subject:"Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning"

Gary R., List:

Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and thought-provoking
response.  Up until now, I have been considering all of this with the
mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed as *one *Sign.  Upon
reflection, I realize that such an approach fails to take proper account of
the nature of a *genuine *Sign as "something that exists in replicas" (EP
2:411; 1904).  What you seem to be suggesting--please correct me if I am
misunderstanding--is that the same "thing" can be a Replica of *more than
one* Sign.

In this case, as Gary F. observed, the girl's scream is, for her,
"primarily a natural sign," or what I have started calling a
*degenerate *Sign--an
instinctive physical reflex, rather than an intentional "utterance"--such
that all six Correlates are Existents (2ns).  As such, I get the sense that
many of the steps in the *internal *chain of events, from the contact of
the child's finger with the hot burner to the propagation of sound waves
from her vocal chords--including both of those phenomena themselves--could
conceivably be analyzed as *dynamical*, rather than *semiosic*.  Why should
we treat the girl's scream as the Dynamic Interpretant of a particular
neural pattern within her that represents the hot burner, rather than as
merely the last in a series of strictly dyadic causes and effects?  If she
effectively *cannot help* but scream, is this really an example of
Sign-action at all?  The same questions arise regarding the flight of a
bird upon hearing a loud sound.  I have some vague notions of possible
answers, but I am hoping that you (or someone else) can provide a clear
explanation.

For the mother, on the other hand, the scream does not produce any
kind of *deterministic
*response.  Although it probably triggers certain "motherly instincts," she
rushes into the kitchen *deliberately*; presumably she *could *ignore the
child if she were so inclined, as a neglectful parent might be.  From her
standpoint, the child is the *utterer* of the Sign that is the scream, even
if *unintentionally*; and therefore, the girl is indeed where we must
"look" to "find" the Sign's Dynamic Object, "the essential ingredient of
the utterer" (EP 2:404; 1907).  However, I am still not convinced that it
is the child *herself*; typically when a Sign *has *an utterer, the Dynamic
Object is *not *that utterer, but whatever the utterer (as the saying
goes) *has
in mind* upon uttering the Sign--in this case, perhaps the *pain *that the
girl is sensing.  The Immediate Object is then the combination of
attributes of *this particular scream* that the mother's Collateral
Experience leads her to associate with previous *screams of pain or
distress* that she has heard, both from this child and from others, which
likely differentiates them somehow from *other kinds* of childish screams.

This, then, takes us back to my first paragraph above.  For the mother, the
girl's scream is a *Replica*--a Token of a Type--which it obviously *cannot
*be for the child.  The Dynamic Object of the corresponding *genuine *Sign
is presumably something like *pain or distress in general*.  Hence the
context-dependence of any *concrete *instance of *actual *semiosis--necessarily
involving Replicas--is quite evident here.

Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels highly
conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.
In fact, I can already anticipate that Edwina will reject it right
away--understandably, given her very different model of semiosis--but I am
eager to see what you and others have to say.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 6:12 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I
> still can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the
> mother. You wrote:
>
> JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the
> child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not continuous?
>
> I do not see the semioses as continuous which is not to say that there is
> no continuity. There's a continuity of communication, shall we say, but the
> dynamic object of each person's semiosis is different in my opinion.
>
> The mother's semiosis at that moment of its occurrence seems to me not
> determined by the oven at all, but by her daughter. So in my view the
> Immediate Object of the mother concerns the oven not at all. Rather it is
> grounded (in Peirce's sense of the ground of a sign, which he later terms
> the immediate object: 'selected' characters of the DO) in the child
> herself.Again, the ground of he semiosis cannot be the child in the
> entirety of all her characters (an impossibility), but exactly those which
> are predominant, her scream, perhaps the look on her face, etc.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Hi Soren... Interesting. Peirce uses the word flummery in ref. to Hegel.
Who has examined Peirce in relation to logical positivism? He missed it
didn't he? As to finding a basis for empirically showing the impact of
ontological terms, it seems to me that the Symbol in the triad Icon(Sign)
Index Symbol amounts to a sort of laboratory for the testing of such
things. I would love to design such a study based on Peirce's understanding
of the power and ubiquity of memorial maxims.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 7:29 PM, Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk> wrote:

> I think all three categories are framed in the phenomenological view of
> experience as the primary reality, where he also seems to place qualitative
> mathematic. But he opens for the possibility of an outer word behind
> experience through Secondness and therefore opens for an empirical realism,
> which is what he criticize Hegel for not doing. It seem to me that when we
> get to Thirdness we already have established an inner and an outer world. I
> think that is his trick to make empirical quantitative research possible
> from a phenomenological and hermeneutical basis. Thereby he goes beyond
> logical positivism. No one else has done this*.* But I do not have quotes
> to support this. So if anybody have it I would be grateful. . More might be
> found in C. Misak’s *Verificationism.*
>
>
>
>   Best
>
>  Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 16:33
> *To:* Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Thanks, Soren -- I think that clears it up.  Does phenomenology apply as a
> sort of catch-all for the various attributes of the three elements of the
> triad? Does Peirce's phenomenology deal with the ontological. I assume that
> while ontology deals with words that words themselves refer to what lies
> behind them. I find it convenient to see the words that are key grouped
> either as ontotogy (truth, beauty, freedom and so forth) or as utilities
> (will, reason, etc) I guess that is a point at which people's philosophy
> becomes individualized, almost necessarily.
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk> wrote:
>
> Dear Stephen and Edwina
>
>
>
> I think the entropy is a natural scientific conceptualization of
> evolutionary processes in natural science, further developed by Prigogine
> into a non-equilibrium thermodynamics but is unable to encompass
> experiential mind as it is created in a materialist-energetic ontology (not
> even an informational one) where Peirce in his philosophy includes
> phenomenology.
>
>
>
> Best
>
>    Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 15:18
> *To:* Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> sent:*
>
> Gary R., List:
&

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-13 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I still
can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the mother.
You wrote:

JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the
child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not continuous?

I do not see the semioses as continuous which is not to say that there is
no continuity. There's a continuity of communication, shall we say, but the
dynamic object of each person's semiosis is different in my opinion.

The mother's semiosis at that moment of its occurrence seems to me not
determined by the oven at all, but by her daughter. So in my view the
Immediate Object of the mother concerns the oven not at all. Rather it is
grounded (in Peirce's sense of the ground of a sign, which he later terms
the immediate object: 'selected' characters of the DO) in the child
herself.Again, the ground of he semiosis cannot be the child in the
entirety of all her characters (an impossibility), but exactly those which
are predominant, her scream, perhaps the look on her face, etc. So, again,
as I see it the Dynamic Object for the mother is the child, while those
several characters which form the ground of her semiosis (equivalent to her
immediate object) contribute to a wholly different IO-R-II-DI, and so a
different Sign, than her daughter's, again, the consequence of their
having *entirely
different* Dynamic Objects.

Edwina, while my understanding of the semioses involved here seems closer
to yours than to Jon's, I do not agree that the child's scream in the DO.
For just as the DO was the oven, while the heat (a character) from the
flaming burners led to the child's pain (a character) that grounded her
semiosis, it was the child as DO whose scream (a character for her mother)
grounded her mother's semiosis.

Jon continued:

JAS: It seems to me that there must be some semiotic connection between the
hot burner and the mother's eventual response to the child's cry, because
the one would not have happened without the other.

Well this kind of thinking would, I believe, lead to an infinite regress
going as far back as the child's conception, and probably much further back
than that. It seems to me a kind of post hoc, propter hoc version of that
regress. What you point to ("the one would not have happened without the
other") seems to me more like physical than semiotic determination.

JAS: Why regard the girl's scream as having a different Dynamic Object for
the mother than it does for the child?  Is it not the very same Sign?

I do not *at al*l see it as "the very same Sign." In my view there are two
signs, not, however, unrelated, and even intimately connected by the DI of
the child leading to the IO of the mother: but still *two distinct signs*(at
least) Here I think Edwina and I may be in at least partial agreement.

So, I think I already offered a reason in my earlier post as to why I think
our views are so different GR: ". . . in my understanding the interpretant
standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign
itself does"  doesn't apply to both signs, but to the child's sign and* not
*to the mother's (as you've been analyzing the semioses).

The remainer of your analysis follows from your viewpoint which, as I see
it, goes well beyond the example into habit-change and the like which will
in my view necessarily involve more time, more semiosis, additional signs,
etc. than the discrete analysis put forth here. This is not to suggest that
the habits of the mother and the daughter will not lead to perhaps
life-changing habit change. But you yourself have noted that these will be
very different habits: not touching flames in the future for the child; not
leaving the child alone in the kitchen in the future for the mother. Again,
this stark difference in habit-change strongly suggests to me two different
signs, not one.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
> In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am going
> to try combining multiple replies into one post.
>
> Gary R.:
>
> 1.  I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside, their
> capacity for Habit-change.  Hopefully it is evident that I am still very
> much open to adjusting my own views on these matters.
>
> 2.  In particular, as you have observed and I have acknowledged
> previously, I tend to be a more abstract than concrete thinker; so these
> kinds of practical examples are good "stretching exercises" for me.  In
> this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the child's
> semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not *continuous*?  It
> seems to me that there must be *some *semiotic connection between the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Edwina, List:

What you quoted from EP 2:304 is at the bottom of the page, where Peirce
contrasts theory (from a Sign of an Object as Matter to Interpretants as
Form to *perceiving *Entelechy) with practice (from a Sign of a character
as Form to Interpretants as Matter to *producing* Entelechy).  For example,
scientists study things and develop theories to explain them (theory),
while engineers conceive ideas and design artifacts to embody them
(practice).  The meaning of the key Aristotelian terms *in this context* is
spelled out in the previous paragraph.

CSP:  But so far as the "Truth" is merely the *object *of a sign, it is
merely the Aristotelian *Matter *of it that is so. In addition however
to *denoting
*objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or
qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the
Aristotelian *Form* of the universe that it signifies ... Aristotle gropes
for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in
making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the
ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such
identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the
very form signified by it.

Form is 1ns (characters or qualities *signified *by the Sign), Matter is
2ns (objects *denoted *by the Sign), and Entelechy is 3ns (Matter and
Form *united
*by the Sign).  Even if you are not convinced about *this *passage, it is
absolutely undeniable that this is how Peirce aligns the terms with the
Categories in NEM 4:292-300.  Nevertheless, I continue to acknowledge that
he uses "form" differently elsewhere, including places where it is
associated with 3ns.  However, I am still wondering what contrasting terms
you would put in the blanks to label the Categories as _, _, and
Form.

I do appreciate you answering my other three questions, though.  Regarding
(a), Peirce said that a Habit-change is *not *a Sign and thus *does not*
have a subsequent Interpretant, so it seems to me that semiosis terminates
at that point.  Regarding (b), I am still not seeing a good reason to treat
chemical breakdown as triadic rather than dyadic, since it seems to me that
the physical processes involved can all be explained in terms of the latter
kind of action.  Regarding (c), I am not defining a Quasi-mind as a
"thing," but as a bundle of habits, which is precisely how Peirce
characterized a *substance *(CP 1.414, EP 2:279; 1887-8); he also once
described a *man *as "a bundle of habits" with "the unity of
self-consciousness" that "must be given as a centre for the habits" (CP
6.228; 1898), which sounds very much like the concept of Quasi-mind that I
am exploring.

