Re: Religious exemptions in ND
I think that public schools should be held to, if anything, a HIGHER standard than the church. After all, children are REQUIRED to attend public school; attending church is optional. But I also think that I should be rich and famous. Still waiting for it to happen. Lisa On 6/15/2012 10:29 AM, Marci Hamilton wrote: Public schools should also be held to the same standard as any private institution and it should be child-protective Marci On Jun 15, 2012, at 11:04 AM, Douglas Laycock dlayc...@virginia.edu mailto:dlayc...@virginia.edu wrote: It is not just other constitutional interests that limit liability for harm to children. It is also other public policies. For example, in Missouri, where Gibson v. Brewer limits the church's liability to cases where they knew about abuse and failed to act, public schools have no state-law liability at all in sex abuse cases. See Mo. Stat. §537.600; Letlow v. Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Doe v. Special School District, 637 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo. 1986). And they would have no federal liability unless an official with authority to act had actual knowledge and made an official decision not to do anything. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). The should-have-known liability now imposed on churches in many states, and the should-have-known-there-was-an-elevated-risk liability that is often alleged and sometimes imposed, goes far beyond the liability rules applicable to most public schools. Douglas Laycock Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546 *From:*religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Graber, Mark *Sent:* Friday, June 15, 2012 9:46 AM *To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics *Subject:* RE: Religious exemptions in ND May I suggest this is too strong. A great many constitutional rights increase to some degree the possibility that child abuse will occur, not be detected and not be adequately punished. Consider in this respect the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, at least as presently interpreted (and I suspect most of us would not agree with an interpretive rule that said government does not violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendment whenever doing so might increase to any degree the possibility that a crime will not be committed, not be detected, and not be punished. So we might assume that a) protections for religious freedom will have some negative consequences, including some severe negative consequences but b) that this is true for pretty much all constitutional rights. So the issue is how much do we risk because we value religious freedom (remembering that a strategy of risk nothing will have other severe bad consequences. In this vein, may I suggest that the present alternatives are not helpful. SMITH seems to suggest a rational basis test that would allow government to severely burden religious practice whenever doing so has any appreciable tendency to prevent, detect, or punish crime. Many RFRAs suggest a compelling interest test that probably puts too high a burden on government to do a variety of acts (not just in the area of criminal justice---so even if you think, as I do, that preventing child abuse is obviously a compelling government interest, you might still think the compelling interest standard too strong in other cases). Strikes me that one thing we might discuss is what that in-between standard looks like. Mark A. Graber ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com IRS Circular 230 Notice To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you
Re: The End of NY's Kosher Inspectors
Perhaps it was a Consumer fraud issue? to assure that the consumers were really getting Kosher food when it was so advertised? Lisa On 1/5/2011 1:00 PM, Nathan Oman wrote: According to the story below, NY has decided to nix its Kosher inspectors as a way of spending money. Does anyone know the details (and citation) for the 2004 case mentioned in the article? Also, I am wondering what precisely the inspectors after the decision. Finally, does anyone know why the inspectors were set up in the first place? Why wasn't the issue simply solved by having private kosher audits by reputable bodies? The idea of a state Kosher inspector just seems perverse and unnecessary to me. What am I missing? http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704735304576058100916662270.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_newyork N -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com IRS Circular 230 Notice To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used by any taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding U.S. tax penalties. This message and any attachments may be protected by the attorney/client privilege. If you believe that it has been sent to you in error, do not read, copy or distribute it. Please reply to the sender that you have received the message in error and then delete it. Thank you. NOTE: Emails are not a secure method of communication. If you do not wish to obtain future communications from me via email, please advise me immediately. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Billing controversial speakers for security costs incurred bycity: 1st Am violation?
