RE: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Tonyata
Thank you all for your comments, very much appreciated
 
Tony
 
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2015 12:28:11 -0700
From: ml-node+s1065346n114635...@n5.nabble.com
To: tiar...@hotmail.com
Subject: Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II



On Wed, 18 Feb 2015 14:16:02 -0500

Joe Quinn [hidden email] wrote:


 On 2/18/2015 2:10 PM, Reindl Harald wrote:


  the source contains at least socket:// and heavy pulsating disk-IO 

  noticed from the RAID10 as long the process was active - will give

  it a try in a isolated VM to look what it does the next spare time


 Or if there was an SA-style classifier for malware that scores files

 in addition to this is a keylogger.


A lot of the samples we see heavily obfuscate the VB code.  Example:


Sub h()

 ds = 99 + Sgn(98) + Sgn(902) + Sgn(-5)

 USER = Module1.Travel(username)

 

 jks = ds

 PST2 =  + a + do  be  ac  d-u  pd  a  te 
 

 VBT2 =   a + Chr(100) + o  b  ea  cd-up  da  te  

 VBTXP2 =   a  Chr(100)  o  be + ac  d-u + pd + atex + 
p  

 BART2 =   a + Chr(100)  o  b  e + ac  d-up + date  

 

 PST1 = PST2 + . + Chr(Asc(p)) + Chr(ds + 15) + 1 + 

 VBT1 = VBT2 + . + Chr(118) + b + Chr(Asc(s)) + 

 VBTXP = VBTXP2 + . + Chr(Asc(v)) + Chr(Asc(b)) + s + 

... more of the same


This makes a simple-minded strings inadequate. :( I've also seen

highly-obfuscated Javascript code that builds up strings and then evaluates

them as Javascript.


Regards,


David.













If you reply to this email, your message will be added to the 
discussion below:

http://spamassassin.1065346.n5.nabble.com/Recent-spate-of-Malicious-VB-attachments-II-tp114621p114635.html



To unsubscribe from Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments 
II, click here.

NAML
  



--
View this message in context: 
http://spamassassin.1065346.n5.nabble.com/Recent-spate-of-Malicious-VB-attachments-II-tp114621p114639.html
Sent from the SpamAssassin - Users mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

Phishing dropbox/google systems

2015-02-19 Thread Alex Regan

Hi,

I've seen quite a few what I believe are phishing attack emails today 
that I haven't seen before:


http://pastebin.com/tKEBH16e

It uses a bit.ly address to point the user to what looks like an 
alternative way to login to Google Drive or any other cloud service in 
one spot. Seriously evil stuff.


It's also obviously from a hacked account normally known and trusted by 
the recipients.


Thanks,
Alex


Bogus day old domains from RRPPROXY.NET

2015-02-19 Thread Kevin Miller
Lately we've been getting slammed by spam.  The bulk of it (no pun intended) is 
coming from new domains (many just a day or two old) which originate from 
key-systems gmbh, and all use RRPPROXY.NET as their name servers such as this 
snippet from whois:

   Domain Name: WATTSMINDANDBODYLAB.COM
   Registrar: KEY-SYSTEMS GMBH
   Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 269
   Whois Server: whois.rrpproxy.net
   Referral URL: http://www.key-systems.net
   Name Server: NS1.RRPPROXY.NET
   Name Server: NS2.RRPPROXY.NET
   Name Server: NS3.RRPPROXY.NET
   Status: ok http://www.icann.org/epp#OK
   Updated Date: 19-feb-2015
   Creation Date: 19-feb-2015
   Expiration Date: 19-feb-2016

The Day Old Bread rules don't seem to catch them.  

