On Tue, Dec 10, 2002 at 11:50:59PM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Assuming that the default option is the status quo, that is, the
> currently selected option.
> And assuming that an option winning an election makes it the status quo,
> and hence the default option.
> And assuming the default optio
Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD
(and newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not.
This
On Tue, Dec 10, 2002 at 11:50:59PM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Assuming that the default option is the status quo, that is, the
> currently selected option.
> And assuming that an option winning an election makes it the status quo,
> and hence the default option.
> And assuming the default optio
Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD
(and newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not.
This
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
> election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD (and
> newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not. This
> criteria 'Consi
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Consistancy Criteria - "If election X and election Y have identical
> votes and supermajority requirements, and election X has a default
> option of A, and election Y has a default option of B, and B is the
> winner of election X, t
Raul Miller wrote:
It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:45:07PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It doesn't matter whether the axiom is false as written: it's trivial
to salvage its intended meaning (by either dropping quoru
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 07:57:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I am uncomfortable this for the axiom that the option ranked last must
> lose. It's just too arbitrary. For example, consider also a ballot with
> only one option (not that our current system allows this). The resulting
> statement i
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
> election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD (and
> newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not. This
> criteria 'Consi
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Consistancy Criteria - "If election X and election Y have identical
> votes and supermajority requirements, and election X has a default
> option of A, and election Y has a default option of B, and B is the
> winner of election X, t
Raul Miller wrote:
It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:45:07PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It doesn't matter whether the axiom is false as written: it's trivial
to salvage its intended meaning (by either dropping quorum r
> > It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:45:07PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> It doesn't matter whether the axiom is false as written: it's trivial
> to salvage its intended meaning (by either dropping quorum requirements,
> or quali
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 07:57:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I am uncomfortable this for the axiom that the option ranked last must
> lose. It's just too arbitrary. For example, consider also a ballot with
> only one option (not that our current system allows this). The resulting
> statement i
> > It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:45:07PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> It doesn't matter whether the axiom is false as written: it's trivial
> to salvage its intended meaning (by either dropping quorum requirements,
> or quali
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 07:44:55PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000,
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 07:44:55PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000,
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> That's not what's important: by his rules som
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
That's not what's important: by his rules some elections that _meet_
quorum don't have a "democratic" outcome. The
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> That's not what's important: by his rules som
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
That's not what's important: by his rules some elections that _meet_
quorum don't have a "democratic" outcome. The
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 10:36:45AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > Proof that A.6 draft is undemocratic.
> > I'm ignoring your proof because you've left out something I consider to
> > be significant out of your axioms. [see above.]
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 02:10:18AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
>
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 10:36:45AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Proof that A.6 draft is undemocratic.
> I'm ignoring your proof because you've left out something I consider to
> be significant out of your axioms. [see above.]
I'm not sure that's fair, since quorum doesn't come into play in the e
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 01:56:01AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Firstly, I mistakenly defined the strength of defeats in my last
> definition, so I've changed rule (3) to match my implimentation.
> Strength is now measured by how many votes prefer A over B.
Ok. I've actually not taken the time
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 10:36:45AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > Proof that A.6 draft is undemocratic.
> > I'm ignoring your proof because you've left out something I consider to
> > be significant out of your axioms. [see above.]
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 02:10:18AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
>
Firstly, I mistakenly defined the strength of defeats in my last
definition, so I've changed rule (3) to match my implimentation.
Strength is now measured by how many votes prefer A over B. In the
previous definition I defined the strength of defeats as the difference
between how many votes pre
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 10:36:45AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Proof that A.6 draft is undemocratic.
> I'm ignoring your proof because you've left out something I consider to
> be significant out of your axioms. [see above.]
I'm not sure that's fair, since quorum doesn't come into play in the e
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 01:56:01AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Firstly, I mistakenly defined the strength of defeats in my last
> definition, so I've changed rule (3) to match my implimentation.
> Strength is now measured by how many votes prefer A over B.
Ok. I've actually not taken the time
Firstly, I mistakenly defined the strength of defeats in my last
definition, so I've changed rule (3) to match my implimentation.