Well but IMHO, the City of LA was its own worst enemy in that case. On 9/17/2010 6:08 PM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote: I think Alan underestimates how unpopular land uses shoehorned into incompatible districts can be (religious or not). You don't need a minority religion to trigger negative reactions to houses of worship. This is particularly true in residential neighborhoods where the reaction and potential liability for the city rests on the incompatibility of the use and not the religious identity of the applicant. Look at the Hancock Park case where the city had to pay attorneys fees for abandoning its l and use laws in favor of a synagogue and against the neighbors. Marci Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry -Original Message- From: Brownstein, Alanaebrownst...@ucdavis.edu Sender: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2010 16:57:56 To: Law Religion issues for Law Academicsreligionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academicsreligionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: Billing controversial speakers for security costs incurred by city: 1st Am violation? There is a more commonplace example of a policy that makes houses of worship of unpopular faiths pay additional fees because of the reaction of neighbors to their activities. Many cities require all landowners, including houses of worship, to sign indemnity agreements as a condition to the government considering changes to their conditional use permit or other land use regulations. The agreement requires the house of worship to indemnify the city for the cost of reviewing the house of worship's proposal (including city staff time at hearings), any costs the city may incur in defending itself against a lawsuit if the permit is granted, and any damages the city may pay if its decision is held to be unlawful. Obviously, the more local opposition that exists to the house of worship's proposals (at least some of which may be predicated on opposition to the faith of the congregation seeking the permit), the greater will be the costs to the city in evaluating the proposal and the! g! reater the costs to the house of worship. Are these indemnification agreements constitutional under Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement when they are applied to land uses engaging in First Amendment protected activity? Alan Brownstein -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Friday, September 17, 2010 4:10 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Billing controversial speakers for security costs incurred by city: 1st Am violation? I would think that under Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992), security fees that are based partly on the risk of violent reaction based on the content of the speech are unconstitutional. That case held this even as to parades on public streets, and even when the fee was capped at $1,000 per day; here the bill they're talking about would be $200,000. I can't see why there'd be a less speech-protective result as to conduct on private property. -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark Sent: Friday, September 17, 2010 3:29 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Billing controversial speakers for security costs incurred by city: 1st Am violation? It is reported that the city of Gainesville, Florida is planning to bill Terry Jones for the costs of providing security for his church and the surrounding neighborhoods in light of his announced plan to burn a Quran. See http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/09/17/florida.quran.pastor/index.html?hpt=T 2. I have not followed the cases dealing with imposition of security costs on controversial speakers. It seems Jones typically has spoken on his church's property, and has not held the kind of rally or parade with respect to which it might be more reasonable to bill the speaker for security costs (and trash pickup, etc.). But, as I said, I haven't followed the relevant cases. Perhaps someone on the list would have some insight here. Of course, one way to shut up controversial speakers would be to make their speech very expensive in this way. Mark Scarberry Pepperdine -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can
Re: N.J. public transit employee fired for blasphemy
Well, so if he thought he was yelling fire because there really was a fire, then is he innocent even if there wasn't a fire? :-) On 9/16/2010 2:11 PM, Steven Jamar wrote: Can you give me the rule that supports not yelling fire? Or how to distinguish fighting words in all cases? Context matters. Method matters. Calculated to inflame another matters. Of course you may disagree with other speech rrestrictions because a computer cannot apply them in a simple syllogistic manner-- fair enough, but all such rules have boundaries worked out over time. Sent from Steve Jamar's iPhone On Sep 16, 2010, at 4:34 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: I indeed believe that people should be free to express hatred of the Koran, or of Christianity, or of America, or of Israel, or of Iran, or of whatever else. And I think the suggestion that people could be punished – maybe even sent to prison, yes? – for expressing hatred of the Koran or of Islam just helps show the problem with “hate speech” laws. But the deeper problem with many calls for regulation of hate speech, including this one, is that they almost never come with a clear definition of just what constitutes the “hate speech” that people could now be punished for. Can we have a definition out on the table, so we can figure just what else besides burning the Koran would be punishable? (Would it, for instance, allow people to be imprisoned for published the Mohammed cartoons? For arguing that Catholicism is a diabolical religion, or for that matter a harmful one?) Eugene *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Steven Jamar *Sent:* Thursday, September 16, 2010 12:24 PM *To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics *Cc:* religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu *Subject:* Re: N.J. public transit employee fired for blasphemy This case is easy if one accepts the legitimacy of regulating and in some instances curtailing hate speech. I know Eugene does not. -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Perry v. Schwarzenegger - Effect of Religious Beliefs
