Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[kirstima]

Jerry,

CSP did use divisions into three, so trichotomies do belong to his 
philosophy. Only in his latest phase he devoted himself to developing 
triadicity as his key concept in his theory of the Categories.


So, trichotomies of signs, such as icon, index, symbol etc. are OK. But 
only for the limited purposes of Secondness. For these he used a 
three-partite graph. (Which does not belong to the set of special marks 
that I can use here).


Note also, that the existential graphs (the only he developed to his 
full satisfaction) presents his logical graphs ONLY from the viewpoint 
of Secondness.


There are intermediate logical steps needed to proceed into true 
triadicity. I have not found a clear presentation of these steps in the 
now available writings of CSP.


I'll leave others to respond for their own comments.

Best,

Kirsti


Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 2.2.2017 23:07:

List, Kirsti, Ben:

I am a bit puzzled by these responses, which appear strange to my way
of thinking.

By the standards of some, I am not a “Peircer”.

My aim is bio-medical reserch on specific quantitative issues; the
writings of CSP are studied in order to contribute to my understanding
of the logics of the (bio-medical) sciences. I attempt to place
CSP’s doctrines in context.

Thus, I interpret CSP’s writings and terminology in terms of early
21 st Century biological science / mathematics; while paying do heed
to the status of late 19 th Century status of language usage, science
and mathematics.

First, my post was in reference to the December, 2015 posts of
Franklin and Frederik and the discussion thread at that point. The
meaning of the CSP-coined term “dicisign” was the issue on my
mind. It was brought to my mind by recent progress on the diagrammatic
logic (I thank Frederik for his inspection of this topic and
especially for the introduction to the book by Greaves, The
Philosophical Status of Diagrams, which is an original and intensive
inquiry into CSP’s diagrammatic logic.)

Secondly, it is of critical importance to examine the precedence for
CSP’s usage of terms related to the count of the number “three”.
From the Apple Dictionary:
triad |ˈtrīˌad| noun1 a group or set of three connected people or
things: the triad of medication, diet, and exercise are necessary in
diabetes care.• a chord of three musical notes, consisting of a
given note with the third and fifth above it.• a Welsh form of
literary composition with an arrangement of subjects or statements in
groups of three.2 (also Triad) a secret society originating in China,
typically involved in organized crime.• a member of a
triad.DERIVATIVES triadic |trīˈadik| adjectivetriad ( sense 1)ORIGIN
mid 16th century: from French triade, or via late Latin from Greek
trias, triad-, from treis ‘three.’

Within this context, I was using the term “triad” in the sense of
three terms of CSP, two of his own creation.

In this context, in contrast to the usage by Frederik (as best as I
recall), I was using the three terms to acknowledge the modal sequence
of _inferences_. That is, CSP in his diagram of the eight terms that
infer the ninth term, “argument” includes these three terms as a
linear sequence of inferences. I view the eight terms as necessary (in
CSP’s mindset) to construct an an argument consistent with his
analysis of natural sorts and kinds (sinsigns).

My post merely recommended a book by a philosopher on the topic of
mereology, the study of part - whole illations. CSP is not mentioned
in the book in either the author index or the term index.

If one seeks to translate the In CSP meta-speak, a natural kind
(sinsign) is composed of parts which can be indexed and these parts
can then be composed into sentences (dicisigns) that are then composed
into arguments which are either true, false or indetermine. (For an
alternative (physical) worldview, R. Carnap’s book, The Logical
Structure of the World” (1930s). The sentence, "The union of units
unifies the unity” is an abstract statement about collections of
‘sinsigns” that can be decomposed into “indexes" and unified by
an argument to generate “legisigns."

I hope this clarifies my usage and places the reference to the 2015
posts in context of triadicity in the 21 st Century.

I believe that CSP’s logic goes deep into sublative structures of
natural sorts and kinds. Unfortunately, the depth of CSP’s
scientific logic is seldom recognized.

