Hallo,
the Condorcet criterion and the later-no-harm criterion
are incompatible. Therefore, the fact that Debian's Condorcet
method violates the later-no-harm criterion doesn't come
from the order of its checks.
Markus Schulze
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paper:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf
Markus Schulze
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A.
You wrote (25 May 2003):
> C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
> B and A are the only remaining options, and B defeats A.
> B wins.
That's strange! The majority requirement makes the default
option lose. Doesn't that contradict the intention of the
majority requirement?
Markus Schulze
.
Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose A.
Markus Schulze
ing to my proposal
cannot be cyclic when the voters don't change their minds.
Markus Schulze
e E to candidate D _without having any voter to change his
mind_. On the other side, the winner according to my proposal would still
be candidate D.
In my opinion, this is a disadvantage of Manoj's May 15 proposal because
this means that Manoj's May 15 proposal leads to unnecessarily frequent
changes of the status quo.
Markus Schulze
ess" gained by your
> approach yield a positive result:
>
> For the case that these options aren't that important, it's harder to
> explain to people what the default option means. [It no longer means
> postponing agreeing on some decisions, except for cases where people
> can come to some sort of agreement on the overall ranking of options.]
>
> For the case where these options are important, we're achieving a decision
> before people have realized that they care.
My proposal isn't "extra decisive." When Manoj's May 15 proposal
disqualifies all options (other than the default option) because
of the quorum requirement then so does my proposal.
Markus Schulze
erse result I was talking about in
> another thread (where Manoj's proposal causes B to win).
> Am I correct, Markus?
Yes. You are absolutely correct.
Markus Schulze
Dear Raul,
you wrote (25 May 2003):
> Markus Schulze wrote (25 May 2003):
> > I suggest that one should at first calculate the ranking of
> > the candidates according to the beat path method and then,
> > of those candidates whose beat path to the default option
>
38. Then the winner is candidate D.
Markus Schulze (not Martin Schulze)
or example, the default option is C
and the quorum is 207. Then the winner is candidate D.
Markus Schulze
:144
E:F=211:99
Candidate D is the unique beat path winner.
This example demonstrates that the extreme violation of
the participation criterion has nothing to do with quorum
requirements.
Markus Schulze
efer candidate A to every other candidate and
who rank all the other candidates equally must not change
candidate A into a loser.
Markus Schulze
he Condorcet criterion are incompatible.
(Proof: Herve Moulin, "Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox,"
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 45, pp. 53-64, 1988.)
As far as I know, only point methods (e.g. plurality, Approval Voting,
Borda) meet the participation criterion.
Markus Schulze
he Condorcet criterion are incompatible.
(Proof: Herve Moulin, "Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox,"
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 45, pp. 53-64, 1988.)
As far as I know, only point methods (e.g. plurality, Approval Voting,
Borda) meet the participation criterion.
r option D such that D transitively defeats C AND C does
> not transitively defeat D.
Markus Schulze
r option D such that D transitively defeats C AND C does
> not transitively defeat D.
Markus Schulze
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Dear Manoj,
the Floyd algorithm to calculate the beat paths from
each candidate to each other candidate looks as follows
(Markus Schulze; 17 Oct 2002):
> for (i : = 1; i <= NumberOfCandidates; i++)
> for (j : = 1; j <= NumberOfCandidates; j++)
> for (k : = 1; k <= Num
Dear Manoj,
the Floyd algorithm to calculate the beat paths from
each candidate to each other candidate looks as follows
(Markus Schulze; 17 Oct 2002):
> for (i : = 1; i <= NumberOfCandidates; i++)
> for (j : = 1; j <= NumberOfCandidates; j++)
> for (k : = 1; k <= Num
if ((P1(i,j) < P1(j,i)) or
((P1(i,j) = P1(j,i)) and (P2(i,j) < P2(j,i then
winner(i) : = false;
}
If there is more than one candidate with "winner(i) = true",
the elector with the casting vote picks the winner from all
the candidates with "winner(i) = true".
Markus Schulze
if ((P1(i,j) < P1(j,i)) or
((P1(i,j) = P1(j,i)) and (P2(i,j) < P2(j,i then
winner(i) : = false;
}
If there is more than one candidate with "winner(i) = true",
the elector with the casting vote picks the winner from all
the candidates with "
iolating the
supermajority requirement. Therefore the above
mentioned definition of "available" proposals
makes sense.
The above mentioned definition of an "available" proposal
is very weak. Even proposals that are Pareto-inferior to
the Status Quo (**) can be "a
iolating the
supermajority requirement. Therefore the above
mentioned definition of "available" proposals
makes sense.
The above mentioned definition of an "available" proposal
is very weak. Even proposals that are Pareto-inferior to
the Status Quo (**) can be "a
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