Of course, the courts had no problem with this type of discrimination when it outlawed polygamy and took the assets of the Mormon church. :-) On 8/9/2010 8:12 AM, Steve Sanders wrote: Well, it was a finding of fact (suppored by evidence) in this particular case, not a legal holding. Moreover, the context is the plaintiffs' arguments that Prop 8 was inappropriately enacted in part on the basis of religious beliefs; not that religious beliefs were part of the debate, which is of course acceptable, but rather that Prop 8 effectively enacts religious doctrine in order to abridge 14th Amendment rights. No one familiar with Prop 8 -- least of all its proponents -- thought it was merely about some sort of secularly motivated discrimination. So I don't see that the judge could or should have simply avoided the question. Even if such a finding of fact were problematic for free exercise, as Will suggests, the enactment of religiously motivated discrimination seems to me more problematic from the standpoint of establishment. -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com IRS Circular 230 Notice To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used by any taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding U.S. tax penalties. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Perry v. Schwarzenegger - Effect of Religious Beliefs
Marci - Are you seriously suggesting that the court made the decision in Reynolds on the basis of womens rights and not on the basis of politics and/or religion? BTW, I agree with Alan's analysis. Lisa On 8/9/2010 10:24 AM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote: Alan-- It is my view that those who are not proud of the Reynolds decision are reading it both ahistorically and without proper attention to the Court's description of the evils of polygamy. The Court made clear that the patriarchal principle is tantamount to despotism, and the practice of polygamy in history and around the world now prove that it contains more than a tendency to the suppression of women's rights and children's welfare. That is why the UN has taken up the practice as a violation of women's rights. This is one of the Court's first gender equality decisions. Reading these cases solely through the lens of religion distorts the decision and suppresses the actual civil rights issues being addressing by the neutral and generally applicable laws against polygamy in every state and then the Territories. Which is to say that I agree with you that the issues with respect to polygamy are quite distinct from the issues of excluding gay partners from being married. Marci In a message dated 8/9/2010 1:04:01 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu writes: I doubt that there are many scholars who are proud of the Court’s decisions during this period. -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com IRS Circular 230 Notice To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used by any taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding U.S. tax penalties. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Augusta State University student sues school over requirement that she undergo remediation due to her religious views
Thought I would point out /Schneider v. Smith/, 390 U.S. 17 (1968), where the Court determined that an individual's ability to serve on a merchant vessel could not be limited on the basis of past associations: We are loath to conclude that Congress, in its grant of authority to the President to `safeguard' vessels and waterfront facilities from `sabotage or other subversive acts,' undertook to reach into the First Amendment area. The provision of the Act in question, 50 USC Sec. 191(b), speaks only in terms of actions, not ideas or beliefs or reading habits or social, educational, or political associations. The purpose of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, unlike more recent models promoting a welfare state, was to take government off the backs of people. The First Amendment's ban against Congress `abridging' freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and to petition, and the `associational freedom' (/Sheldon v. Tucker,/ [364 US 479] at 490 that goes with those rights create a preserve where the views of the individual are made inviolate. This is the philosophy of Jefferson that `[t]he opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction [I]t is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order ...' On 7/29/2010 3:34 PM, Lisa A. Runquist wrote: The right to believe is absolute. The right to act on that belief is not. Obviously if the adult mail initiated minors of either sex into sexual conduct, that person is committing a crime and, IMHO, should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law (and said conduct would probably result in disbarment). But belief without corresponding criminal or tortious action does not seem to me to be an offense that is actionable or should limit the person's right to pursue his or her chosen profession. Lisa On 7/29/2010 3:08 PM, Steven Jamar wrote: What are the limits on state considering moral fitness or analogues for licensing public-service professions? Could a state lawfully refuse to license a lawyer who was a holocaust denier? Who believed that the proper role for adult males was to initiate minor males into sexual conduct through homosexual actions? What, if any, would be the limits? Or are there none? -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Augusta State University student sues school over requirement that she undergo remediation due to her religious views