Cheers

Jerry


On Feb 1, 2017, at 5:02 PM, Benjamin Udell 
wrote:

Kirsti, Jerry, list,

Kirsti is generally correct. I remember years ago at peirce-l when
Orliaguet made the same point (with superfluous sarcasm) to Kirsti.
He quoted a passage by Peirce that required understanding the term
"triad" to refer to the three correlates in triadic action with one
another — sign-object-interpretant — and not to any other
trichotomy (three-way division); otherwise the passage by Peirce
became nonsense. Still it should be noted that on some occasions
Peirce used the term 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary, Kirsti, list,

You wrote, "I've been a little "out of it" post surgery, but did someone 
earlier quote that passage? In any event, I can't find it in this thread."


I was referring to a post by Orliaguet from many years ago, but nobody 
else quoted it in the thread. I tried a few years ago to find it, and I 
just spent an hour trying to find it. I think I've found it now but it 
was a response not to Kirsti but to Inna Semetsky. I don't know how I 
confused Kirsti with Inna, they're quite different. He also argued with 
Kirsti around the same time, so I guess I just got mixed up years later. 
(I found that in 2006 I mentioned Orliaguet's post and added that it was 
"gratuitously passionate" without saying to whom it was a response 
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/archive?id=222334 ). Here's Orliaguet's post 
from 2004:


http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=89853#89853

Re: Off list Re: Peirce a dualist? 2004-03-21 17:29:30 Orliaguet>


I'll quote the pertinent part. In it Orliaguet systematically 
interchanges "triad" and "trichotomy" in quotes from Peirce, in order to 
show that the terms are not well interchangeable. Note that Orliaguet 
adds "[sic]" when he does it. (I don't quite get his quip about special 
relativity.)


   [===Begin quote Orliaguet===]
   OK, but the words mean different things.
   how does the following make sense to you? (I replaced 'pair' with
   'dichotomy' to agree with special relativity)

   "... Signs are divisible by three triads [sic]; first, according as
   the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a
   general law; ..."
   " ... According to the third triad [sic], a Sign may be termed a
   Rheme, a Dicisign or Dicent Sign (that is, a proposition or
   quasi-proposition), or an Argument."

   "Trichotomic relations [sic] are in three ways divisible by triads
   [sic], according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate,
   respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law.

   "According to the second triad [sic], a Sign may be termed an Icon,
   an Index, or a Symbol."

   "Every physical force reacts between a dichotomy [sic] of particles,
   either of which may serve as an index of the other. On the other
   hand, we shall find that every intellectual operation involves a
   trichotomy [sic] of symbols."

   "But a trichotomy [sic] always involves three dichotomies [sic] and
   three monads; and a dichotomy [sic] involves two monads."
   [===End quote===]

The only case where Orliaguet's change seems to make more sense than 
Orliaguet intended is "On the other hand, we shall find that every 
intellectual operation involves a trichotomy [sic] of symbols." Peirce 
actually wrote "triad of symbols". I would expect "trichotomy" there 
(term, proposition, argument, or rheme, dicisign, argument). The Peirce 
quote is from CP 2.300. CP 2.297-302 are from Chapter 2 of "The Art of 
Reasoning" circa 1895. Finding Peirce's further discussion of symbols in 
"The Art of Reasoning" in CP would take some work, if it's there at all.


You wrote, "I agree with Kirsti that the trio "sinsign, index and 
dicisign" is NOT a trichotomy /because/ it does not involve a 
categorially triadic relation."


Kirsti said that they _are_ a trichotomy:

   [Quote Kirsti]
   I feel a need to point out that "sinsign, index and dicisign"
   presents a trichotomy of signs. Not a triad, but a t[h]ree-part
   division, a classification, if you wish.

   All triads and triadicity involve mediation. Triadicity also
   involves meaning, not just signs.
   [End quote]

I hadn't noticed that Kirsti said "sinsign, index and dicisign". You're 
right, it's not a trichotomy in the strong Peircean sense, but it's not 
quite a non-Peircean trichotomy either. It contains (in terms of the 
three-trichotomy system, and borrowing the italicized terms from Liszka):
1. the second division from the _/presentative/_ trichotomy (sign's 
relation to itself),
2. the second division from the _/representative/_ trichotomy (sign to 
object), and
3. the second division from the _/interpretative/_ trichotomy (sign to 
interpretant).