Strength is now measured by how many votes prefer A over B. In the
previous definition I defined the strength of defeats as the difference
between how many votes pre
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 06:02:12PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> Frankly, I don't think that special treatment of the default option
> is a good idea. We are already using supermajority rules, which gives the
> default option extra weight. Why would we want _another_ rule which does
> basically
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 03:13:59PM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> First, heres a definition of a rough proposal I've used in examples
> below, which I've called, for want of a better name, Considered CSSD
> (CCSSD). Its a clean up and patch of a similar earlier proposal.
I basically have a lot of
Hi,
Anthony Towns:
> (Raul doesn't eliminate defaults by the default option, 40:35 is the next
... defeats by ...
> weakest defeat)
>
I seem to have overlooked that.
Frankly, I don't think that special treatment of the default option
is a good idea. We are already using supermajority rules, whic
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 06:02:12PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> Frankly, I don't think that special treatment of the default option
> is a good idea. We are already using supermajority rules, which gives the
> default option extra weight. Why would we want _another_ rule which does
> basically
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 03:13:59PM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> First, heres a definition of a rough proposal I've used in examples
> below, which I've called, for want of a better name, Considered CSSD
> (CCSSD). Its a clean up and patch of a similar earlier proposal.
I basically have a lot of
Hi,
Anthony Towns:
> (Raul doesn't eliminate defaults by the default option, 40:35 is the next
... defeats by ...
> weakest defeat)
>
I seem to have overlooked that.
Frankly, I don't think that special treatment of the default option
is a good idea. We are already using supermajority rules, whic
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 09:23:27AM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> I'm going to walk through these examples and apply my preferred algorithm
> of "if an option wins but doesn't satisfy the supermajority requirement
> against the default option, drop it from the ballot and repeat".
> > Z is the de
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 09:23:27AM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> I'm going to walk through these examples and apply my preferred algorithm
> of "if an option wins but doesn't satisfy the supermajority requirement
> against the default option, drop it from the ballot and repeat".
> > Z is the de
Hi,
I'm going to walk through these examples and apply my preferred algorithm
of "if an option wins but doesn't satisfy the supermajority requirement
against the default option, drop it from the ballot and repeat".
The ones I've deleted stay the same.
Two of the results you get make no sense to
Hi,
Andrew Pimlott:
> Empirically, many people look at their vote as a means for achieving
> the best outcome, not a statement of belief. (Eg, those who
> preferred Nader but voted for Gore.) Do you assume that there are
> no such people in Debian, or would you propose to exclude them?
>
Given
Hi,
I'm going to walk through these examples and apply my preferred algorithm
of "if an option wins but doesn't satisfy the supermajority requirement
against the default option, drop it from the ballot and repeat".
The ones I've deleted stay the same.
Two of the results you get make no sense to
Hi,
Andrew Pimlott:
> Empirically, many people look at their vote as a means for achieving
> the best outcome, not a statement of belief. (Eg, those who
> preferred Nader but voted for Gore.) Do you assume that there are
> no such people in Debian, or would you propose to exclude them?
>
Given
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 11:38:12AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Second, I don't think that the disadvantages of this approach have
> been adequately addressed. You have focused almost entirely on one
> aspect ("what supermajority is about") as if it were the only one to
> consider.
Condorcet
First, heres a definition of a rough proposal I've used in examples
below, which I've called, for want of a better name, Considered CSSD
(CCSSD). Its a clean up and patch of a similar earlier proposal.
- A defeats B if more votes prefer A over B than B prefer over A.
- A challenges B if more t
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 11:38:12AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Second, I don't think that the disadvantages of this approach have
> been adequately addressed. You have focused almost entirely on one
> aspect ("what supermajority is about") as if it were the only one to
> consider.
Condorcet
First, heres a definition of a rough proposal I've used in examples
below, which I've called, for want of a better name, Considered CSSD
(CCSSD). Its a clean up and patch of a similar earlier proposal.
- A defeats B if more votes prefer A over B than B prefer over A.
- A challenges B if more th
> On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 05:50:28PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > If we can't trust them to vote what they think, why should we trust the
> > outcome of such a vote?
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 06:48:00PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Empirically, many people look at their vote as a means for achiev
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 05:50:28PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> If we can't trust them to vote what they think, why should we trust the
> outcome of such a vote?