On 7/28/2010 3:23 PM, Lisa A. Runquist wrote: If the person completed all of the requirements to obtain a degree, the degree should be granted, regardless of their religious beliefs. That would include allowing someone to graduate from medical school, even if they do not believe in blood transfusions or abortions. And they should be able to obtain a degree from the counselor education program if, as appears to be the case in this situation, both the academic showing and the clinical performance are adequate. The question of obtaining licensing is a second matter, although again, if the person is otherwise qualified, that person should be granted a license -- e.g. if the person passes the bar exam, is of good moral character, etc., then he or she should be able to become a lawyer, regardless of his or her religious beliefs. Then comes the bottom line question which is being incorrectly posed as the answer to the first: Can and should that person be hired for a particular position? But this is a third and totally separate question. Clearly if the person is unable to perform the functions of the job, he or she should not be hired. And if the person insists on interjecting religion into a non-religious workplace, they probably would be fired from most jobs (for good cause). But that does not mean the person would not be a good counselor in other situations. Many religious organizations provide counselors for their constituents; these people want counseling from someone with strong moral standards rather than from someone who has no moral standards at all, or standards that are far different from theirs. Why should we deny them the ability to hire counselors with similar religious beliefs, by refusing to allow said person(s) to graduate, and/or to be licensed? This clearly does not mean everyone will want to or should use that counselor, just as not everyone will want a counselor who is unwilling to hold fast to his or her beliefs. Lisa On 7/28/2010 2:50 PM, Paul Finkelman wrote: I am not suggesting Christians can't go to medical school just that they cannot impose their religious doctrines on their patients and they should not be graduated if they will not do that. Again, Will, are you going to graduate med students who insist on being surgeons but will not use blood transfusion? This issue is not one of belief, nor is it one of practice. It is one of separating the workplace from what you believe outside the workplace. If you cannot make that separation, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that you cannot take a certain job. Would you recruit and train a pacifist Christian for the police department who says I will NEVER carry a gun? How about an EMT, Firefighter, or police officer who will not enter someone else's church or a cemetery on religious grounds? --- On *Wed, 7/28/10, Will Esser /willes...@yahoo.com/* wrote: From: Will Esser willes...@yahoo.com Subject: Re: Augusta State University student sues school over requirement that she undergo remediation due to her religious views To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Date: Wednesday, July 28, 2010, 9:18 AM It strikes me that Paul's comments tie in well with the recent discussion about the Fifth Circuit's Arocha decision overturning the school district ban on wearing long hair. As I recall in those discussions, Doug Laycock raised the legitimate question about whether a ban on wearing long hair could cause religious groups to chose not to move to certain regions of the country (i.e. geographical de-selection of religious groups due to government regulation). Similarly, in this case, the question strikes me as whether the therapy program is being set up in such a manner that it de-selects certain religious groups (i.e. Christians, in this example). Paul talks about the standards of the profession. While, I have no doubt there is significant disagreement over what the standards of the profession are, it seems to me that if the government (through a university) is involved in saying what the standards are in such a way that Christians are automatically de-selected from the program (i.e. you cannot be a faithful, believing Christian AND a therapist), that is a problem. Taking Paul's example of the medical school a step further, could a public medical school set up its program such that students were not allowed to graduate unless they had participated in (or performed) an abortion? Will P.S. As a quick aside, Paul, I think Christian ethical convictions of do unto others requires respect for /people/ as children of God but does not therefore necessarily require acceptance or respect of people's /values/. Christian ethical convictions are based in a belief in objective truth, such that do unto others requires a desire
Re: Augusta State University student sues school over requirement that she undergo remediation due to her religious views