(Borrowing from Liszka in "A Synopsis of A General Introduction to the 
Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce")


http://web.archive.org/web/20030216133540/http://hosting.uaa.alaska.edu/afjjl/LinkedDocuments/LiszkaSynopsisPeirce.htm 



Of course that points to the idea that sign-object-interpretant is 
itself a First-Second-Third threefold, and some, such as Edwina and Jon 
A., disagree.


You wrote "However it may appear in /that/ passage, I do not believe 
that this holds for semeiotic "generally" (see, for example,"A Guess at 
the Riddle," CP 1.369-372)."


Yes, sometimes, as in "A Guess at the Riddle," Peirce uses the term 
"triad" to refer to a trichotomy that is not a triad of the three 
correlates of semiotic action. I was just saying that it's clearer to 
reserve "triad" for the semiotic triad, the correlates united in triadic 
action, and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[Benjamin Udell]

Kirsti, Jerry, list,

Kirsti is generally correct. I remember years ago at peirce-l when 
Orliaguet made the same point (with superfluous sarcasm) to Kirsti. He 
quoted a passage by Peirce that required understanding the term "triad" 
to refer to the three correlates in triadic action with one another — 
sign-object-interpretant — and not to any other trichotomy (three-way 
division); otherwise the passage by Peirce became nonsense. Still it 
should be noted that on some occasions Peirce used the term "triad" to 
refer to a merely classificatory trichotomy. But I think that, in 
Peircean contexts, Kirsti's point is not only supported in Peirce but 
also promotes much more clarity than does treating "triad" and 
"trichotomy" as interchangeable. Over the years commenters at peirce-l 
have tended to adhere to the distinction and FWIW I always stick to it.


Best, Ben

On 1/31/2017 5:22 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Hi,

I feel a need to point out that "sinsign, index and dicisign" presents 
a trichotomy of signs. Not a triad, but a tree-part division, a 
classification, if you wish.


All triads and triadicity involve mediation. Triadicity also involves 
meaning, not just signs.


Kirsti



Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 26.1.2017 21:07:

List, Franklin, Frederik:

The OUP book,

THE STRUCTURE OF OBJECTS

by Kathrin Koslicki (2008)

addresses some of the philosophy that appears to be difficult to
understand.

More particularly, it illuminates the triad, sinsign, index and
dicisign in relation to parts of the whole, the illation between the
identity, the individual and the particular that also considers the
chemical perspective.
Unfortunately, the intertwining of the meaning of this triad with
diagrammatic logic as described by Mark Greaves in “The
Philosophical Status of Diagrams” is beyond the scope of the logic
presented.

Cheers

Jerry


On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:10 PM, Franklin Ransom
 wrote:

Jerry, list,

Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement
went.

Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must
admit I'm not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such
as 'coupling' and 'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean
something like what the original meaning of 'atom' meant, as
something basic and indivisible from which other, more complex
things can be built up out of.

I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the
order in which they were presented.


Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in
character"?


I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation,
and mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would
seem almost tautological that it is "mereological in character". But
there are different and competing theories in mereology, and I don't
want to be taken as supporting any one of them specifically.


Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit?


I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends
on the context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic
elements, or units, while in another context of analysis we might
try to break it down more, as presumably someone in experimental
psychology might try to break down sense impressions to the physical
operations of the body and the thing experienced. Similarly with
smoke, if we just wanted to talk about the matter in terms of
commonly understood objects and signs, then it could be considered a
unit; but obviously, the chemist could try to break it down more
into the specific analysis of gases, and down to the atoms, of which
the smoke is composed, and so on further to particles and such.


If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external
events with internal processes, then what is the nature of the
grammar the generates the coupling of the parts of the whole?