Thanks again,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Jon - in reply
>
> 1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:
>
> 'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
> passing from this to its matter, to successive interpretants embodying
> more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a direct
> perception of the entelechy.setting out from a sign signifying a
> character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as its form, to
> successive interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter
> hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct effort, producing the
> entelchy'.
>
> [Note: My underlinings are italics in the original].
>
>  I don't see 'form' as Firstness in this selection from Peirce.
>
>  Instead, I read the first part as a semiosic process, moving from a
> direct indexical experience of an object, to a concept of its
> Form/Type/3rdness...to reach a Final Interpretant ]Entelechy]
>
> I read the second example as a semiosic process, moving from a symbolic
> experience [idea], to a concept of its Form/Type/3rdness..to figuring out
> its matter [2ndness]...to reach the final Interpretant [entelechy].
>
> a] I read 5.476 and EP 2.418 as a change in the nature of the habits;
> i.e., a change in the nature of 3rdness.
>
> b] The breakdown of the chemical composition of a rock is triadic, where
> the habits holding together the molecules of the rock , in interaction with
> external molecules [eg, oxygen of the air, water, heat from the sun],
> become weaker and as such these molecules are free of the habits. This is
> not dyadic or mechanical, for the rock doesn't break into 'bits' - the
> habits lose their power to organize the molecules into a rock.
>
> c] No - I find your use of quasi-mind problematic. You seem to be defining
> a 'thing-in-itself'; i.e., any form of matter with the capacity for
> self-organization and interaction with other 'things'.
>
> Edwina
>

-
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-13 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - in reply

1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:

'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this to its matter, to successive interpretants
embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a
direct perception of the entelechy.setting out from a sign
signifying a character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as
its form, to successive interpretants realizing more and more
precisely its matter hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct
effort, producing the entelchy'.

[Note: My underlinings are italics in the original].

 I don't see 'form' as Firstness in this selection from Peirce.

 Instead, I read the first part as a semiosic process, moving from a
direct indexical experience of an object, to a concept of its
Form/Type/3rdness...to reach a Final Interpretant ]Entelechy]

I read the second example as a semiosic process, moving from a
symbolic experience [idea], to a concept of its Form/Type/3rdness..to
figuring out its matter [2ndness]...to reach the final Interpretant
[entelechy].

a] I read 5.476 and EP 2.418 as a change in the nature of the
habits; i.e., a change in the nature of 3rdness.

b] The breakdown of the chemical composition of a rock is triadic,
where the habits holding together the molecules of the rock , in
interaction with external molecules [eg, oxygen of the air, water,
heat from the sun], become weaker and as such these molecules are
free of the habits. This is not dyadic or mechanical, for the rock
doesn't break into 'bits' - the habits lose their power to organize
the molecules into a rock.

c] No - I find your use of quasi-mind problematic. You seem to be
defining a 'thing-in-itself'; i.e., any form of matter with the
capacity for self-organization and interaction with other 'things'. 

Edwina
 Edwina, List:
 Just to clarify, what is undeniable is that Peirce associated Form
with 1ns in those two passages (NEM 4:292-300, EP 2:304)--not as
"freshness, spontaneity," but as "quality, suchness" in one case and
"characters, or qualities" in the other.  I agree that he used "form"
to mean other things in other writings, including 3ns as you have
outlined.  I am also familiar with the various words that he
associated with each Category on different occasions; my specific
question for you is which ones for 1ns and 2ns, respectively, you
would contrast with "form" as 3ns.  Put another way, Peirce labeled
the Categories as Form, Matter, and Entelechy in those two passages;
what would you put in the blanks to label them instead as _,
_, and Form? 
 I also remain interested in getting your responses to the following,
as I continue to gain a better understanding of your views on these
matters.
 a.  What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907)
that habit-changes as "ultimate logical interpretants" are not Signs
(CP 5.476), or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are (at
least) not Signs in the same way as the Signs that produce them (EP
2:418)?
 b.  What warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as (triadic)
semiosic action, rather than (dyadic) dynamical action?
 c.  Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative
definition of "Quasi-mind" as a bundle of Collateral Experience and
Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and
thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires
a  purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any Sign?
 Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
  On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:54 AM, Edwina Taborskywrote:
Jon, list -

1. With regard to the example - I consider the child's scream to be
a DI, which then transforms into a DO for the mother.

2. I do not think that it is 'undeniable' that Peirce associated
Form with Firstness. Apart from that one quote - which I have, in a
separate post before I read this response from you - interpreted it
to mean 'wholeness of Type' rather than the fresh spontaneity that is
Firstness - I can't find any references in Peirce's work using Form as
Firstness. 

3. It isn't that I 'prefer' aligning Form with 3rdness, which
suggests a strictly individual interpretation - I read Peirce's work
as doing just that.

4. As for Peirce's terms for the three categories - he has provided
them throughout his work:

Firstness: spontaneity, chance, state, quality, freshness, feeling,
possible

Secondness; brute, struggle, reaction, otherness, existent,
volition, fact

Thirdness: habit,, mind, mediation, necessity, generality,
continuity 

Edwina On

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Edwina, List:

Just to clarify, what is undeniable is that Peirce associated Form with 1ns *in
those two passages* (NEM 4:292-300, EP 2:304)--not as "freshness,
spontaneity," but as "quality, suchness" in one case and "characters, or
qualities" in the other.  I agree that he used "form" to mean other things
in other writings, including 3ns as you have outlined.  I am also familiar
with the various words that he associated with each Category on different
occasions; my specific question for you is which ones for 1ns and 2ns,
respectively, you would contrast with "form" as 3ns.  Put another way,
Peirce labeled the Categories as Form, Matter, and Entelechy in those two
passages; what would you put in the blanks to label them instead as _,
_, and Form?

I also remain interested in getting your responses to the following, as I
continue to gain a better understanding of your views on these matters.

a.  What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907) that
habit-changes as "ultimate logical interpretants" are not Signs (CP 5.476),
or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are (at least) not Signs in
the same way as the Signs that produce them (EP 2:418)?

b.  What warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as (triadic) semiosic
action, rather than (dyadic) dynamical action?

c.  Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative definition of
"Quasi-mind" as a bundle of Collateral Experience and Habits of
Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains the capacity for
Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus can be the
Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a *purpose*) and the
Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list -
>
> 1. With regard to the example - I consider the child's scream to be a DI,
> which then transforms into a DO for the mother.
>
> 2. I do not think that it is 'undeniable' that Peirce associated Form with
> Firstness. Apart from that one quote - which I have, in a separate post
> before I read this response from you - interpreted it to mean 'wholeness
> of Type' rather than the fresh spontaneity that is Firstness - I can't
> find any references in Peirce's work using Form as Firstness.
>
> 3. It isn't that I 'prefer' aligning Form with 3rdness, which suggests a
> strictly individual interpretation - I read Peirce's work as doing just
> that.
>
> 4. As for Peirce's terms for the three categories - he has provided them
> throughout his work:
>
> Firstness: spontaneity, chance, state, quality, freshness, feeling,
> possible
>
> Secondness; brute, struggle, reaction, otherness, existent, volition, fact
>
> Thirdness: habit,, mind, mediation, necessity, generality, continuity
>
> Edwina
>
On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> List
>
> With reference to 'form', as I said, Peirce has multiple references to it.
> When I look up, in the CP index, the term 'form', besides page numbers, I
> also find 'see also Generals'...and generals are Thirdness.
>
> "originality is not an attribute of the matter of life, present in the
> whole only so far as it is present in the smallest parts, but is an affair
> of form, of the way in which parts none of which possess it are joined
> together" 4.611
>
> Peirce refers to form as 'type': "this noun is not an existent thing; it
> is a type or form, to which objects, both those that are externally
> existent and those which are imagined may conform, but which none of them
> can exactly be' 5.429.
>
> In 5.430, he refers to generals and forms...In 5.194 - he refers to the
> difference between matter and logical form
>
> In 5.550- he refers to the mathematical form..'as represents only the
> sameness and diversities involved in that state of things".  This sounds,
> to me, like 3rdness not 1stness.
>
> Then, in 6.353 and on, there is his long outline of the history of the
> distinction between matter and form. And in 6.360- a long list of the
> 'varieties of form' - something imposible within the mode of Firstness.
>
> I  am aware of that one quote referring to Form as  quality, suchness' -
> but I take that to mean only the holistic nature of Form, which is meant to
> be understood in its whole general nature rather than by its mechanical
> parts.
>
> So- I'll still maintain that Peirce's use of Form refers to its generality
> of Type and not to a state of 'freshness, spontaneity'- which is Firstness.
>
> Note- see also 1.409, with Pierce's rejection that habits will eventually
> be dominant in the world.."at any assignable date in the future there will
> be some slight aberrancy from law'.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to

Re: : Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Interesting Edwina -- I would see the formation of a habit as what we are
looking at. And indeed a continual adjustment even when habits exist in
relatively stable form. A while back I took entropy to mean the dispersion
of everything with no reference to Peirce or habits or the eventual
attainment of order which I take to be an objective of CSP. Wittgenstein is
of interest I believe because he regarded most of what matters as
unspeakable. I am interested in what seems to me almost a Peirce goal to
make metaphysics a science. That would be a good move.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:37 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Stephen - I can't answer all your questions, but, to my understanding, the
> fact of Firstness - which introduces deviations from the norm, is a key
> 'cause' of the dissipation of a habit. To me - that is entropy.
>
> I have no knowledge of Wittgenstein.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 13/02/18 9:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, Jon, list:
>>
>> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
>> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
>> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
>> Matter and vice versa.
>>
>> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
>> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
>> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
>> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
>> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
>> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
>> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>>
>> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>>
>> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
>> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
>> is a State and has no structure.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-13 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen - I can't answer all your questions, but, to my
understanding, the fact of Firstness - which introduces deviations
from the norm, is a key 'cause' of the dissipation of a habit. To me
- that is entropy.

I have no knowledge of Wittgenstein.

Edwina
 On Tue 13/02/18  9:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the
location of what we might term ontology -- things we make into words
that are indeed Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that
entropy trumped what I would call syntropy? If so did he then believe
that logic was entropic? 
 amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
 On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary R, Jon, list:

1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because
Firstness, which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as
Thirdness/habits. Even a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think
that Mind is ever separate from Matter and vice versa.

2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can
regress to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the
Mother, the Sign that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign]. The hot stove is almost irrelevant to
her. 

3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.

4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and
I certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness.
Firstness is a State and has no structure.

Edwina


Links:
--
[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-13 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 
 List

With reference to 'form', as I said, Peirce has multiple references
to it. When I look up, in the CP index, the term 'form', besides page
numbers, I also find 'see also Generals'...and generals are Thirdness.