Alan - Are not your caveats are satisfied by the fact that her clinical performance was apparently satisfactory? BTW, there have been clients that I, as an attorney, have declined to represent, as it has been obvious to me that, because their goals were so diametrically opposed to mine, I would not be able to adequately represent them (such as people who want to spay and neuter all dogs, and ultimately do away with all pet ownership). I rarely have that problem with religious organizations, however, as long as they are sincere in their beliefs. Lisa On 7/29/2010 11:02 AM, Brownstein, Alan wrote: I think Lisa Runquist draws an important distinction that clarifies the issue and its resolution. Excluding someone from professional education suggests that their beliefs, or more precisely the influence of their beliefs on their behavior, prevents them from providing competent professional services in almost any circumstance. The religious beliefs at issue in some cases may disqualify a person from being hired for certain counseling positions – but there may be other opportunities for which their beliefs do not pose a barrier to the successful performance of their duties. Dismissal from professional school seems premature and unjustified in such circumstances. In the counseling context, I might offer two tentative caveats (tentative because I have so little expertise relating to this profession). First, it may be that being a successful counselor requires the practitioner to be able to distance themselves from the beliefs of the client at least to some extent. If that is the case (and I emphasize “if” here), then there may be reason to dismiss a student who is completely incapable of separating her own views from the needs of her client. There may be quasi-counseling jobs that person may fulfill, but she cannot be certified as counselor under professional standards. The second caveat is that the student must be willing to abide by accepted clinical requirements – which may require the temporary subordination of her beliefs to avoid harm to the client. The situations described in these cases presume that an openly gay or lesbian client seeks counseling and the counselor chooses to refer that client to another counselor because her religious beliefs would interfere with the provision of counseling services to that individual. In situations where such referrals are easily arranged, that seems like a win-win decision. The counselor and client will be better off if the client sees a different counselor. In some cases, however, the client’s homosexuality (or other personal characteristic that the counselor cannot affirm because of her religious beliefs) may not be disclosed until several counseling sessions have been completed. It may be that in such a circumstance, it is still desirable for the client to transition to a different counselor. But clinical requirements designed to protect the client may preclude any abrupt transfer of responsibilities. If a student indicated that even in such situations, she would not be able to subordinate her beliefs even temporarily in order to protect the mental health of her client – the professional school may have reason to dismiss the student from its program. Alan Brownstein *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Lisa A. Runquist *Sent:* Thursday, July 29, 2010 8:41 AM *To:* religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu *Subject:* Re: Augusta State University student sues school over requirement that she undergo remediation due to her religious views On 7/28/2010 3:23 PM, Lisa A. Runquist wrote: If the person completed all of the requirements to obtain a degree, the degree should be granted, regardless of their religious beliefs. That would include allowing someone to graduate from medical school, even if they do not believe in blood transfusions or abortions. And they should be able to obtain a degree from the counselor education program if, as appears to be the case in this situation, both the academic showing and the clinical performance are adequate. The question of obtaining licensing is a second matter, although again, if the person is otherwise qualified, that person should be granted a license -- e.g. if the person passes the bar exam, is of good moral character, etc., then he or she should be able to become a lawyer, regardless of his or her religious beliefs. Then comes the bottom line question which is being incorrectly posed as the answer to the first: Can and should that person be hired for a particular position? But this is a third and totally separate question. Clearly if the person is unable to perform the functions of the job, he or she should not be hired. And if the person insists on interjecting religion into a non-religious workplace, they probably would be fired from most jobs (for good cause). But that does
Re: Augusta State University student sues school over requirement that she undergo remediation due to her religious views
Ah - but Mr. Hale had repeatedly violated the law (including a conviction for criminal trespass, resisting arrest, aggravated battery and carrying a concealed weapon) before applying for a license to practice law. Again,I would argue that it was not his beliefs, but his actions, that caused a question as to his moral character and fitness. Lisa On 7/29/2010 4:15 PM, Steven Jamar wrote: but see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_F._Hale On Jul 29, 2010, at 6:34 PM, Lisa A. Runquist wrote: The right to believe is absolute. The right to act on that belief is not. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Associate Director, Institute of Intellectual Property and Social Justice http://iipsj.org Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 http://iipsj.com/SDJ/ There are obviously two educations. One should teach us how to make a living and the other how to live. James Truslow Adams -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Augusta State University student sues school over requirement that she un...