The message is posted in pastebin:  http://pastebin.com/9FhgEiwa

My scores for this are:
SpamAssassin Score: 4.71
Spam Report:
Score   Matching Rule   Description
cached   
score=4.711  
5   required 
-0.00   BAYES_20 Bayesian spam probability is 5 to 20%
2.50CBJ_DementiaMail with dementia
1.50CBJ_SickoDisease related spam
0.00HTML_MESSAGEHTML included in message
0.72MIME_HTML_ONLY  Message only has text/html MIME parts
-0.00   SPF_HELO_PASS   SPF: HELO matches SPF record
-0.00   SPF_PASSSPF: sender matches SPF record
-0.01   T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD   

Is there a way to reject or up the score on anything that is served up by that 
name server or registar?  I was thinking maybe putting the rrproxy.net 
nameserver in my dns as 127.0.0.1, on the theory that if it doesn't resolve the 
message will be rejected at the MTA level.  It would be nice to have a bit more 
control over it, just in case however.  Any pearls of wisdom?

Thanks...

...Kevin
--
Kevin Miller
Network/email Administrator, CBJ MIS Dept.
155 South Seward Street
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Phone: (907) 586-0242, Fax: (907) 586-4500
Registered Linux User No: 307357 




Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Chad M Stewart

I use amavis-new and block based on file type.  My users should never get legit 
executables via email, so they are sent to a quarantine.

### BLOCKED ANYWHERE
# qr'^UNDECIPHERABLE$',  # is or contains any undecipherable components
  qr'^\.(exe-ms|dll)$',   # banned file(1) types, rudimentary
  qr'^\.(exe|lha|cab|dll)$',  # banned file(1) types


  # block certain double extensions in filenames
  
qr'^(?!cid:).*\.[^./]*[A-Za-z][^./]*\.\s*(exe|vbs|pif|scr|bat|cmd|com|cpl|dll)[.\s]*$'i,



  qr'.\.(exe|vbs|pif|scr|cpl)$'i, # banned extension - basic


Which results in my admin mailbox receiving messages like the following:


 =_1424346907-90515-0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
 Content-Disposition: inline
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
 
 No viruses were found.
 
 Banned name: .exe,.exe-ms,in.exe
 Content type: Banned
 Internal reference code for the message is 90515-05/T9Uh2zuM5Ym6
 
 First upstream SMTP client IP address: [23.113.51.23]:56334
   23-113-51-23.lightspeed.irvnca.sbcglobal.net
 
 Received trace: ESMTP://[23.113.51.23]:56334
 
 Return-Path: nycs...@csis.dk
 From: nycs...@csis.dk
 Message-ID: 048678970043189683240541243784...@csis.dk
 Subject: Attention csis
 The message has been quarantined as: banned-T9Uh2zuM5Ym6
 
 The message WAS NOT relayed to:
 spamt...@ubefree.net:
250 2.7.0 ok, discarded, id=90515-05 - banned: .exe,.exe-ms,in.exe
 
 


-Chad

smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Reindl Harald


Am 19.02.2015 um 14:46 schrieb Chad M Stewart:

I use amavis-new and block based on file type.  My users should never get legit 
executables via email, so they are sent to a quarantine.

### BLOCKED ANYWHERE
# qr'^UNDECIPHERABLE$',  # is or contains any undecipherable components
   qr'^\.(exe-ms|dll)$',   # banned file(1) types, rudimentary
   qr'^\.(exe|lha|cab|dll)$',  # banned file(1) types


   # block certain double extensions in filenames
   
qr'^(?!cid:).*\.[^./]*[A-Za-z][^./]*\.\s*(exe|vbs|pif|scr|bat|cmd|com|cpl|dll)[.\s]*$'i,

   qr'.\.(exe|vbs|pif|scr|cpl)$'i, # banned extension - basic


well, that can you achieve directly on the MTA but that won't help in 
case of emails containing MS office attachments with a Malicious VB script


