predicative as-structure or opophantical. This is basically the use in assertions. I think, although I may well be wrong, that this is the distinction between the index as an index and the index as indicating via an icon. Peirce makes a move along those lines farther down in the EP 2:311 passage. For something would have to bring the general sense of that general verb down to the case in hand. An index alone can do this. But how is this index to signify the connection? In the only way in which any index can ever signify anything; by involving an icon. If I’m right then this aspect of the copula within the dicisign has the two rhemes originarily as indices but does so by way of an icon. That is the d
Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1
Gary F., Jeff, Clark, lists,
I've been reading the passages you pointed to from *Kaina Stoicheia* ("New
Elements") in EP2, Gary, and I tend to agree with you that, while I too
will be very interested in the special direction that Jeff would like to
take the discussion of this chapter of NP, that for the purposes of the
seminar more can be accomplished of general interest and value to members
of *both* lists if we don't get too distracted by reflections on the
history of Whewill, Mill, and Kant conceptions of the proposition, at least
just yet (one can imagine that a deep reflection on those accounts in
relation to Peirce's own might itself warrant a seminar of several to many
weeks; in fact, it sounds like a good dissertation topic).
In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial interest
and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the
way that in the proposition "Socrates is wise," for example, that ". . .it
is not the two *signs* 'Socrates' and 'wise' that are connected, but the
*replicas* of them used in the sentence" (EP2:110, emphasis added).
This paragraph is very rich and I'd like to return to it later in the week.
Just now I'm considering it in the light of something which Peirce says in
the very next paragraph and which relates to Clark's question regarding the
relation between logic and mathematics as well as to the nature of logic as
semiotic itself.
Three snippets: "Logic is a science little removed from pure mathematics."
"Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. A sign is something
which exists in replicas." ". . . logic, [. . .] is a study, not of
replicas, but of signs" (EP2.311).
So taken together, I take this to mean that although signs exist as
replicas, logic is *not *the study of those replicas at all, but rather the
study of the *essential *nature of signs. That is to say that it is not the
study of anything existential, but of something more *general* which *can
be* instantiated. It is the nature of *that* reality behind the replicas,
so to speak, which semiotics (and mathematics) study, one of the reasons
why, in my understanding so far, that the study of dicisigns has direct
application to biosemiotics.
Best,
Gary R.
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 9:50 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
> Jeff, I think what you have in mind here is a more 'advanced' stream of our
> seminar, i.e. for those who are " trying to work more systematically
> through
> his philosophical position." But since we expect that many of those
> following this seminar are not trying to do that, it's likely that those
> who
> aren't Peirce specialists will need a more entry-level approach in order to
> get the gist (and the importance) of Peirce's take on propositions. For
> this
> more basic approach, consideration of "the respective accounts of the
> proposition offered by Whewell, Mill and Kant", though relevant, might be
> more distracting than helpful. So although I hope to read what you say on
> the subject, and the proposed answers to your questions, most of my own
> limited time and energy will be devoted to that more basic approach,
> leaving
> the more advanced stream to you. Come to think of it, maybe we should
> divide
> up Chapter 3 between us in that way, rather than me taking the first half
> and you the second half (as the schedule says). But you and I can discuss
> that offlist.
>
> I suppose Frederik will probably have good answers to the questions at the
> end of your post, but you may have to wait awhile for them, as he's 'on the
> road' in Germany this week and may not have time to post.
>
> gary f.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> Sent: 23-Sep-14 6:05 PM
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
> Subject: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions,
> Chapter 3.1
>
> Gary F., Jon, Lists,
>
> Looking back on my own struggles to find coherence in Peirce's published
> and
> unpublished writings, I now think that the early lectures 1865-6 are
> actually quite a good place to start--at least when one reaches the point
> of
> trying to work more systematically through his philosophical position.
> That, I believe is what Jon was pointing to when he suggested that Peirce's
> later accounts of the different kinds of sign functions and relations were
> already present--sometimes in a quite a clear form--in the early lectures.