"originality is not an attribute of the matter of life, present in
the whole only so far as it is present in the smallest parts, but is
an affair of form, of the way in which parts none of which possess it
are joined together" 4.611

Peirce refers to form as 'type': "this noun is not an existent
thing; it is a type or form, to which objects, both those that are
externally existent and those which are imagined may conform, but
which none of them can exactly be' 5.429.

In 5.430, he refers to generals and forms...In 5.194 - he refers to
the difference between matter and logical form

In 5.550- he refers to the mathematical form..'as represents only
the sameness and diversities involved in that state of things".  This
sounds, to me, like 3rdness not 1stness. 

Then, in 6.353 and on, there is his long outline of the history of
the distinction between matter and form. And in 6.360- a long list of
the 'varieties of form' - something imposible within the mode of
Firstness.

I  am aware of that one quote referring to Form as  quality,
suchness' - but I take that to mean only the holistic nature of Form,
which is meant to be understood in its whole general nature rather
than by its mechanical parts. 

So- I'll still maintain that Peirce's use of Form refers to its
generality of Type and not to a state of 'freshness, spontaneity'-
which is Firstness.

Note- see also 1.409, with Pierce's rejection that habits will
eventually be dominant in the world.."at any assignable date in the
future there will be some slight aberrancy from law'.

Edwina
 On Tue 13/02/18  8:34 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, Jon, list:

1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because
Firstness, which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as
Thirdness/habits. Even a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think
that Mind is ever separate from Matter and vice versa.

2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can
regress to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the
Mother, the Sign that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign]. The hot stove is almost irrelevant to
her. 

3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.

4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and
I certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness.
Firstness is a State and has no structure.

Edwina
 On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., List:
 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it,
the end of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the
production of a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a
material substance is a bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it
has effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it
seems to me that the behavior of such "things" can in most or all
cases be adequately analyzed in terms of  dyadic action/reaction,
rather than the irreducibly triadic action of semiosis.  In fact, I
am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a Quasi-mind (see #3
below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even though
"things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
Objects) of degenerate Signs.
 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an
II--not necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the
mother's inability (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my
view) as standing for the hot burner.  She would presumably find this
out very quickly, of course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The
Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of
pain--of which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant;  and
every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand in the same relation
to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.  Hence both the
internal neural signal and the external scream are  Indices of the hot
burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.  
  3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a  reacting substance)
that retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e.,   learning by
experience), and thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a   genuine Sign
(since this requires a   purpose) and the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Thanks, Soren -- I think that clears it up.  Does phenomenology apply as a
sort of catch-all for the various attributes of the three elements of the
triad? Does Peirce's phenomenology deal with the ontological. I assume that
while ontology deals with words that words themselves refer to what lies
behind them. I find it convenient to see the words that are key grouped
either as ontotogy (truth, beauty, freedom and so forth) or as utilities
(will, reason, etc) I guess that is a point at which people's philosophy
becomes individualized, almost necessarily.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk> wrote:

> Dear Stephen and Edwina
>
>
>
> I think the entropy is a natural scientific conceptualization of
> evolutionary processes in natural science, further developed by Prigogine
> into a non-equilibrium thermodynamics but is unable to encompass
> experiential mind as it is created in a materialist-energetic ontology (not
> even an informational one) where Peirce in his philosophy includes
> phenomenology.
>
>
>
> Best
>
>Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 15:18
> *To:* Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> sent:*
>
> Gary R., List:
>
>
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
> of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
>
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant;  and every Sign determines its Interpretant to
> stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself
> does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are 
> *Indices
> *of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.
>
>
>
> 3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
> current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

List:

In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am going
to try combining multiple replies into one post.

Gary R.:

1.  I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside, their
capacity for Habit-change.  Hopefully it is evident that I am still very
much open to adjusting my own views on these matters.

2.  In particular, as you have observed and I have acknowledged previously,
I tend to be a more abstract than concrete thinker; so these kinds of
practical examples are good "stretching exercises" for me.  In this case, I
am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the child's semiosis" and
"the mother's semiosis"; are they not *continuous*?  It seems to me that
there must be *some *semiotic connection between the hot burner and the
mother's eventual response to the child's cry, because the one would not
have happened without the other.  Why regard the girl's scream as
having a *different
*Dynamic Object for the mother than it does for the child?  Is it not the
very same Sign?  I suppose that it might have different *Immediate* Objects
for the two of them, because of their different Collateral Experiences, but
I am still mulling over that possibility.  Regardless, my conjecture is
that any "individual" instance of semiosis *begins* with a Dynamic
Object--either selected for a purpose in a Quasi-mind (genuine Signs), or a
"thing" itself (degenerate Signs)--and *ends* (if it ever does) with a
Habit-change.  For the child, that termination is (I suspect) her new habit
of not touching hot burners; but her scream, as a Dynamic Interpretant, is
an external Sign that continues the semiosic process in the mother--perhaps
resulting in a new habit of not leaving her daughter alone in the kitchen.

3.  As a matter of fact, Peirce used the term "quasi-sign" at least twice.
In "What Makes a Reasoning Sound" (1903), it refers to "certain objects
more or less analogous to signs," but nothing more is said (EP 2:257).  In
"Pragmatism" (1907), it refers to something that *would* be a Sign *except*
that it lacks "the triadic production of the interpretant," and a Jacquard
loom is given as an example (CP 5.473; cf. EP 2:404).  However, I think
that there is now fairly widespread consensus, at least among those of us
who have discussed it on the List in recent years, that as long as
something is *interpretable*--i.e., has an *Immediate* Interpretant--it
qualifies as a Sign, even if it never *actually* produces a *Dynamic*
Interpretant.

4.  I agree that Edwina is using "Form" in way that better aligns with 3ns
than 1ns.  As I said in the other thread, while it is undeniable that
Peirce associated "Form" with 1ns, "Matter" with 2ns, and "Entelechy" with
3ns in NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?) and EP 2:304 (1904), this does not entail
that he *always* did so.  Having reread both "A Sketch of Dichotomic
Mathematics" and "New Elements" within the last few days, I noticed a few
other uncanny similarities, suggesting that he may have composed them at
about the same time and for much the same purpose.  I wonder if that is why
the online Commens bibliography dates R 4 as 1904, rather than "c. 1903?"
per CP and Robin.

Edwina:

1.  What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907) that
habit-changes as "ultimate logical interpretants" are *not* Signs (CP
5.476), or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are (at least) not
Signs *in the same way* as the Signs that produce them (EP 2:418)?  What
warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as (triadic) *semiosic*
action, rather than (dyadic) *dynamical* action?  No one is advocating the
separation of Mind and Matter; the point, as always, is that Matter *is*
(effete) Mind whose habits have become so inveterate as to be effectively
invulnerable to *Habit-change*, which is the final cause of every semiosic
process.

2.  I agree that there is "a plethora of Signs" in the example, which is
why I said a while back that we have to agree on *which* Sign to analyze
before attempting to assign any of the other terms.  Right now, we are
discussing the girl's scream as a Sign; but unless you have changed your
mind, you analyze it instead as a Dynamic Object for the mother, since you
deny that there are any *external* Signs.

3.  Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative definition of
"Quasi-mind" (see below)?

4.  In NEM 4:292-300, obviously "Form" does not mean "formlessness."  In
fact, I find it very interesting that Peirce instead characterizes it as
"something definite," in contrast to other writings where "definite" and
"vague" are antonyms, and he associates the *latter* with 1ns (e.g., CP
5.447-450; 1905).  So again, we must pay careful attention to the context
and not necessarily impose the same interpretation on a given word
throughout Peirce's (or anyone else's) writings, despite his explicit
desire to be self-consistent in his own terminology.  Since you prefer
aligning "Form" with 3ns, what corresponding terms do you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of dyadic action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly triadic action of
> semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant;  and every Sign determines its Interpretant to
> stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself
> does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are 
> Indices
> of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.
>
> 3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
> current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
> Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that
> retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and
> thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires a
> purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any Sign.
>
> 4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>>
>> For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points.
>> In response to Edwina, Jon wrote:
>>
>> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
>> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
>> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
>> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
>> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
>> hoped that when we jointly recognized the  internal triad of [IO-R-II]
>> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call this (and only 
>> this)
>> the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign without a DO.
>>
>>
>> My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
>> created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
>> less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
>> analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
>> longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).
>>
>> John Deely, who introduced the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-13 Thread Neal Bruss

On Gary’s first point, cf. Peirce,  "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits 
becoming physical laws", discussed by
Lucia Santella, in Sign System Studies, the reference at 
https://philpapers.org/rec/SANMAE-8

I recall, and cannot find, Peirce saying somewhere something like that the 
purpose of signs for inquiry is the reduction of thinking, that is, that when 
habits are formed and deployed, they leave consciousness (my term, not 
Peirce’s) free to observe new objects (again, my terms).  Do any of you have 
the source for Peirce on this, or something like it?


From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Date: Tuesday, February 13, 2018 at 3:57 AM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, 
Reasoning

Jon, list,

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end of 
semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of a 
habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a bundle 
of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the capacity for 
Habit-change.

Nicely said. And I would suggest that to the extent that a person has 
"effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change," has become, say, 'set in his 
ways' or 'married to his theories, that he is, in a sense, to that extent 
intellectually 'hardened' or spiritually 'deadened'.

I'll be interested to see how you develop your idea that the "irreducibly 
triadic action of semiosis" requires a Quasi-interpreter. I agree that 
'things', especially those in nature, can serve as Quasi-utterers of degenerate 
Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not 
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability (at 
first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for the hot 
burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of course, after 
rushing into the kitchen.

I disagree. Whether or not the mother interprets the DI (the cry of her 
daughter) correctly or not, the cry is part of the child's semiosis, not that 
of the mother. You continue:

The Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of 
which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines 
its Interpretant to stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as 
the Sign itself does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external 
scream are Indices of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the 
moment.

I would say that the Interpretant standing in the same relation to the Sign's 
DO as the Sign does concerns the child's sign only. I see the mother as 
grounding (in the sense of semiotic 'determination') her Immediate Object for 
her, the mother's) semiosis not in the distant burner but in the cry of her 
child. So I still hold that the child is the Dynamic Object of the mother's 
Sign action (semiosis). Again, in my understanding the interpretant standing 
"in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does" 
applies to a different Sign, namely, that of the child.

3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current 
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience and 
Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that retains the capacity 
for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and thus can be the 
Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires a purpose) and the 
Quasi-interpreter of any Sign.

Yes, of course I meant Quasi-mind and not Quasi-sign (an impossibility, I'd 
think). I'll have to reflect on your "current tentative definition of 
'Quasi-mind' " which at first blush seems quite promising.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.

It would be helpful for me if you'd comment on my thought that Edwina may be 
using 'Form' in a different sense than Peirce such that in her sense it would 
connect more to 3ns than to 1ns. And of course I'd be especially eager to hear 
what Edwina thinks about that interpretation.

Best,

Gary R


[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690<tel:(718)%20482-5690>

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Gary R., List:

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end of 
semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of a 
habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a bundle 
of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the capacity for 
Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that t

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-13 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, list,

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
capacity for Habit-change.