I did not see that she was saying that people should act according to her beliefs; she said she would work with the person to work their issues out themselves, but that IF ASKED, she would not lie about what she believed. BTW, are the school authorities not saying that all its counselors must believe the same as they believe? What makes those beliefs more legitimate or more worthy of protection than her beliefs? Isn't the first amendment designed to let everyone maintain and act in accordance with their own beliefs? It is clear, Marci, that you think that your beliefs are correct, and that everyone who disagrees with you is wrong. Should she not be able to think the same thing about her beliefs? Lisa On 7/28/2010 12:16 PM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote: How can someone with that belief be capable of providing competent psychological counseling to anyone other than a fellow believer? It is particularly troubling that someone would defend the right of a person to be a psychological counselor if one believes that others should act in accordance with the counselor's beliefs? Marci In a message dated 7/28/2010 1:10:14 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu writes: In fact, the standard that she is said to be violating is her subjective belief that her moral views are true. She was apparently told that it is unethical for her to be not truly accepting that others can have different beliefs and values that are equally valid as your own and for her to think certain people should act in accordance with your moral values, and/or that your beliefs are in some way superior to those of others. (emphasis in original) -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: A real-life on-campus example
On 5/12/2010 6:51 PM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote: Here is my question-- why would anyone care about a takeover? Wouldn't that just mean that a majority of the members voted in a different slate of leaders? It's not like a dissenter could come in and singlehandedly takeover a group, is it? They have to be chosen by a majority. Then if the group takes a turn some don't like, the minority starts their own new group, right?? Isn't that what happens everyday with groups of people? And in particular religious groups? There is even a term for it -- schism. But you don't even need a full-out schism to see this happen in religious groups, where a congregation will love a pastor but then some start disliking his/her sermons or priorities, and switch over to another congregation, or start a new congregation, or agitate for a new pastor. Isn't that the American way of a marketplace in ideas and religion? Well, not really. To begin with, there are congregational churches and hierarchical churches, and churches that fall sort of in the middle. In fact, there is no such thing as boilerplate bylaws for churches because they all differ. Anyway, with hierarchical churches, the church is controlled by the higher church authority (e.g. see the recent Episcopal cases). With congregational churches, where the members control, there is the question of who is a true member and has a right to vote. Normally the people have to be admitted; you do not generally become a member just by attending meetings. Sometimes the members have to take classes; generally they need to agree to a statement of faith. If someone does not do these things they can still attend the church, but they cannot vote at church meetings. I had one case that went to trial over who the members of the church were as of a specific date. The vast majority of church splits occur, not because someone doesn't like a pastor's sermons (as you said, that person will probably just find another church where he or she is more comfortable), but over some doctrinal issue. And courts cannot decide matters of church doctrine; they must decide cases on the basis of neutral principles of law. The case I mentioned re the members had to do with whether the church was going to remain a Christian Church/Church of Christ, or whether it was going to become a Pentecostal Church (and yes, new people came in and claimed (unsuccessfully) that they were members, in order to try to wrest the property away from the original church). So why does CLS or any other group need protection from the possibility that outsiders will take them over? If the CLS leaders are so weak that those with different views can take over, they can form a whole new group. So just how does the all-comers rule disadvantage CLS? I think this need for protection against takeovers is just a pretense for the intent to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. As set forth above, churches (and other religious groups) all have their own doctrines and beliefs, and generally require members to adhere to those beliefs. A statement of faith of a Christian church is going to be totally different from a new age type church. And there is no uniformity of beliefs between the various Christian churches. Doctrinal disputes have been going on, probably as long as there have been people to believe (if you get 5 rabbis together, you will probably end up with 6 opinions). The issue of sexual orientation is really a