[PEN-L:1489] Re: State taxes
Richard: Get a hold of several articles by Jane Gravelle of the Congressional Research Service for a theoretical case that consumption taxes *reduce* efficiency. I don't have the cites but remember reading them back in 1990, and I think I remember the punch line. I believe that the offset to the usual neoclassical case--based on incentives to greater capital formation--comes from modelling the impact on labor supply of increasing the tax on labor. When I saw them they were working papers; I don't know where they were published. If you call her, she may be able to give you these papers and direct you to other literature. Good luck! On Sun, 19 Nov 1995, Richard Ira Lavine wrote: > Here's the reality of trying to deal with state and local taxes: > > Arguments for progressivity are nice, but the reality is that only > the very best state and local systems (Minnesota, Vermont) are even close > to proportional when all taxes are considered -- sales, property, > cigarette, gasoline, etc. -- and that's not including the notoriously > regressive state lotteries. > > I would consider it a great step forward if we could direct the current > public discussion on tax reform in Texas toward a consideration of > distributional impact. Once there, we could get into ability to pay, etc. > and I would be happy to settle for moving toward proportionality. In > fact, Gov. Bush is pushing hard to replace $9 billion in local school > property taxes (and $1 billion in corporate franchise taxes, tipping off > who is really pushing tax reform to begin with) with some kind of > consumption tax. His argument is that a consumption tax would promote > savings, and thus economic growth (the Holy Grail of all state > politicians). The fight will probably not be over the regressivity of > any changes (although I'll do my best), but instead over the role of > consumption taxes. > > So I need something to say about the role of consumption taxes > (broad-based sales tax, VAT) in a state economy. This may be a big > national issue if the Republicans keep their Congressional majorities in > Nov 96, but Texas could serve as the out-of-town opening. Bush has > made this his major issue and if he succeeds here, he could easily ride > consumption taxes (and his famous name) onto the national scene. > > Therefore I need something other than equity arguments to combat a move > from property taxes (which are at least partially absorbed by landlords > and owners of capital) to consumption taxes (which are paid strictly > according to the percentage of income spent, i.e. regressive as hell). > > Your help would be greatly appreciated and could make a real difference > in the real world. > > Dick Lavine > Center for Public Policy Priorities > Austin, TX >
[PEN-L:1485] Re: Speedup and Lordstown
There's Aronowitz's *False Promises* On Sun, 19 Nov 1995, Harry M. Cleaver wrote: > Two questions: > > 1. Does anyone know a good reference/discription/analysis of the conflict > over speedup at the Lordstown plant of Ford(?) that led to widespread > sabotage by young workers. This was back in the 1970s I think. >
[PEN-L:1392] Re: firm behaviour and teaching
If you want the straight micro theory critically considered, you can do much worse than to go with 2 pen-lers. For undergraduates, Peter Dorman has a manuscript coming out imminently, I think, that is superb. For graduate micro there is Hahnel and Albert's *Quiet Revolution in Welfare Economics*. BUY PEN-L!!
[PEN-L:855] Re: Extinction, Market Socialism and priorities
Well Lotus, I saw your reply to Barney. The latter wouldn't be, would he, the esteemed purple dinosaur and chanteur? What I want to know is, who is this Stallin' character and why doesn't he just get on with it? As for Troutsky, the whole thing smells fishy. And what was so gosh-darned important about scissors that led to such a crisis! I find incisors do just fine for most everyday purposes. The Spirit of Emily Latella PS: Just kidding, Louis. Once in a while--it must be the weather--it's necessary to take Wittgenstein's advice and descend "from the clear heights of cleverness to the green valleys of silliness". This debate raises huge, and hugely important, issues, about which I am ill-qualified to speak. So it's back to the sidelines I go!
[PEN-L:766] Re: Lucas????