Nicely said. And I would suggest that to the extent that a person has
"effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change," has become, say, 'set in
his ways' or 'married to his theories, that he is, in a sense, to that
extent intellectually 'hardened' or spiritually 'deadened'.

I'll be interested to see how you develop your idea that the "irreducibly
triadic action of semiosis" *requires* a Quasi-interpreter. I agree that
'things', especially those in nature, can serve as Quasi-utterers of
degenerate Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
(at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
course, after rushing into the kitchen.

I disagree. Whether or not the mother interprets the DI (the cry of her
daughter) correctly or not, the cry is part of the child's semiosis, not
that of the mother. You continue:

The Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of
which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign
determines its Interpretant to stand in the same relation to the Sign's
Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.  Hence both the internal neural
signal and the external scream are *Indices *of the hot burner; at least,
that is how I see it at the moment.

I would say that the Interpretant standing in the same relation to the
Sign's DO as the Sign does concerns the child's sign only. I see the mother
as grounding (in the sense of semiotic 'determination') her Immediate
Object for *her, *the mother's) semiosis not in the distant burner but in
the cry of her child. So I still hold that the child is the Dynamic Object
of the mother's Sign action (semiosis). Again, in my understanding the
interpretant standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as
the Sign itself does" applies to a different Sign, namely, that of the
child.

3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience
and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus
can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a
*purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign.

Yes, of course I meant Quasi-mind and not Quasi-sign (an impossibility, I'd
think). I'll have to reflect on your "current tentative definition of
'Quasi-mind' " which at first blush seems quite promising.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.

It would be helpful for me if you'd comment on my thought that Edwina may
be using 'Form' in a different sense than Peirce such that in her sense it
*would* connect more to 3ns than to 1ns. And of course I'd be especially
eager to hear what Edwina thinks about that interpretation.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
> of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand
> in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary R., List:

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
Objects) of degenerate Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
(at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand
in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.
Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are *Indices *of
the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.

3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience
and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus
can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a
*purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>
> For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
> response to Edwina, Jon wrote:
>
> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
> hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and
> *only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign
> *without *a DO.
>
>
> My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
> created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
> less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
> analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
> longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).
>
> John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for
> a, shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
> have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid
> down the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life,
> and that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the
> shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for
> which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis."*
> *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
> *
>
> As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
> termed "physiosemiosis" not only "played a role in the shaping of the
> physical universe prior to the advent of life" but has played one since and
> does so today, and not only in the formation of crystals. But, again, in my
> view, once the crystal is formed the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it
> continues to have a relation to its environment, and there will be atomic
> and sub-atomic activity necessarily occurring, but I personally have yet to
> be convinced that such activity constitutes a form of semiosis, while some
> physicists have argued that it does).
>
> Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
> (esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
> Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of
> Biosemiotics holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in
> relation to its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex
> semiosic activity. I would tend to

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-12 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon S, Edwina, list,

For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
response to Edwina, Jon wrote:

1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
"Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and
*only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign
*without *a DO.

My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).

John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for a,
shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down
the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life, and
that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the shaping of
the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for which Deely
coined the term *physiosemiosis."*
*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
*

As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
termed "physiosemiosis" not only
"played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent
of life" but has played one since and does so today, and not only in the
formation of crystals. But, again, in my view, once the crystal is formed
the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it continues to have a relation to its
environment, and there will be atomic and sub-atomic activity necessarily
occurring, but I personally have yet to be convinced that such activity
constitutes a form of semiosis, while some physicists have argued that it
does).

Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
(esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of Biosemiotics
holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in relation to
its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex semiosic
activity. I would tend to strongly agree.

2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child
(the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and
its DO is still the hot burner.

While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother, I
do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the
room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not
connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the
DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the
child herself.

3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
would not normally associate with "mind."

As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept
"Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I
would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases
that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept
includes more ordinary cases as well.

4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you are
not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.

At times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there seems
to me that for Peirce 'Form' *is *1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form seems to
me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of related
elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the elements
themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many if not
all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity."

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
>

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Edwina, List:

1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
"Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and *only
*this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign *without *a
DO.

2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child
(the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and
its DO is still the hot burner.

3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
would not normally associate with "mind."

4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you are
not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 6:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> Thanks for your comments.
>
> 1] Yes, my point is that there is no such thing as an isolate sign. Even a
> stone on a sandy beach is in interaction. It is Mind-as-Matter, and this
> matter/mind is in interaction with the heat of the sun, with the cooling of
> the night, with the water, with other stones. Any exisistence, i.e., a sign
> unit MUST be in interaction or...it disappears.
>
> That's why I write the full semiosic action, which is a Sign [capital S]
> as: DO-[IO-R-II]. AND - if this basic interaction does not move into a DI,
> then, I'd wonder how long such an organism could survive. That is,
> biologically, if the food input is not transformed into muscle and fat
> [understood as the DI]...or if the child when told to pick up the
> book...simply sits and stares in a catatonic state...
>
> So- yes, the DI is indeed a vital bridge to further semiosis.
>
> 2] Agreed, the child's DI, a cry of pain, becomes a DO for the mother, who
> reacts to this DO ...
>
> 3] I'm having trouble with the quasi-mind. I don't get it. Perhaps it's
> ego. Why isn't my mind - just an individual existence of Mind?
>
> 4] And I'm having trouble seeing Form as a mode of Firstness. Since, to
> me, Form has perimeters and laws and continuity, it is therefore an
> integral property of Mind -  and I can see it only in a mode of Thirdness.
>
> Now, whether these Forms are FIRST in operation in the universe, i.e., as
> in a Platonic Universe, followed, Second, by their materialization  - is
> quite another debate and such an order has nothing to do with the three
> modal Categories.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

Thanks for your comments.

1] Yes, my point is that there is no such thing as an isolate sign.
Even a stone on a sandy beach is in interaction. It is
Mind-as-Matter, and this matter/mind is in interaction with the heat
of the sun, with the cooling of the night, with the water, with other
stones. Any exisistence, i.e., a sign unit MUST be in interaction
or...it disappears.

That's why I write the full semiosic action, which is a Sign
[capital S] as: DO-[IO-R-II]. AND - if this basic interaction does
not move into a DI, then, I'd wonder how long such an organism could
survive. That is, biologically, if the food input is not transformed
into muscle and fat [understood as the DI]...or if the child when
told to pick up the book...simply sits and stares in a catatonic
state...

So- yes, the DI is indeed a vital bridge to further semiosis. 

2] Agreed, the child's DI, a cry of pain, becomes a DO for the
mother, who reacts to this DO ...

3] I'm having trouble with the quasi-mind. I don't get it. Perhaps
it's ego. Why isn't my mind - just an individual existence of Mind? 

4] And I'm having trouble seeing Form as a mode of Firstness. Since,
to me, Form has perimeters and laws and continuity, it is therefore an
integral property of Mind -  and I can see it only in a mode of
Thirdness. 

Now, whether these Forms are FIRST in operation in the universe,
i.e., as in a Platonic Universe, followed, Second, by their
materialization  - is quite another debate and such an order has
nothing to do with the three modal Categories. 

Edwina
 On Sat 10/02/18  5:53 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Jon, list,
 I'm trying to catch the upshot of your (including others) recently
exceedingly illuminating discussion even given the remaining
differences in viewpoints. So, springboarding off Jon's recent bullet
points:
*The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one
Correlate within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it. 

While I agree that for any given Sign that this is correct in some
abstract way. But I am wondering if Edwina isn't suggesting that no
single Sign can be so isolated in the continuum of semiosis (a notion
involved in the concept of Quasi-sign). This is to say that the
individual's semiosis is not discontinuous with that of his
environment where all manner of semiosis is occurring.
  And Peirce did offer the determination of semiosis as beginning in
the DO, making a simple diagram not unlike the one Edwina has been
offering (although he didn't include the brackets which, I think, are
an essential addition to the diagram; as I recall he uses only
dashes). 
 Further, as I analyzed it in terms of the child burning her hand in
the fire, the child's DI becomes a sign for her mother. While I'm not
sure whether I agree with Edwina that  only the II is within the sign,
the DI would seem to be at least a bridge to further semiosis, viz.,
that of her mother, and much as the DO was to the child's semiosis.
Again, isolating the individual Sign seems problematic to me except
in the most abstract of analyses.
*A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of
Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation. 

This use of Quasi-mind as that which "stores" knowledge is not yet
convincing to me. That is, it seems to me that the concept is perhaps
being overburdened in employing it in that way. An individual no doubt
has her Collateral Experience and Knowledge and Habits of
Interpretation, but this is "stored" in her memory (including sense
memory) and externally (for example, in notes she may make, etc.),
and is no doubt continuous with those signs in the Quasi-mind that
involves all the signs she interprets and uses. 
 But why burden the idea of Quasi-mind with "all that" memory
mentioned above? Yes for communication to occur a Quasi-mind is
essential, and even one's own thought process takes the form of a
dialogue (a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter: "So I says to
myself": Peirce notes the common expression), but one can make too
much of this I think. So I would like to see a further discussion of
Quasi-mind. Again, I don't see that Peirce loads the concept with all
that has been recently suggested. He writes: 
 Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may
further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover,
signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a  Quasi-utterer and a
Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one
mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the
Sign they are, so to say,  welded. CP 4.551
  A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily
a sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better
considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as
every thinking requires a

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Gary R., List:

Edwina and I agree that "the individual's semiosis is not discontinuous
with that of his environment," and that every Sign requires a DO to
determine it.  The issue is whether it is consistent with Peirce's writings
and/or conceptually advantageous to use the term "Sign" for the entire *process
*of semiosis.  My view is that "Sign" should instead be used to refer *only
*to the First Correlate of the genuine triadic Sign-relation, and that
"Sign-action" is a better term for the overall process.

Another difference, as I understand it, is that Edwina sees the child's DI
as becoming the mother's DO, rather than the child's DI being an external
Sign for which the child is the utterer and the mother is the interpreter.
Even for the mother, that Sign would then presumably still have the hot
burner as its DO, since any Interpretant is determined by its Sign to have
the same Object as the Sign itself.

