Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

Clay Shentrup wrote: Condorcet systems fundamentally try to maximize the wrong thing. no. excluding the cases where there are cycles (which is another topic), there is no quantitative metric to be "the wrong thing". Condorcet only imposes a logical consistency that, from a popula

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 2:05 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > How would you vote with SODA? > I would usually end up delegating to my favorite. I'd look at their ranking and if it was pretty good I'd delegate. Otherwise, I'd probably come up with my own ranking (perhaps based on theirs) and then cho

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

Ranking more than ten candidates? Condorcet does NOT require such. However, if too many are running, you need to look for sanity: . You may have preferences among those most likely to win - pick those you see as the best few of these. . Also pick among the few you would prefer, regard

Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

> > > Condorcet systems fundamentally try to maximize the wrong thing. They try >> to maximize the odds of electing the Condorcet winner, even though it's a >> proven mathematical fact that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the >> option whom the electorate prefers. >> > > Trouble is that th

Re: [EM] Majority-Judgement. Condorcet.

2012/2/3 Ted Stern > On 03 Feb 2012 16:07:59 -0800, Kevin Venzke wrote: > > > > Personally I don't understand why one would want to spend time on a > > method that you have to defend by saying "it might work anyway," > > even if as built the incentives are wrong. > > > > I like the idea of being

Re: [EM] Majority-Judgement. Condorcet.

2012/2/3 Kevin Venzke > Personally I don't understand why one would want to spend time on a method > that you have to defend by saying > "it might work anyway," even if as built the incentives are wrong. > At worst, it's approval. Not so bad. There's good reason to think that it will lead to mor

Re: [EM] [CES #4437] Re: Looking at Condorcet

On Feb 3, 2012, at 12:31 AM, Clay Shentrup wrote: As far as I can tell, no amount of evidence will change DaveK's mind. But it's worth pointing out that Score Voting is superior to Condorcet in essentially every way. * Lower Bayesian Regret with any number of strategic or honest voters NOTE

Re: [EM] Majority-Judgement. Condorcet.

On 03 Feb 2012 16:07:59 -0800, Kevin Venzke wrote: > > Personally I don't understand why one would want to spend time on a > method that you have to defend by saying "it might work anyway," > even if as built the incentives are wrong. > > I like the idea of being able to test things, so I may be

Re: [EM] Majority-Judgement. Condorcet.

Personally I don't understand why one would want to spend time on a method that you have to defend by saying "it might work anyway," even if as built the incentives are wrong.   I like the idea of being able to test things, so I may be biased here.   It's taking a shot in the dark. How fantastic m

Re: [EM] Gaming the Vote

On 30 Jan 2012 23:51:56 -0800, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > > On 01/31/2012 01:48 AM, Ted Stern wrote: >> I've been thinking that one way to spread information about >> alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems. > > [...] > >> Has anyone out there in the EM communities th

Re: [EM] not fair.

> > > From: Jameson Quinn > To: EM > Cc: > Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2012 16:25:26 -0600 > Subject: Re: [EM] not fair. > > > 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell > >> [sarcasm]Thanks for the constructive criticism of the model building >> process. >> >> I'm so sorry I haven't had as many pseudo-experimental models t

Re: [EM] brainstorm'n electoral calculus on acid...

> > 1. I disagree; I do not think IRV will do well in the scenario you > describe. > Well that's why we'd need to try it out > > 2. It's too complex. We need toy models that focus on one aspect at a > time, not anything that tries to be realistic. Think macroeconomics 101 > (saltwater), where

Re: [EM] Kevin V. wrt anti-Approval Voting.

> > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: Kevin Venzke > To: em > Cc: > Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2012 21:56:53 + (GMT) > Subject: Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils... > Hi David, > > I'm trying to make sense of this as an anti-Approval argument, since you > say we don

Re: [EM] not fair.

2012/2/3 David L Wetzell > [sarcasm]Thanks for the constructive criticism of the model building > process. > > I'm so sorry I haven't had as many pseudo-experimental models to buttress > my args on this list. They so commonly shed so much light on the matter, > it's no wonder you all agree on so

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

On 02/03/2012 08:45 PM, Andy Jennings wrote: - If someone built a computer program that presented me pairs of candidates at a time as Kristofer suggested, that would make it somewhat easier. I think I would still prefer to divide them into tiers first, but if I divided them into tiers first, I

Re: [EM] brainstorm'n electoral calculus on acid...

2012/2/3 David L Wetzell > What if the electoral space goes back and forth between a 2-d space and a > 1-d space? > For every election, there's a randomly generated weight given to the 2-ds > that has some continuity over time. > Like lets say that the weight given to one dimension at time t is v

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

Hi David,   I'm trying to make sense of this as an anti-Approval argument, since you say we don't want people to pursue the center "too doggedly." Did you explain what bad consequence follows from pursuing the center doggedly, though? I thought I understood your post as an "IRV is not so bad" arg

[EM] brainstorm'n electoral calculus on acid...

What if the electoral space goes back and forth between a 2-d space and a 1-d space? For every election, there's a randomly generated weight given to the 2-ds that has some continuity over time. Like lets say that the weight given to one dimension at time t is vt and the weight to the other is 1-vt

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

On 3.2.2012, at 21.45, Andy Jennings wrote: > - If someone built a computer program that presented me pairs of candidates > at a time as Kristofer suggested, that would make it somewhat easier. I > think I would still prefer to divide them into tiers first, but if I divided > them into tiers f

Re: [EM] RBJ et al.