Barro writes praising his pal in today's WSJ. He recounts an anecdote evidently meant to support his high opinion of Lucas. Before having his 1972 article published in the JET, it was rejected by the AER for being "too mathematical". Lucas fired off an angry letter to the editor, asking him whether he thought he was "publishing Newsweek". When one thinks about what this anecdote, and the smug tone in which it is recounted, says about the state of the profession, the mind boggles! Wassily Leontief, call your office.
[PEN-L:626] Re: We need to respond
Sorry if this point has already been made--I deleted some of this thread inadvertently. The same day that piece of crap from the Cato people appeared in the WSJ, they carried a good piece from their token human being, Albert Hunt, about the outrageous cuts in the earned income tax credit. If the catoites really cared about work for those on welfare, why aren't they emitting the slightest peep of protest about this EITC savagery?
[PEN-L:316] Re: feminist econ
Doug: The connection between Cartesian detachment and masculinity is made by feminist object-relations psychoanalysts in an important body of literature whose touchstones are Nancy Chodorow's *The Reproduction of Mothering* and Dorothy Dinnerstein's *The Mermaid and the Minotaur*. The claim is that mother-only childrearing creates boys as separate and detached and girls whose self-identity is achieved not despite of but in conjunction with intimate relationships. Naomi Scheman, in her book *Engenderings* states the claim succintly: "..the view of a separate, autonomous, sharply individuated self embedded in liberal political and economic ideology...can be seen as a defensive reification of the process of ego development in males raised by women in a patriarchal society. Patriarchal family structure tends to produce men of whom these political and philosophical views seem factually descriptive and who are, moreover, deeply motivated to accept the truth of those views as truths about themselves. In turn, the acceptance by all of us of those views as views about *persons* sustains these child-rearing practices by leading us to devalue, to see as truncated, as less than fully, healthily adult, the very didderent psychical structures of *women* raised by women." On Fri, 1 Sep 1995, Doug Henwood wrote: > I've just gotten a sample copy of the first issue of Feminist Economics > (and congrats to Nancy Folbre for getting her article in that ish written > up in the Financial Times), and in Sandra Harding's article I read the > following: > > > For example, Julie Nelson argues that the dominant definition of economics > as dealing with 'choice in the face of scarcity' reflects gender bias: > > Defining the subject of economics as individual choice makes the detached > cogito, not the material world or real persons in the material world, > the center of study. Nature, childhood, bodily needs, and human > connectedness, cut off from 'masculine' concern in the Cartesian split, > remain safely out of the limelight. > > > What is specifically feminist about this critique? What is specifically > "masculine" about Descartes and the detached individual? > > Doug > > -- > > Doug Henwood > [[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Left Business Observer > 250 W 85 St > New York NY 10024-3217 > USA > +1-212-874-4020 voice > +1-212-874-3137 fax > > >
[PEN-L:244] Re: Re: Elizabeth Fox-Genovese (fwd)
--This never made it so I'm reposting. -- Forwarded message -- Date: Fri, 25 Aug 1995 10:16:21 -0400 (EDT) From: Kevin Quinn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [PEN-L:197] Re: Re: Elizabeth Fox-Genovese This is depressing. I'm not sure their current politics follows inevitably from their past work. They both espoused a strong communitarianism, a position that holds both dangers and opportunities for leftists. The danger is the Romantic embrace of some imagined pre-capitalist "organic" society; the opportunity is the critique of individualism and the imperative to form political arguments that don't rely exclusively on "rights-talk", arguments that contest the meaning of important values like autonomy and freedom. Interestingly one and the same thinker, Raymond Williams, wrote both the most sympathetic portrayal of romantic, right-wing anti-capitalism--in *Culture and Society*, and one of the best critiques of this position--in *The Country and the City*.