I agree that the term "stores" is problematic with reference to Collateral
Experience and Habits of Interpretation for an individual Quasi-mind.  I
guess I am not sure yet how to express properly their persistence over
time, other than to invoke Peirce's definitions of a "scientific
intelligence" as one that is "capable of learning by experience" and of a
"substance" as a "bundle of habits."  I will keep thinking about it, and
would welcome input from others.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 4:53 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, Jon, list,
>
> I'm trying to catch the upshot of your (including others) recently
> exceedingly illuminating discussion even given the remaining differences in
> viewpoints. So, springboarding off Jon's recent bullet points:
>
>- The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
>within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.
>
> While I agree that for any *given* Sign that this is correct in some
> abstract way. But I am wondering if Edwina isn't suggesting that no single
> Sign can be so isolated in the continuum of semiosis (a notion involved in
> the concept of Quasi-sign). This is to say that the individual's semiosis
> is not discontinuous with that of his environment where all manner of
> semiosis is occurring.
>
> And Peirce did offer the determination of semiosis as beginning in the DO,
> making a simple diagram not unlike the one Edwina has been offering
> (although he didn't include the brackets which, I think, are an essential
> addition to the diagram; as I recall he uses only dashes).
>
> Further, as I analyzed it in terms of the child burning her hand in the
> fire, the child's DI becomes a sign for her mother. While I'm not sure
> whether I agree with Edwina that *only* the II is within the sign, the DI
> would seem to be *at least a bridge* to further semiosis, viz., that of
> her mother, and much as the DO was to the child's semiosis. Again,
> isolating the individual Sign seems problematic to me except in the most
> abstract of analyses.
>
>- A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of
>Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation.
>
> This use of Quasi-mind as that which "stores" knowledge is not yet
> convincing to me. That is, it seems to me that the concept is perhaps being
> overburdened in employing it in that way. An individual no doubt has her
> Collateral Experience and Knowledge and Habits of Interpretation, but this
> is "stored" in her memory (including sense memory) and externally (for
> example, in notes she may make, etc.), and is no doubt continuous with
> those signs in the Quasi-mind that involves all the signs she interprets
> and uses.
>
> But why burden the idea of Quasi-mind with "all that" memory mentioned
> above? Yes for communication to occur a Quasi-mind is essential, and even
> one's own thought process takes the form of a dialogue (a Quasi-utterer and
> a Quasi-interpreter: "So I says to myself": Peirce notes the common
> expression), but one can make too much of this I think. So I would like to
> see a further discussion of Quasi-mind. Again, I don't see that Peirce
> loads the concept with all that has been recently suggested. He writes:
>
> Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be
> declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
> least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
> although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they
> must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*.
> CP 4.551
>
> A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort
> of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered
> self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking
> requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a
> determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
> determinable sign. 1906 Letter to Victoria

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-10 Thread Gary Richmond

Edwina, Jon, list,

I'm trying to catch the upshot of your (including others) recently
exceedingly illuminating discussion even given the remaining differences in
viewpoints. So, springboarding off Jon's recent bullet points:

   - The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
   within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.

While I agree that for any *given* Sign that this is correct in some
abstract way. But I am wondering if Edwina isn't suggesting that no single
Sign can be so isolated in the continuum of semiosis (a notion involved in
the concept of Quasi-sign). This is to say that the individual's semiosis
is not discontinuous with that of his environment where all manner of
semiosis is occurring.

And Peirce did offer the determination of semiosis as beginning in the DO,
making a simple diagram not unlike the one Edwina has been offering
(although he didn't include the brackets which, I think, are an essential
addition to the diagram; as I recall he uses only dashes).

Further, as I analyzed it in terms of the child burning her hand in the
fire, the child's DI becomes a sign for her mother. While I'm not sure
whether I agree with Edwina that *only* the II is within the sign, the DI
would seem to be *at least a bridge* to further semiosis, viz., that of her
mother, and much as the DO was to the child's semiosis. Again, isolating
the individual Sign seems problematic to me except in the most abstract of
analyses.

   - A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of Collateral
   Experience and Habits of Interpretation.

This use of Quasi-mind as that which "stores" knowledge is not yet
convincing to me. That is, it seems to me that the concept is perhaps being
overburdened in employing it in that way. An individual no doubt has her
Collateral Experience and Knowledge and Habits of Interpretation, but this
is "stored" in her memory (including sense memory) and externally (for
example, in notes she may make, etc.), and is no doubt continuous with
those signs in the Quasi-mind that involves all the signs she interprets
and uses.

But why burden the idea of Quasi-mind with "all that" memory mentioned
above? Yes for communication to occur a Quasi-mind is essential, and even
one's own thought process takes the form of a dialogue (a Quasi-utterer and
a Quasi-interpreter: "So I says to myself": Peirce notes the common
expression), but one can make too much of this I think. So I would like to
see a further discussion of Quasi-mind. Again, I don't see that Peirce
loads the concept with all that has been recently suggested. He writes:

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be
declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they
must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*.
CP 4.551

A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort
of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered
self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking
requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a
determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
determinable sign. 1906 Letter to Victoria Welby

   - Peirce was not defining Form or contrasting it with Matter in CP
   4.537; again, I suggest reading (or rereading) NEM 4:292-300, not just EP
   2:303-304, to see how he clearly aligned Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns,
   and Entelechy with 3ns.

I agree with Jon that Peirce aligns Form with 1ns and that it might be
prudent to stick with his usage.

Any thoughts?

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> Our deeper differences are resurfacing, so we might want to stop here,
> before things get contentious again.  Briefly ...
>
>- The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
>within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.
>- A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of
>Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation.
>- Peirce was not defining Form or contrasting it with Matter in CP
>4.537; again, I suggest reading (or rereading) NEM 4:292-300, not just EP
>2:303-304, to see how he clearly aligned Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns,
>and Entelechy with 3ns.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - - my view is that  the IO and II are internal to the FORM that is
>> involved within the semiosic interaction. BUT - this semiosic process could
>> not

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Helmut, List:

As I believe Edwina and I agree, the II is precisely the range of *possible
*effects that a Sign *may *produce, so having an II is sufficient for
something to qualify as a Sign.  Whether the Sign produces any *actual *effect
(DI), and whether that leads to the development of a *habit *(FI), depends
on other factors.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, List,
> So, if DI and FI are not necessarily expressed, maybe they do have a
> function for the Sign, because they potentially exist, exist as a
> possibility? They exist as a telos? So the sign functionally does consist
> of them, though not actually, spatiotemporally, at the moment and within
> its (blurred) spatial boundary. This is very complicated- to ask what
> something, e.g. a Sign is- It can mean how is it classified, and it can
> mean what does it consist of. Consistence, composition again, in my view,
> is not a clear matter, as there are three kinds of composition:
> Traitial/propertial composition, spatial (spatiotemporal?), and functional
> composition. I have written it at www.signs-in-time.de . But I am afraid
> it complicates and convolutes the matter totally in a way that from some
> point I lose the understanding of my own thoughts. Perhaps I should get
> myself a completely different, simpler hobby, at least for some time.
> Best,
> Helmut
> 10. Februar 2018 um 19:46 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky" 
>
>
> Helmut - none of these 'parts' of the total Semiosic process, which I call
> the Sign [capital S] exists on its own. None of them. This full Sign only
> functions within relations, within interactions...and these interactions
> determine the nature of what is going on at that moment.
>
> DO-[IO-R-II] is a full Sign in interaction/relation with an external
> Dynamic Object. So, it's one molecule in interaction with another molecule.
> Or a person hearing a loud noise from the street.
>
> The reason the DI and FI are not included in this basic sign - is because
> these two more specific aspects of the Form of the Sign need not take place
> within this basic process. They can take place later or not at all.
>
> And by the way -  this is not Neo-Peircean. It's all based on Peirce's own
> writings. Peirce himself said that there need not be a DI expressed; and
> there need not be a FI expressed - it might, possibly, come later on and by
> someone else. And Peirce himself outlined all these phases of the full
> semiosic process.
>
> I don't consider that Mind and Matter are separate. Peirce was
> an Aristotelian and therefore was quite clear that he was against the
> Cartesian separation of Mind and Matter. Therefore - Mind, as the logic, as
> the act/force of Reason, operates WITHIN Matter. So, Mind is within/as the
> full Sign.
>
> The semiosic triad, in interaction with other Signs, expresses Matter as a
> Form. That is, Mind organizes Matter. The two are merged. Mind could not
> function without Matter. And Matter could not exist without Mind. Again -
> one cannot separate them; Matter is 'effete Mind' 6.25
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 10/02/18 1:23 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, Jon, List,
> I find this all very interesting and think it is enlighting, though I am
> far from being enlightened yet, but it seems to me like a (new?
> Neo-Peircean?) well-suiting theory about to being constructed, or already
> is by you, Edwina. I have so far two questions:
> - Why is the sign only DO-[IO-R-II], and not DI and FI too?
> - Is mind the signs themselves, or a continuum/ space in which signs
> happen? I mean this question like an analogy to the question in older
> times, whether light waves are vibrations of the "ether", like water waves
> are vibrations of the water, or not, as nowadays is mostly agreed.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Edwina, List:

Our deeper differences are resurfacing, so we might want to stop here,
before things get contentious again.  Briefly ...

   - The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
   within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.
   - A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of Collateral
   Experience and Habits of Interpretation.
   - Peirce was not defining Form or contrasting it with Matter in CP
   4.537; again, I suggest reading (or rereading) NEM 4:292-300, not just EP
   2:303-304, to see how he clearly aligned Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns,
   and Entelechy with 3ns.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - - my view is that  the IO and II are internal to the FORM that is
> involved within the semiosic interaction. BUT - this semiosic process could
> not take place without an external stimuli, the DO. That is why I refer to
> the FULL semiosic process [which I term the Sign, capital S] as inclusive
> of both the internal and external relations.
>
> Since I consider that this full semiosic process, the full Sign, is
> Mind-operating-as-Matter, then, it does store knowledge. There is no
> separate domain for such a storage! An insect, as the individual
> existential version of its species, is storing the knowledge of How To Be
> An Individual Existential Version of that Species...within its actual
> existence.
>
> And since Form must involve Mind, then, I read Peirce as associating it
> with 3rdness. My reading of EP 2.303-4 doesn't give me the same conclusion
> as you come up with.
>
> Instead, I understand FORM to be a TYPE, which is in a mode of Thirdness.
> "It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a
> definitely significant Form I propose to term a Type. 4.537
>
> The Type is understood as operating as a Legisign; ie. within definite
> common laws. Habits can hardly be understood as 'vagueness'; therefore, I
> don't see how the Form that matter takes can be in a mode of Firstness.
> Form, as a general, as a commonality, sets up the laws by which Matter
> exists in its state of individuality.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 10/02/18 2:03 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I still cannot agree with your definition of the Representamen, nor with
> your inclusion of DO and DI within "The FULL Sign."  On my reading of
> Peirce, only the IO and II are internal to the Sign, while the DO and DI
> are external to the Sign.  That said, I believe we do agree that there is
> no Sign that does not have an external DO, while there are Signs that
> have no external DI (or FI).  I also cannot see "this FULL SIGN" as "the
> site for the storage of knowledge"; again, in my view, that is the
> Quasi-mind.
>
> Regarding Form and Matter, I can only suggest that you read (or reread)
> NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.  In these two passages, Peirce repeatedly
> associates Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns, and Entelechy with 3ns.  The one
> in NEM is especially detailed and illuminating on this point.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 12:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list
>>
>> I don't see the Representamen as the individual site for storage. That
>> would make it 'existential' in itself. I see it as a site for a mediation
>> process that accesses knowledge/information and inputs it/uses it...to deal
>> with the information provided from the DO/IO.
>>
>> The FULL Sign of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI is the existential FORM of Matter and
>> thus, as this FULL SIGN is the site for the storage of knowledge. That is,
>> a molecule, as itself, as a form of matter, stores information. That same
>> molecule is functioning within a full Sign format: DO-[IO-R-II]-DI.  It is
>> in interaction with other molecules [DO] and forms its own nature [DI]
>> which will interact as a DO with other molecules.
>>
>> However, I do not agree that Form is 1stness; I maintain that Form is
>> Thirdness. Firstness functions within vagueness and possibility.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Sat 10/02/18 1:07 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Well, I still see the Quasi-mind as "the [individual] site for storage,"
>> rather than the Sign/Representamen.  However, I do see the latter as the
>> means "for the introduction of novelty and diversity," since it always adds
>> new Collateral Experience to a particular Quasi-mind as its Immediate
>> Object, and also always has the potential for adding a new Habit of
>> Interpretation to it as its Final Interpretant.
>>
>> We might also still disagree about exactly how form and matter come into
>> play.  In accordance with NEM 4:292-300 (1902) and EP 2:303-304 (1904), I
>> see Signs as bringing about the entelechy of Being (3ns, "the perfect
>> Truth, the absolute Truth ... the ultimate interpretant of every sign")
>> by uniting Form (1ns, "signifies characters, or