very recent dispute that has arisen in some religious organizations, and is only one item on a long list of beliefs, any one of which would disqualify someone from membership/leadership in the particular organization. Truly, most Christian groups do NOT spend most of their time on the issue of sexual orientation. Lisa In a message dated 5/12/2010 9:21:14 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu writes: In any event, I think those who argue that an all comers rule is OK because takeovers are unlikely would in effect be relying on a pattern or practice of groups choosing leaders based on their views. Usually a pattern or practice is somewhat equivalent to a rule, where antidiscrimination principles are at stake. Thus in a sense CLS is being denied benefits in part because of its honesty in admitting what its members will do, and the all comers rule is supported because groups will in fact engage in discrimination, though perhaps not by way of formal rules. Mark Scarberry Pepperdine -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo
Re: A real-life on-campus example
On 5/10/2010 8:21 PM, Steven Jamar wrote: Religion and religious organizations are different from other organizations. The constitution says we need to treat religion differently. Unless we decide that speech and association and equal treatment principles trump the religion clauses, we need to give them effect somehow -- both the free exercise and establishment clauses. And the constitution does not say that religious organizations are to be treated worse than all other groups. The government cannot establish religion, but it also cannot prohibit the free exercise of religion. Yet that, it seems to me, is exactly what the college is trying to do here. What would be the result if the university made an exception for religious organizations -- then it is not treating the religious organization equally. As long as all religious organizations are treated the same way, then there is no violation. If, for example, it allowed CLS to meet but prohibited a Muslim group from meeting, then this would be not treating the religious organizations equally. Lisa -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Factual Clarification re CLS
On 5/10/2010 3:14 PM, Ira (Chip) Lupu wrote: If social liberals join a conservative Christian group, and succeed in changing the message, conservative Christians can leave and form a new, conservative Christian group. You do recognize, don't you, that the Christian Legal Society is a national religious organization of attorneys and law students? I do think that CLS has a right to maintain control over its membership and its name. To suggest that it is appropriate to allow a student chapter to be taken over by people who have different beliefs, and then require the original group to form a new entity (which would also then have to have a new name) seems at least as fantastical as anything else you suggest. If someone wants a group for these new beliefs, that seems to be more appropriate to require them to start the new group. To Art Spitzer's question -- I don't know how you can say the purpose of an all-comers policy is fully served by allowing dissenters to attend meetings, but not vote or hold office. This is a matter of degree -- the more that dissenters can exercise political influence in the group, the more the interchange within the group may be open, dynamic, and non-dogmatic. Political influence? Firmly held religious beliefs are generally not established by who gets the most votes. And why do you want to insist that any student group be non-dogmatic? Is this another term for politically correct? Those may not be purposes that religious congregations may prefer, but the law school can have its own, independent purposes for insisting on access to full membership for all comers. And what might these be? It seems that this policy will ultimately backfire. What is to be gained by requiring a Latino student group to change its documents to allow whites to become voting members? Why should the gay, lesbian, transgender group have to allow individuals who do not believe in their lifestyle to be members of their organization? (Whether anyone at Hastings LS really thought all of this through is another question, but CLS did stipulate that all comers is among the relevant policies.) Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg Original message Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 14:45:10 -0700 (PDT) From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick Duncannebraskalawp...@yahoo.com) Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS To: Law Religion issues for Law Academicsreligionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Perhaps democrats will not attempt to take control of the Young Republicans. But I think there is a good chance that socially liberal Christians may take control of a conservative Christian group that can't protect its doctrinal beliefs through its membership policy. By the way, it is clear that the CLS allows all comers to attend its meetings. This case is strictly about who can control an organization's beliefs and speech, not about who may attend meetings. I have read the oral argument transcript several times. And it is clear to me that Breyer believes an all comers membership policy is silly and completely inconsistent with a marketplace of ideas in which many groups with different beliefs debate and express different ideas from very different perspectives. Rick Duncan Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 __ -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Factual Clarification re CLS
