On Feb 1, 2017, at 5:02 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Kirsti, Jerry, list,
Kirsti is generally correct. I remember years ago at peirce-l when
Orliaguet made the same point (with superfluous sarcasm) to Kirsti.
He quoted a passage by Peirce that required understanding the term
"triad" to refer to the three correlates in triadic action with one
another — sign-object-interpretant — and not to any other
trichotomy (three-way division); otherwise the passage by Peirce
became nonsense. Still it should be noted that on some occasions
Peirce used the term "triad" to refer to a merely classificatory
trichotomy. But I think that, in Peircean contexts, Kirsti's point
is not only supported in Peirce but also promotes much more clarity
than does treating "triad" and "trichotomy" as interchangeable. Over
the years commenters at peirce-l have tended to adhere to the
distinction and FWIW I always stick to it.
Best, Ben
On 1/31/2017 5:22 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
Hi,
I feel a need to point out that "sinsign, index and dicisign"
presents a trichotomy of signs. Not a triad, but a tree-part
division, a classification, if you wish.
All triads and triadicity involve mediation. Triadicity also
involves meaning, not just signs.
Kirsti
Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 26.1.2017 21:07:
List, Franklin, Frederik:
The OUP book,
THE STRUCTURE OF OBJECTS
by Kathrin Koslicki (2008)
addresses some of the philosophy that appears to be difficult to
understand.
More particularly, it illuminates the triad, sinsign, index and
dicisign in relation to parts of the whole, the illation between the
identity, the individual and the particular that also considers the
chemical perspective.
Unfortunately, the intertwining of the meaning of this triad with
diagrammatic logic as described by Mark Greaves in “The
Philosophical Status of Diagrams” is beyond the scope of the logic
presented.
Cheers
Jerry
On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:10 PM, Franklin Ransom
<pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
Jerry, list,
Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement
went.
Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must
admit I'm not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such
as 'coupling' and 'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean
something like what the original meaning of 'atom' meant, as
something basic and indivisible from which other, more complex
things can be built up out of.
I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the
order in which they were presented.
Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in
character"?
I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation,
and mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would
seem almost tautological that it is "mereological in character". But
there are different and competing theories in mereology, and I don't
want to be taken as supporting any one of them specifically.
Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit?
I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends
on the context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic
elements, or units, while in another context of analysis we might
try to break it down more, as presumably someone in experimental
psychology might try to break down sense impressions to the physical
operations of the body and the thing experienced. Similarly with
smoke, if we just wanted to talk about the matter in terms of
commonly understood objects and signs, then it could be considered a
unit; but obviously, the chemist could try to break it down more
into the specific analysis of gases, and down to the atoms, of which
the smoke is composed, and so on further to particles and such.
If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external
events with internal processes, then what is the nature of the
grammar the generates the coupling of the parts of the whole?
This is where the meaning of 'coupling' worries me, but I'll suppose
it's something like correspondence. Also not sure what grammar is
supposed to be in this context. By "whole work of understanding", I
meant the introduction of a concept, whether in perceptual judgment
or in an abduction, for explaining the phenomenon (percept); which
concept, when analyzed into possible further interactions with the
object of the percept, and then put to experimental test in
practical conduct, proves helpful for interacting with the object of
the percept. So the whole process of semiosis, up to the following
out of a scientific inquiry into the object, may be required to
grasp the (whole) object. Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose
that the fact that the object responds to our interactions in the
way we predict is what reveals that there is a correspondence
between our concept of the object and the object as it is in itself.
I'm not sure how to relate that to "the nature of the grammar the
generates the coupling of the parts of the whole". Part and whole
here were originally about the object as immediate and the object as
dynamical, but relating what is going on between external events and
internal processes (i.e., perception?), is a different kind of
relating. Perhaps (and this is simply a suggestion), we might think
of there being the real object, which has a part of it involved in
perception, and there being the mind, which has a part of it
involved in perception, and these two (the real object and the mind)
are themselves parts of a semiosis, and so the 'grammar' that would
ultimately be appropriate would be that offered by semiotic.
What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the
"whole" of the experience?
Hmm, that's a good question. Partly it depends upon what is meant by
experience, and whether one subscribes to the doctrine of immediate
perception. If one includes perception and conception, and what is
perceived and conceived, then smoke would be a part of the
experience; and with respect to perception, it would be a part of
smoke, but with respect to conception it would be the whole of the
smoke. But, it is good to recognize that in such case, we can think
of experience in a somewhat flexible way, such that we could
consider the initial experience as one of perception only, then the
experience of seeing the smoke and coming to recognize it as smoke,
and then the experience later of interacting with the fire that is
the source of the smoke; or we could lump these altogether as one
long experience, and include in it any other interactions we ever
have or could have of perceiving the smoke. Of course, even in the
latter case, the smoke and the experience of it will not be the same
thing, because there is always us, the ones experiencing the smoke,
either as individuals or as a community, that are also always
involved in the experience. So the smoke remains part of the
experience, not the whole of it; while whether we consider the smoke
as experienced in part, or as a whole, depends on how experience is
considered in a given context of analysis.
-- Franklin
----------------------------------------------
On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Jerry LR Chandler
<jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> wrote:
List, Frank:
On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
That effect of the smoke is in some sense part of what it is to be
smoke. Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and
grasping it as a whole, requires the whole work of understanding.
But while the percept is not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the whole
of the object, it is nevertheless as much a part of smoke as it is a
part of the perceiver.
While I concur with these sentences, I would ask further of your
views:
What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the "whole"
of the experience?
If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external
events with internal processes, then what is the nature of the
grammar the generates the coupling of the parts of the whole?
Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit?
Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in
character"?
Just curious.
Cheers
Jerry
