Gary, Kirsti, list,
You wrote, "I've been a little "out of it" post surgery, but did someone
earlier quote that passage? In any event, I can't find it in this thread."
I was referring to a post by Orliaguet from many years ago, but nobody
else quoted it in the thread. I tried a few years ago to find it, and I
just spent an hour trying to find it. I think I've found it now but it
was a response not to Kirsti but to Inna Semetsky. I don't know how I
confused Kirsti with Inna, they're quite different. He also argued with
Kirsti around the same time, so I guess I just got mixed up years later.
(I found that in 2006 I mentioned Orliaguet's post and added that it was
"gratuitously passionate" without saying to whom it was a response
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/archive?id=222334 ). Here's Orliaguet's post
from 2004:
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=89853#89853
Re: Off list Re: Peirce a dualist? 2004-03-21 17:29:30 <Jean-Marc
Orliaguet>
I'll quote the pertinent part. In it Orliaguet systematically
interchanges "triad" and "trichotomy" in quotes from Peirce, in order to
show that the terms are not well interchangeable. Note that Orliaguet
adds "[sic]" when he does it. (I don't quite get his quip about special
relativity.)
[===Begin quote Orliaguet===]
OK, but the words mean different things.
how does the following make sense to you? (I replaced 'pair' with
'dichotomy' to agree with special relativity)
"... Signs are divisible by three triads [sic]; first, according as
the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a
general law; ..."
" ... According to the third triad [sic], a Sign may be termed a
Rheme, a Dicisign or Dicent Sign (that is, a proposition or
quasi-proposition), or an Argument."
"Trichotomic relations [sic] are in three ways divisible by triads
[sic], according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate,
respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law.
"According to the second triad [sic], a Sign may be termed an Icon,
an Index, or a Symbol."
"Every physical force reacts between a dichotomy [sic] of particles,
either of which may serve as an index of the other. On the other
hand, we shall find that every intellectual operation involves a
trichotomy [sic] of symbols."
"But a trichotomy [sic] always involves three dichotomies [sic] and
three monads; and a dichotomy [sic] involves two monads."
[===End quote===]
The only case where Orliaguet's change seems to make more sense than
Orliaguet intended is "On the other hand, we shall find that every
intellectual operation involves a trichotomy [sic] of symbols." Peirce
actually wrote "triad of symbols". I would expect "trichotomy" there
(term, proposition, argument, or rheme, dicisign, argument). The Peirce
quote is from CP 2.300. CP 2.297-302 are from Chapter 2 of "The Art of
Reasoning" circa 1895. Finding Peirce's further discussion of symbols in
"The Art of Reasoning" in CP would take some work, if it's there at all.
You wrote, "I agree with Kirsti that the trio "sinsign, index and
dicisign" is NOT a trichotomy /because/ it does not involve a
categorially triadic relation."
Kirsti said that they _are_ a trichotomy:
[Quote Kirsti]
I feel a need to point out that "sinsign, index and dicisign"
presents a trichotomy of signs. Not a triad, but a t[h]ree-part
division, a classification, if you wish.
All triads and triadicity involve mediation. Triadicity also
involves meaning, not just signs.
[End quote]
I hadn't noticed that Kirsti said "sinsign, index and dicisign". You're
right, it's not a trichotomy in the strong Peircean sense, but it's not
quite a non-Peircean trichotomy either. It contains (in terms of the
three-trichotomy system, and borrowing the italicized terms from Liszka):
1. the second division from the _/presentative/_ trichotomy (sign's
relation to itself),
2. the second division from the _/representative/_ trichotomy (sign to
object), and
3. the second division from the _/interpretative/_ trichotomy (sign to
interpretant).
(Borrowing from Liszka in "A Synopsis of A General Introduction to the
Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce")
http://web.archive.org/web/20030216133540/http://hosting.uaa.alaska.edu/afjjl/LinkedDocuments/LiszkaSynopsisPeirce.htm
Of course that points to the idea that sign-object-interpretant is
itself a First-Second-Third threefold, and some, such as Edwina and Jon
A., disagree.
You wrote "However it may appear in /that/ passage, I do not believe
that this holds for semeiotic "generally" (see, for example,"A Guess at
the Riddle," CP 1.369-372)."
