Source code would be nice as well.
On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at 6:27 PM, Mansour Moufid wrote:
> On Sun, 2013-11-03 at 04:17 +, Roth Paxton wrote:
>
> > Cryptographyuniversal.com is my website.@Niko. I accept your criticism
> > and you are correct that I was angry at the IACR when the site was
> >
On Sun, 2013-11-03 at 04:17 +, Roth Paxton wrote:
> Cryptographyuniversal.com is my website.@Niko. I accept your criticism
> and you are correct that I was angry at the IACR when the site was
> published. However I am only an amatuer cryptographer. Some of the
> math is wrong. The site is mere
Peter Gutmann (at Monday, November 4, 2013, 1:40:26 AM):
> Then it deprecates PKCS #1 v1.5 (which pretty much the entire
> planet uses) because it doesn't have a security proof, while recommending a
> bunch of exotic alternatives that more or less nothing uses.
what is the purpose of academic re
Can't the distributed pool P2Pool easily be updated to account for that?
- Sent from my phone
Den 4 nov 2013 16:33 skrev "Peter Todd" :
> On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 09:31:04AM -0430, Karn Kallio wrote:
> >
> > The paper "Majority is not Enough Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable" may be of
> > interest.
>
On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 09:31:04AM -0430, Karn Kallio wrote:
>
> The paper "Majority is not Enough Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable" may be of
> interest.
>
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243
>
> Abstract. The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a pub-
> lic log called the blockchai
The paper "Majority is not Enough Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable" may be of
interest.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243
Abstract. The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a pub-
lic log called the blockchain. Its security rests critically on the
distributed
protocol that maintains th
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Aloha!
ianG wrote:
> Has anyone got/found test vectors for ChaCha?
Why yes, I have a draft for it:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-strombergson-chacha-test-vectors-00
Suggestions and comments highly welcome.
- --
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours
Joac
By no means I claim to be an expert, but what I feel is that ENISA's
report is missing recommendations for TLS key exchange algorithms. I
would except this report to recommend algorithms that achieve forward
secrecy. In any case I found the report very comprehensive and well
suited for an engineer.
On 4 November 2013 09:51, yersinia wrote:
> Nist recently posted a raccomandation very recently (IN DRAFT)
> http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-52-rev1/draft_sp800_52_r1.pdf
If you ignore the bits about FIPS-140 and SP800-90A, its not bad. But
fairly obvious.
It seems to be missing a c
On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at 1:40 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Sandy Harris writes:
>
>>Cited in a comment on Schneier's blog:
>>https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/nsa_eavesdroppi_2.html
>>
>>Register article with link to actual report:
>>http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/31/most_security_
Peter,
(Full disclosure: I was one of the external reviewers of this report.)
I take your point that there is a gap between cryptography and security
engineering, and I understand the gap well from first-hand experience,
first from my time in industry and more recently as a consultant to
industry
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