cat /etc/postfix/mime_header_checks.cf
/^Content-(?:Disposition|Type):(?:.*?;)? \s*(?:file)?name \s* = 
\s*?(.*?(\.|=2E)(386|acm|ade|adp|awx|ax|bas|bat|bin|cdf|chm|class|cmd|cnv|com|cpl|crt|csh|dll|dlo|drv|exe|hlp|hta|inf|ins|isp|jar|jse|lnk|mde|mdt|mdw|msc|msi|msp|mst|nws|ocx|ops|pcd|pif|pl|prf|rar|reg|scf|scr|script|sct|sh|shb|shm|shs|so|sys|tlb|vb|vbe|vbs|vbx|vxd|wiz|wll|wpc|wsc|wsf|wsh))(?:\?=)??\s*(;|$)/x 
REJECT Attachment Blocked (Executables And RAR-Files Not Allowed) $1


(.rar because ClamAV can't scan the content on Fedora)



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Backup of bayes database failed

2015-02-19 Thread Olivier CALVANO
Hi

i want backup the bayes database of my spamassassin server but impossible.

On all server, that's finish at :

locker: safe_unlock: lock on /var/spool/spamassassin/bayes.lock was lost
due to expiry at
/usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.10.0/Mail/SpamAssassin/Locker/UnixNFSSafe.pm
line 200.


and the backup.txt file stop:
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1563977214 2015-02-19 09:18 backup.txt

ll /var/spool/spamassassin/
-rw-rw-rw- 1 qscand qscand  74568 2015-02-19 09:26 bayes_journal
-rw-rw-rw- 1 root   root   2749222912 2015-02-19 09:25 bayes_seen
-rw-rw-rw- 1 qscand qscand4636672 2015-02-19 09:25 bayes_toks


i want export for import after on a new server with SQL Database.


anyone know this problems ?
regards
olivier


Re: Backup of bayes database failed

2015-02-19 Thread RW
On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 09:27:12 +0100
Olivier CALVANO wrote:

 Hi
 
 i want backup the bayes database of my spamassassin server but
 impossible.
 
 On all server, that's finish at :
 
 locker: safe_unlock: lock on /var/spool/spamassassin/bayes.lock was
 lost due to expiry at
 /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.10.0/Mail/SpamAssassin/Locker/UnixNFSSafe.pm
 line 200.
 
 
 and the backup.txt file stop:
 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1563977214 2015-02-19 09:18 backup.txt
 
 ll /var/spool/spamassassin/
 -rw-rw-rw- 1 qscand qscand  74568 2015-02-19 09:26 bayes_journal
 -rw-rw-rw- 1 root   root   2749222912 2015-02-19 09:25 bayes_seen
 -rw-rw-rw- 1 qscand qscand4636672 2015-02-19 09:25 bayes_toks
 
I'm guessing the problem is due to the huge size of bayes_seen. You
could try copying the  bayes_toks to a new location and dumping that.
bayes_seen is only need for reversing the training of mistrained mail.


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Matteo Dessalvi

Hello.

I am just curious, since I am using SaneSecurity
signatures too.

According to: http://sanesecurity.com/usage/signatures/
some of the lists you mentioned have been classified
with 'medium' to 'high' risk of false positives:

foxhole_*
spear / spearl

Did you not get into trouble with those ones?

Regards,
   Matteo

On 19.02.2015 15:46, Reindl Harald wrote:


Am 19.02.2015 um 15:43 schrieb David F. Skoll:

On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 09:34:28 -0500
Alex Regan mysqlstud...@gmail.com wrote:

[David Skoll]

spreadsheet with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially
useless at detecting viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?



Useless? Are you using the third-party patterns?