This is where the meaning of 'coupling' worries me, but I'll suppose
it's something like correspondence. Also not sure what grammar is
supposed to be in this context. By "whole work of understanding", I
meant the introduction of a concept, whether in perceptual judgment
or in an abduction, for explaining the phenomenon (percept); which
concept, when analyzed into possible further interactions with the
object of the percept, and then put to experimental test in
practical conduct, proves helpful for interacting with the object of
the percept. So the whole process of semiosis, up to the following
out of a scientific inquiry into the object, may be required to
grasp the (whole) object. Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose
that the fact that the object responds to our interactions in the
way we predict is what reveals that there is a correspondence
between our concept of the object and the object as it is in itself.

I'm not sure how to relate that to "the nature of the grammar the
generates the coupling of the parts of the whole". Part and whole
here were originally about the object as immediate and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Franklin, Frederik:

The OUP book,

The Structure of Objects

by Kathrin Koslicki (2008)

addresses some of the philosophy that appears to be difficult to understand.  

More particularly, it illuminates the triad, sinsign, index and dicisign in 
relation to parts of the whole, the illation between the identity, the 
individual and the particular that also considers the chemical perspective.
Unfortunately, the intertwining of the meaning of this triad with diagrammatic 
logic as described by Mark Greaves in “The Philosophical Status of Diagrams” is 
beyond the scope of the logic presented.

Cheers

Jerry



> On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:10 PM, Franklin Ransom  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, list,
> 
> Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement went.
> 
> Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must admit I'm 
> not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such as 'coupling' and 
> 'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean something like what the 
> original meaning of 'atom' meant, as something basic and indivisible from 
> which other, more complex things can be built up out of.
> 
> I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the order in 
> which they were presented.
> 
> Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in character"?
> 
> I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation, and 
> mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would seem almost 
> tautological that it is "mereological in character". But there are different 
> and competing theories in mereology, and I don't want to be taken as 
> supporting any one of them specifically.
> 
> Is smoke a unit?  Is a precept a unit?
> 
> I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends on the 
> context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic elements, or 
> units, while in another context of analysis we might try to break it down 
> more, as presumably someone in experimental psychology might try to break 
> down sense impressions to the physical operations of the body and the thing 
> experienced. Similarly with smoke, if we just wanted to talk about the matter 
> in terms of commonly understood objects and signs, then it could be 
> considered a unit; but obviously, the chemist could try to break it down more 
> into the specific analysis of gases, and down to the atoms, of which the 
> smoke is composed, and so on further to particles and such.
> 
> If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external events with 
> internal processes, then what is the nature of the grammar the generates the 
> coupling of the parts of the whole?
> 
> This is where the meaning of 'coupling' worries me, but I'll suppose it's 
> something like correspondence. Also not sure what grammar is supposed to be 
> in this context. By "whole work of understanding", I meant the introduction 
> of a concept, whether in perceptual judgment or in an abduction, for 
> explaining the phenomenon (percept); which concept, when analyzed into 
> possible further interactions with the object of the percept, and then put to 
> experimental test in practical conduct, proves helpful for interacting with 
> the object of the percept. So the whole process of semiosis, up to the 
> following out of a scientific inquiry into the object, may be required to 
> grasp the (whole) object. Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose that the 
> fact that the object responds to our interactions in the way we predict is 
> what reveals that there is a correspondence between our concept of the object 
> and the object as it is in itself.
> 
> I'm not sure how to relate that to "the nature of the grammar the generates 
> the coupling of the parts of the whole". Part and whole here were originally 
> about the object as immediate and the object as dynamical, but relating what 
> is going on between external events and internal processes (i.e., 
> perception?), is a different kind of relating. Perhaps (and this is simply a 
> suggestion), we might think of there being the real object, which has a part 
> of it involved in perception, and there being the mind, which has a part of 
> it involved in perception, and these two (the real object and the mind) are 
> themselves parts of a semiosis, and so the 'grammar' that would ultimately be 
> appropriate would be that offered by semiotic.
> 
> What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the "whole" of the 
> experience?
> 
> Hmm, that's a good question. Partly it depends upon what is meant by 
> experience, and whether one subscribes to the doctrine of immediate 
> perception. If one includes perception and conception, and what is perceived 
> and conceived, then smoke would be a part of the experience; and with respect 
> to perception, it would be a part of smoke, but with respect to conception it 
> would be the whole of the smoke. But, it is good to 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[Franklin Ransom]

