One other brief thought. Something I’ve not seen discussed much in the literature is the relationship between mathematics and propositions. (This may just because admittedly I’ve not sought out such discussions) Propositions are usually taken as linguistic with fairly strict boundaries on what counts as language. Now clearly Peirce’s dicisigns can handle equations and other meanings written via highly symbolic notation or even graphs. Traditional philosophy would need at best these to be translated into language first I think.
I’d think we also fall into the question of mathematical foundations as well. Those who see mathematics as pure syntactical manipulation probably are fine with there being no propositions for math. Those who see more meaning in math probably need to deal with this. (Whether platonists or otherwise)
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