No, because when I tried some of them, there were an unacceptably
high number of FPs.  I tried tweaking various sets of Sane Security
signatures and they didn't work well for me


looks you are using the wrong ones
no problems with that ones

blurl.ndb
bofhland_cracked_URL.ndb
bofhland_malware_attach.hdb
bofhland_malware_URL.ndb
bofhland_phishing_URL.ndb
crdfam.clamav.hdb
foxhole_all.cdb
foxhole_filename.cdb
foxhole_generic.cdb
malwarehash.hsb
phish.ndb
phishtank.ndb
rogue.hdb
sanesecurity.ftm
scamnailer.ndb
scam.ndb
sigwhitelist.ign2
spearl.ndb
spear.ndb
winnow.attachments.hdb
winnow_bad_cw.hdb
winnow_extended_malware.hdb
winnow_malware.hdb
winnow_malware_links.ndb
winnow_phish_complete_url.ndb
winnow_spam_complete.ndb



Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Reindl Harald



Am 19.02.2015 um 16:13 schrieb Matteo Dessalvi:

I am just curious, since I am using SaneSecurity
signatures too.

According to: http://sanesecurity.com/usage/signatures/
some of the lists you mentioned have been classified
with 'medium' to 'high' risk of false positives:

foxhole_*
spear / spearl

Did you not get into trouble with those ones?


no, ClamAV don't see much mail at all because clamav-milter is running 
after spamass-milter and the filters in front are killing 99% at the 
envelope stage


Blocked:  204540
SpamAssassin:   3292
Virus:68

the foxhole ar classified with 'high' because they don't care if it is a 
virus at all, they unpack the archive and reject if there is a file with 
a blocked extension unconditional



On 19.02.2015 15:46, Reindl Harald wrote:


Am 19.02.2015 um 15:43 schrieb David F. Skoll:

On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 09:34:28 -0500
Alex Regan mysqlstud...@gmail.com wrote:

[David Skoll]

spreadsheet with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially
useless at detecting viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?



Useless? Are you using the third-party patterns?


No, because when I tried some of them, there were an unacceptably
high number of FPs.  I tried tweaking various sets of Sane Security
signatures and they didn't work well for me


looks you are using the wrong ones
no problems with that ones

blurl.ndb
bofhland_cracked_URL.ndb
bofhland_malware_attach.hdb
bofhland_malware_URL.ndb
bofhland_phishing_URL.ndb
crdfam.clamav.hdb
foxhole_all.cdb
foxhole_filename.cdb
foxhole_generic.cdb
malwarehash.hsb
phish.ndb
phishtank.ndb
rogue.hdb
sanesecurity.ftm
scamnailer.ndb
scam.ndb
sigwhitelist.ign2
spearl.ndb
spear.ndb
winnow.attachments.hdb
winnow_bad_cw.hdb
winnow_extended_malware.hdb
winnow_malware.hdb
winnow_malware_links.ndb
winnow_phish_complete_url.ndb
winnow_spam_complete.ndb




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Dave Funk

On Thu, 19 Feb 2015, Reindl Harald wrote:

well, that can you achieve directly on the MTA but that won't help in case of 
emails containing MS office attachments with a Malicious VB script


cat /etc/postfix/mime_header_checks.cf
/^Content-(?:Disposition|Type):(?:.*?;)? \s*(?:file)?name \s* = 
\s*?(.*?(\.|=2E)(386|acm|ade|adp|awx|ax|bas|bat|bin|cdf|chm|class|cmd|cnv|com|cpl|crt|csh|dll|dlo|drv|exe|hlp|hta|inf|ins|isp|jar|jse|lnk|mde|mdt|mdw|msc|msi|msp|mst|nws|ocx|ops|pcd|pif|pl|prf|rar|reg|scf|scr|script|sct|sh|shb|shm|shs|so|sys|tlb|vb|vbe|vbs|vbx|vxd|wiz|wll|wpc|wsc|wsf|wsh))(?:\?=)??\s*(;|$)/x 
REJECT Attachment Blocked (Executables And RAR-Files Not Allowed) $1


(.rar because ClamAV can't scan the content on Fedora)


Is that a politically inspired limitation? If you build ClamAV from source
it can scan RAR.