Jerry, list,

Jerry, you wrote:

The terms "coupling" and "grammar" are used in the senses of CSP.  Coupling
> referring to CSP's paper on the logic of Copula.  Grammar in the typical
> sense that that one may find in the classical text by Otto Jesperson, *The
> Philosophy of Grammar *or in CSP's writings*.*


Ah, coupling in the sense of the copula. That is very helpful, thank you.

As for grammar, it is clear that you mean speculative grammar then, though
this has not always been clear to me in your posts using the term. Of
course speculative grammar is not the same thing as syntax, since a
division between syntax and semantics does not fit neatly in Peirce's
speculative grammar. This is largely because of the idea of the sign as a
triadic relation, which is not simply a syntactical structure to which a
semantics can be applied, but rather the very structure of meaning. The
reason I have been confused is that it has sometimes seemed to me that you
meant syntax rather than speculative grammar.

"Unit" being a term of one-ness, such as the 7 basic units of physics
> (mass, distance, time, temperature, light, electricity and "mole". Or
> integers as numbers. Equally applicable to the basic units of chemistry (92
> different logical structures with names) and biology (cells, etc).  Take
> you pick for meaningfulness of the term for you and for your personal
> philosophy.


Sounds good. I don't see this as necessarily in disagreement with what I
said, so I am content to leave it at that.

But, you wrote:
> Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a
> whole, requires the whole work of understanding.
> This is what motivated my questions:
> In what sense are your using "whole-ness" where the suffix -ness infers
> changing an adjective into a noun -in the grammatical sense of the
> wholeness of the smoke or the sense of the wholeness of interpretation?


Well, I did not use the term "whole-ness", so I suppose you meant that when
I use the term "whole", in one case it at least really means "whole-ness".
For one, I don't see the whole of the smoke as something grammatical, but
ontological. The whole of interpretation, on the other hand, will be
semiotic(al?), which will include the grammatical. I think this answers
your question, though it suggests that the idea of the whole is different
in kind in the case of smoke from what it is in the case of interpretation.
I am not prepared at this time to articulate the differences in these kinds
of wholes, because I have an intellectual project I am going to be devoting
myself to for a few months.

Is it correct to read this paragraph that for the term "smoke", one can
> assign an arbitrary number of different percepts?  And hence, the each
> different percept would lead to a different perceptual judgment?  In other
> words, in this specific case, the premises implicit to the scenario can
> lead to an arbitrary number of arguments that are consistent with symbols
> and legisigns?


Much hinges on the sense of 'arbitrary' here. If by arbitrary, you mean in
the sense of judgement as in arbitration, there is some truth to that. If
by arbitrary you mean willy-nilly or at random, then no. Consider that
there are different experiences we have of smoke. Suppose one had an
experience of smoke three days ago when sitting by a fireplace. Now suppose
one has an experience of smoke right now from someone smoking a cigarette
nearby. These are two different experiences, with different percepts,
resulting in different perceptual judgments. But the term 'smoke' is still
applied to both. If we wanted to treat of specific experiences of smoke
such that we could classify different kinds of smoke, there would be a need
for arbitrating which percepts of smoke had to with which specific kinds of
smoke. This would help in identifying different chemical components, which
later could help us to identify new experiences of smoke as being of one
kind or another, and so understand what the smoke is composed of when it is
experienced, and thus of how the smoke is related to other percepts and
what might be expected in future percepts in the vicinity of the smoke.

I'm not altogether sure I understood what the question was driving at
though, so I can only hope this helps clarify my way of thinking about it.

What do you wish to express when you think of "correspondence" in this
> context of yoking?


