Gary F., Jeff, Clark, lists,
I've been reading the passages you pointed to from *Kaina Stoicheia* ("New
Elements") in EP2, Gary, and I tend to agree with you that, while I too
will be very interested in the special direction that Jeff would like to
take the discussion of this chapter of NP, that for the purposes of the
seminar more can be accomplished of general interest and value to members
of *both* lists if we don't get too distracted by reflections on the
history of Whewill, Mill, and Kant conceptions of the proposition, at least
just yet (one can imagine that a deep reflection on those accounts in
relation to Peirce's own might itself warrant a seminar of several to many
weeks; in fact, it sounds like a good dissertation topic).
In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial interest
and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the
way that in the proposition "Socrates is wise," for example, that ". . .it
is not the two *signs* 'Socrates' and 'wise' that are connected, but the
*replicas* of them used in the sentence" (EP2:110, emphasis added).
This paragraph is very rich and I'd like to return to it later in the week.
Just now I'm considering it in the light of something which Peirce says in
the very next paragraph and which relates to Clark's question regarding the
relation between logic and mathematics as well as to the nature of logic as
semiotic itself.
Three snippets: "Logic is a science little removed from pure mathematics."
"Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. A sign is something
which exists in replicas." ". . . logic, [. . .] is a study, not of
replicas, but of signs" (EP2.311).
So taken together, I take this to mean that although signs exist as
replicas, logic is *not *the study of those replicas at all, but rather the
study of the *essential *nature of signs. That is to say that it is not the
study of anything existential, but of something more *general* which *can
be* instantiated. It is the nature of *that* reality behind the replicas,
so to speak, which semiotics (and mathematics) study, one of the reasons
why, in my understanding so far, that the study of dicisigns has direct
application to biosemiotics.
Best,
Gary R.
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 9:50 AM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
> Jeff, I think what you have in mind here is a more 'advanced' stream of our
> seminar, i.e. for those who are " trying to work more systematically
> through
> his philosophical position." But since we expect that many of those
> following this seminar are not trying to do that, it's likely that those
> who
> aren't Peirce specialists will need a more entry-level approach in order to
> get the gist (and the importance) of Peirce's take on propositions. For
> this
> more basic approach, consideration of "the respective accounts of the
> proposition offered by Whewell, Mill and Kant", though relevant, might be
> more distracting than helpful. So although I hope to read what you say on
> the subject, and the proposed answers to your questions, most of my own
> limited time and energy will be devoted to that more basic approach,
> leaving
> the more advanced stream to you. Come to think of it, maybe we should
> divide
> up Chapter 3 between us in that way, rather than me taking the first half
> and you the second half (as the schedule says). But you and I can discuss
> that offlist.
>
> I suppose Frederik will probably have good answers to the questions at the
> end of your post, but you may have to wait awhile for them, as he's 'on the
> road' in Germany this week and may not have time to post.
>
> gary f.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> Sent: 23-Sep-14 6:05 PM
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
> Subject: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions,
> Chapter 3.1
>
> Gary F., Jon, Lists,
>
> Looking back on my own struggles to find coherence in Peirce's published
> and
> unpublished writings, I now think that the early lectures 1865-6 are
> actually quite a good place to start--at least when one reaches the point
> of
> trying to work more systematically through his philosophical position.
> That, I believe is what Jon was pointing to when he suggested that Peirce's
> later accounts of the different kinds of sign functions and relations were
> already present--sometimes in a quite a clear form--in the early lectures.
> Jon also referred to the 1870 essay on the logic of relatives, and that is
> more challenging for those of us who do not already find themselves at home
> in the worlds of logic and math--or do not find themselves at home in the
> world of Peirce's particular views on logic and math.
>
> As we make our way into Peirce's account of the dicisign and the logical
> character of the proposition, I think these early essays are particularly
> helpful--in part because they show us there is remarkable continuity in the
> development of his thought on these logical matters from the very get
> go--and also because it provides a clear window on what exactly is
> providing
> much of the larger context and background we would need to study in order
> to
> deepen our understanding of what he is trying to do and what is guiding the
> development of his thought.
>
> Following this lead a bit, I think it will be helpful as we make our way
> through Chapter 3 of NP to consider the respective accounts of the
> proposition offered by Whewell, Mill and Kant, and then to consider their
> views in relationship to the larger historical trends. As we know, Peirce
> was drawing a number of key insights from his careful examination of the
> Aristotelian theory of the syllogism. In order to understand these
> insights, it is good to consider the development of logical accounts of
> deduction, induction and hypothesis--and the features of the premises and
> conclusions (i.e., the propositions) that function in such forms of
> argumentation--from the Port Royal Logic up through the modern period. As
> we can see from "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties," "Consequences"
> and
> "Further Consequences," he's trying to identify the roots of the most basic
> mistakes that were made in this tradition as a whole. Focusing on the
> account of the proposition in this tradition, we can see that Peirce is
> questioning a number of the key assumptions that were made about the kinds
> of data that might be used to get an account off the ground. He is
> rejecting data that is drawn from a supposed power of introspection, and he
> is rejecting data gathered through a supposed power of intuition.
>
> So, I'd like to ask, what are the key data that a logical theory should
> draw
> on for the purposes of generating and testing hypotheses about real the
> nature of the dicisign? How might we analyze those data for the sake of
> clarifying what needs to be explained? How might we correct for errors
> that
> might have been made in the collection of those data?
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
>
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