--
Dave Funk  University of Iowa
dbfunk (at) engineering.uiowa.eduCollege of Engineering
319/335-5751   FAX: 319/384-0549   1256 Seamans Center
Sys_admin/Postmaster/cell_adminIowa City, IA 52242-1527
#include std_disclaimer.h
Better is not better, 'standard' is better. B{


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Reindl Harald


Am 19.02.2015 um 15:43 schrieb David F. Skoll:

On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 09:34:28 -0500
Alex Regan mysqlstud...@gmail.com wrote:

[David Skoll]

spreadsheet with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially
useless at detecting viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?



Useless? Are you using the third-party patterns?


No, because when I tried some of them, there were an unacceptably
high number of FPs.  I tried tweaking various sets of Sane Security
signatures and they didn't work well for me


looks you are using the wrong ones
no problems with that ones

blurl.ndb
bofhland_cracked_URL.ndb
bofhland_malware_attach.hdb
bofhland_malware_URL.ndb
bofhland_phishing_URL.ndb
crdfam.clamav.hdb
foxhole_all.cdb
foxhole_filename.cdb
foxhole_generic.cdb
malwarehash.hsb
phish.ndb
phishtank.ndb
rogue.hdb
sanesecurity.ftm
scamnailer.ndb
scam.ndb
sigwhitelist.ign2
spearl.ndb
spear.ndb
winnow.attachments.hdb
winnow_bad_cw.hdb
winnow_extended_malware.hdb
winnow_malware.hdb
winnow_malware_links.ndb
winnow_phish_complete_url.ndb
winnow_spam_complete.ndb



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Dave Funk

On Thu, 19 Feb 2015, David F. Skoll wrote:


On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 07:46:16 -0600
Chad M Stewart c...@balius.com wrote:


I use amavis-new and block based on file type.  My users should never
get legit executables via email, so they are sent to a quarantine.


Unfortunately, we're finding those simple-minded rules are running out
of gas. :(  We've seen a zip file containing an Excel spreadsheet
with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially useless at detecting
viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?


I thought that ClamAV knew how to unpack zip/rar/tar/gzip/etc...
and scan the cruft inside them.

Are you saying that doesn't work or are you saying that the malware is
mutating fast enough that the ClamAV signatures aren't keeping up with it?
If the latter case, is there -any- AV kit that is?
Are the Sanesecurity add-in ClamAV signatures helpful?

--
Dave Funk  University of Iowa
dbfunk (at) engineering.uiowa.eduCollege of Engineering
319/335-5751   FAX: 319/384-0549   1256 Seamans Center
Sys_admin/Postmaster/cell_adminIowa City, IA 52242-1527
#include std_disclaimer.h
Better is not better, 'standard' is better. B{


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Alex Regan

Hi,


I use amavis-new and block based on file type.  My users should never
get legit executables via email, so they are sent to a quarantine.


Unfortunately, we're finding those simple-minded rules are running out
of gas. :(  We've seen a zip file containing an Excel spreadsheet
with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially useless at detecting
viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?


if you have enough trap traffic, MD5 hashes   clamav signatures is a
quick and dirty way of detecting them.

also, Sophos is taking care of them, real nicely.


I'm interested in knowing if you're running Sophos on fedora/centos with 
amavisd?


I used it years ago with sophie, but have been out-of-touch, and lost 
track of how to get it going these days.


Off-topic, I guess, but if anyone has any pointers on how to integrate 
sophos and clamav with amavisd on fedora, I'd be very appreciative. 
Googling only reveals ancient sources.


Thanks,
Alex


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread David F. Skoll
On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 07:46:16 -0600
Chad M Stewart c...@balius.com wrote:

 I use amavis-new and block based on file type.  My users should never
 get legit executables via email, so they are sent to a quarantine.

Unfortunately, we're finding those simple-minded rules are running out
of gas. :(  We've seen a zip file containing an Excel spreadsheet
with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially useless at detecting
viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?

Regards,

David.


