At 02:39 AM 3/6/03 +, Ian Brown wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote:
...
> For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by
> using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera,
> obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the
> vote, or keep the job. And no one would kn
Lotus Notes/Domino already has something similar to what Microsoft is
proposing.
You can designate an outgoing message as "read-only".
The end-user (if they are using a Notes Client) can only view the message,
menu choices for printing and cutting/copy text are disabled. Forwarding the
message
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 08:38:42PM -0500, Dan Riley wrote:
>
> But this whole discussion is terribly last century--still pictures are
> passe. What's the defense of any of these systems against cell phones
> that transmit live video?
A Faraday cage.
Seriously, what current or historic voting sy
Dan Riley wrote:
> The vote can't be final until the voter confirms the paper receipt.
> It's inevitable that some voters won't realize they voted the wrong
> way until seeing the printed receipt, so that has to be allowed for.
> Elementary human factors.
This brings in two other factors I have a
At 9:17 AM -0800 3/6/03, Daniel Garcia wrote:
>On Thu, 6 Mar 2003, Don Davis wrote:
>> http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item=2162414185
>> i saw this on the boing-boing blog.
>
>Interesting, when i try to look at this from work (over in brighton,
>actually), i get:
>
> Dear User:
At 3:47 AM -0800 3/6/03, Ben Laurie wrote:
>I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
>the lists I can find are more interested in records, which are _way_ too
>big for cryptographic purposes.
>
>By "sensibly sized" I mean in the range 512-8192 bits. I'm particularly
>af
Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> This is not possible for current paper ballots, for several reasons. For
> example, if you take a picture of your punch card as a proof of how you
> voted, what is to prevent you -- after the picture is taken -- to punch
> another hole for the same race and in
DG> On Thu, 6 Mar 2003, Don Davis wrote:
>> http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item=2162414185
>> i saw this on the boing-boing blog.
Blocked for German T-Online customers, too.
--
Best regards,
Carstenmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
Ben Laurie writes:
> I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
> the lists I can find are more interested in records, which are _way_ too
> big for cryptographic purposes.
Directory
ftp://ftp.ssh.com/pub/ietf/ecpp-certificates
contains ecpp certificates for IKE prim
http://www.yaledailynews.com/articlefunctions/Printerfriendly.asp?AID=22111
yaledailynews.com -
Changes may follow hoax e-mail
Published Wednesday, March 5, 2003
Changes may follow hoax e-mail
BY JESSAMYN BLAU
Staff Reporter
The Feb. 17 hoax e-mail that caused some students to miss classe
John Ioannidis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Are you referring to the "" string on the boarding pass? That
> indicated that you were going to be searched by the boarding gate TSA
> people whether they were going to decide to search you or not (they
> still picked up "random" people without th
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 01:50:44PM -0500, Derek Atkins wrote:
> [...]
>
> When I flew on US-Airways out of BAL last year, they had a marking on
> the boarding pass that signified "search this person". If your
> boarding pass had the mark, you were searched as you tried to board.
> If it did not,
"Trei, Peter" wrote:
> Ballot boxes are also subject to many forms of fraud. But a dual
> system (electronic backed up by paper) is more resistant to
> attack then either alone.
The dual, and multiple, system can be done without paper ballot.
There is nothing "magic" about paper as a record me
At 12:17 06.03.03 -0500, Daniel Garcia wrote:
>On Thu, 6 Mar 2003, Don Davis wrote:
>> http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item=2162414185
>> i saw this on the boing-boing blog.
>
>Interesting, when i try to look at this from work (over in brighton,
>actually), i get:
>
>Dear Use
David Howe wrote:
> at Thursday, March 06, 2003 5:02 PM, Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> was seen
> to say:
> > On the other hand, photographing a paper receipt behind a glass, which
> > receipt is printed after your vote choices are final, is not readily
> > deniable because that receipt is printe
bear wrote:
> Let's face it, if somebody can *see* their vote, they can record it.
Not necessarily. Current paper ballots do not offer you a way to record
*your* vote. You may even photograph your ballot but there is no way to
prove that *that* was the ballot you did cast. In the past, we had bal
John,
John Gilmore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> And, besides identifying what cities they're doing this in, we should
> also start examining a collection of these boarding passes, looking
> for the encrypted "let me through without searching me" information.
> Or the "Don't let me fly" informati
John says:
Next time, before disagreeing with someone:
a) Please read what he actually wrote, and
b) Don't quote snippets out of context.
Three sentences later, at the end of the paragraph that
began as quoted above, I explicitly pointed out that
cellphone transmissions are a more-protected sp
At 4:57 PM -0500 3/5/03, John S. Denker wrote:
Tim Dierks wrote:
In order to avoid overreaction to a nth-hand story, I've attempted to
locate some primary sources.
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines:
> http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/9th/case/9955106p&exact=1
[US v Councilman:]
http://pacer.mad
> Francois Grieu[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Peter Trei wrote:
>
> > I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling
> > station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it.
> > This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling
> > described above, and seco
Peter Trei wrote:
I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling
station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it.