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Stephen R., List:

I would say all of the above--we are each trying to design a *model *that
accurately *represents *something that exists and is real, in accordance
with what Peirce thought, which we interpret differently.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 1:07 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Is this an effort to agree on something that exists and is real, or to
> design something, or to identify what Peirce thought. If it exists then
> there can only be one right interpretation.  If is it a matter of coming to
> an agreement with each other well and good.  If it has to do with what
> Peirce thought and there is no agreement, to what might that be ascribed --
> a communication problem or that Peirce was not clear, or something else?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-10 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, List,

So, if DI and FI are not necessarily expressed, maybe they do have a function for the Sign, because they potentially exist, exist as a possibility? They exist as a telos? So the sign functionally does consist of them, though not actually, spatiotemporally, at the moment and within its (blurred) spatial boundary. This is very complicated- to ask what something, e.g. a Sign is- It can mean how is it classified, and it can mean what does it consist of. Consistence, composition again, in my view, is not a clear matter, as there are three kinds of composition: Traitial/propertial composition, spatial (spatiotemporal?), and functional composition. I have written it at www.signs-in-time.de . But I am afraid it complicates and convolutes the matter totally in a way that from some point I lose the understanding of my own thoughts. Perhaps I should get myself a completely different, simpler hobby, at least for some time.

Best,

Helmut

10. Februar 2018 um 19:46 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut - none of these 'parts' of the total Semiosic process, which I call the Sign [capital S] exists on its own. None of them. This full Sign only functions within relations, within interactions...and these interactions determine the nature of what is going on at that moment.

DO-[IO-R-II] is a full Sign in interaction/relation with an external Dynamic Object. So, it's one molecule in interaction with another molecule. Or a person hearing a loud noise from the street.

The reason the DI and FI are not included in this basic sign - is because these two more specific aspects of the Form of the Sign need not take place within this basic process. They can take place later or not at all.

And by the way - this is not Neo-Peircean. It's all based on Peirce's own writings. Peirce himself said that there need not be a DI expressed; and there need not be a FI expressed - it might, possibly, come later on and by someone else. And Peirce himself outlined all these phases of the full semiosic process.

I don't consider that Mind and Matter are separate. Peirce was an Aristotelian and therefore was quite clear that he was against the Cartesian separation of Mind and Matter. Therefore - Mind, as the logic, as the act/force of Reason, operates WITHIN Matter. So, Mind is within/as the full Sign.

The semiosic triad, in interaction with other Signs, expresses Matter as a Form. That is, Mind organizes Matter. The two are merged. Mind could not function without Matter. And Matter could not exist without Mind. Again - one cannot separate them; Matter is 'effete Mind' 6.25

Edwina

On Sat 10/02/18 1:23 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, Jon, List,

I find this all very interesting and think it is enlighting, though I am far from being enlightened yet, but it seems to me like a (new? Neo-Peircean?) well-suiting theory about to being constructed, or already is by you, Edwina. I have so far two questions:

- Why is the sign only DO-[IO-R-II], and not DI and FI too?

- Is mind the signs themselves, or a continuum/ space in which signs happen? I mean this question like an analogy to the question in older times, whether light waves are vibrations of the "ether", like water waves are vibrations of the water, or not, as nowadays is mostly agreed.

Best,

Helmut

10. Februar 2018 um 18:11 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.

I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for the introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced at various stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be taken up by the R in the next individual.

I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not merely for communication between individuals, but as the actual method of forming matter.

Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more in line with each other!

Edwina

On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:

Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it to be inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather than limited to the latter. It is most easily understood as a substitute for a human mind, but also applies to bees, crystals, etc. Each individual Quasi-mind serves as a "site" for "storage" of an "accumulated knowledge base" that includes acquaintance with various systems of Signs, Collateral Experience (previous Immediate Objects), and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final Interpretants). A Sign serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms between individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds overlap--"welds" them together in the Sign. Every Sign adds to a Quasi-mind's Collateral Experience, and some Signs produce Final Interpretants that

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - - my view is that  the IO and II are internal to the FORM that
is involved within the semiosic interaction. BUT - this semiosic
process could not take place without an external stimuli, the DO.
That is why I refer to the FULL semiosic process [which I term the
Sign, capital S] as inclusive of both the internal and external
relations.

Since I consider that this full semiosic process, the full Sign, is
Mind-operating-as-Matter, then, it does store knowledge. There is no
separate domain for such a storage! An insect, as the individual
existential version of its species, is storing the knowledge of How
To Be An Individual Existential Version of that Species...within its
actual existence.

And since Form must involve Mind, then, I read Peirce as associating
it with 3rdness. My reading of EP 2.303-4 doesn't give me the same
conclusion as you come up with. 

Instead, I understand FORM to be a TYPE, which is in a mode of
Thirdness. "It does not exist; it only determines things that do
exist. Such a definitely significant Form I propose to term a Type.
4.537 

The Type is understood as operating as a Legisign; ie. within
definite common laws. Habits can hardly be understood as 'vagueness';
therefore, I don't see how the Form that matter takes can be in a mode
of Firstness. Form, as a general, as a commonality, sets up the laws
by which Matter exists in its state of individuality. 

Edwina
 On Sat 10/02/18  2:03 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I still cannot agree with your definition of the Representamen, nor
with your inclusion of DO and DI within "The FULL Sign."  On my
reading of Peirce, only the IO and II are internal to the Sign, while
the DO and DI are external to the Sign.  That said, I believe we do
agree that there is no Sign that does not have an external DO, while
there are Signs that have no external DI (or FI).  I also cannot see
"this FULL SIGN" as "the site for the storage of knowledge"; again,
in my view, that is the Quasi-mind. 
 Regarding Form and Matter, I can only suggest that you read (or
reread) NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.  In these two passages,
Peirce repeatedly associates Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns, and
Entelechy with 3ns.  The one in NEM is especially detailed and
illuminating on this point.
 Thanks,
 Jon S.  
 On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 12:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list

I don't see the Representamen as the individual site for storage.
That would make it 'existential' in itself. I see it as a site for a
mediation process that accesses knowledge/information and inputs
it/uses it...to deal with the information provided from the DO/IO.

The FULL Sign of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI is the existential FORM of Matter
and thus, as this FULL SIGN is the site for the storage of knowledge.
That is, a molecule, as itself, as a form of matter, stores
information. That same molecule is functioning within a full Sign
format: DO-[IO-R-II]-DI.  It is in interaction with other molecules
[DO] and forms its own nature [DI] which will interact as a DO with
other molecules. 

However, I do not agree that Form is 1stness; I maintain that Form
is Thirdness. Firstness functions within vagueness and possibility. 

Edwina

On Sat 10/02/18  1:07 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
  Edwina, List:
 Well, I still see the Quasi-mind as "the [individual] site for
storage," rather than the Sign/Representamen.  However, I do see the
latter as the means "for the introduction of novelty and diversity,"
since it always adds new Collateral Experience to a particular
Quasi-mind as its Immediate Object, and also always has the potential
for adding a new Habit of Interpretation to it as its Final
Interpretant. 
  We might also still disagree about exactly how form and matter come
into play.  In accordance with NEM 4:292-300 (1902) and EP 2:303-304
(1904), I see Signs as bringing about the entelechy of Being (3ns,
"the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth ... the ultimate interpretant
of every sign") by uniting Form (1ns, "signifies characters, or
qualities") and Matter (2ns, " denoting objects"); i.e., "the
attribution of a predicate to a subject" (CP 6.341; 1909).  This is
another way of expressing the  telos of all Sign-action,  the  summum
bonum, which is "the ultimate representation" (EP 2:324; 1904).
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.

I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for
the introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced
at various stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be
taken up by the R in the next individual. 

I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-10 Thread Stephen C. Rose

Is this an effort to agree on something that exists and is real, or to
design something, or to identify what Peirce thought. If it exists then
there can only be one right interpretation.  If is it a matter of coming to
an agreement with each other well and good.  If it has to do with what
Peirce thought and there is no agreement, to what might that be ascribed --
a communication problem or that Peirce was not clear, or something else?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 1:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> I don't see the Representamen as the individual site for storage. That
> would make it 'existential' in itself. I see it as a site for a mediation
> process that accesses knowledge/information and inputs it/uses it...to deal
> with the information provided from the DO/IO.
>
>  The FULL Sign of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI is the existential FORM of Matter and
> thus, as this FULL SIGN is the site for the storage of knowledge. That is,
> a molecule, as itself, as a form of matter, stores information. That same
> molecule is functioning within a full Sign format: DO-[IO-R-II]-DI.  It is
> in interaction with other molecules [DO] and forms its own nature [DI]
> which will interact as a DO with other molecules.
>
> However, I do not agree that Form is 1stness; I maintain that Form is
> Thirdness. Firstness functions within vagueness and possibility.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat 10/02/18 1:07 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Well, I still see the Quasi-mind as "the [individual] site for storage,"
> rather than the Sign/Representamen.  However, I do see the latter as the
> means "for the introduction of novelty and diversity," since it always adds
> new Collateral Experience to a particular Quasi-mind as its Immediate
> Object, and also always has the potential for adding a new Habit of
> Interpretation to it as its Final Interpretant.
>
> We might also still disagree about exactly how form and matter come into
> play.  In accordance with NEM 4:292-300 (1902) and EP 2:303-304 (1904), I
> see Signs as bringing about the entelechy of Being (3ns, "the perfect
> Truth, the absolute Truth ... the ultimate interpretant of every sign")
> by uniting Form (1ns, "signifies characters, or qualities") and Matter
> (2ns, "denoting objects"); i.e., "the attribution of a predicate to a
> subject" (CP 6.341; 1909).  This is another way of expressing the telos of
> all Sign-action, the  summum bonum, which is "the ultimate
> representation" (EP 2:324; 1904).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.
>>
>> I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
>> DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for the
>> introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced at various
>> stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be taken up by the R in
>> the next individual.
>>
>> I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not
>> merely for communication between individuals, but as the actual method of
>> forming matter.
>>
>> Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more in
>> line with each other!
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>> sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it to be
>> inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather than limited
>> to the latter.  It is most easily understood as a substitute for a human 
>> mind,
>> but also applies to bees, crystals, etc.  Each individual Quasi-mind
>> serves as a "site" for "storage" of an "accumulated knowledge base" that
>> includes acquaintance with various systems of Signs, Collateral Experience
>> (previous Immediate Objects), and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final
>> Interpretants).  A Sign serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms
>> between individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only
>> take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds overlap--"welds"
>> them together in the Sign.  Every Sign adds to a Quasi-mind's Collateral
>> Experience, and some Signs produce Final Interpretants that constitute
>> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--when they supplement or
>> alter the Quasi-mind's Habits of Interpretation.  The telos of this
>> process is the summum bonum--the "welding" of all Quasi-minds into a
>> continuum.
>>
>> At least, that is how I see it right now.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list - I like your outline of a syllogistic format - I

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Edwina, List:

I still cannot agree with your definition of the Representamen, nor with
your inclusion of DO and DI within "The FULL Sign."  On my reading of
Peirce, only the IO and II are *internal *to the Sign, while the DO and DI
are *external *to the Sign.  That said, I believe we do agree that there is
no Sign that does not *have *an external DO, while there *are *Signs that
have no external DI (or FI).  I also cannot see "this FULL SIGN" as "the
site for the storage of knowledge"; again, in my view, that is the
Quasi-mind.