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Axb

On 02/19/2015 03:24 PM, David F. Skoll wrote:

On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 07:46:16 -0600
Chad M Stewart c...@balius.com wrote:


I use amavis-new and block based on file type.  My users should never
get legit executables via email, so they are sent to a quarantine.


Unfortunately, we're finding those simple-minded rules are running out
of gas. :(  We've seen a zip file containing an Excel spreadsheet
with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially useless at detecting
viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?


if you have enough trap traffic, MD5 hashes   clamav signatures is a 
quick and dirty way of detecting them.


also, Sophos is taking care of them, real nicely.




Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread David F. Skoll
On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 09:34:28 -0500
Alex Regan mysqlstud...@gmail.com wrote:

[David Skoll]
  spreadsheet with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially
  useless at detecting viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?

 Useless? Are you using the third-party patterns?

No, because when I tried some of them, there were an unacceptably
high number of FPs.  I tried tweaking various sets of Sane Security
signatures and they didn't work well for me.

 Just not responsive enough or doesn't have the technology to catch
 today's threats?

It's not responsive enough.  And I don't mean to pick on ClamAV;
these macro viruses are slipping past a lot of signature-based AV products.

 What are the threats it doesn't catch?

Pretty much 99% of the malware passing through our relays (mostly
macro viruses nowadays.)

Regards,

David.


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Alex Regan

Hi,


I use amavis-new and block based on file type.  My users should never
get legit executables via email, so they are sent to a quarantine.


Unfortunately, we're finding those simple-minded rules are running out
of gas. :(  We've seen a zip file containing an Excel spreadsheet
with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially useless at detecting
viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?


Useless? Are you using the third-party patterns? You think it's useless 
using those as well? Just not responsive enough or doesn't have the 
technology to catch today's threats?


What are the threats it doesn't catch?

Thanks,
Alex





Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Reindl Harald


Am 19.02.2015 um 15:47 schrieb Dave Funk:

On Thu, 19 Feb 2015, Reindl Harald wrote:


well, that can you achieve directly on the MTA but that won't help in
case of emails containing MS office attachments with a Malicious VB
script

cat /etc/postfix/mime_header_checks.cf
/^Content-(?:Disposition|Type):(?:.*?;)? \s*(?:file)?name \s* =
\s*?(.*?(\.|=2E)(386|acm|ade|adp|awx|ax|bas|bat|bin|cdf|chm|class|cmd|cnv|com|cpl|crt|csh|dll|dlo|drv|exe|hlp|hta|inf|ins|isp|jar|jse|lnk|mde|mdt|mdw|msc|msi|msp|mst|nws|ocx|ops|pcd|pif|pl|prf|rar|reg|scf|scr|script|sct|sh|shb|shm|shs|so|sys|tlb|vb|vbe|vbs|vbx|vxd|wiz|wll|wpc|wsc|wsf|wsh))(?:\?=)??\s*(;|$)/x
REJECT Attachment Blocked (Executables And RAR-Files Not Allowed) $1

(.rar because ClamAV can't scan the content on Fedora)


Is that a politically inspired limitation?


you can call it politically i blame the authors like the license change 
of JSON (https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=63520)

https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Licensing:Unrar?rd=Licensing/Unrar


If you build ClamAV from source it can scan RAR


i build already enough packages and my day has only 24 hours






signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Re: Recent spate of Malicious VB attachments II

2015-02-19 Thread Benny Pedersen
On February 19, 2015 3:26:00 PM David F. Skoll d...@roaringpenguin.com 
wrote:



Unfortunately, we're finding those simple-minded rules are running out
of gas. :(  We've seen a zip file containing an Excel spreadsheet
with a macro virus in it.  ClamAV is essentially useless at detecting
viruses, so it's a real problem... any ideas?


clamav foxhole rules, then in amavisd map this signatere to spam or how end 
user want it, problem is that amavisd is not a virus scanner, but a good 
interface to clamav :)