[PEN-L:189] Request for Info
A friend not on the list is looking for data on public ownership of industry for a comparative systems course she is teaching. Please respond privately to me at [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thanks Kevin Quinn
[PEN-L:4969] Re: popular economics books
Hmm...I find this insulting to the poets; since poets, "scientists" believe, are subject to woolyheadedness, give them woolyheaded prose. Or maybe the thinking is: "it's terrible prose--it must be poetry!" On Thu, 4 May 1995, Eric Glynn wrote: > I would recommend either of two books by Steve Resnick and Richard Wolff, > if your poets are at all interested in theories of knowledge production, > and some of the newer directions in Marxism: > > Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical > > Knowledge and Class (the latter somewhat responsible for turning several > poets and economists into poet-economists) > > Eric Glynn > University of Massachusetts >
[PEN-L:4960] Re: popular economics books
Jim: The poets might enjoy Dickens' *Hard Times*. This is a blistering attack on utilitarianism and on Political Economy that was virtually dictated by Carlyle--at whose feet CD was sitting at the time--and so embodies the latter's romantic anti-capitalism. (Marx took the language about the reduction "to the cash nexus" of evrything from Carlyle's Signs of the Time.) And since I'm back in that century, JS Mill's autobiography--detailing his nervous breakdown and rejection of his father's utilitarianism--is great, too. Not that the prose of a Krugman or a Reich isn't full of poetry, of course. But, uh...well, Dickens it's not!
[PEN-L:4892] Re: asset tax
On Mon, 1 May 1995 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Are we having (Islamic) fun(damentalism) yet? > :-) > Yes! This reminds me of my puzzlement when I didn't find all of the bastard Keynesians shipping off to Tehran in the late 70's to help construct the "IS-LMic Republic"!
[PEN-L:4802] Re: econ. and cognitive psychology
Susan Feiner's paper at the last AEA meetings, at an IAFFE session, was wonderful on h.e.'s psychopathology. She drew on Chodorow and Bordo, both of whom use object-relations psychoanalysis to critique Cartesian, masculinist conceptions of theoretical rationality. Feiner applies these ideas to psychoanalyze the practically rational h.e. --Kevin Quinn On Fri, 21 Apr 1995, Jim Devine wrote: > > Has anyone remarked that homo economicus is either autistic or > psychopathic? > > sincerely, > > Jim Devine > [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA > 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 >
[PEN-L:4533] Re: monetary theory: classical to neoclassical
Evan: Try Hicks (Sir John) Essays in Monetary Theory and also Leijonhufvud (Axel) in his Information and Coordination on what he calls the pre-Keynesian "Art of Central Banking" tradition. On Tue, 28 Mar 1995, Evan Jones - 448 - 3063 wrote: > Are there any experts out there on nineteenth century monetary > theory? > I'm trying to pursue the origins of the profound macro/micro > bifurcation in english-speaking mainstream economic thought and > policy, and have delved into unknown territory. > One can readily comprehend why there was no hope of coherent > development emanating from the micro side, once the neoclassical > engine was up and running. > But at the macro level, the Keynesians and the anti-Keynesians are > bipartisan in their contempt for structure (the 'microfoundations' > literature is a scandal). Keynes himself appears heavily to blame, not > least because, in spite of his much-vaunted knowledge of 'the City', > he seems content to base his conceptual framework on the piddling > Cambridge (Marshall) tradition, even though he simultaneously spent > much of his time ridiculing it. > What happends to the centre of gravity of monetary/banking ideas in > the transition from classical to neoclassical economics? Much of the > literature is too segmented - literature on the classics stops in > 1870s. > A book by Laidler (The Golden Age of the Quantity Theory) > neatly covers the transition, but it would be nice to get an opinion > from someone who doesn't think that progress in human civilisation is > to be measured in terms of how many souls swear fealty to the quantity > theory. Doesn't look optimistic - a perusal of the relevant library shelves >indicates that the > quantity theorists and the Chicago school appear to have become > near-hegemonic (helped along a little by funding by right-wing think > thanks). > Ddoes anybody know of some useful literature on the > topic? > Ultimately, I'm trying to find the origins of the mainstream macro detachment > from structural considerations. Does it start and end with the > proposition (a priori and heavily ideological) of the neutrality of > money? > Evan Jones >
[PEN-L:4438] Re: the labour market and the 'markets'
Doug: The professionals Keynes describes in Ch. 12 are not simpletons--remember they are portrayed as knowing the fundamentals but also canny that they couldn't act profitably on this knowledge: they play the game of Old Maid even though they know that the old maid is circulatingor something. (BTW, what's Snap, anyway--my money and banking students always ask me this when I assign bits of The Chapter?) Anyway, I think you're being a bit of a methodological individualist here: markets can be highly irrational and loony depite the rationality and non-lunacy of the individual participants.
