Re: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-08 Thread Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy
On February 9, 2018 at 1:24:12 AM, Wayne Thayer (wtha...@mozilla.com) wrote: On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 6:03 PM, Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > So, how long is too long? > This is the crux of the issue for me. If a CA (that really should have

Re: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-08 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 6:03 PM, Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > So, how long is too long? > This is the crux of the issue for me. If a CA (that really should have stopped responding 'good' for unknown certs back in 2013) needs to select,

Re: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-08 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 07/02/18 15:14, Alex Gaynor wrote: > That said, given the issues Paul highlighted in his original mail (which I > wholeheartedly concur with), it seems the place to focus is the folks who > are getting Ds right now. Therefore I think the essential part of your > email is your agreement that CAs

RE: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-07 Thread James Burton via dev-security-policy
Of Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy Sent: 07 February 2018 16:11 To: Alex Gaynor <agay...@mozilla.com> Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org; Paul Kehrer <paul.l.keh...@gmail.com> Subject: RE: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines Alex, Most CAs probably

RE: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-07 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
leb...@digicert.com> Cc: Paul Kehrer <paul.l.keh...@gmail.com>; mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines Hey Tim, A piece I think I'm missing is what you see as the incentive for CAs to aim for an "A" r

RE: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-07 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
Subject: Re: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines So your view is the “carrot” is getting to use Mozilla’s brand as an endorsement, and the “stick” being that if you don’t get that endorsement for a while, you get kicked out? The assumption is that the branding of “best”

Re: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-06 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
So your view is the “carrot” is getting to use Mozilla’s brand as an endorsement, and the “stick” being that if you don’t get that endorsement for a while, you get kicked out? The assumption is that the branding of “best” is valuable - presumably, through the indirect benefit of being able to

RE: Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-06 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
Absolutely not. I view the competition as being based as the “most best”. You cannot get an “A” (or even A- or B+) without significantly exceeding the minimum requirements, or demonstrating behaviors and practices that, while not required, are behaviors Mozilla wants to encourage.

Misissuance/non-compliance remediation timelines

2018-02-06 Thread Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy
A bit over 5 months ago I reported a series of OCSP responders that were violating BRs (section 4.9.10) by returning GOOD on unknown serial numbers. Since that time the majority of those responder endpoints have been fixed, but several are still non-compliant; either with little communication or