This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling
described above, and second, if a recount is required, it allows
the recount to be done
- Original Message -
From: "Ben Laurie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Anton Stiglic" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> [Talking about the ECPP package...]
> I'm not convinced any of those binaries are going to run on my system
> (which is FreeBSD), and anyway, if I'm going to use a binary to do ECPP
> I m
at Thursday, March 06, 2003 5:02 PM, Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> was seen
to say:
> On the other hand, photographing a paper receipt behind a glass, which
> receipt is printed after your vote choices are final, is not readily
> deniable because that receipt is printed only after you confirm your
>
Anton Stiglic wrote:
> -Well the whole process can be filmed, not necessarily photographed...
> It's difficult to counter the "attack". In you screen example, you can
> photograph
> the vote and then immediately photograph the "thank you", if the photographs
> include the time in milliseconds,
Tal Garfinkel wrote:
> The value of these type of controls that they help users you basically
> trust who might be careless, stupid, lazy or confused to do the right
> thing (however the right thing is defined, according to your company
> security policy).
It beats me that "users you basically
On Thu, 6 Mar 2003, Don Davis wrote:
> http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item=2162414185
> i saw this on the boing-boing blog.
Interesting, when i try to look at this from work (over in brighton,
actually), i get:
Dear User:
Unfortunately, access to this particular c
- Original Message -
From: "Ed Gerck" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[...]
> This is not possible for current paper ballots, for several reasons. For
> example, if you take a picture of your punch card as a proof of how you
> voted, what is to prevent you -- after the picture is taken -- to punch
>
Anton Stiglic wrote:
- Original Message - From: "Ben Laurie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Cryptography" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday,
March 06, 2003 6:47 AM Subject: Proven Primes
I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes -
all the lists I can find are more inter
Anton Stiglic wrote:
> An extortionist could provide their own camera device to the voter, which
> has
> a built in clock that timestamps the photos and does some watermarking, or
> something like that, which could complicate the counter-measures. But this
> problem already exists with current n
On Wed, 5 Mar 2003, Bill Frantz wrote:
>The best counter to this problem is widely available systems to produce
>fake photos of the vote, so the vote buyer can't know whether the votes he
>sees in the photo are the real votes, or fake ones.
blink, blink.
you mean *MORE* widely available than p
- Original Message -
From: "Bill Frantz" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Ed Gerck" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2003 2:14 AM
Subject: Re: Scientists question electronic voting
[..]
> The best counter to this problem is widely available systems to produce
>
Will Rodger wrote:
John says:
> Wireless is a horse of a different color. IANAL but
> the last time I looked, there was no federal law
> against intercepting most wireless signals, but you
> were (generally) not allowed to disclose the contents
> to anyone else.
No longer, if it ever was. It's a
Peter Trei wrote:
> I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the
> polling station, after the voter has had an opportunity to
> examine it. This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the
> vote selling described above, and second, if a recount is
> required, it allows the recount to
I believe the IPSec primes had been proven. All are SG primes with a g=2
Check RFC 2412, draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-05.txt, and
draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-modp-groups-05.txt
However, I don't seen any primality proof certificates included in the
texts.
On Thu, 6 Mar 2003, Ben Laurie wrote:
> I'm looking f
- Original Message -
From: "Ben Laurie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Cryptography" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2003 6:47 AM
Subject: Proven Primes
> I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
> the lists I can find are more interested in records, w
> -Mensagem original-
> De: Ben Laurie [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Enviada em: quinta-feira, 6 de março de 2003 08:47
> Para: Cryptography
> Assunto: Proven Primes
>
> I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
> the lists I can find are more interested in reco
> Ian Brown[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> Ed Gerck wrote:
> > Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal
> > that addresses one of the major weaknesses of electronic
> > voting. However, it creates problems that are even harder to
> > solve than the silent subversion o
http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item=2162414185
i saw this on the boing-boing blog.
- don davis, boston
-
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "uns
I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
the lists I can find are more interested in records, which are _way_ too
big for cryptographic purposes.
By "sensibly sized" I mean in the range 512-8192 bits. I'm particularly
after Sophie Germain primes right now, but I gue
Delta Air Lines is the guinea pig for the CAPPS-2 intrusive database
search on every passenger. They'll be doing this in three cities,
starting THIS MONTH.
First, if you were thinking of flying, be sure not to fly on Delta.
See http://boycottdelta.org.
Second, if you're stuck on Delta, or want t
At 5:21 PM -0800 3/3/03, Ed Gerck wrote:
>Henry Norr had an interesting article today at
>http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/03/BU1227
>67.DTL&type=business
>
>Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal that addresses
>one of the major weaknesse
John says:
Wireless is a horse of a different color. IANAL but
the last time I looked, there was no federal law
against intercepting most wireless signals, but you
were (generally) not allowed to disclose the contents
to anyone else.
No longer, if it ever was. It's a crime, as evidenced by the wi
Ed Gerck wrote:
> Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal
> that addresses one of the major weaknesses of electronic
> voting. However, it creates problems that are even harder to
> solve than the silent subversion of e-records.
>
> For example, using the proposed system a
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