Empirically, many people look at their vote as a means for achieving
the best outcome, not a statement of belief. (Eg, those who
preferr
> On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 05:50:28PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > If we can't trust them to vote what they think, why should we trust the
> > outcome of such a vote?
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 06:48:00PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Empirically, many people look at their vote as a means for achiev
> > So, in this case, the fact that no option has enough approval from the
> > developers (none defeats the default option by by 2:1) means that it's
> > probably a good idea to talk through the issue a bit more.
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 05:42:02PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Sorry again that my
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 12:53:46PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> 2:1 supermajority means that these developers are trying to overrule a
> technical committee decision. This implies that the technical committee
> does not agree with either A or B, and that the issue is technical
> in nature.
>
> So,
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 05:50:28PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> If we can't trust them to vote what they think, why should we trust the
> outcome of such a vote?
Empirically, many people look at their vote as a means for achieving
the best outcome, not a statement of belief. (Eg, those who
preferr
> > So, in this case, the fact that no option has enough approval from the
> > developers (none defeats the default option by by 2:1) means that it's
> > probably a good idea to talk through the issue a bit more.
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 05:42:02PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Sorry again that my
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 12:53:46PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> 2:1 supermajority means that these developers are trying to overrule a
> technical committee decision. This implies that the technical committee
> does not agree with either A or B, and that the issue is technical
> in nature.
>
> So,
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 11:38:12AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Second, I don't think that the disadvantages of this approach have
> been adequately addressed. You have focused almost entirely on one
> aspect ("what supermajority is about") as if it were the only one to
> consider. Given the su
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 11:08:43AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> > > 3 ADB
> > > 2 BDA
> > >
> > > We are deadlocked.
...
> Sorry--I had written initially (before editing) that A, B, and D are
> as in your example: A requires a 2:1 supermajority, B a simple
> majority, and D is the d
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 01:30:25PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 06:32:26PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> > I see. However, this system (like aj's) still rewards the strategy
> > of ranking the default option second, [...]
>
> Yes, it does, and this is entirely deliberate
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 11:38:12AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> Second, I don't think that the disadvantages of this approach have
> been adequately addressed. You have focused almost entirely on one
> aspect ("what supermajority is about") as if it were the only one to
> consider. Given the su
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 11:08:43AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> > > 3 ADB
> > > 2 BDA
> > >
> > > We are deadlocked.
...
> Sorry--I had written initially (before editing) that A, B, and D are
> as in your example: A requires a 2:1 supermajority, B a simple
> majority, and D is the d
On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 10:15:39PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 06:32:26PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> > YAExample: sincere preferences are
> >
> > 3 ABD
> > 2 BAD
> >
> > but voters vote strategically
> >
> > 3 ADB
> > 2 BDA
> >
> > We are dead
On Thu, Dec 05, 2002 at 01:30:25PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 06:32:26PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> > I see. However, this system (like aj's) still rewards the strategy
> > of ranking the default option second, [...]
>
> Yes, it does, and this is entirely deliberate
On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 10:15:39PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 06:32:26PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> > YAExample: sincere preferences are
> >
> > 3 ABD
> > 2 BAD
> >
> > but voters vote strategically
> >
> > 3 ADB
> > 2 BDA
> >
> > We are dead
On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 06:32:26PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> I see. However, this system (like aj's) still rewards the strategy
> of ranking the default option second, [...]
Yes, it does, and this is entirely deliberate. It's what "supermajority"
is about: allowing minorities to block propos
On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 06:32:26PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> (I only have time for a quick reply, and I haven't read any of the
> other recent discussion carefully.)
I think a lot of us are a bit busy. I know I keep intending to write
up another draft, but I've not completed it yet.
> > A d
On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 06:32:26PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> I see. However, this system (like aj's) still rewards the strategy
> of ranking the default option second, [...]
Yes, it does, and this is entirely deliberate. It's what "supermajority"
is about: allowing minorities to block propos
On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 06:32:26PM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> (I only have time for a quick reply, and I haven't read any of the
> other recent discussion carefully.)
I think a lot of us are a bit busy. I know I keep intending to write
up another draft, but I've not completed it yet.