Regarding Form and Matter, I can only suggest that you read (or reread) NEM
4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.  In these two passages, Peirce repeatedly
associates Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns, and Entelechy with 3ns.  The one
in NEM is especially detailed and illuminating on this point.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 12:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> I don't see the Representamen as the individual site for storage. That
> would make it 'existential' in itself. I see it as a site for a mediation
> process that accesses knowledge/information and inputs it/uses it...to deal
> with the information provided from the DO/IO.
>
> The FULL Sign of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI is the existential FORM of Matter and
> thus, as this FULL SIGN is the site for the storage of knowledge. That is,
> a molecule, as itself, as a form of matter, stores information. That same
> molecule is functioning within a full Sign format: DO-[IO-R-II]-DI.  It is
> in interaction with other molecules [DO] and forms its own nature [DI]
> which will interact as a DO with other molecules.
>
> However, I do not agree that Form is 1stness; I maintain that Form is
> Thirdness. Firstness functions within vagueness and possibility.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 10/02/18 1:07 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Well, I still see the Quasi-mind as "the [individual] site for storage,"
> rather than the Sign/Representamen.  However, I do see the latter as the
> means "for the introduction of novelty and diversity," since it always adds
> new Collateral Experience to a particular Quasi-mind as its Immediate
> Object, and also always has the potential for adding a new Habit of
> Interpretation to it as its Final Interpretant.
>
> We might also still disagree about exactly how form and matter come into
> play.  In accordance with NEM 4:292-300 (1902) and EP 2:303-304 (1904), I
> see Signs as bringing about the entelechy of Being (3ns, "the perfect
> Truth, the absolute Truth ... the ultimate interpretant of every sign")
> by uniting Form (1ns, "signifies characters, or qualities") and Matter
> (2ns, "denoting objects"); i.e., "the attribution of a predicate to a
> subject" (CP 6.341; 1909).  This is another way of expressing the telos of
> all Sign-action, the  summum bonum, which is "the ultimate
> representation" (EP 2:324; 1904).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.
>>
>> I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
>> DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for the
>> introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced at various
>> stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be taken up by the R in
>> the next individual.
>>
>> I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not
>> merely for communication between individuals, but as the actual method of
>> forming matter.
>>
>> Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more in
>> line with each other!
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>> sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it to be
>> inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather than limited
>> to the latter.  It is most easily understood as a substitute for a human 
>> mind,
>> but also applies to bees, crystals, etc.  Each individual Quasi-mind
>> serves as a "site" for "storage" of an "accumulated knowledge base" that
>> includes acquaintance with various systems of Signs, Collateral Experience
>> (previous Immediate Objects), and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final
>> Interpretants).  A Sign serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms
>> between individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only
>> take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds overlap--"welds"
>> them together in the Sign.  Every Sign adds to a Quasi-mind's Collateral
>> Experience, and some Signs produce Final Interpretants that constitute
>> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--when they supplement or
>> alter the Quasi-mind's Habits of Interpretation.  The telos of this
>> process is the summum bonum--the "welding" of all Quasi-minds into a
>> continuum.
>>
>> At least, that is how I see it

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

 

Helmut - none of these 'parts' of the total Semiosic process, which
I call the Sign [capital S] exists on its own. None of them. This
full Sign only functions within relations, within interactions...and
these interactions determine the nature of what is going on at that
moment.

DO-[IO-R-II] is a full Sign in interaction/relation with an external
Dynamic Object. So, it's one molecule in interaction with another
molecule. Or a person hearing a loud noise from the street. 

The reason the DI and FI are not included in this basic sign - is
because these two more specific aspects of the Form of the Sign need
not take place within this basic process. They can take place later
or not at all.

And by the way -  this is not Neo-Peircean. It's all based on
Peirce's own writings. Peirce himself said that there need not be a
DI expressed; and there need not be a FI expressed - it might,
possibly, come later on and by someone else. And Peirce himself
outlined all these phases of the full semiosic process.

I don't consider that Mind and Matter are separate. Peirce was an
Aristotelian and therefore was quite clear that he was against the
Cartesian separation of Mind and Matter. Therefore - Mind, as the
logic, as the act/force of Reason, operates WITHIN Matter. So, Mind
is within/as the full Sign. 

The semiosic triad, in interaction with other Signs, expresses
Matter as a Form. That is, Mind organizes Matter. The two are merged.
Mind could not function without Matter. And Matter could not exist
without Mind. Again - one cannot separate them; Matter is 'effete
Mind' 6.25

Edwina
 On Sat 10/02/18  1:23 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, Jon, List, I find this all very interesting and think it is
enlighting, though I am far from being enlightened yet, but it seems
to me like a (new? Neo-Peircean?) well-suiting theory about to being
constructed, or already is by you, Edwina. I have so far two
questions: - Why is the sign only DO-[IO-R-II], and not DI and FI
too? - Is mind the signs themselves, or a continuum/ space in which
signs happen? I mean this question like an analogy to the question in
older times, whether light waves are vibrations of the "ether", like
water waves are vibrations of the water, or not, as nowadays is
mostly agreed.  Best, Helmut  10. Februar 2018 um 18:11 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

  Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline. 

I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for
the introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced
at various stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be
taken up by the R in the next individual. 

I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not
merely for communication between individuals, but as the actual
method of forming matter. 

Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more
in line with each other! 

Edwina 
 On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:  Edwina, List:   Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in
CP 4.551, I take it to be inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic
thought, rather than limited to the latter.  It is most easily
understood as a substitute for a human mind, but also applies to
bees, crystals, etc.  Each individual Quasi-mind serves as a "site"
for "storage" of an "accumulated knowledge base" that includes
acquaintance with various systems of Signs, Collateral Experience
(previous Immediate Objects), and Habits of Interpretation (previous
Final Interpretants).  A Sign serves as a medium for communication of
ideas/forms between individual Quasi-minds, and successful
Sign-action--which can only take place within the Commens, where
multiple Quasi-minds overlap--"welds" them together in the Sign. 
Every Sign adds to a Quasi-mind's Collateral Experience, and some
Signs produce Final Interpretants that constitute Habit-change--i.e.,
  learning from experience--when they supplement or alter the
Quasi-mind's Habits of Interpretation.  The telos of this process is
the summum bonum--the "welding" of all Quasi-minds into a continuum. 
 At least, that is how I see it right now.   Regards,Jon Alan
Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:57 AM,
Edwina Taborsky  wrote:  

Jon, list - I like your outline of a syllogistic format - I consider
that the semiosic triad of DO-[IO-R-II]..and possibly DI functions in
a syllogistic format. 

But with regard to the Mind/Quasi-Mind discussion, I consider that
Mind can be understood as the Real, while the individual articulation
of this Mind is its spatiotemporal Existence. We might sometimes refer
to the individual

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list

I don't see the Representamen as the individual site for storage.
That would make it 'existential' in itself. I see it as a site for a
mediation process that accesses knowledge/information and inputs
it/uses it...to deal with the information provided from the DO/IO.

 The FULL Sign of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI is the existential FORM of Matter
and thus, as this FULL SIGN is the site for the storage of knowledge.
That is, a molecule, as itself, as a form of matter, stores
information. That same molecule is functioning within a full Sign
format: DO-[IO-R-II]-DI.  It is in interaction with other molecules
[DO] and forms its own nature [DI] which will interact as a DO with
other molecules.

However, I do not agree that Form is 1stness; I maintain that Form
is Thirdness. Firstness functions within vagueness and possibility. 

Edwina
 On Sat 10/02/18  1:07 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Well, I still see the Quasi-mind as "the [individual] site for
storage," rather than the Sign/Representamen.  However, I do see the
latter as the means "for the introduction of novelty and diversity,"
since it always adds new Collateral Experience to a particular
Quasi-mind as its Immediate Object, and also always has the potential
for adding a new Habit of Interpretation to it as its Final
Interpretant.
  We might also still disagree about exactly how form and matter come
into play.  In accordance with NEM 4:292-300 (1902) and EP 2:303-304
(1904), I see Signs as bringing about the entelechy of Being (3ns,
"the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth ... the ultimate interpretant
of every sign") by uniting Form (1ns, "signifies characters, or
qualities") and Matter (2ns, "denoting objects"); i.e., "the
attribution of a predicate to a subject" (CP 6.341; 1909).  This is
another way of expressing the  telos of all Sign-action,  the  summum
bonum, which is "the ultimate representation" (EP 2:324; 1904).
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.

I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for
the introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced
at various stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be
taken up by the R in the next individual. 

I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not
merely for communication between individuals, but as the actual
method of forming matter. 

Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more
in line with each other!

Edwina

On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it
to be inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather
than limited to the latter.  It is most easily understood as a
substitute for a human mind, but also applies to bees, crystals, etc.
 Each individual Quasi-mind serves as a "site" for "storage" of an
"accumulated knowledge base" that includes acquaintance with various
systems of Signs, Collateral Experience (previous Immediate Objects),
and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final Interpretants).  A Sign
serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms between
individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only
take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds
overlap--"welds" them together in the Sign.  Every Sign adds to a
Quasi-mind's Collateral Experience, and some Signs produce Final
Interpretants that constitute Habit-change--i.e.,  learning from
experience--when they supplement or alter the Quasi-mind's Habits of
Interpretation.  The telos of this process is the summum bonum--the
"welding" of all Quasi-minds into a continuum.
 At least, that is how I see it right now.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4] 
 On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list - I like your outline of a syllogistic format - I consider
that the semiosic triad of DO-[IO-R-II]..and possibly DI functions in
a syllogistic format.