Well, I thought that I had just made that clear. Allow me to quote myself
from the passage to which you responded with this question, which I think
answers the question: "Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose that the
fact that the object responds to our interactions in the way we predict is
what reveals that there is a correspondence between our concept of the
object and the object as it is in itself." Correspondence, then, is just
the fact that the object responds in the way we predict it will, when we
interact with it. If it does not, then our idea of the object 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[Jerry LR Chandler]

(This post was found in my email "Draft Box”. This response was drafted on Dec. 
13 th, 2015.

Franklin, Matt, List:

Some short responses to your concerns and further questions are raised.
On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:10 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:

> Jerry, list,
> 
> Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement went.
> 
> Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must admit I'm 
> not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such as 'coupling' and 
> 'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean something like what the 
> original meaning of 'atom' meant, as something basic and indivisible from 
> which other, more complex things can be built up out of.

The terms "coupling" and "grammar" are used in the senses of CSP.  Coupling 
referring to CSP's paper on the logic of Copula.  Grammar in the typical sense 
that that one may find in the classical text by Otto Jesperson, The Philosophy 
of Grammar or in CSP's writings.
"Unit" being a term of one-ness, such as the 7 basic units of physics (mass, 
distance, time, temperature, light, electricity and "mole". Or integers as 
numbers. Equally applicable to the basic units of chemistry (92 different 
logical structures with names) and biology (cells, etc).  Take you pick for 
meaningfulness of the term for you and for your personal philosophy.
> 
> I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the order in 
> which they were presented.
> 
> Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in character"?
> 
> I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation, and 
> mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would seem almost 
> tautological that it is "mereological in character". But there are different 
> and competing theories in mereology, and I don't want to be taken as 
> supporting any one of them specifically.

But, you wrote:
Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a whole, 
requires the whole work of understanding.

This is what motivated my questions:
In what sense are your using "whole-ness" where the suffix -ness infers 
changing an adjective into a noun -in the grammatical sense of the 
wholeness of the smoke or the sense of the wholeness of interpretation?

> 
> Is smoke a unit?  Is a precept a unit?
> 
> I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends on the 
> context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic elements, or 
> units, while in another context of analysis we might try to break it down 
> more, as presumably someone in experimental psychology might try to break 
> down sense impressions to the physical operations of the body and the thing 
> experienced. Similarly with smoke, if we just wanted to talk about the matter 
> in terms of commonly understood objects and signs, then it could be 
> considered a unit; but obviously, the chemist could try to break it down more 
> into the specific analysis of gases, and down to the atoms, of which the 
> smoke is composed, and so on further to particles and such.

Is it correct to read this paragraph that for the term "smoke", one can assign 
an arbitrary number of different percepts?  And hence, the each different 
percept would lead to a different perceptual judgment?  In other words, in this 
specific case, the premises implicit to the scenario can lead to an arbitrary 
number of arguments that are consistent with symbols and legisigns? 
> 
> If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external events with 
> internal processes, then what is the nature of the grammar the generates the 
> coupling of the parts of the whole?
> 
> This is where the meaning of 'coupling' worries me, but I'll suppose it's 
> something like correspondence. Also not sure what grammar is supposed to be 
> in this context. By "whole work of understanding", I meant the introduction 
> of a concept, whether in perceptual judgment or in an abduction, for 
> explaining the phenomenon (percept); which concept, when analyzed into 
> possible further interactions with the object of the percept, and then put to 
> experimental test in practical conduct, proves helpful for interacting with 
> the object of the percept. So the whole process of semiosis, up to the 
> following out of a scientific inquiry into the object, may be required to 
> grasp the (whole) object. Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose that the 
> fact that the object responds to our interactions in the way we predict is 
> what reveals that there is a correspondence between our concept of the object 
> and the object as it is in itself.

The word "coupling" comes from the Gk / L. roots. It requires a minimum of a 
pair to be yoked together. (But not an ordered pair as in category theory or 
set theory.)
What do you wish to express when you think of "correspondence" in this context 
of yoking?
> 
> I'm not sure how to relate that to "the nature of the grammar the generates 
>