Yes, sometimes, as in "A Guess at the Riddle," Peirce uses the term
"triad" to refer to a trichotomy that is not a triad of the three
correlates of semiotic action. I was just saying that it's clearer to
reserve "triad" for the semiotic triad, the correlates united in triadic
action, and reserve "trichotomy" for division into three. Of course
there's nothing about English or Ancient Greek that requires us so to
reserve "triad," which in both langauges just means "trio" or
"threesome." But Peirce's development of the semiotic triad in terms of
an irreducibly "triadic predicate" as he consistently called it,
reflecting irreducibly "triadic action" as he consistently called it,
leads one to associate "triad" with that context, and I think it
benefits clarity to adhere to it, even though Peirce sometimes used the
word "triad" more generally. At one time I suggested the use of words
like "triastic" and "triasm" to refer to both trichotomies and triads.
Nobody liked it, and maybe just as well. A few years ago I looked up
that which would be the normal root, if it existed, in Ancient Greek:
_/triazo/_. It did exist, but it meant "destroy" — I guess as if by
cutting in three.
You wrote, "certainly a trichotomy can be a simple, non-categorial
division into three, but I don't see how one can claim this "generally"
(including generally in semeiotic) /for Peirce/ even if particular
passages might suggest otherwise."
I agree, "trichotomy" does not refer generally for Peirce to simple
non-categorial division into three. Usually he's talking about three-way
categorial divisions. I was just saying that it benefits clarity to
habitually refer to them as trichotomies rather than as triads, and I
took Kirsti to be saying that IS the distinction, to which I added that
Peirce did not always follow that terminologically but instead sometimes
referred to various categorial classificatory trichotomies as "triads".
Best, Ben
On 2/1/2017 9:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben, list
Ben, you wrote: ".[Orliaguet ]. . . . quoted a passage by Peirce that
required understanding the term "triad" to refer to the three
correlates in triadic action with one another —
sign-object-interpretant — and not to any other trichotomy (three-way
division); otherwise the passage by Peirce became nonsense. "
I've been a little "out of it" post surgery, but did someone earlier
quote that passage? In any event, I can't find it in this thread.
However it may appear in /that/ passage, I do not believe that this
holds for semeiotic "generally" (see, for example,"A Guess at the
Riddle," CP 1.369-372). While the ordinary sense (that is, in the
vernacular, and as it is employed in some sciences) of trichotomy is
"a three fold cut," trichotomy can and does refer in Peirce to /all/
tricategorial relations, including those which appear in semeiotic.
(Note, however, that I agree with Kirsti that the trio "sinsign, index
and dicisign" is NOT a trichotomy /because/ it does not involve a
categorially triadic relation.)
Ben wrote: "Still it should be noted that on some occasions Peirce
used the term "triad" to refer to a merely classificatory trichotomy."
On the other hand, on some (I mean many) occasions Peirce used the
term "trichotomy" to refer to categorially triadic relations as in the
ms "Trichotomic." I /always/ use "Trichotomy to refer to a genuine
trichotomic relation (the elements of the triad involving all three
categories in relation in any context, semeiotic or otherwise),
while--as I would express it--not all triads are trichotomic. Again,
certainly a trichotomy can be a simple, non-categorial division into
three, but I don't see how one can claim this "generally" (including
generally in semeiotic) /for Peirce/ even if particular passages might
suggest otherwise.
Ben, am I missing something here?
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690 <tel:%28718%29%20482-5690> *
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 6:02 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com
<mailto:baud...@gmail.com> > wrote:
Kirsti, Jerry, list,
Kirsti is generally correct. I remember years ago at peirce-l when
Orliaguet made the same point (with superfluous sarcasm) to Kirsti.
He quoted a passage by Peirce that required understanding the term
"triad" to refer to the three correlates in triadic action with one
another — sign-object-interpretant — and not to any other trichotomy
(three-way division); otherwise the passage by Peirce became
nonsense. Still it should be noted that on some occasions Peirce used
the term "triad" to refer to a merely classificatory trichotomy. But
I think that, in Peircean contexts, Kirsti's point is not only
supported in Peirce but also promotes much more clarity than does
treating "triad" and "trichotomy" as interchangeable. Over the years
commenters at peirce-l have tended to adhere to the distinction and
FWIW I always stick to it.
Best, Ben
On 1/31/2017 5:22 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi
<mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
Hi,
I feel a need to point out that "sinsign, index and dicisign"
presents a trichotomy of signs. Not a triad, but a tree-part
division, a classification, if you wish.
All triads and triadicity involve mediation. Triadicity also
involves meaning, not just signs.
Kirsti
Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 26.1.2017 21:07:
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