On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 8:19 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range if
> voters are strategic and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls. It is true
> for Majority Judgment under the same conditions, but also when any fraction
> of vote
2011/10/11 Kevin Venzke
> Hi Jameson,
>
> --- En date de : *Mar 11.10.11, Jameson Quinn * a
> écrit :
>
>
> Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range
> if voters are strategic *and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls*.
>
>
> I'm curious whether you believe the "
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Mar 11.10.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range if
voters are strategic and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls.
I'm curious whether you believe the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" claim
Hi,
--- En date de : Mar 11.10.11, Warren Smith a écrit :
> I've done sim experiments indicating that range voting
> finds
> honest-voter Condorcet winners
> more often than Condorcet methods do, if the voters are
> strategic.
Though you have to be careful what you mean by "strategic."
My own r
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
"Kristofer Munsterhjelm" [km_el...@lavabit.com] writes:
In the case of the Burlington pair, I'd say that the suspect
election is the real one, rather than the one where Kiss was raised
yet didn't win.
can you elaborate? which candidate was made to lose because t
"Kristofer Munsterhjelm" [km_el...@lavabit.com] writes:
> In the case of the Burlington pair, I'd say that the suspect election is
> the real one, rather than the one where Kiss was raised yet didn't win.
can you elaborate? which candidate was made to lose because too many people
voted for hi
Richard Fobes wrote:
If you have already signed the declaration and do not like the new
wording, please say so. If necessary we can remove your signature, but
hopefully we can resolve any objection (which is likely to be an issue
for others as well). If you like the new wording and have alre
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
"Instant Runoff (IRV): monotonicity criterion - Both two-election
runoffs and IRV can fail the monotonicity criterion because voters
who shift to this otherwise winning candidate may shift their votes
away from the candidate who would otherwise be in the runoff,
r
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
dunno if i can do much critiquing of that particular doc. what i
like is in FairVote's page:
http://www.fairvote.org/single-winner-voting-method-comparison-chart
where they claim that IRV will do a better job getting the Condorcet
winner than does Condorcet (some
Matthew Welland wrote:
I consider it very bad to have to use a computer at all. Any system that
requires a computer to be easy to use gets a zero vote from me.
You could have the computer as a purely optional step. Let the voter go
through "is candidate A better, equally good, or worse than B?
Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range if
voters are strategic *and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls*. It is
true for Majority Judgment under the same conditions, but also when any
fraction of voters are honest and ideology is one dimensional; I believe
that
On 7.10.2011, at 12.19, Michael Allan wrote:
> Imagine one person is nodding
> in agreement to a proposal, while another is shaking her head.
> We could ask, "What effect did this voter *as such*
> have on the decision that was reached, or anything that followed from
> it?" In most cases, the an
There is a big difference between claims
"Range and Approval do better than Condorcet in electing the Condorcet winner"
and
"In some situations Range and Approval do better than Condorcet in electing the
Condorcet winner"
(or
"In some situations Range and Approval may do better than Condorcet
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