> > A d
(I only have time for a quick reply, and I haven't read any of the
other recent discussion carefully.)
On Fri, Nov 29, 2002 at 11:48:53AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> A has a 2:1 supermajority requirement, B has no special majority
> requirement, D is the default option, votes are
> 3 ABD
> 1 BDA
>
(I only have time for a quick reply, and I haven't read any of the
other recent discussion carefully.)
On Fri, Nov 29, 2002 at 11:48:53AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> A has a 2:1 supermajority requirement, B has no special majority
> requirement, D is the default option, votes are
> 3 ABD
> 1 BDA
>
On Sat, Nov 30, 2002 at 03:51:36AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Actually, A defeats B by 3:2. You meant:
> 3 ABD
> 1 BDA
> 1 DAB
Thanks for pointing this out.
I've modified my test program to dump defeats, and to mention the
ratio of the eliminated options, and I've verified that it gives the
sa
On Sat, Nov 30, 2002 at 03:51:36AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Actually, A defeats B by 3:2. You meant:
> 3 ABD
> 1 BDA
> 1 DAB
Thanks for pointing this out.
I've modified my test program to dump defeats, and to mention the
ratio of the eliminated options, and I've verified that it gives the
sa
On Fri, Nov 29, 2002 at 11:48:53AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 29, 2002 at 12:22:32AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> > What you did propose doesn't seem to do what you want. It says that
> > a defeat by the default option can't be weaker than another defeat.
> > It can still be stronge
On Fri, Nov 29, 2002 at 12:22:32AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> What you did propose doesn't seem to do what you want. It says that
> a defeat by the default option can't be weaker than another defeat.
> It can still be stronger.
I wanted to say that a defeat by the default option can't be weak
On Fri, Nov 29, 2002 at 11:48:53AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 29, 2002 at 12:22:32AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> > What you did propose doesn't seem to do what you want. It says that
> > a defeat by the default option can't be weaker than another defeat.
> > It can still be stronge
On Fri, Nov 29, 2002 at 12:22:32AM -0500, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> What you did propose doesn't seem to do what you want. It says that
> a defeat by the default option can't be weaker than another defeat.
> It can still be stronger.
I wanted to say that a defeat by the default option can't be weak
> On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 02:54:31PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > b. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if A is not
> > > the default option and V(A,X) is less than V(B,Y). Also,
> > > (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) A is not the default option and if
>
> On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 02:54:31PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > b. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if A is not
> > > the default option and V(A,X) is less than V(B,Y). Also,
> > > (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) A is not the default option and if
>
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 02:54:31PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > b. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if A is not
> > the default option and V(A,X) is less than V(B,Y). Also,
> > (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) A is not the default option and if
> >
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 02:54:31PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > b. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if A is not
> > the default option and V(A,X) is less than V(B,Y). Also,
> > (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) A is not the default option and if
> >
Hi,
Andrew Pimlott:
> - Please use either tabs or spaces consistently. ;-)
>
Seconded.
>
> - I find use of terms before their definitions jarring. But
> since nobody else has complained, that's may just be me.
>
IMHO it's unusual, but I actually like it that way. The reader can
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 02:54:31PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> b. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if A is not
> the default option and V(A,X) is less than V(B,Y). Also,
> (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) A is not the default option and if
> V
Hi,
Andrew Pimlott:
> - Please use either tabs or spaces consistently. ;-)
>
Seconded.
>
> - I find use of terms before their definitions jarring. But
> since nobody else has complained, that's may just be me.
>
IMHO it's unusual, but I actually like it that way. The reader can
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 02:54:31PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> b. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if A is not
> the default option and V(A,X) is less than V(B,Y). Also,
> (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) A is not the default option and if
> V
On Mon, Nov 25, 2002 at 03:38:34PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 25, 2002 at 02:51:21PM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
> > I'm not a *deliberately* obtuse person[2], so it may be that other
> > people share the misconception.
> ...
> > [2] :)
>
> Hey, stop stealing my lines!
I did?
--
On Mon, Nov 25, 2002 at 03:38:34PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 25, 2002 at 02:51:21PM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
> > I'm not a *deliberately* obtuse person[2], so it may be that other
> > people share the misconception.
> ...
