Re: Regional BGP hijack of Amazon DNS infrastructure

2018-04-24 Thread Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 7:11 PM, Wayne Thayer wrote: > Thanks Matthew, I appreciate you bringing this to everyone's attention. > > Unless I'm misunderstanding the scope of the attack, it would have been > trivial for them to get a trusted cert from most any CA. However, according > to the followi

Re: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Define/clarify policy for transfer of intermediate CA certificates

2018-04-24 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 9:21 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 6:12 PM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> I'm re-sending this with the subject tagged as a 'policy 2.6 proposal' in >> case anyone missed it the first time.

Re: Regional BGP hijack of Amazon DNS infrastructure

2018-04-24 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Thanks Matthew, I appreciate you bringing this to everyone's attention. Unless I'm misunderstanding the scope of the attack, it would have been trivial for them to get a trusted cert from most any CA. However, according to the following article, "Victims had to click through a HTTPS error message,

Re: Transforming a trade name into ASCII in the O field of an OV cert

2018-04-24 Thread Peter Saint-Andre via dev-security-policy
On 4/24/18 2:47 PM, Henri Sivonen via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 11:03 PM, cbonnell--- via dev-security-policy > wrote: >> On Tuesday, April 24, 2018 at 4:33:24 PM UTC-4, Henri Sivonen wrote: >>> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 10:18 PM, Jeremy Rowley via >>> dev-security-policy

Re: Transforming a trade name into ASCII in the O field of an OV cert

2018-04-24 Thread Henri Sivonen via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 11:03 PM, cbonnell--- via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Tuesday, April 24, 2018 at 4:33:24 PM UTC-4, Henri Sivonen wrote: >> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 10:18 PM, Jeremy Rowley via >> dev-security-policy wrote: >> > That is correct. We use transliteration of non-latin names

Re: Transforming a trade name into ASCII in the O field of an OV cert

2018-04-24 Thread cbonnell--- via dev-security-policy
On Tuesday, April 24, 2018 at 4:33:24 PM UTC-4, Henri Sivonen wrote: > On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 10:18 PM, Jeremy Rowley via > dev-security-policy wrote: > > That is correct. We use transliteration of non-latin names through a system > > recognized by ISO per Appendix D(1)(3) > > But "Säästöpankkil

Re: Transforming a trade name into ASCII in the O field of an OV cert

2018-04-24 Thread Henri Sivonen via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 10:32 PM, Henri Sivonen wrote: > On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 10:18 PM, Jeremy Rowley via > dev-security-policy wrote: >> That is correct. We use transliteration of non-latin names through a system >> recognized by ISO per Appendix D(1)(3) > > But "Säästöpankkiliitto osk" is no

Re: Transforming a trade name into ASCII in the O field of an OV cert

2018-04-24 Thread Henri Sivonen via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 10:18 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy wrote: > That is correct. We use transliteration of non-latin names through a system > recognized by ISO per Appendix D(1)(3) But "Säästöpankkiliitto osk" is not a non-Latin name! (It is a non-ASCII name.) Also, no such trans

RE: Transforming a trade name into ASCII in the O field of an OV cert

2018-04-24 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
That is correct. We use transliteration of non-latin names through a system recognized by ISO per Appendix D(1)(3) -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy On Behalf Of cbonnell--- via dev-security-policy Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2018 7:12 AM To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozi

Re: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Require separate intermediates for different usages (e.g. server auth, S/MIME)

2018-04-24 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
I'm not sure I underestand the use case. I'm hoping that they can clarify more. That is, it would seem valuable as part of the technical constraint exercise to ensure the EKUs are restsricted. This is particularly true due to how nameConstraints work - they are blacklists (effectively), rather tha

Re: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Define/clarify policy for transfer of intermediate CA certificates

2018-04-24 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 6:12 PM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > I'm re-sending this with the subject tagged as a 'policy 2.6 proposal' in > case anyone missed it the first time. > > I am leaning toward option 2 as the best solution. The scope

Regional BGP hijack of Amazon DNS infrastructure

2018-04-24 Thread Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy
This story is still breaking, but early indications are that: 1. An attacker at AS10297 (or a customer thereof) announced several more specific subsets of some Amazon DNS infrastructure prefixes: 205.251.192-.195.0/24 205.251.197.0/24 205.251.199.0/24 2. It appears that AS10297 via peering arr

Re: Transforming a trade name into ASCII in the O field of an OV cert

2018-04-24 Thread cbonnell--- via dev-security-policy
On Monday, April 23, 2018 at 3:34:38 PM UTC-4, Wayne Thayer wrote: > Section 9.2.1 of the EVGLs is stricter, only permitting abbreviations. If > this were an EV cert I would argue that it was misissued. > > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 12:13 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-poli