> Jon also referred to the 1870 essay on the logic
Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1
One other brief thought. Something I’ve not seen discussed much in the literature is the relationship between mathematics and propositions. (This may just because admittedly I’ve not sought out such discussions) Propositions are usually taken as linguistic with fairly strict boundaries on what counts as language. Now clearly Peirce’s dicisigns can handle equations and other meanings written via highly symbolic notation or even graphs. Traditional philosophy would need at best these to be translated into language first I think. I’d think we also fall into the question of mathematical foundations as well. Those who see mathematics as pure syntactical manipulation probably are fine with there being no propositions for math. Those who see more meaning in math probably need to deal with this. (Whether platonists or otherwise) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1
Jeff, I think what you have in mind here is a more 'advanced' stream of our seminar, i.e. for those who are " trying to work more systematically through his philosophical position." But since we expect that many of those following this seminar are not trying to do that, it's likely that those who aren't Peirce specialists will need a more entry-level approach in order to get the gist (and the importance) of Peirce's take on propositions. For this more basic approach, consideration of "the respective accounts of the proposition offered by Whewell, Mill and Kant", though relevant, might be more distracting than helpful. So although I hope to read what you say on the subject, and the proposed answers to your questions, most of my own limited time and energy will be devoted to that more basic approach, leaving the more advanced stream to you. Come to think of it, maybe we should divide up Chapter 3 between us in that way, rather than me taking the first half and you the second half (as the schedule says). But you and I can discuss that offlist. I suppose Frederik will probably have good answers to the questions at the end of your post, but you may have to wait awhile for them, as he's 'on the road' in Germany this week and may not have time to post. gary f. -Original Message- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 23-Sep-14 6:05 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' Subject: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1 Gary F., Jon, Lists, Looking back on my own struggles to find coherence in Peirce's published and unpublished writings, I now think that the early lectures 1865-6 are actually quite a good place to start--at least when one reaches the point of trying to work more systematically through his philosophical position. That, I believe is what Jon was pointing to when he suggested that Peirce's later accounts of the different kinds of sign functions and relations were already present--sometimes in a quite a clear form--in the early lectures. Jon also referred to the 1870 essay on the logic of relatives, and that is more challenging for those of us who do not already find themselves at home in the worlds of logic and math--or do not find themselves at home in the world of Peirce's particular views on logic and math. As we make our way into Peirce's account of the dicisign and the logical character of the proposition, I think these early essays are particularly helpful--in part because they show us there is remarkable continuity in the development of his thought on these logical matters from the very get go--and also because it provides a clear window on what exactly is providing much of the larger context and background we would need to study in order to deepen our understanding of what he is trying to do and what is guiding the development of his thought. Following this lead a bit, I think it will be helpful as we make our way through Chapter 3 of NP to consider the respective accounts of the proposition offered by Whewell, Mill and Kant, and then to consider their views in relationship to the larger historical trends. As we know, Peirce was drawing a number of key insights from his careful examination of the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism. In order to understand these insights, it is good to consider the development of logical accounts of deduction, induction and hypothesis--and the features of the premises and conclusions (i.e., the propositions) that function in such forms of argumentation--from the Port Royal Logic up through the modern period. As we can see from "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties," "Consequences" and "Further Consequences," he's trying to identify the roots of the most basic mistakes that were made in this tradition as a whole. Focusing on the account of the proposition in this tradition, we can see that Peirce is questioning a number of the key assumptions that were made about the kinds of data that might be used to get an account off the ground. He is rejecting data that is drawn from a supposed power of introspection, and he is rejecting data gathered through a supposed power of intuition. So, I'd like to ask, what are the key data that a logical theory should draw on for the purposes of generating and testing hypotheses about real the nature of the dicisign? How might we analyze those data for the sake of clarifying what needs to be explained? How might we correct for errors that might have been made in the collection of those data? --Jeff - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