[PEN-L:4250] Re: "story"
On the story stuff: at the risk of sounding like an idealist from hell--and respectfully, Jim--I think the great merit of the story formulation is in its suggesting a parallel between social "science" and the story we tell of our lives. This last is a funny thing: part creation, part discovery. There's something out there to be true to--we can get it wrong, the notion of correctness has a place here--while at the same time our narrative articulation of who we are partially shapes (is partly "constitutive" of, to use the jargon) what it is "about"--see Taylor and Sandel on "self-understanding". What about economics conceived along these lines? We try to articulate our practices, in the same, part shaping, part discovering, way we seek self-understanding. Who can doubt the constitutive role that the NC picture of maximizing instrumentally-rational atoms and the story of linear progress has had on the practices of the modern agent, however innocent of NC economics. Alternative pictures claim that this story distorts our practices and hinders us--that our practices (think of politics, especially) would "go better" (this is Taylor's phrase--see "Social science as practice") if they were articulated differently. Conceived as attempts at self-understanding, social-scientific "theory" *does* shape the "facts" it is about--without creating them, though. Well: that's my story and I'm stickin' to it-- Kevin Quinn [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Wed, 15 Feb 1995, Jim Devine wrote: > With a realist epistemology, on the other hand, we are > trying to tell the best stories (or make the best similes > about) the dimly-perceived empirical reality (the shadows > on the wall of the cave). In addition to elegance and > logical coherence, we have to care about the correspondence > between the model or theories and the empirical world. > We also have to find the model or theories that help us > understand what's going on the best, in order to help us > attain our goals. A good theory can be tested in practice. > > BTW, unlike Plato (with the shadows on the cave-wall metaphor) > I am a materialist: the elements of the dimly received reality > are not dim reflections of some ideal forms, but are instead > real objects that may vary tremendously. (the "typical" > object is an average of a variety havving some shared > characteristics rather than being a reflection of some hidden > ideal.) >
[PEN-L:3915] Re: papal economics
Re: the popiate of the people. I've always thought anti-clericalism and leftism were mutually implicating, myself, and love quoting the last priest/last king thing that Justin mentioned. Recently, though, I've had 2nd thoughts about associating *religion* with compensation, due to having just read Christopher Lasch's posthumous *Revolt of the Elites*. He points out that religion in the *prophetic* vein isn't consolatory at all--it makes things harder, not easier, for the believer. By contrast, especially in the light of feminist work on science and rationality, appreciating the psychological roots of the secular-humanist-Cartesian-scientist's stance--as a reaction-formation to anxiety, on Bordo's interpretation, e.g.--kinda turns the tables! On Mon, 23 Jan 1995, Jim Devine wrote: > Nathan's right: anti-clericalism fought the _established_ church. > Now we don't have that any more. It's fine as far as I'm concerned > if some people have religion. That doesn't alwsys always mean > that they're closed to reason. > > Marx thought that religion was the p opiate of the people, > but that people needed that kind of opium given the alienating > nature of society. Unlike the Young Hegelians, he decided to > put his energy into opposing the society not the symptim > symptom, that is. Makes sense to me. > > The hard-to-correct typo above suggests a pun: the Vatican > might be termed the "popiate." > > in pen-l solidarity, > > Jim Devine > [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA > 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 > "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." > (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing > Dante. >
[PEN-L:3843] Re: rationality
I agree completely: I'm playing right into their hands! The goofiness was
just too hard to resist: ("Tall buildings, High interest rates": in this
sequel to Bright Lights, Big City we get the bratpack's investment
philosophy). Actually the larger causes of the OC thing are interesting:
what Citron was buying was what the industry calls the "toxic waste"
thrown off of mortgage-baked securities--or so I remember reading
somewhere recently. The risk was all taken out and concentrated and
shipped off to Texas to be sold to unsophisticated investors by the
"tin-men" of
the industry, so Wall Street could peddle a nice risk-free instrument
with a clear conscience. --Thanks for the warning!
On Thu, 19 Jan 1995, John E. Parsons wrote:
> On Thursday, Jan 19, Kevin Quinn wrote...
>
> > Speaking of rationality, did people catch the WSJ article on Robert
> > Citron, Orange County's erstwhile Treasurer? Apparently he was
> > loony-tunes and had been for some time. When his huge bet that interest
> > rates would fall became questionable as rates rose last Fall, he
> > explained to the oversight board why this would be reversed:
> >
> > "We do not have the large inflationary wage increases, runaway building
> > both in homes, commercial and those tall glass-office buildings. Few, if
> > any, tall office buildings are being built.."
> >
> > The reporter asked the source whether this sort of pretzel logic didn't
> > worry the Board---no, because he'd always "reasoned" this way, and they'd
> > been raking it in earlier!
> >
>
> Careful Kevin. The WSJ and a large part of the investment
> management community feel a need to scapegoat Citron in
> order to protect the investment advisor industry. He may
> have been off in a variety of ways, and certainly he did
> something plain wrong, but he was a perfect match, a
> perfect component, for an industry that needs to be
> criticized.
>
> There is an old saying in business that "You can't cheat an
> honest man." It's the ones who want a deal that really is
> too good to be true that can be made into suckers.
> Unfortunately some people in the industry forget that that
> still leaves them cheating whoever or however one might
> describe their prey.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> John Parsons
> Graduate School of Business
> Columbia University
> 116th St. & Broadway
> New York, NY 10027
> (212) 854-3783
> (617) 288-4367
>
[PEN-L:3838] Re: rationality
I agree with Jim that a full-blown homo economicus is nuts, because I think that "our" practices, properly articulated, would support this judgement. Speaking of rationality, did people catch the WSJ article on Robert Citron, Orange County's erstwhile Treasurer? Apparently he was loony-tunes and had been for some time. When his huge bet that interest rates would fall became questionable as rates rose last Fall, he explained to the oversight board why this would be reversed: "We do not have the large inflationary wage increases, runaway building both in homes, commercial and those tall glass-office buildings. Few, if any, tall office buildings are being built.." The reporter asked the source whether this sort of pretzel logic didn't worry the Board---no, because he'd always "reasoned" this way, and they'd been raking it in earlier! Well I think we need more evidence on this: e.g., in DC, where there are height restrictions on buildings, are interest rates lower? Kevin Quinn [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:3820] Re: rationality
This is in response to Robin's comments on rationality. I agree with Robin that institutions shape the selves whose lives they structure, and in this context that the instrumentally rational agents that people rational choice models tend to be produced by the universal reign of markets. I think an appreciation of this, though, must lead to an attempt to formulate a thicker notion of rationality, if we are to do what Robin wants to do--evaluate institutions. Once we appreciate the shaping of agency and preferences by institutions, the standard welfare criteria, such as Pareto-efficiency, become simply tests of "coherence" between the agent-creating institutions and the agents they create. Arguably, coherence in this sense is neither necessary nor sufficient for an institutional structure's being judged good. Not sufficient: reread Brave New World. Not necessary either, because we might argue for the superiority of less coherent institutions which create unsatisfied Socratess to those which create satisfied pigs. (Apologies to Mill.) The point is that to evaluate institutions is to evaluate a package: institution-plus-types-of-agents, and we're then doing at the theoretical level what people do practically when they think not so much about how to get what they transparently want, but what sort of people they want to be, what sort of wants they should have. And the theorist should follow the practical agent in this: trying to articulate the sorts of criteria that are employed by the latter, and push for "reflective equilibrium". Unless one thinks that reason has no place here, we as practical agents employ and we as "social scientists" need to articulate a thicker kind of rationality. In Susan Hurley's phrase, a theory of rationality for human agents is "an ethic". I put the quote marks around "scientist" advisedly: this sort of endeavor won't pass muster under conceptions of science which make it the neutral examination of some independently existing reality.
[PEN-L:3780] Re: rationality
This is just a bibliographic footnote to the rationality discussion. For those interested, as I was/am, in Jim Devine's suggestion that Aristotelian phronesis is an alternative to rational choice theory worth considering, there are several contemporary philosophers to check out. Martha Nussbaum, especially the Fragility of Goodness, is important. So is Elizabeth Anderson's Value in Ethics and Economics and virtually anything by Charles Taylor, especially Sources of the Self. I've already mentioned Susan Hurley's Natural Reasons. I don't agree with Gil Skillman that challenging the rationality hypothesis has no importance for leftists.
[PEN-L:3711] Re: rationality
I agree completely with what Jim says below. There are always some substantive constraints on the interpretation of preferences being employed, and the economist, whether neo-classical or analytically marxist, typically denies this, maintaining that they are only employing innocuous formal principles: consistency, transitivity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives. I also agree with Peter Dorman that the substantive assumptions typically, albeit unwittingly, made are adequate for understanding lots of what we do in our narrowly economic lives. But they are patently inappropriate when thinking about choice outside this realm--especially in our political lives. Recognizing what we are doing would make economic imperialism presumptively invalid. Rational choice theory is *not* the science of choice it pretends to be. On Wed, 11 Jan 1995, Jim Devine wrote: > I think that a lot of economists play a disingenuous game: > they take a non-tautological version of rationality, i.e., > one that assumes that people are atomistically individualistic > with fixed tastes -- and all sorts of convenient ideological > overtones, since this sociopathic behavior is seen as > "rational," in some sense good -- but THEN defend this > concept and its ideological content by invoking the tautological > version. > > in pen-l solidarity, > > Jim Devine > [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA > 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 > "Who'll stop the rain?" -- John Fogarty. >
[PEN-L:3695] Re: rationality
Broome and others have pointed out, very much as Jim argues, that it's always possible to redefine options in ways that can save the rationality hypothesis, even in the face of the aporia Peter mentions below. In order therefore for the hypothesis to "have any bite", as Broome puts it, there must be constraints on the interpretation of preferences. In her book Natural Reasons, Susan Hurley runs with this and argues that these constraints are, inter alia, evaluative and intersubjective. This has remarkable implications: first, formal rationality is either tautologous or incomplete and in need of a substantive rationality which rules out certain preferences as irrational; second, preferences are not subjective, since they can only be individuated by an appeal to evaluative, intersubjective standards; and, third, values cannot be reduced to preferences, as in neoclassical welfare economics, since the former are implicated in the individuation of the latter. Hurley's work lays out, persuasively, a *very* thick rationality. On Wed, 11 Jan 1995, Peter.Dorman wrote: > I must register a disagreement with Jim Devine on the question of rationality > in neoclassical economics. I DO think their view is non-tautological. > Rationality is generally defined as adherence to Von Neuman/Morgenstern (or > Friedman/Savage) expected utility, where the decision-maker selects the option > that maximizes the dot product of probabilities and values of potential > outcomes (all present value, of course). There is a large literature on the > discrepancy between this model and real-world observed behavior, beginning > with the Allais paradox and extending to Kahneman & Tversky, Thaler, Frank, > etc. (Simon should also be mentioned.) My personal view is that the weakness > of the rationality assumption is one of the soft underbellies of neoclassical > theory, particularly since "near-rational" behavior leads to significantly > different outcomes (e.g. Akerlof & Yellen). One of my interests is the > intersection of "thick" (non-NC) rationality and strategic behavior in > repeated games. I find this useful for understanding the emergence (or > eclipse) of solidarity, etc. > > Peter Dorman >
Re: Middle Class
On Thu, 22 Dec 1994, Jim Devine wrote: > I agree that Marxism is not enough. If we had a seance, Marx > would probably agree. > Happy Secular-Humanist Winter Festival! Could someone look into the possibility Jim broaches here! At the next URPE meeting, couldn't there be a session titled: "Contacting the Spirit of Marx and Engels: the Medium and the Message" or "Ouija, ouija on the wall, who's the most revolutionary class or class-fraction of all?" Just kidding--I don't mean to derail the discussion! Happy Secular-Humanist Winter Festival to you too! Yes, Virginia, there is a Sanity Clause-- which we'll invoke if--G__ forbid-- Newt or Dan takes the Highest Office two winter festivals hence! (Apologies to Chico Marx for stealing his bad Xmas pun.)
Re: federal Reserve taxes
I agree. It's important to see, though, that the taxes paid by the Fed are more than offset by interest payments going the other way--the "more than" serving as operating funds and for the odd ice-sculpture--so that the Fed is in this respect, as a "taxpayer", in a class of its own. (This ignores earnings on discount loans.) An increase in taxes paid by the Fed doesn't allow more spending--except the implied interest payments to the Fed--or a cut in anybody else's taxes. De facto, of course, that's the case with lots of corporate profits taxes, too! Self-financing and independence generally are entirely undemocratic: I didn't mean to imply otherwise. On Mon, 12 Dec 1994, Jim Devine wrote: > The Fed isn't really "part of the government" but a largely independent > government-sponsored and -chartered bank (that typically acts as a > cartel for the banks). > > in pen-l solidarity, > > Jim Devine > [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA > 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 >
Re: federal Reserve taxes
Isn't most of this the interest earnings on the government securities in its portfolio? So except for earnings on discount loans, we're talking about one hand of the government paying the other hand and then getting it back at the end of the year? On Sun, 11 Dec 1994, Helene Jorgensen wrote: > On Sat, 10 Dec 1994 22:08:15 -0800 Michael Perelman said: > >Does anybody know off hand how much the Fed pays in taxes and what share > >it is of the total corporrate tax contributions? How has the share increased > >over time? > > > >I remember that it was a relatively high percentage. > >-- > According to the Economic Report of the President, the Federal Reserve > banks' corporate profits were $16.1 billion, which means that given > Doug's data on taxes that the Fed pays 100 percent in corporate taxes. > Profits of the Fed have been declining since 1990. However, the Fed > earned 4.2 percent of total corporate profit of domestic industries, down > from 7.5 percent in 1990. I am really surprised, how does the Fed make > this huge amount of money? Just from lending money to commercial bank? > > Helene Jorgensen > Department of Economics > The American University > Washington, DC. > > Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >
Re: "Nobel" prizes in Econ.
On Wed, 12 Oct 1994, John E. Parsons wrote: > > Personally I think people level criticism too often against > mathematical tools like game theory based on the > ideologiacally sad use of them by the current crop of > social scientists. It isn't the brand of mathematics that > makes a social movement, but a renewed social movement that > could actually make something with this brand of > mathematics. > Is Parsons right that game theory is simply a neutral mathematical tool? Isn't the theory deeply implicated in--both supporting and supported by--the individualistic and instrumental notion of rationality that is the stock-in-trade of neo-classical economics? Is there room in game theory for rational agents who deliberate about what kinds of agents they should be, and the appropriate unit of agency--collective or individual--rather than simply choosing the best means of satisfying given and unexamined tastes; is there a version of game theory, that is, that can be useful in studying people, not wantons?