While I agree with Rick's analysis, I would also point out that if the organization wants a closed meeting, it does not have to occur on the university campus. It can find a local church, a dorm room, or some other similar location. Lisa On 5/10/2010 3:28 PM, Rick Duncan wrote: Alan asks a great question: I understand that the facts of CLS v. Martinez case are limited to voting membership and eligibility for leadership positions. But if the foundation of the CLS claim is that it is being required to sacrifice its freedom of association rights to obtain access to a designated public forum, why wouldn’t those associational freedom rights also extend to deciding to who may attend meetings and participate in discussions? Just asking. I think the essence of expressive association is that an expressive group speaks through its leaders, and leaders are elected by voting members. Hastings has created a limited public forum for the express purpose of creating a diverse marketplace of ideas. Even if the all comers policy is viewpoint neutral, Hastings reason for excluding a student group from its forum must be reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum. This policy is not reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum; it is destructive of a marketplace of ideas, of a forum in which groups with diverse beliefs come together to debate and express very different views about the good life and what is true, what is good, and what is beautiful. If all groups must allow everyone and anyone to participate in the formation of its beliefs, there will be no diversity of ideas in the marketplace. Just a lot of watered down, least common denominators of expression. Rick Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com IRS Circular 230 Notice To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used by any taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding U.S. tax penalties. This message and any attachments may be protected by the attorney/client privilege. If you believe that it has been sent to you in error, do not read, copy or distribute it. Please reply to the sender that you have received the message in error and then delete it. Thank you. NOTE: Emails are not a secure method of communication. If you do not wish to obtain future communications from me via email, please advise me immediately. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Wisconsin convicts parents for denial of medical treatment
Well, not to minimize child abuse, but speaking from experience, my parents believed in spanking and I seem to have turned out okay. Actually, I do not recall any specific times of having been spanked; however, I DO remember having my mouth washed out with soap for having bitten my sister. Which seemed to me at the time (and still does) to be a much worse punishment. :-) Lisa Volokh, Eugene wrote: It also seems noteworthy to me that one of the arguments on the list for having any bruise-inflicting corporal punishment of children be criminal was equally applicable to minor spanking as well. The argument was, “I have to wonder if there is anyone on this list who would not consider it a battery (or assault depending on what your state calls what used to be common law battery) if someone deliberately hit them to the point of bruising them. Sounds like a tort or a crime to me, and I find it hard to imagine how a claim of religious belief would justify it. I suppose adults could consent to such interpersonal behavior. but since children cannot legally consent to such harms, I have to wonder how Vance can justify such abuse.” But I take it that everyone on the list would consider it a battery if someone spanked them even without bruising them, no? So when the logic of the arguments suggests the illegality of /all/ corporal punishment, it seems reasonable for people who support some corporal punishment to think that the other side’s position would go beyond just prohibiting bruising. -- Lisa A. Runquist Runquist Associates Attorneys at Law 17554 Community Street Northridge, CA 91325 (818)609-7761 (818)609-7794 (fax) l...@runquist.com http://www.runquist.com IRS Circular 230 Notice To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used by any taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding U.S. tax penalties. This message and any attachments may be protected by the attorney/client privilege. If you believe that it has been sent to you in error, do not read, copy or distribute it. Please reply to the sender that you have received the message in error and then delete it. Thank you. NOTE: Emails are not a secure method of communication. If you do not wish to obtain future communications from me via email, please advise me immediately. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