> > [2] :)
>
> Hey, stop stealing my lines!
I did?
--
On Mon, Nov 25, 2002 at 02:51:21PM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
> I'm not a *deliberately* obtuse person[2], so it may be that other
> people share the misconception.
...
> [2] :)
Hey, stop stealing my lines!
--
Raul
On Mon, Nov 25, 2002 at 11:52:43AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> The default option is a status quo which includes the fact that we have
> an issue we're trying to resolve. This is not the same thing as claiming
> that there is no issue to be resolved.
>
> There might be a better way of saying this
On Mon, Nov 25, 2002 at 02:51:21PM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
> I'm not a *deliberately* obtuse person[2], so it may be that other
> people share the misconception.
...
> [2] :)
Hey, stop stealing my lines!
--
Raul
--
To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
with a subject of "unsubscri
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 05:58:29PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Focussing on aesthetics: right now the only two supermajority ratios
> > possible are 2:1 and 3:1 -- the numbers 2 and 3 are easy to represent.
> > Asking for something more general, without specifying what that more
> > general thing
On Mon, Nov 25, 2002 at 11:52:43AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> The default option is a status quo which includes the fact that we have
> an issue we're trying to resolve. This is not the same thing as claiming
> that there is no issue to be resolved.
>
> There might be a better way of saying this
> > If they believe the current situation is superior to any of the
> > proposed changes, they should propose or second an amendment that
> > simply preserves the status-quo, and only rank options they find
> > unacceptable below the default option.
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 10:5
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 05:58:29PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Focussing on aesthetics: right now the only two supermajority ratios
> > possible are 2:1 and 3:1 -- the numbers 2 and 3 are easy to represent.
> > Asking for something more general, without specifying what that more
> > general thing
> > If they believe the current situation is superior to any of the
> > proposed changes, they should propose or second an amendment that
> > simply preserves the status-quo, and only rank options they find
> > unacceptable below the default option.
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 10:5
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 10:54:43PM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
> > If they believe the current situation is superior to any of the
> > proposed changes, they should propose or second an amendment that
> > simply preserves the status-quo, and only rank options they find
> > un
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 10:54:43PM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
> > If they believe the current situation is superior to any of the
> > proposed changes, they should propose or second an amendment that
> > simply preserves the status-quo, and only rank options they find
> > un
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 05:58:29PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 11:32:07PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> > It offends my aesthetic senses as a programmer. ;-)
> >
> > Rewriting it as
> >
> > >>> e. If a majority of n:m is required for A, and B is the
> > >>> d
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 05:58:29PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 11:32:07PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> > It offends my aesthetic senses as a programmer. ;-)
> >
> > Rewriting it as
> >
> > >>> e. If a majority of n:m is required for A, and B is the default
>
> If they believe the current situation is superior to any of the
> proposed changes, they should propose or second an amendment that
> simply preserves the status-quo, and only rank options they find
> unacceptable below the default option.
Since this is the case, why do we ne
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 09:20:59PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> > e. If a majority of n:1 is required for A, and B is the default
> > option, N(B,A) is n. In all other cases, N(B,A) is 1.
> I would generalize that to n:m (a 60% majority is 3:2, for instance).
Or 1.5:1!
> If they believe the current situation is superior to any of the
> proposed changes, they should propose or second an amendment that
> simply preserves the status-quo, and only rank options they find
> unacceptable below the default option.
Since this is the case, why do we ne
On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 09:20:59PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> > e. If a majority of n:1 is required for A, and B is the default
> > option, N(B,A) is n. In all other cases, N(B,A) is 1.
> I would generalize that to n:m (a 60% majority is 3:2, for instance).
Or 1.5:1!
Hi,
Raul Miller:
> Is there another reason for introducing that complexity?
>
No. It's not that important.
--
Matthias Urlichs | noris network AG | http://smurf.noris.de/
pgprd8IxAfVsi.pgp
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On Sun, Nov 24, 2002 at 11:32:07PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> It offends my aesthetic senses as a programmer. ;-)
>
> Rewriting it as
>
> >>> e. If a majority of n:m is required for A, and B is the default
> >>> option, N(B,A) is (n/m). In all other cases, N(B,A) is
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