Please, stop talking, and start calculating. If you're not ready to calculate, then at least stop arguing with us, and start arguing with the fuzzy beast, until you are. Jameson 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell > dlw: When you try out a new piece of technology, you can't expect to get >>> it right rig

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

It sounds to me as if, of all the methods you mentioned, you would prefer MJ. How would you vote with SODA? (go ahead and think of your answer before you read mine) I think I'd almost always just delegate to my favorite with SODA. If I don't like my favorite's delegation order, that would make m

Re: [EM] RBJ et al.

> > dlw: When you try out a new piece of technology, you can't expect to get >> it right right away. A democracy is a function of both the rules and >> people's habits. If GOPers had seen that their party couldn't win then >> some of them wd've voted Dem first and the CW wd have won >> > > Da

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 10:09 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: > On 2/2/2012 11:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > >> On 02/02/2012 05:28 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >> I honestly think that honest rating is easier than honest ranking. >>> ... >>> >> > As a contrast, to me, ranking is easier than ra

Re: [EM] Jameson: MJ

2012/2/3 MIKE OSSIPOFF > *I'd said: > > ***>* But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and > beat*>* a sincere-voting faction.*>** > Not to my satisfaction. > > [endquote] > > Of course that won't do. > > If you want to claim that my statements referred to were incorrec

Re: [EM] Majority-Judgement. Condorcet.

On 02/02/2012 09:40 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: MJ: Thanks for all the answers about MJ strategy. But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and beat a sincere-voting faction. And, if the contest is close, then even a small difference in sincerity could decide which factio

[EM] Jameson: MJ

I'd said: > But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and beat > a sincere-voting faction. > Not to my satisfaction. [endquote] Of course that won't do. If you want to claim that my statements referred to were incorrect, then you need to tell why you think so. I cle

Re: [EM] "Compliant SODA?": seeking a SODA version which may meet more criteria

2012/2/3 Kristofer Munsterhjelm > On 02/03/2012 02:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> Of course, in most real-world elections I've ever heard of, 4 candidates >> are plenty. So is there a way to fix SODA to make those pesky >> 5-candidate scenarios go away? Analogously, Condorcet's paradox arises >

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

the cart comes after the horse, not before it. Just as you cannot beat the Smiths with bullets in the Matrix, you cannot beat fuzzy monsters with Numbers. Graphs. Diagrams... There's gotta be some messy speculation about how to boil it down first... dlw On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 11:04 AM, Jameson

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

> > > dlw: I know. I'm still grappling w. the fucking fuzzy monster in my > head... > Numbers. Graphs. Diagrams. These are the weapons which beat fuzzy monsters. Not words. > ...reasserting our positions verbally has no value. >> > > dlw: I'm saying ... > ummm. JQ Election-Methods m

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

On 2/3/12 6:00 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I consider the whole "encourages big parties to follow the moving center" thing to be so ridiculous as not to bear argument, i do too. fully agree. given that, as DSH points out, the center is one of the worst places to be in IRV. as evidenced in the

Re: [EM] re Unger wrt tabulation

On 2/3/12 10:41 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: dlw: I do change my mind. The fact I haven't wrt IRV is because I got a good case and it is a huge non sequitur to presume that "the" solution to the US's political problems is for it to

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

> >> *dlw:JMKeynes* stated that creative thinking begins as a "grey, *fuzzy*, >> woolly *monster*" in one's head. my idea is still under development >> and it very well may remain a heuristic due to the phenomena of theglobal >> underdetermination of >> science.

[EM] re Unger wrt tabulation

> > >> dlw: I do change my mind. The fact I haven't wrt IRV is because I >>got a good case and it is a huge non sequitur to presume that >>"the" solution to the US's political problems is for it to >>become an EU-style multi-party system >> >> >> RBJcareful,

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

2012/2/3 David L Wetzell > > > On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 8:38 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> >> >> 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell >> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 5:00 AM, Jameson Quinn >>> wrote: >>> I consider the whole "encourages big parties to follow the moving center" thing to be so

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 8:38 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > > 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell > >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 5:00 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >>> I consider the whole "encourages big parties to follow the moving >>> center" thing to be so ridiculous as not to bear argument, given that, a

Re: [EM] "Compliant SODA?": seeking a SODA version which may meet more criteria

On 02/03/2012 02:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: Of course, in most real-world elections I've ever heard of, 4 candidates are plenty. So is there a way to fix SODA to make those pesky 5-candidate scenarios go away? Analogously, Condorcet's paradox arises for 3 or more candidates, but you can make 3 c

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

2012/2/3 David L Wetzell > > > On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 5:00 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> I consider the whole "encourages big parties to follow the moving center" >> thing to be so ridiculous as not to bear argument, given that, as DSH >> points out, the center is one of the worst places to be in

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 5:00 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > I consider the whole "encourages big parties to follow the moving center" > thing to be so ridiculous as not to bear argument, given that, as DSH > points out, the center is one of the worst places to be in IRV. I said "follow" and I presume

[EM] "Compliant SODA?": seeking a SODA version which may meet more criteria

In exploring SODA's criteria compliance, I've realized that 4 candidates is a bit of a magic number for SODA. For many criteria, the non-compliant scenarios for SODA require at least 5 candidates: one "threat candidate" who will win unless three of the other four can pool their votes; 2 "delegator

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

I consider the whole "encourages big parties to follow the moving center" thing to be so ridiculous as not to bear argument, given that, as DSH points out, the center is one of the worst places to be in IRV. Sure, it does a better job than plurality. But if you want a system which preserves two par

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

On 3.2.2012, at 0.21, Jameson Quinn wrote: > 2012/2/2 Juho Laatu > Attempt 1: It is difficult to write something like "a>b>c" on the ballot > paper, or to push buttons of the voting machine so that all the candidates > will be in the correct order. > > Answer 1: Don't use such procedures. If