Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

2021-01-04 Thread Alessandro Vesely
On Sun 03/Jan/2021 20:56:59 +0100 Douglas Foster wrote: You can disagree about whether this wording is appropriate, but there should be no disagreement about the scope problem. We do not have a protocol which can handle all situations, and much of our discussion is caused by those who apply DMA

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

2021-01-04 Thread Alessandro Vesely
On Sun 03/Jan/2021 17:09:22 +0100 John R Levine wrote: On Sun, 3 Jan 2021, Alessandro Vesely wrote: I don't think so.  There is a very practical outcome.  We should expand Section 9.5, "Interoperability Issues" and say something actually workable. With some trepidation I ask, like what? I'd

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

2021-01-04 Thread Laura Atkins
> On 4 Jan 2021, at 11:50, Alessandro Vesely wrote: > > > >> Lets define "legitimate mail" as used in my proposed text to mean "delivery >> is desired by the intended recipient and the message contains nothing that >> threatens the interest of the user, the interest of the user's network, or

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Clarification about data integrity within Aggregate Reports (Ticket #40)

2021-01-04 Thread Brotman, Alex
-- Alex Brotman Sr. Engineer, Anti-Abuse & Messaging Policy Comcast > -Original Message- > From: dmarc On Behalf Of Alessandro Vesely > Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 10:27 AM > To: dmarc@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Clarification about data integrity within Aggregate > Repo

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

2021-01-04 Thread John Levine
In article <123e18e2-71ab-4946-b886-a12a735aa...@wordtothewise.com> you write: >There is absolutely nothing stopping a phisher from taking advantage of this. >In fact, phishers currently do send DMARC verified email where the >domain in the 5322.from is unrelated to the links in the message or to

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

2021-01-04 Thread Dave Crocker
Similarly, DMARC alignment tells you nothing unless you also have a reputation for the domain. Authentication creates a noise-free basis for developing an indentifier's reputation. Any activity involving an authenticated identifier is, in fact, the responsibility of the agency responsibl

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

2021-01-04 Thread Michael Thomas
On 1/4/21 9:46 AM, John Levine wrote: Similarly, DMARC alignment tells you nothing unless you also have a reputation for the domain. I have trouble imagining why anyone would think it's a good idea to get alignment by using third party domains that recipients don't know. You don't need to kno

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

2021-01-04 Thread Alessandro Vesely
On Mon 04/Jan/2021 13:22:20 +0100 Laura Atkins wrote: On 4 Jan 2021, at 11:50, Alessandro Vesely wrote: Lets define "legitimate mail" as used in my proposed text to mean "delivery is desired by the intended recipient and the message contains nothing that threatens the interest of the user, the

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

2021-01-04 Thread Douglas Foster
I have not seen an identity problem with ESPs, bevause messages are received directly. They consistently use their own domain for MailFrom to ensure SPF pass, and the client domain for From.Domains that use DMARC enforcement have signatures. Additionally, the From domain correctly presents th