But with regard to the Mind/Quasi-Mind discussion, I consider that
Mind can be understood as the Real, while the individual articulation
of this Mind is its spatiotemporal Existence. We might sometimes refer
to the individual articulation of the Reality of Mind as 'Quasi-Mind',
but to me at least, that phrase suggests a non-symbolic version of
thinking, as in a paramecium, rather than the individual existential
articulation of the Reality of Mind. 

As for the accumulated knowledge base - that's held in the laws of
Form, so

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

2018-02-10 Thread Helmut Raulien


Edwina, Jon, List,

I find this all very interesting and think it is enlighting, though I am far from being enlightened yet, but it seems to me like a (new? Neo-Peircean?) well-suiting theory about to being constructed, or already is by you, Edwina. I have so far two questions:

- Why is the sign only DO-[IO-R-II], and not DI and FI too?

- Is mind the signs themselves, or a continuum/ space in which signs happen? I mean this question like an analogy to the question in older times, whether light waves are vibrations of the "ether", like water waves are vibrations of the water, or not, as nowadays is mostly agreed.


Best,

Helmut


10. Februar 2018 um 18:11 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:




Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.

I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for the introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced at various stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be taken up by the R in the next individual.

I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not merely for communication between individuals, but as the actual method of forming matter.

Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more in line with each other!

Edwina



 

On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:


Edwina, List:
 

Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it to be inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather than limited to the latter.  It is most easily understood as a substitute for a human mind, but also applies to bees, crystals, etc.  Each individual Quasi-mind serves as a "site" for "storage" of an "accumulated knowledge base" that includes acquaintance with various systems of Signs, Collateral Experience (previous Immediate Objects), and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final Interpretants).  A Sign serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms between individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds overlap--"welds" them together in the Sign.  Every Sign adds to a Quasi-mind's Collateral Experience, and some Signs produce Final Interpretants that constitute Habit-change--i.e.,  learning from experience--when they supplement or alter the Quasi-mind's Habits of Interpretation.  The telos of this process is the summum bonum--the "welding" of all Quasi-minds into a continuum.

 

At least, that is how I see it right now.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Jon, list - I like your outline of a syllogistic format - I consider that the semiosic triad of DO-[IO-R-II]..and possibly DI functions in a syllogistic format.

But with regard to the Mind/Quasi-Mind discussion, I consider that Mind can be understood as the Real, while the individual articulation of this Mind is its spatiotemporal Existence. We might sometimes refer to the individual articulation of the Reality of Mind as 'Quasi-Mind', but to me at least, that phrase suggests a non-symbolic version of thinking, as in a paramecium, rather than the individual existential articulation of the Reality of Mind.

As for the accumulated knowledge base - that's held in the laws of Form, so to speak. Within physic-chemical laws, within genetics,  and socially, within cultural rules and norms which are passed down to the next generation by socialization. Peirce described its Storage method as Thirdness and it is interesting that he has three types of Thirdness - from the most abstract idealism to the collectivism of an indexical binding and an emotional cloning of this knowledge.

Edwina

On Sat 10/02/18 9:15 AM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:



Peircers,

There's a bit on the role of accumulated knowledge bases in
inquiry, learning, and reasoning in the following section:

Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems • Learning, Transfer, Testing
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Introduction_to_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#Inquiry

Regards,

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Edwina, List:

Well, I still see the Quasi-mind as "the [individual] site for storage,"
rather than the Sign/Representamen.  However, I do see the latter as the
means "for the introduction of novelty and diversity," since it always adds
new Collateral Experience to a particular Quasi-mind as its Immediate
Object, and also always has the *potential *for adding a new Habit of
Interpretation to it as its Final Interpretant.

We might also still disagree about exactly how form and matter come into
play.  In accordance with NEM 4:292-300 (1902) and EP 2:303-304 (1904), I
see Signs as bringing about the *entelechy *of Being (3ns, "the *perfect
Truth*, the absolute Truth ... the ultimate interpretant of every sign") by
uniting Form (1ns, "*signifies characters*, or qualities") and Matter (2ns,
"*denoting *objects"); i.e., "the attribution of a predicate to a subject"
(CP 6.341; 1909).  This is another way of expressing the *telos *of all
Sign-action, the *summum bonum*, which is "the ultimate representation" (EP
2:324; 1904).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.
>
> I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
> DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for the
> introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced at various
> stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be taken up by the R in
> the next individual.
>
> I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not merely
> for communication between individuals, but as the actual method of forming
> matter.
>
> Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more in
> line with each other!
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it to be
> inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather than limited
> to the latter.  It is most easily understood as a substitute for a human mind,
> but also applies to bees, crystals, etc.  Each individual Quasi-mind
> serves as a "site" for "storage" of an "accumulated knowledge base" that
> includes acquaintance with various systems of Signs, Collateral Experience
> (previous Immediate Objects), and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final
> Interpretants).  A Sign serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms
> between individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only
> take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds overlap--"welds"
> them together in the Sign.  Every Sign adds to a Quasi-mind's Collateral
> Experience, and some Signs produce Final Interpretants that constitute
> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--when they supplement or
> alter the Quasi-mind's Habits of Interpretation.  The telos of this
> process is the summum bonum--the "welding" of all Quasi-minds into a
> continuum.
>
> At least, that is how I see it right now.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list - I like your outline of a syllogistic format - I consider that
>> the semiosic triad of DO-[IO-R-II]..and possibly DI functions in a
>> syllogistic format.
>>
>> But with regard to the Mind/Quasi-Mind discussion, I consider that Mind
>> can be understood as the Real, while the individual articulation of this
>> Mind is its spatiotemporal Existence. We might sometimes refer to the
>> individual articulation of the Reality of Mind as 'Quasi-Mind', but to me
>> at least, that phrase suggests a non-symbolic version of thinking, as in a
>> paramecium, rather than the individual existential articulation of the
>> Reality of Mind.
>>
>> As for the accumulated knowledge base - that's held in the laws of Form,
>> so to speak. Within physic-chemical laws, within genetics,  and socially,
>> within cultural rules and norms which are passed down to the next
>> generation by socialization. Peirce described its Storage method as
>> Thirdness and it is interesting that he has three types of Thirdness - from
>> the most abstract idealism to the collectivism of an indexical binding and
>> an emotional cloning of this knowledge.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Sat 10/02/18 9:15 AM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
>>
>> Peircers,
>>
>> There's a bit on the role of accumulated knowledge bases in
>> inquiry, learning, and reasoning in the following section:
>>
>> Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems • Learning, Transfer, Testing
>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Introduction_to_
>> Inquiry_Driven_Systems#Inquiry
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> --
>>
>> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>> academia:

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.

I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for
the introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced
at various stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be
taken up by the R in the next individual. 

I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not
merely for communication between individuals, but as the actual
method of forming matter.

Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more
in line with each other!

Edwina
 On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it
to be inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather
than limited to the latter.  It is most easily understood as a
substitute for a human mind, but also applies to bees, crystals, etc.
 Each individual Quasi-mind serves as a "site" for "storage" of an
"accumulated knowledge base" that includes acquaintance with various
systems of Signs, Collateral Experience (previous Immediate Objects),
and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final Interpretants).  A Sign
serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms between
individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only
take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds
overlap--"welds" them together in the Sign.  Every Sign adds to a
Quasi-mind's Collateral Experience, and some Signs produce Final
Interpretants that constitute Habit-change--i.e.,  learning from
experience--when they supplement or alter the Quasi-mind's Habits of
Interpretation.  The telos of this process is the summum bonum--the
"welding" of all Quasi-minds into a continuum.
 At least, that is how I see it right now.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list - I like your outline of a syllogistic format - I consider
that the semiosic triad of DO-[IO-R-II]..and possibly DI functions in
a syllogistic format.

But with regard to the Mind/Quasi-Mind discussion, I consider that
Mind can be understood as the Real, while the individual articulation
of this Mind is its spatiotemporal Existence. We might sometimes refer
to the individual articulation of the Reality of Mind as 'Quasi-Mind',
but to me at least, that phrase suggests a non-symbolic version of
thinking, as in a paramecium, rather than the individual existential
articulation of the Reality of Mind. 

As for the accumulated knowledge base - that's held in the laws of
Form, so to speak. Within physic-chemical laws, within genetics,  and
socially, within cultural rules and norms which are passed down to the
next generation by socialization. Peirce described its Storage method
as Thirdness and it is interesting that he has three types of
Thirdness - from the most abstract idealism to the collectivism of an
indexical binding and an emotional cloning of this knowledge. 

Edwina 

On Sat 10/02/18  9:15 AM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net [4] sent:
 Peircers, 
 There's a bit on the role of accumulated knowledge bases in 
 inquiry, learning, and reasoning in the following section: 
 Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems • Learning, Transfer,
Testing 

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Introduction_to_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#Inquiry

 Regards, 
 Jon 
 --  
 inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ 
 academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey 
 oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey 
 isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA 
 facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jawb...@att.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

Edwina, List:

Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it to be
inclusive of *both *symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather than limited
to the latter.  It is most easily understood as a substitute for a
*human *mind,
but *also *applies to bees, crystals, etc.  Each individual Quasi-mind
serves as a "site" for "storage" of an "accumulated knowledge base" that
includes acquaintance with various systems of Signs, Collateral Experience
(previous Immediate Objects), and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final
Interpretants).  A Sign serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms
between individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only
take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds overlap--"welds"
them together in the Sign.  Every Sign adds to a Quasi-mind's Collateral
Experience, and some Signs produce Final Interpretants that constitute
Habit-change--i.e., *learning *from experience--when they supplement or
alter the Quasi-mind's Habits of Interpretation.  The *telos *of this
process is the *summum bonum*--the "welding" of all Quasi-minds into a
continuum.

At least, that is how I see it right now.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - I like your outline of a syllogistic format - I consider that
> the semiosic triad of DO-[IO-R-II]..and possibly DI functions in a
> syllogistic format.
>
> But with regard to the Mind/Quasi-Mind discussion, I consider that Mind
> can be understood as the Real, while the individual articulation of this
> Mind is its spatiotemporal Existence. We might sometimes refer to the
> individual articulation of the Reality of Mind as 'Quasi-Mind', but to me
> at least, that phrase suggests a non-symbolic version of thinking, as in a
> paramecium, rather than the individual existential articulation of the
> Reality of Mind.
>
> As for the accumulated knowledge base - that's held in the laws of Form,
> so to speak. Within physic-chemical laws, within genetics,  and socially,
> within cultural rules and norms which are passed down to the next
> generation by socialization. Peirce described its Storage method as
> Thirdness and it is interesting that he has three types of Thirdness - from
> the most abstract idealism to the collectivism of an indexical binding and
> an emotional cloning of this knowledge.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 10/02/18 9:15 AM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
>
> Peircers,
>
> There's a bit on the role of accumulated knowledge bases in
> inquiry, learning, and reasoning in the following section:
>
> Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems • Learning, Transfer, Testing
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Introduction_
> to_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#Inquiry
> 
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> 
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> 
> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> 
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> 
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
> 
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning