Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
The thing about you Mine, is you are just so SMART! Steve On Wed, 21 Jun 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Sometimes, it is interesting to follow the "orientation" of discussion > taking place in this list. The intellectual ranks of _Analytical Marxism_ > include people like Cohen, Elster, Przeworski, Roemer and Olin Wright. > It is increasingly becoming hard for me to understand how one criticizes > Cohen's functionalism, and takes a position on Elster's or Hahnel's > application of game theory at the same time, given that both disregard the > broad conception of history, economy and society in Marx's thought... ohhh > well... life! > > Mine > >
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
Marx in volume II shows that capitalist equilibrium with growth is possible, but that it is unlikely because of the co-ordination problems between the sectors of the economy. Arrow and Debreu using neo-classical modeling techniques show something similar. That static equilibrium is possible. But that the conditions are so onerous as to be unlikely. Leontiev was correct to connect his research with Marx. There is a continuous development of the input-output model from Quesnay to Marx to Leontiev, although each of them put it to a different use than the others. Leontiev was familiar with the efforts in the Soviet Union during the 1920s to develop a model of the economy that could be used for planning purposes, and those planners drew their inspiration from Marx. Rational choice models has a long pre-history, they go back possibly to John Duns Scottus and certainly to Marcellus of Padua. The Bernoulli's were involved and Condilliac should also be consulted. Smith's contribution was actually quite small on this particular question. Rod Jim Devine wrote: > > I think that a market environment encourages individualism, but the > application of rat choice came first with Smith, not Marx. And Marx, unlike > the rat choice types, saw "preferences" as endogenous. He also clearly > rejected methodological individualism, though he saw that something like it > was the ordinary consciousness of many people within the system, shaped, > constrained, and mystified by commodity fetishism and the illusions created > by competition. > > > Leontief was wrong to credit Marx with this. Marx's volume II is a > non-equilibrium system, while the equilibrium interpretation has hobbled > Marxian political economy (showing up in absurd ways in the "transformation > problem" lit, seen for example in Sweezy's THEORY OF CAPITALIST > DEVELOPMENT). Marx did present "equilibrium conditions" for the > proportional relationship between sectors, but he did not think equilibrium > could be achieved easily. To the extent that equilibrium was achieved, it > was the result of crisis, which involved _forcible_ equilibration, which > was often quite destructive (small businesses going broke, working people > losing their livelihood, etc.) Instead of seeing the results of his > reproduction schemes as continually met -- as in input-output analysis -- > Marx saw them as regularly being broken and then violently reestablished. > An extreme crisis --- like the Great Depression -- might require an extreme > solution -- like World War II, though of course the solution's rise is not > predetermined. > > I'm afraid that Leontief wanted to link Marx to his own research, which > helped create IO theory. Back then, being associated with Marx was > prestigious, at least in some circles. > > I think we should eschew them because they weren't Marx's accomplishments. > > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine -- Rod Hay [EMAIL PROTECTED] The History of Economic Thought Archive http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/index.html Batoche Books http://Batoche.co-ltd.net/ 52 Eby Street South Kitchener, Ontario N2G 3L1 Canada
Re: Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
Sometimes, it is interesting to follow the "orientation" of discussion taking place in this list. The intellectual ranks of _Analytical Marxism_ include people like Cohen, Elster, Przeworski, Roemer and Olin Wright. It is increasingly becoming hard for me to understand how one criticizes Cohen's functionalism, and takes a position on Elster's or Hahnel's application of game theory at the same time, given that both disregard the broad conception of history, economy and society in Marx's thought... ohhh well... life! Mine
Re: Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
At 07:57 PM 06/21/2000 -0400, you wrote: >see Daniel Little, the Scientific Marx, who explains how Marx's analysis >in Capital depends on many rational choice presuppositions. It's not >surprising, since he was analysing a market systrem where those >presuppositions are more valid than not. I think that a market environment encourages individualism, but the application of rat choice came first with Smith, not Marx. And Marx, unlike the rat choice types, saw "preferences" as endogenous. He also clearly rejected methodological individualism, though he saw that something like it was the ordinary consciousness of many people within the system, shaped, constrained, and mystified by commodity fetishism and the illusions created by competition. >And in a a classic paper from the 30s, Wassily Leontieff credited Marx >along with Walras with being a founder of general equlibrium theory. WL >was a graet fan of CII in particuklar. Leontief was wrong to credit Marx with this. Marx's volume II is a non-equilibrium system, while the equilibrium interpretation has hobbled Marxian political economy (showing up in absurd ways in the "transformation problem" lit, seen for example in Sweezy's THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT). Marx did present "equilibrium conditions" for the proportional relationship between sectors, but he did not think equilibrium could be achieved easily. To the extent that equilibrium was achieved, it was the result of crisis, which involved _forcible_ equilibration, which was often quite destructive (small businesses going broke, working people losing their livelihood, etc.) Instead of seeing the results of his reproduction schemes as continually met -- as in input-output analysis -- Marx saw them as regularly being broken and then violently reestablished. An extreme crisis --- like the Great Depression -- might require an extreme solution -- like World War II, though of course the solution's rise is not predetermined. I'm afraid that Leontief wanted to link Marx to his own research, which helped create IO theory. Back then, being associated with Marx was prestigious, at least in some circles. >What's wrong with those accomplishments? we are to eschew them because >some use them apologetically? I think we should eschew them because they weren't Marx's accomplishments. That's enough. I can't participate in pen-l for a day, since I have participated much too much during the previous 24 hours. Maybe I'll take a week off Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT
Justin writes: >Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I think Cohen was right that >historical materialism is basically functional explanation,a nd I approve of >historical materialism. Cohen's version of historical materialism may be totally based on fallacious functionalism, but his version is nothing but a formalized version of what Colletti called the "Marxism of the 2nd International" or what the Stalinists called "histomat." It's a bunch of transhistorical and thus unhistorical abstractions that say little or nothing about real human history. Its connection with Marx's ideas is weak, except for that one little introduction that Marx wrote when he was just starting his economic investigations and was still too much under the influence of Smith and Ricardo (the "preface" to the CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY) -- and which is so abstract that many authors have interpreted that preface in non-Cohen ways. Even so, Marx presents it not as a set of substantive propositions of the sort that the "Analytical Marxists" adore as much as a "guiding principle for my studies" (a heuristic, a method of analysis, a bunch of questions). And his ideas became less Cohenesque as he learned more about history and capitalism. In CAPITAL, vol. III, for example, he shifted his emphasis away from the technological determinism of his early works (the stuff that excites Cohen) to a view that it's the method of exploitation that's key to understanding any society, almost a sociological determinism. >You mistake functional explanation for teleology if you think it involves >reference to the "purpose" of events in a "grander >scheme of things." Rather it explains events in terms of their usefulness >for phenomena that support them. Thus (in the dated example of my paper), >welfare is functionally explained in capitalism because of its function in >damping social unrest, stabilizing the capitalist state that is itself >functional for capitalist reproduction. There is no suprahuman teleogy >here; the only >uintentions are of actual political actors, class, state, and individual >operating within constraints. But read the paper, it's really quite useful. I don't think that "welfare" can be seen in this way. Welfare does dampen social unrest (in some cases, but remember the Welfare Rights movement). But in the US, it was simply a result of the conflict between classes (seen concretely, overdetermined by racial issues, in such phenomena as the Civil Rights movement) and the competition within the capitalist class, including that between factions of the government, within (as you say) the constraints of the capitalist system. It may have stabilized the system, but the fact that it did so could only be known _after the fact_. It was not a predetermined outcome. Of course, capitalist elites fought to make it that way, but they don't always get their way. Further, what stabilized the system in the 1960s need not have done so under different conditions (say, the 1980s). Similarly, "welfare reform" may not stabilize the system. Joel Blau writes: >The other problem with functionalism is the implicit tendency to homeostasis. Whatever happens serves the function of maintaining the whole. Functionalist conceptions of welfare in capitalist society focus solely on its system-maintaining characteristics, when actually between the partial decommodification and independence from the marketplace, the reality is much more ambiguous.< This is right. Though Cohen -- following the lead of the mainstream sociologist Arthur Stinchecombe, though he doesn't cite the man [*] -- can point to various forces that encourage the welfare system to be "functional" (for example, a kind of Darwinian process), there are also mechanisms that encourage results to be dysfunctional. Capitalism is a contradictory system, not a functional-homeostatic system. For example, capitalism produced the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, which led to all sorts of problems. They might be interpreted _after the fact_ as allowing the creation of a "new stage of accumulation" that was even better for the system than the ones that preceded these crises. But that result was not predetermined. It depended on the actual, concrete, outcomes of class struggles and competition within the captialist class (including inter-national competition). The basis functionalist fallacy is to read the present as justifying the past. [*] I doubt that Cohen plagiarized. Rather, he suffers from the same disease that inflicts most NC economists, that of only reading recent literature in one's immediate specialty. This often gives an air of spurious originality. > I will send you a copy if you like. --jks I have a copy somewhere already. In fact, in moving to my new office, I created a Justin Schwarz pile of papers. But my life is too disorganized to get to it... Jim Devin
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT
The other problem with functionalism is the implicit tendency to homeostasis. Whatever happens serves the function of maintaining the whole. Functionalist conceptions of welfare in capitalist society focus solely on its system-maintaining characteristics, when actually between the partial decommodification and independence from the marketplace, the reality is much more ambiguous. Joel Blau [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I think Cohen was right that > historical materialism is basically functional explanation,a nd I approve of > historical materialism. You mistake functional explanation for teleology if > you think it involves reference to the "purpose" of events in a "grander > scheme of things." Rather it explains events in terms of their usefulness for > phenomena that support them. Thus (in the dated example of my paper), welfare > is functionally explained in capitalism because of its function in damping > social unrest, stabilizing the capitalist state that is itself functional for > capitalist reproduction. There is no suprahuman teleogy here; the only > uintentions are of actual political actors, class, state, and individual > operating within constraints. But read the paper, it's really quite useful. I > will send you a copy if you like. --jks > > In a message dated 6/21/00 11:18:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > > << Justin wrote: > >Functional explanation is legitimate, but Cohen's account of it in terms > >of "consequence laws" is wrong; you need a mechanical account of > >explanation, i.e., one that regards explanation as exposing the causal > >mechanisms > > functional explanation isn't the same as seeing the feed-back from the > whole to the parts. I don't think functional explanation is reasonable in > most cases, at least in social science. We can't explain societal events or > institutions in terms of their purpose in some grander scheme of things. > They are instead the result of individuals "creating history" within the > pre-existing society, based on the ideology that's encouraged and rewarded > within that society. > >>
Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
In a message dated 6/21/00 1:02:30 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << funny, like other religious followers of neo-classical bourgeois ideology, Elster, in _Making Sense of Marx_, attempts to demonstrate that Marx was indeed a founder of rational choice. I am sure Ricardo was the father of socialism then... No No Marx was indeed a spy.. >> Elster is quite right. For a more careful analyses, see Daniel Little, the Scientific Marx, who explains how Marx's analysis in Capital depends on many rational choice presuppositions. It's not surprising,s ince he was analysinga market systrem where those presuppositions are more valid than not. And in a a classic paper from the 30s, Wassily Leontieff credited Marx along with Walras with being a founder of general equlibrium theory. WL was a graet fan of CII in particuklar. What's wrong with those accomplishments? we areto schewthem because some use them apologetically? --jks
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT
Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I think Cohen was right that historical materialism is basically functional explanation,a nd I approve of historical materialism. You mistake functional explanation for teleology if you think it involves reference to the "purpose" of events in a "grander scheme of things." Rather it explains events in terms of their usefulness for phenomena that support them. Thus (in the dated example of my paper), welfare is functionally explained in capitalism because of its function in damping social unrest, stabilizing the capitalist state that is itself functional for capitalist reproduction. There is no suprahuman teleogy here; the only uintentions are of actual political actors, class, state, and individual operating within constraints. But read the paper, it's really quite useful. I will send you a copy if you like. --jks In a message dated 6/21/00 11:18:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << Justin wrote: >Functional explanation is legitimate, but Cohen's account of it in terms >of "consequence laws" is wrong; you need a mechanical account of >explanation, i.e., one that regards explanation as exposing the causal >mechanisms functional explanation isn't the same as seeing the feed-back from the whole to the parts. I don't think functional explanation is reasonable in most cases, at least in social science. We can't explain societal events or institutions in terms of their purpose in some grander scheme of things. They are instead the result of individuals "creating history" within the pre-existing society, based on the ideology that's encouraged and rewarded within that society. >>
RE: Re: Re: GT
Nancy works for me at the National Cancer Institute. See http://www-dccps.ims.nci.nih.gov/ARP/economics.html -Original Message- From: Jim Devine [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2000 12:17 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [PEN-L:20477] Re: Re: GT At 08:57 AM 6/21/00 -0700, you wrote: >Nancy Breen (Do you remember, Nancy?) and I once met at Davis where we went to >a talk by Elster. I had never read anything by him, but understood that he >was important. The only thing I recall from the talk was the appalling number >of errors about Marx that he propogated with absolute conviction. I use Elster's MAKING HASH OF MARX as a source for common misinterpretations (ones that are often shared by bourgeois critics of Marx and dogmatic followers of the "Marxism of the 3rd International"). By collecting them all in one place, he's done the world a service. But his other work (often in game theory) is sometimes very interesting and instructive. I can't say I'm an Elsterite, but some of his work provides a starting point, if considered critically. where is Nancy these days? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine ["clawww" or "liberalarts" can replace "bellarmine"]
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT
Justin wrote: >Functional explanation is legitimate, but Cohen's account of it in terms >of "consequence laws" is wrong; you need a mechanical account of >explanation, i.e., one that regards explanation as exposing the causal >mechanisms functional explanation isn't the same as seeing the feed-back from the whole to the parts. I don't think functional explanation is reasonable in most cases, at least in social science. We can't explain societal events or institutions in terms of their purpose in some grander scheme of things. They are instead the result of individuals "creating history" within the pre-existing society, based on the ideology that's encouraged and rewarded within that society. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine
Re: Re: Re: Re: GT
At the risk of tooting my own horn, I wrote a piece on MI called "Metaphysical Individualism and Functional Explanation," Philosophy of Science 1993, that I still think is quite good. In the context of the Cohen-Elster debate, I argued that: 1. Functional explanation is legitimate, but Cohen's account of it in terms of "consequence laws" is wrong; you need a mechanical account of explanation, i.e., one that regards explanation as exposing the causal mechanisms. 2. MI has two senses that are not often distinguished: the claim that the individual level of explanation is the only legitimate one, andthe claim that the individual level is a legitimate one, but not the only one. Most of the problems around MI derive from the first version, but this is utterly implausible. Whether the second version is true is an open question, but even if it is, that does not threaten functional explanation or other kinds of explanation that refer to group phenomena in an explanatory way. After all, on the second version, individualistic explanation is merely available, not required. There, now you don't have to read the piece. But you should. --jks In a message dated Wed, 21 Jun 2000 10:11:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, Jim Devine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: << At 04:02 AM 06/21/2000 -0400, you wrote: >At the risk of sounding somewhat Hegelian. The problem can be looked at like >this. Both the individual and the group exist with equal ontological status. >Methodological individual gives priority to the individual, while some >forms of >sociology (including some varieties of of Marxism) give priority to the group. In their THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST, a book that everyone on pen-l should read, Lewins and Lewontin describe the dialectical method as follow (to paraphrase): "part makes whole, while whole makes part." That is, individual people make the structure of social relations (though not as they please) at the same time as the structure of social relations makes us who we are (how we think, what we want, etc.) though there are some biological limits to this latter determination (just as there are limits on what kinds of societies can be created). This mutual determination is a dynamic process rather than reaching an equilibrium, BTW. this dialectical view would reject _both_ methodological individualism (because it ignores the feed-back from society to the individual) and radical holism (because it ignores individual agency). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine/AS >>
Re: Re: Re: GT
At 04:02 AM 06/21/2000 -0400, you wrote: >At the risk of sounding somewhat Hegelian. The problem can be looked at like >this. Both the individual and the group exist with equal ontological status. >Methodological individual gives priority to the individual, while some >forms of >sociology (including some varieties of of Marxism) give priority to the group. In their THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST, a book that everyone on pen-l should read, Lewins and Lewontin describe the dialectical method as follow (to paraphrase): "part makes whole, while whole makes part." That is, individual people make the structure of social relations (though not as they please) at the same time as the structure of social relations makes us who we are (how we think, what we want, etc.) though there are some biological limits to this latter determination (just as there are limits on what kinds of societies can be created). This mutual determination is a dynamic process rather than reaching an equilibrium, BTW. this dialectical view would reject _both_ methodological individualism (because it ignores the feed-back from society to the individual) and radical holism (because it ignores individual agency). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine/AS
Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
I guess I've got to respond to this message because Mine dug up (spurious) "evidence" to show that I said that third world people were irrational. However, I doubt that anyone has to read this message except Mine. Mine wrote: > GT is methodologically on the right. Period. The reason for this is >that the attention to micro foundations through rational choice, game >theoric models and formal modeling of neo-classical economics have tended >to obscure the importance of relations of production and the exploitative >relationship between the capitalist and the worker. GT lacks a progressive >framework to explain systemic inequalities. I wrote: >no, the problem is that GT typically assumes relative equality in "games." >It need not do so. Mine ripostes: >well, my argument is that one can not start with a relative equality >assumption to desribe a capital-labor relationship. If you do, you are >implying that capitalism is a system of equality, given that it is not. I wasn't referring to capitalism as a system of equality. If Mine reallys thinks that I do, she should read what I say for actual _content_ as much as she looks for (spurious) politically incorrectness. In any event, the topic was GT, not capitalism. I don't think GT has produced a model that reveals much if anything about capitalism, as I've said before. In two separate messages, Mine wrote: > >>While I respectfully say that this is A bullshit [a BS what? a BS > argument?], supposed "neutrality" of game theory... I think that the > very assumptions of game theory--individualism, profit maximizing > agency, egoism, alturism [altruism?] in return for benefit--are > bombastically IDEOLOGICAL. > > >first of all, don't correct my words or intervene in the text. You > are not the editor here. I wrote: >Actually, I am (and an economist too). One of the frustrating things about >threads in on-line discussions is that they rapidly become >incomprehensible to the readers. >I don't see it. Whoever reads "alturism" above can perfectly understand >that it is meant "altruism", if s(he) does not suffer from an acute mental >problem of comprehension, of course... Okay perhaps I did some editing that wasn't necessary. So how does that make me racist? not to mention "disgustingly racist"? (BTW, Justin S. types really poorly too, even though he speaks English as a first language, so I sometimes correct his messages.) Mine had written: >I write quickly, and sometimes misuse letters. Knowing that English is my >second language, you are being *disgustingly racist*, like once upon a >time you called third world people *irrational* here. << I wrote: >As far as I am concerned, you can have any opinion of me that you want. >But the fact that you're stooping to calling me names says that this >conversation is over. This is my last contribution to this thread. Mine now responds: >yuppie! goodness! how do you know I'm urban? It's too bad that that wasn't my last contribution. Actually, I wouldn't call this one a "contribution" as much as a simple defense against lying attacks (or willful misinterpretation or simple ignorance). I wrote: >More importantly, I _never_ referred to third world people as >irrational. I would like to see documentation of this totally outrageous >claim. If you have any evidence, I _will_ respond, to show that it is >spurious and libelous. Mine now writes: >I did not say that you were a racist par excellence. Yeah, but you called me "disgustingly racist." That's not the same as putting me in the same league as Adolph Eichmann (a racist par excellence), but it's the kind of thing which needs more serious justification. Not that I take such charges from you seriously, since you seem to throw words like "racist" about. In European folklore, it's called "crying wolf." Mine writes: >Once upon a time, however, you made a comment in this list which I thought >had culturally racist implications, despite your own intentions.. In the >below passage, you are labeling some people as irrational from the >standpoint of rationality you are socialized into. I don't mind quick >comments _that_ much and let them go, but when it comes to religious >labeling, I strongly disagree. Here is your post: In this infamous message, I wrote: >Non-religious folks have this kind of upbringing, training, faith in the >socialist tradition etc. Either way, there seems to be an "irrational" >component, an element of _faith_. BTW, there is nothing in this quote about the "third world," nor anything about the third world being "irrational." Religion is not the same thing as "third world." You'll note that I put the word "irrational" in quotation marks. That's because _I do not accept_ the standard meanings of the words "rational" and "irrational" but was deliberately indicating to the readers that I was using the standard meanings. Unlike the definition of "rationality" which Mine _presumes_ I was "socialized
Re: Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:McArthur grantee (fwd)
>Mine responds: >yuppie! > > >Mine, is what it has come down to? It's way over the top. Hopefully, that was meant to be a slightly less rude 'yippie', Joel - that 'u''s hanging right next door, just gasping for moments like this. Cheers, Rob.
Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
>Jim Devine says: As far as I am concerned, you can have any opinion of me that you want. >But >the fact that you're stooping to calling me names says that this >conversation is over. This is my last contribution to this thread. Mine responds: yuppie! Mine, is what it has come down to? It's way over the top. Joel Blau
Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee
Justin wrote: >The PD generates the players' second worst outcome, not the worst one. The >worst is generated by I cooperate, you defect. --jks Justin, I hope you don't mind that I edited what you said here, dropping the extraneous "L." What the "worst outcome" is depends on your perspective. The "I cooperate, you defect" outcome is the worst only from an individual's (my) perspective, whereas the "you cooperate, I defect" would be the worst from the other individual's (your) perspective. From the _social_ perspective, the worst would be "both defect." Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine ["clawww" or "liberalarts" can replace "bellarmine"]
Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: McArthur grantee
I have been on pen-l now for 8 years. Calling people racists on this list is infantile to say the least. Storm in a tea cup I hope:) Cheers, Anthony xxx Anthony P. D'Costa, Associate Professor Comparative International Development University of WashingtonTaylor Institute & South Asia Program 1900 Commerce StreetJackson School of International Studies Tacoma, WA 98402, USA University of Washington, Seattle Phone: (253) 692-4462 Fax : (253) 692-5612 xxx
