Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-11-04 Thread Murray S. Kucherawy
On Fri, Nov 4, 2022 at 4:18 AM Douglas Foster < dougfoster.emailstanda...@gmail.com> wrote: > Maybe the problem is that John has trademarked "weak" to mean "L=0", so I > will use "poorly constructed". DKIM "works" because malicious actors have > found easier ways to attack than using an intermed

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-11-04 Thread John Levine
It appears that Douglas Foster said: >-=-=-=-=-=- > >Maybe the problem is that John has trademarked "weak" to mean "L=0", so I >will use "poorly constructed". ... Sorry, no. Once again, you appear to have completely misunderstood my old double signing proposal. Nobody uses weak signatures, an

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-11-03 Thread John Levine
It appears that Neil Anuskiewicz said: > >> On Oct 30, 2022, at 11:09 AM, Scott Kitterman wrote: >> >> I believe it would go in a separate applicability statement if it were >> going to be in an IETF document. >> >> Scott K > >I think the ideas discussed around this topic shouldn’t be forgot

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-11-03 Thread Neil Anuskiewicz
> On Oct 30, 2022, at 11:09 AM, Scott Kitterman wrote: > > I believe it would go in a separate applicability statement if it were going > to be in an IETF document. > > Scott K I think the ideas discussed around this topic shouldn’t be forgotten. But I’m seeing that going down this rabbit

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-30 Thread Scott Kitterman
I believe it would go in a separate applicability statement if it were going to be in an IETF document. Scott K On October 30, 2022 5:54:20 PM UTC, Douglas Foster wrote: >Where does the operational guidance go? A simple review of actual >messages demonstrates that there is a need for guidanc

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-30 Thread Douglas Foster
Where does the operational guidance go? A simple review of actual messages demonstrates that there is a need for guidance. It would seem to me that a sentence or two, elucidating principles and providing guidance (not mandate), would solve the problem now. If we leave it to each implementation

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-30 Thread Scott Kitterman
On October 29, 2022 5:30:07 AM UTC, Neil Anuskiewicz wrote: > > >> On Oct 27, 2022, at 10:46 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy >> wrote: >> >>  >>> On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 4:16 PM Douglas Foster >>> wrote: >> >>> Murray raised the issue of a signature which produces PASS, but lacks trust >>> beca

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-30 Thread Alessandro Vesely
On Sat 29/Oct/2022 14:24:15 +0200 Douglas Foster wrote: [...] 1) These fields are used with some frequency in observed signatures, but I withhold judgement as I am not fluent in MIME. mime-version content-type content-transfer-encoding; These are MTA's responsibility. Protecting them hardl

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-29 Thread Neil Anuskiewicz
> On Oct 29, 2022, at 10:35 AM, Dotzero wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 1:30 AM Neil Anuskiewicz wrote: > > >> >> DMARC’s job is to flat out prevent unauthorized spoofing. It’s not a >> stretch to imagine some higher signature standard without feeling like >> you’re on DKIM’s turf. >

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-29 Thread Dotzero
On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 1:30 AM Neil Anuskiewicz wrote: > > DMARC’s job is to flat out prevent unauthorized spoofing. It’s not a > stretch to imagine some higher signature standard without feeling like > you’re on DKIM’s turf. > The above statement is so incorrect. DMARC's "job" is to mitigat

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-29 Thread Douglas Foster
This is to document some research related to this issue: IANA Registry --- After reviewing the IANA registry, these headers appear to be appropriate only for a message originator, and are therefore candidates for inclusion in an originator's DKIM signature: Accept-Language Bcc Cc

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-28 Thread Neil Anuskiewicz
> On Oct 27, 2022, at 10:46 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote: > >  >> On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 4:16 PM Douglas Foster >> wrote: > >> Murray raised the issue of a signature which produces PASS, but lacks trust >> because it is constructed with weak coverage, such as omitting the Subject >> or

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-28 Thread Neil Anuskiewicz
> On Oct 27, 2022, at 4:16 PM, Douglas Foster > wrote: > >  > Murray raised the issue of a signature which produces PASS, but lacks trust > because it is constructed with weak coverage, such as omitting the Subject or > including an L=valuie clause. > > DKIM was designed to be flexible so

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-27 Thread Murray S. Kucherawy
On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 4:16 PM Douglas Foster < dougfoster.emailstanda...@gmail.com> wrote: > Murray raised the issue of a signature which produces PASS, but lacks > trust because it is constructed with weak coverage, such as omitting the > Subject or including an L=valuie clause. > > DKIM was de

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-27 Thread Neil Anuskiewicz
> On Oct 27, 2022, at 4:16 PM, Douglas Foster > wrote: > >  > Murray raised the issue of a signature which produces PASS, but lacks trust > because it is constructed with weak coverage, such as omitting the Subject or > including an L=valuie clause. > > DKIM was designed to be flexible so

[dmarc-ietf] Standardizing signature contents

2022-10-27 Thread Douglas Foster
Murray raised the issue of a signature which produces PASS, but lacks trust because it is constructed with weak coverage, such as omitting the Subject or including an L=valuie clause. DKIM was designed to be flexible so that it could be used for many purposes. DMARC is a specific purpose and the